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ABSTRACT
Strategic management as an academic field of study has spanned over four decades. As an
interdisciplinary subject that enjoys concurrent contributions by allied disciplines such as
economics and social science, numerous industries have benefited from applying tools and
concepts developed within strategic management that are subsequently tailored to match their
specific contexts. Strangely, although postured as one of the oldest and largest industries, the
construction industry has largely chosen to omit the relevance of the subject in daily business
operations. This is especially true in the United States, compared to the British who have
embarked on such studies as early as the 1970s. Recent literatures have commented on inadequate
management knowledge and systems perspective of civil engineers as they rise through the ranks
and shoulder higher responsibilities of management. This is manifested by lackluster performance
and failure of several international construction firms sampled in this research, the causes of
which were least attributed to technical engineering issues and project management aspects.
This doctoral research aims to bridge the knowledge gap in strategy and formulates a conceptual
model suited for construction. Twenty-four large international construction firms originating in
the U.S., Europe and Japan are selected for the study. Fundamental analysis, a common
methodology used in economics and investment studies, forms the quantitative approach to
extract information from publicly available data. The theoretical foundation is then drawn from
the intellect of different schools of strategic thought that have accumulated over the years. Both
complementary components combine for the development of the conceptual model, which is
supported and refined in consideration of factual information observed from the firm sample.
The conceptual model builds on seven strategic fields, two organizational mechanisms and a
boundary notion that divides the external environment from the internal aspects of a firm. The
model works as a process that runs parallel to mainstream strategic management functions. Two
main conclusions are derived: (1) fields and mechanisms should function as variables to react
dynamically to ever changing external conditions; (2) interaction among these variables
automatically promotes higher order differentiation factors that enhance the strategic outlook of a
firm.
Thesis Supervisor: John B. Miller
Title: Associate Professor of Civil & Environmental Engineering
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CHAPTER ONE
A PERSISTENT KNOWLEDGE GAP IN CONSTRUCTION
"Whether through more or different education, engineering educators must
produce a different product. Depressed salaries, the lack of jobs and the
diversification of the workforce now employed to solve traditional civil
engineering problems all point to the fact that major change must occur not only
in content but also in philosophy."
- John V. Fart (1997)
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1.1 Introduction
From the ancient times to the modern era, we, as civil engineers, build our pride
on our professional role in building essential living infrastructures. In the course of
fulfilling our role, both the academia and practicing world frequently rely on advanced
analytical techniques and project management skills in their daily dealings - to the extent
that some of these administrative and technical heritages have created a narrow mindset.
Many would think that only such skills and knowledge are critical for academic
excellence and corporate success. As one of the oldest engineering disciplines, these
rigidities have become well entrenched over time. Consequently, it is sometimes difficult
to overcome the orthodoxy in the process of catching up with dynamic changes of
environmental factors. The increasingly vibrant, competitive nature of businesses in most
industries including construction is further amplified by forces of globalization and
deregulation, and augmented by new trends of technology to foster competitive
positioning. Inevitably, different kinds of knowledge gaps have made their existence in
certain areas within our profession.
This is indeed unfortunate, considering the fact that the construction sector
represents a significant contribution to a national economy, often in the range of 5% to
15% in terms of the gross domestic product (GDP) (Mawhinney, 2001). Posting an
estimated global market size of $3.6 trillion in 1999 (Batchelor, 2000), it also represents
the largest industry on a worldwide basis. Judging from these figures, and founding on
basic economic arguments for creating positive linkages between industries and nations,
it is conspicuous that even a slight improvement in bridging these knowledge gaps can
create potentially large benefits to our profession, nations and the society at large.
Among the several areas of knowledge gaps, one important field that has become
more relevant to us than before is strategic management at the corporate level, contrasting
the majority focus on project and construction site management issues in the civil
engineering profession.' As an academic field, strategic management is relatively young,
effectively blooming only since the 1960s (Rumelt, Schendel and Teece, 1994), and
1 As an additional illustration, another type of knowledge gap is the commonly observed slow pace of
adopting new technologies such as the Internet in the industry. Conservatism seems relatively excessive in
this old-aged profession.
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notably after the works of Chandler (1962) and Ansoff (1965). With in depth studies of
four major industrial enterprises - General Motors, Sears, Standard Oil of New Jersey
(Exxon) and DuPont, Chandler illustrates how senior management at these companies
was involved in the role of strategy formulation that is essentially separated from strategy
implementation at the operational level. Thus, following Chandler's parlance:
Strategy can be defined as the determination of the basic long-term goals and
objectives of an enterprise, and the adoption of courses of action and the
allocation of resources necessary for carrying out these goals. (pp. 15-16)
In retrospect, such classical view of separation between strategy formulation and
implementation may not be warranted, at least in the modem era, and in fact it has been
subjected to criticisms from other schools of thinking. Discussion of these issues is
deferred to the next chapter.
On the other hand, as a field of practice, most would agree that the origins of
strategic management could be traced back to the concepts and thinking applied in
military campaigns in the ancient world.2 Strategic thinking constantly evolved in the
midst of military planning, be it the consolidation and expansion of the Greek Empire in
336 BC, or the art of war masterminded by Sun Tzu in ancient China in the 6 th century
BC. In short, whatever the alternative rhetoric is, strategic management as we know today
is not a typical fad or hype without its merit. Ironically, many powerful rules of thumb
and concepts of strategy are subconsciously adopted in our daily management and
personal life.
1.2 The Project Management Tradition
Research efforts in fields of strategic management, corporate finance,
organizational theories have been achieving breakthroughs and successes with concepts
appropriately applied to many industries, such as automobile, telecommunications, and
retail - just to name a few. Nonetheless, similar research efforts have been lacking in the
construction industry, which still seems to focus largely on management issues at the
project level rather than the corporate level. This poses a peculiar picture, given the sheer
2 See Chinowsky (2000) and Whittington (2001), for example.
17
size of this industry that is essentially the largest among all. Betts and Ofori (1992) also
comment that the general experience in construction is of strategic planning being a low-
profile activity that faces significant restrictions at many levels, and the gap between the
extent of such planning in construction and other industries is only getting wider.
Chinowsky (2000) further provides some plausible explanations elaborating on
such dire outlook in the construction industry. First, an overwhelming number of papers
focusing on technical and managerial issues at the project level dominate civil
engineering-based literature. Second, academic programs at graduate level are mostly
oriented towards technical skills and project management techniques, while leaving out
topics related to corporate management and construction organizations. Third, the boom-
and-bust cycles during the post-World War II era, rendering unpredictability of industrial
trends, have forced firms to be contempt with staying afloat one project at a time. Thus, it
is concluded that the impact of these issues has resulted in a close, parallel evolution in
the industrial and academic world - forging a so-called "project management tradition".
In principle, such a tradition may not be detrimental after all, provided that an
amicable equilibrium is always maintained between the industry and the general
environment. However, such equilibrium conditions rarely last, given regular changes
ranging from political issues and social reform to advances in technology,
communication and economics. Thus, as civil engineers ascend their career ladders
reaching senior-level positions, most of them inevitably find that the project management
knowledge base developed in their education and past career encounters is not quite
compatible with the challenges shaped by such external environmental factors.
Indeed, firms such as Stone & Webster, Washington Group International (WGI)
and Philipp Holzmann - all of which experienced severe financial crisis, did not entirely
fail due to poor technical and project management skills. Despite its bankruptcy, Stone &
Webster's process technologies are still adopted today in many refineries belonging to oil
and gas giants such as Shell and British Petroleum. Consequently, technological
incompetence was unlikely to be a major cause for Stone & Webster's demise. Likewise,
Morrison Knudsen, before its merger with WGI in 1996, had an enviable track record in
the U.S. and was unlikely to fail merely because of poor construction management skills.
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Lastly, Holzmann's 150-year history makes it unquestionable about their ability to
execute construction projects. In each of these cases, crises were partly attributed to
wrong strategic policies and choices made at the corporate level.
While leaving the details in subsequent chapters, the causes of these crises are
worth mentioning at this point to strengthen the argument of breaking out from the
project management tradition. On hindsight, Stone & Webster had diversified too
excessively, frequently creating strain to its cash flow and financial management system
aggregated at the corporate level. The firm's liquidity crisis was then triggered by huge
losses in a couple of international lump sum contracts. WGI, building on its strategy of
acquisition for growth, was unable to fully absorb the operations of newly acquired
Raytheon Engineers & Constructors (REC), which was effectively double of WGI's size.
WGI subsequently found that it could not turn around a couple of large projects that were
previously secured by REC. Holzmann, on the other hand, admitted their wrong decision
in committing to rental guarantees in their real estate development ventures, which
subsequently created huge losses when the domestic real estate market entered into a
slump. In 1999, Holzmann was able to avoid bankruptcy when an eleventh-hour rescue
package was arranged between the creditors and the shareholders, which was indirectly
orchestrated by the German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder. However, the company failed
to turn around during the course of restructuring and eventually filed for insolvency on
March 21, 2002 when Commerzbank AG, Dresdner Bank AG and HypoVereinsbank AG,
three of its biggest creditor banks, rejected a Deutsche Bank AG-led rescue plan. This
time round, even during an election year, the government has backed away from
intervention.
Apparently, there are many issues beyond the technical and project management
regime that determine corporate success and survival. In fact, the last example on
Holzmann also aptly illustrates the larger issue of corporate governance that is closely
related to external factors such as politics and social environment.
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1.3 Motivation of the Research Topic, Objectives and Hypothesis
Armed with the background information presented, this doctoral research is
geared towards bridging the gap of strategic management in the construction industry.
Inevitably, the topic requires a sound understanding of business and management
principles. As a result, the author's research experience has taken full advantage of the
openness towards interdisciplinary research and the availability of courses that facilitate
cross-learning at MIT. In addition, the scope of research includes the review of operating
and financial performance of 24 international construction firms. Concurrently, the study
will thus serve as a timely update on the outlook of the industry and firms. As far as the
author is aware, a more detailed study at MIT that had a similar nature related to this
topic is dated back to a decade ago with Sugimoto's (1990) doctoral thesis.
Specifically, a model for building a better understanding of corporate strategy has
to be developed from first principles in this thesis. A direct consequence of such
philosophy is the adoption of a broader view of the topic. The resulting model could then
serve as a foundation towards detailed studies in more specific areas in the future.
In the search of a concrete methodology, fundamental analysis is used as a means
to derive observations related to corporate strategy. Although fundamental analysis is
better defined in the context of economics and investment 3, a similar mindset is adopted
here in the study of corporate strategy. In essence, this research relies on financial
information (such as the income statements and balance sheet) and selected factors
(operating, industrial etc.) to provide useful hints towards the extraction of drivers that
are pertinent to corporate strategy.
The objectives of the research can thus be summarized into the following:
* To build a conceptual model related to corporate strategy that would help
senior managers of construction firms in making strategic management
decisions;
9 To study how issues beyond the technical and project management regime
can dictate the success or failure of a construction firm;
3 Refer to Downes and Goodman (1998), for example.
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* To provide an update and develop a template that summarizes the
operating and financial performance of the selected sample of construction
firms;
* In general - but most important of all, to promote a general understanding
on the importance of strategic management and its potential to augment
the technical and project management knowledge already embedded in our
profession.
It is believed that the motivation and goals stated previously strongly support the
demand of attention devoted to this research area. Peculiar as it might seem, a specific
research hypothesis is indeed not obvious (and probably unnecessary) due to the generic
nature of this research. The fact that similar research effort has been lacking in this
industry implies that a general form, direction, or set of principles that guide the research
topic is practically non-existent! Without such general consensus on the status quo of
strategic management in construction, it is hard to think of a basis to formulate a 'null'
hypothesis, and the idea of an alternative hypothesis is even fuzzier.
Nevertheless, in order to stimulate an ongoing interest in the topic, the author
would propose the following statements as some kind of hypotheses to put up a challenge
to the intellectual world of our profession:
That corporate and individual success in construction will go
beyond the traditional areas of excellence of civil engineers -
project management skills and technical knowledge streams.
Business, financial, and marketing issues, just to name a few, are
as important, if not more as the type of engineering skills stated.
Moreover, constant reliance and delegation of such management
tasks to professionals who are external to the industry, without
gradual self-learning and building of competence in these areas,
will only act to the detriment of the civil engineering industry in
the long term.
It is hard to prove/disprove objectively the above hypothesis (especially when the
stated hypothesis does not possess a quantitative nature that can be explored using a
statistical methodology), but the intention is generally a healthy one to our profession.
Only through a deeper search for answer(s) leading to the above hypothesis that we can
develop an understanding of a vastly unexplored territory in our profession.
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Also, it should be clarified that the intention is not to call for civil engineers to
abandon their main role or leave their basic training in engineering behind. Neither is it
meant to substitute professionals and experts who are hired to manage financial and
marketing issues with civil engineers. Rather, the key is to strike a balance and build an
understanding of how non-engineering issues can often affect the fate of a company or a
project as an entire "package". Given the uniqueness and complexity of construction
projects, it is believed that a civil engineer is well suited to make the ultimate decisions,
provided that he or she has a clear wisdom of how various issues, engineering and
management inclusive, might interact.
1.4 Limitations of the Research
Strategy by itself is a field with a wide scope and constantly experiences
fermentation of new theories and ideas. Due to the finite timeframe of a typical doctoral
study, there are some inevitable limitations in this research.
The most obvious limitation is initiated by the choice to focus on a broad picture
that encompasses as much material as possible from the main field of strategy that is
deemed relevant to construction. Hence to certain extent, a more detailed level of study
has to be traded off. Given the fact that research related to strategy (within construction)
has been either lacking or evolving at random at best, it is deemed that a broader
approach is more meaningful to streamline the different schools of thought and past
(random) contributions into one coherent philosophy. As will be pointed out repeatedly in
subsequent chapters, the conceptual model developed in this thesis possesses a generic
nature - with the intention that researchers from different background and origin would
still find it useful to develop extensions of their own ideas related to strategy.
Specifically, the conceptual model emphasizes on interactions among various
strategic components. While efforts are devoted to provide as many illustrations and
examples as possible, the thesis is still limited in terms of studying the interaction
between two specific components. On one hand, the author would like to defer such types
of detailed studies (in selected areas) to the future. On the other hand, the author naturally
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cannot claim to possess in-depth expertise to address detailed interactions in all areas. For
example, it is better to leave the interaction between Information Technology Strategy
and other strategic components of the model to those researchers who have kept
themselves up-to-date with the constantly evolving IT trends. Evidently, these researchers
would be in a much better position to explore and provide meaningful insights.
Lastly, because the topic (and approach) is relatively new, it will take a longer
period of time to collect time series data and observe the behavior, success episodes or
failure incidents of construction firms. As such, the thesis is limited in scope to adopt
statistical methodologies to build some kind of quantitative models. However, in the
author's opinion, some of the statistical methodologies are viable tools to be used to
study corporate strategy. Further discussions on this issue will be given in Chapter 7.
1.5 Organization of the Thesis
This section provides an overview of how this thesis is organized.
In the next chapter, a survey and literature review of strategy as a research field in
general (most of which, arguably, were developed with industrial contexts other than
construction in mind) is presented. In a nutshell, the different schools of theories and
thoughts that form the mainstream of strategy research are summarized. In the second
part of the chapter, the unique characteristics of the construction industry that post
additional challenges to the field of strategy are discussed. Furthermore, past research
effort in this area that was conducted by professionals within the civil engineering
discipline is mentioned. The last section of the chapter then consolidates these
background surveys of literature and research efforts to arrive at an argument for an
'open' model.
Chapter 3 focuses on research methodology, whereby the steps involved are
discussed. A key part of the methodology is the construction of a template that facilitates
the organization of data extracted from documents related to a company. The five
components of the template will be elaborated in detail. Selected parts of these data are
then used for the purpose of data analysis in the next part of the chapter. Observations
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and findings from the analysis are then presented and discussed. Various trends of
operating and financial performance for the chosen sample of firms are also presented in
graphical format.
With a thorough theoretical survey in Chapter 2 and a detailed examination of the
current state of performance of selected firms in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 embarks on the
description of the conceptual model that is the crux of this thesis. Individual components
that make up the basic structure of the model are elucidated. The notion of interaction
among strategic variables is formally proposed, followed an example that illustrates this
notion in the last section of the chapter.
Chapter 5 effectively expands on the basic conceptual model that is built in
Chapter 4. To certain extent, it can be said that while Chapter 4 focuses more on the
internal side of an organization, Chapter 5 opens up to consider external factors and the
interplay between the two. Specifically, the concept of 'boundary' is introduced, together
with three possible dimensions of boundary modification and five decision factors that
would aid strategists to master the art of managing boundary issues. Again, the notion of
interaction is illustrated, except that now the examples include the boundary factor.
Chapter 5 thus concludes the theoretical descriptions of the conceptual model.
To enhance the practical use of the conceptual model, it is important to envision
how all these are linked back to general strategic management functions that are
commonly adopted. It will be shown in Chapter 6 that the conceptual model actually
works as a parallel process which, not only augments the role of strategic planning and
management functions in the mainstream, but also validates the compatibility of
strategies. The second half of Chapter 6 provides a detailed case study by using a
renowned U.S. construction firm as the subject to illustrate the use of the conceptual
model in a larger strategic planning and management environment.
The last chapter summarizes the main conclusions of the thesis and contributions
made by this research. The implications of these findings have also led to three major
business imperatives that should be observed by any construction firms. This is then
followed by recommendations made on possible future research directions, some of
which would address the limitations that cannot be fulfilled by this thesis as mentioned in
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Section 1.4. Lastly, the findings from this research study also bear some implications on
civil engineering education. Some comments on the academic nature of civil engineering
programs are made.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF STRATEGY
"The ideal strategy advisor is one who keenly understands the subtleties of the
problem at hand and yet can invoke broad, synthetic knowledge, gleaned from
other cases, and apply it to the present situation."
- Paul J.H. Schoemaker (2001)
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2.1 Setting the Scene
The facts and arguments presented in the first chapter should by now eliminate
any doubtful concern of the need to develop a model for strategic management and
planning purposes for construction. In order to ensure that the model will contain a solid
theoretical construct and a strong logic supporting its propositions, the development of
the model must be preceded by a survey of various schools of theories. Although past
theories and research effort were mostly structured with other industries and contexts in
mind, there remain many core arguments that can be generically applied to construction.
Extraction of such core arguments and broad literature review of the strategy landscape
stand out as the central themes of this chapter.
In addition, the fundamentals of strategy laid out in this chapter are also heavily
relied upon in the study of firms throughout this research. The knowledge base of
strategy greatly augments the overall analytical methodology in conjunction with other
quantitative methods by adding a qualitative, judgmental facet. Detailed outline of the
methodology is given in Chapter Three.
As a matter of fact, strategy is hard. Its intellectual foundations are drawn from
various primary disciplines including finance and economics, organizational sociology,
political science, and cognitive psychology, all of which are constantly evolving at their
own pace (Rumelt et al., 1994). For example, the development of game theory not only
expands the frontier of economics, but also contributes to strategic management through
its adoption in structuring competitive strategy for oligopolies. In addition, the actors and
audience of strategy are diverse, ranging from academicians to managers and consultants
concentrating in different industries and sectors.
Naturally, this heterogeneous composition of disciplines and players ensures that
consensus can only be sought in a few broadly based directions. Many of these directions
also provide conflicting prescriptions for strategy. As in many real-life quandaries then,
an optimal, perfect way is arguably non-existent. With eminent writers on strategy
frequently cannot even agree on the definition and scope of corporate strategy, it is thus
useful as a first step to map out these various schools of strategic thinking along those
broadly based directions. As we shall subsequently see, balancing some of these
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conflicting phenomena forms the key challenge towards the development of the
conceptual model in Chapter Four.
2.2 Mapping the Various Schools of Thoughts in Strategy
Most strategy texts written are predominantly prejudiced towards pre-selected
perspectives. Some schools advocate for formal planning processes in strategy formation,
focusing on 'hard' topics such as market segmentation and analysis. Other schools of
thoughts relinquish the role of these consciously controlled thinking processes and focus
on 'softer' issues such as incentives, learning, organizational structure, culture, and both
internal and external relational contracts. In other words, the latter group is skeptical
about the appropriateness of explicit assessment of strengths and weaknesses of both the
market and its players, given the fact that environmental factors are ever changing. The
debate between two prominent strategy gurus, Henry Mintzberg (1990, 1991) and Igor
Ansoff (1991) on planning versus learning aptly illustrates the point.
Faced with these convoluted arguments and debates in the field, Whittington's
(2001) approach is a novel one. By firstly narrowing down to four basic conceptions of
strategy - rational, fatalistic, pragmatic, and relativist, Whittington finds that these
distinct schools of thoughts can essentially be mapped along two axes: outcomes of
strategy and the processes by which it is made. The two combined continuums are as
shown in Figure 2-1. The vertical axis examines the degree of variation of strategic intent
and outcomes produced. This may represent profit maximization per se at one extreme,
or accommodation for other complex priorities such as social responsibilities at the other
end of the spectrum. The horizontal axis considers the fact of whether such outcomes are
derived from deliberate planning, calculation and formulation, or simply as an emerging
product of accidents, chance, and social and organizational inertia. The radically different
implications on strategy are hence read off from the relative positions along the two axes
in the diagram. However, as even Whittington himself notes, the four generic approaches
to strategy given in Figure 2-1 occasionally overlap with one another when dealing with
certain specific issues. For example, on internationalization, both Classical and
Evolutionary perspectives would agree on the logic of efficiency-seeking motives,
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although Systemic theorists would provide other explanations along political and cultural
dimensions. In other words, while provoking heated debates on some broadest principles,
the differences in the four approaches do not necessarily imply mutual exclusiveness
when deriving solutions for certain particularities of strategy. This is an important
observation since the conceptual model derived later in this thesis has a foundation that
spans across at least two of these four quadrants.
The next few sections provide a brief summary for each of these four generic
approaches. Following the introduction of each, it is important to identify the strengths
and weaknesses of each approach. Ideally, development of any kinds of conceptual
models should encompass the strengths of these various approaches while avoiding the
pitfalls.
Profit-maximizing
A
Classical
- RATIONAL
- Analyse, plan and command
A Processes |
Systemic
- RELATIVIST
- Play by the local rules
0
L
Evolutionary
FATALISTIC
Maintain low costs
Keep options open
* Emergent
Processual
PRAGMATIC
Stay close to operations
Go with the flow
Plural
FIGURE 2-1 The Four Generic Approaches of Strategy
[Sources: Whittington (2001)]
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Deliberate
2.2.1 THE CLASSICAL APPROACHES
2.2.1.1 Characteristics and Paradigm
The Classicists believe in the superiority of rational planning methods and making
objective decisions, which are most evident in mainstream strategy textbooks and
dominant in business schools teaching. Among many authors, some of the prominent and
influential ones who may be classified under this quadrant include Michael Porter (1980,
1985), Alfred Chandler (1962) and Igor Ansoff (1965). Moreover, an inherent key
assumption applied in their models is that profitability is the ultimate and supreme goal of
businesses. This assumption has also long been adopted in many microeconomics
models. The premise that corporate decision-makers will act as 'rational economic men'
(Hollis and Nell, 1975) also forms the philosophical core of Classicists' theories.
Beyond the notion of adopting rational planning approach for profit
maximization, Classical theories often imply a top-down planning process and a
hierarchical command system. In particular, it signifies the important feature of
separation between strategy formulation and implementation. Thus, it is assumed that the
determination of long-term goals and strategy falls under the regime of top executives.
Once the strategic plan is formed, actual execution is presumed to be carried out
smoothly through cascading actions of the middle level and operating core of the
organization as dictated by the plan. Rightfully, these characteristics stem from the
historical origin of military concepts and early studies of large, diversified corporations.
For example, in tracing the link between military and business practice, Bracker (1980)
illustrates with Socrates' quote that the duties of a military general and a businessman
were equivalent, with both relying on planning wisdom to deploy resources in meeting
pre-determined objectives. With a similar theme but in a slightly different context, Alfred
Sloan (1963), founding on his experience in General Motors, enunciated the importance
of establishing 'policies' (strategy) as a specialization that must be kept independent of
the daily distractions owing to policy execution. Incidentally, Sloan's view and General
Motors' experience was potentially representative of the characteristics found in other big
corporations around that epoch, especially those with similarly diversified businesses
under the corporate umbrella.
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Another significant corollary of the separation between strategy formulation and
implementation is the sequence of strategy determination and design of organizational
structure. Since structure is essentially the mechanism through which strategy will be
implemented, the Classicists' promotion and limitation of the role of strategy formulation
at the top level indirectly implies that 'structure follows strategy' (Chandler, 1962). Thus,
whatever the outcome of strategy that has been determined a priori, the design of
structure is meant to suit and match the plan. Put in another way, structure is a mere
enabler rather than one of the core drivers of strategy. Although the maxim has a strong
theoretical basis, this straightforward belief has been subjected to severe criticism
especially from the Processualists (refer Section 2.2.3). With an equally sound logic
concerning the complexity and micro-politics that apparently exist in many of these large,
bureaucratic organizations, Processualists argue that strategy is likely to be compromised
to suit the administrative heritage and operational inefficiency inherent in the
organizational structure. As a matter of fact, structural change to suit new strategy is
notoriously hard. In their view, what tools you have would determine what strategic jobs
you undertake.
2.2.1.2 Strengths and Weaknesses of Classical Approaches
Still remaining as the mainstream of strategy, the Classical approaches obviously
have their merits. First, rational and objective assessment creates a clear-cut and
consistent system for decision making, which usually allows ex post comparison between
projected and actual performance so that the system can be regularly updated and refined.
By virtue of its objectivity, the approach also lends itself to auditing so that transparency
is preserved during the entire process. Systemic theorists (refer Section 2.2.4) also share
this importance of justifying the legitimacy of decisions made especially within the larger
institutional environment where public authorities and the capital market constantly
scrutinize whether a firm is acting with due diligence. Rational planning, as commonly
perceived, is at least one step ahead towards due diligence.
Second, the nature of a rational planning approach creates multiple links with
disciplines such as finance and economics that further provide abundant analytical tools
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and concepts for decision making. Techniques such as net present value (NPV) analysis,
real options and game theory have made substantial contribution towards decision
science and risk management, with corporations such as Merck confirming value added
in applying these techniques in their corporate management functions (Nichols, 1994).
Obviously, the Classical approaches have their flaws as well. Some of these have
been elaborated earlier:
(1) General ignorance of 'softer' issues within the organization, especially of
human behavior.
* Such issues have become more important in the modern days when the
general social, political and operating environment differs from those days
when most mainstream Classical theories were formed.
(2) Naive assumption of strategy implementation to follow strategic plan as
laid out in strategy formulation.
* The separation of strategy formulation and execution does not apply in most
cases. Many companies have discovered the relevance of a 'bottom-up'
approach, thus creating space of concern for operational processes at the floor
level within the larger strategic planning exercise.
(3) Since most Classical theories have traditionally relied on studies of larger
corporations, these models are found incompatible with the strategy of
small, nimble firms especially during the information technology era in
the 1990s.
(4) The maxim of 'structure follows strategy' is far from a universal truth. It
only wins half the battle given abundant evidence that supports the reverse
pattern.
(5) Lastly, schools of analytical and rational planning sometimes place too
much emphasis on optimization. In a dynamic environment that strategy
constantly face, a truly optimal configuration rarely exists. Even if it does,
it will be rapidly rendered obsolete when environmental factors change.
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2.2.2 THE EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVES
2.2.2.1 Characteristics and Paradigm
The primary difference between the Classical and Evolutionary perspectives lies
with their assumption of top management's ability to plan and act rationally to create
superior performance. Evolutionary theorists think that deliberate planning is futile given
the fact that the general environment is constantly changing. Their belief is based on
natural Darwinism, whereby only the 'fittest' will survive under the hostile environment.
Market does its selection of survivors, rather than firms selecting the most profitable
market and optimal configuration of operation. Contrasting Porter's (1985) generic
strategy of differentiation, any competitive advantage is believed to be rapidly 'competed
away'; thus no single unique strategy is sustainable for long. Therefore, a complete free
market is assumed, some flourish while others perish, with new entrants constantly
evolve to replace old and inflexible players who cannot adapt to new environmental
conditions. In essence, Evolutionists push the dictum of "market is efficient" to its
extreme level.
Based on the above arguments, coupled with the Evolutionists' view that strategy
is both futile and inherently 'expensive', the main implication is that firms should stay at
the lowest level of cost in order to survive since revenue is derived from market demand
that is uncontrollable by them anyway. Thus, the only real comparative advantage is
relative efficiency. This indirectly leads to the adoption of myopic short-term actions to
undercut those firms that function with 'expensive', long-term strategies.
While it is true that cost control is always a main business imperative and remains
as the most commonly quoted action by companies, the study of firm sample in this
research confirms that management rarely accepts this as the only critical success factor.
At least in the upper league of major construction players, the trend is for managers to
constantly look beyond cost control to secure stable growth in market share and earnings.
2.2.2.2 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Evolutionary Perspectives
It is thought that adopting the evolutionary perspectives will bring more
disadvantages than benefits in practical sense. First, the adopted view is overly passive
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and pessimistic in nature, when it is all left to 'fate' to decide on survivors. Many players
in the society should also feel uncomfortable with this seemingly innocuous belief. If cost
control remains the one and only business imperative, the value of highly paid executives
and managers responsible for crafting future directions of firms and implementing such
strategies is directly questioned. In the academic world then, the intellectual value of
strategy research that predominantly possesses the classical flavor is substantially
tarnished. Further, the usefulness of scientific management and analytical tools in altering
the 'fate' in the corporate world is also directly challenged. At least for the sake of
looking forward to the future with confidence, the positive belief in success by pursuing
an active posture is a noble one to motivate the basic functioning of corporations in a
more meaningful way.
Other major flaws of the Evolutionary theories include the inclination to succumb
to short-term, myopic actions, and, as it has been mentioned, primarily on cost issues.
These actions per se are far from justified. It is important to realize that market
heterogeneity and complexity do allow segmentation of niche markets. Creation of entry
barriers would effectively deter the entrance of new competitors or prolong the
replacement process to the extent that may subsequently discourage these new players
from remaining in the newly entered market.
That said, a valuable lesson taught by the Evolutionists is the utmost importance
of giving due consideration to environmental factors that constantly call for strategy
renewal in striving for survival. Although they may not agree with the following
consequential argument, all these seem to call for flexibility to be built inside a
corporation in order to react to constant environmental changes. It may be true that
strategy is inherently 'expensive', but the trick lies on trading the costs for a brighter
future.
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2.2.3 THE PROCESSUAL APPROACHES
2.2.3.1 Characteristics and Paradigm
Diagonally placed in Figure 2-1, Processual approaches are in direct conflict with
most aspects of the Classical theories. Similar to the Evolutionary perspectives, it rejects
the hailing of deliberate strategic planning functions. Using a similarly famous
phenomenon of 'bounded rationality' in economics, it refutes the notion of 'rational
economic men' implicit in Classical approaches. According to the notion of bounded
rationality, cognitive limits placed on rational thinking substantially compromise the
effectiveness of strategic planning, analysis and projection that rely on such thinking.
Unlike the Evolutionists, however, the Processualists are less pessimistic in the sense that
"survivors need not be the fittest after all". Market conditions are turbulent and imperfect
enough to accommodate even players with only moderate performance. Market forces
and efficiency are definitely not as strong as those implied in evolutionary theories.
Consequently, since the elimination forces are believed take effect at a slower
pace, Processualists believe that there is room for incremental improvement and learning
for corporations. Thus, in direct contrast to Classical theories, the way to succeed is not to
analyze the unpredictable and then plan and command. Rather, the key is to stay close to
operation and accumulate knowledge about the demanding factors of both internal and
external operating environment. In essence, strategy is discovered in action (March,
1976), and a 'bottom-up' approach in shaping strategy is more desirable. The discovery
and learning of strategy at the operational level thus forms an inextricable link between
strategy formation and implementation, which renders Classicists' recommendation of
their separation to be unrealistic.
Most of the above mentioned characteristics promote a sense of inward looking,
hence taking the internal coordination and functional mechanisms more seriously than the
other three generic approaches. In particular, it recognizes the fact that organization is
made up by human beings with diverse individual interests, and intangible elements such
as corporate culture and organizational behavior bear a big influence on the ultimate
corporate outlook. Furthermore, a direct product of human interaction is the micro-
politics of organization as pointed out by Pettigrew (1973). Political bargaining always
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stands in the way of seeking and implementing ideal strategic actions. Over time,
conservatism starts to set in stone, routines and heuristics get established, and strategic
change becomes harder to execute. In fact, for some Processualists, the ability to handle
strategic change to suit a new environment forms a critical source of competitive
advantage (Pettigrew and Whipp, 1991).
What management can do then, is to adopt an adaptive approach to allow the
organization to gradually blend with the environment and create an operating
environment for employees that is amenable to learning. For the former, Quinn's (1980)
concept of 'logical incrementalism' is widely accepted. For the latter, Senge (1994) has
demonstrated ways to unleash the power of learning within organizations. These are also
directly linked to the larger field of knowledge management that has attracted a lot of
attention these days.
Along a related line, the 'core competency' theory developed by Hamel and
Prahalad (1994) that flourished in the 1990s stands to provide the linkage between skills,
knowledge and strategy. Emphasizing on fundamentals in leveraging corporate
'resourcefulness' instead of the tangible resource level, Hamel and Prahalad stress the
importance of developing core competencies to capture opportunity share rather than
market share that remains the focus of product-market positioning and industry structure
analysis promoted by the Classicists.
2.2.3.2 Strengths and Weaknesses of Processual Approaches
With abundant research effort by authors such as Henry Mintzberg and the
foundation laid by innovative works of the American Carnegie School (which includes
Nobel Prize-winner Herbert Simon), the Processual approaches obviously have their
intellectual appeal. The most significant contribution is perhaps the addition of a 'human
side' to corporate strategy. The Processualissts directly tackle the 'softer' issues that are
often delegated to secondary importance in Classical models, and provide cautionary
advice and recommendations to handle internal crises. Their theories also tilt the scale of
emphasis from creating a machine bureaucracy engaged in cold corporate battle towards
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molding a patient, enriching environment that promotes coordination, learning and
teamwork within the firm.
The brutal reality of competition, however, reminds us about making sure that
firms have to be on their toes. Certain degree of objectivity for corporate control is
desired, and firms cannot afford to allow the internal environment to become too
nihilistic that would potentially undermine transparency. Matrices and pro formas created
by Classical theories and tools are still valuable to maintain a feedback loop in
monitoring corporate and individual performance. The irony is that firms still need to
maintain a certain level of profitability before it can promote that patient, enriching
internal environment! Furthermore, formal planning processes can sometimes serve as a
means for putting everyone on the same wavelength4 ; in other cases, matrices and pro
formas can come in handy as objective justifications to remove entrenched political
figures within the organization.
2.2.4 THE SYSTEMIC VIEWS
2.2.4.1 Characteristics and Paradigm
In many aspects, the Systemic perspectives have the most outward looking nature
in considering the external environment especially dealing with political, regulatory,
social and cultural issues. Thus, contrary to the Classical approaches, firms' missions,
goals and strategies are not purely owed to economic rationales. As part of the social
groups, they are donned with other social responsibilities or even political agendas, as
commonly observed for state-owned firms. They are then expected to act in 'socially
expected' ways, which sometimes may not be rational when seen through the Classical
lens.
4 See Langley (1988, 1991) and Oakes et al. (1998), for example, on the effectiveness of using formal
planning processes as a pedagogical tool for 'group therapy' and consensus building.
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Unlike the Evolutionists and Processualists, however, Systemic theorists have no
holdback towards firms' ability to plan effectively for its future, provided that they
include the intimacies of the sociological context in their strategy. So, the rule of thumb
is to play by the local rules and follow the norm. Legitimacy becomes the doctrine. An
interesting proposition would be to view construction firms' launching of various "e-
Initiatives" in the late 1990s as merely following the main troupe. It is reasonable to
comment that many did not have a fair idea about how much value can eventually be
extracted from such investments, but not pursuing the trend would simply risk being
perceived as 'technologically backwards'.
In short, such 'institutionalism' sufficiently explains those aspects of
organizational life and strategy that are often taken for granted (Rumelt et al., 1994). It is
most helpful in discerning the varying outlook of multinationals from different origins.
For example, Wilks (1990) suggests that the Anglo-Saxon cultures of the United States
and the United Kingdom are the core influence of individualistic free-enterprise models
of strategy. Conversely, the traditional nationalism of the French and German states, and
the developmental role of the Japanese ministries, have virtually created closely-knit
relationships among their local private and public sectors, with industrial cultures that
commonly embed shared agendas and enlist state resources as a natural and important
part of strategic management. For construction, this phenomenon is best seen within the
industrial environment in Japan, which is used (and still remains to a large extent) to be a
closed market, with public spending smoothing cyclical fluctuations in the private
construction market.
Another important implication derived from the Systemic view concerns the issue
of corporate governance. In Germany, for example, the Aufsichtsrat, or supervisory
board, must consist of at least 50% from worker representatives. Outside directors elected
by shareholders, which is more typical in the United States, make up only the other half
(Grinblatt and Titman, 1998). Furthermore, large banks and other financial institutions
often become major shareholders and play a central and interventionist role, emphasizing
on long-term relationships (Scott, 1997). This poses a big contrast to the diverse
shareholding structure in most U.S. companies. For example, Kester (1992) estimated
that banks and insurance companies own about 20% of the stock in German firms,
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whereas the comparable figure in the United States is only about 5%. Large-block
shareholdings then account for roughly 60% of the total shareholdings in Germany, with
a figure of 10% in the United States. Likewise, the large cross-holdings and interlocking
directorships among Japanese firms are responsible for binding group members together
within the now commonly known keiretsus.
All these issues affect firms' corporate strategy and outlook to a considerable
extent. With the type of corporate governance structure in Japan and Germany, actions
taken by firms do not necessarily conform to profit-making motives. Incidentally, most
Classical theories were developed in the United States using U.S. firms as study samples!
Naturally, other schools of thoughts frequently use examples of non-U.S. companies to
attack Classical theories. On the other hand, firms are deemed to survive well as part of
the bigger family, which directly contrast the fatalistic feature of Evolutionary
perspectives. Lastly, the more outward looking nature of the Systemic views concerning
sociological context contrasts with the Processual approaches that focus more on internal
mechanisms within the firms.
2.2.4.2 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Systemic Views
The Systemic views hence provide valuable lenses to examine external political,
regulatory, social and cultural issues. Consistent with the traditional view of competitive
advantage in construction, local network and relationship plays an influential role in a
firm's success. The rich vocabulary and complexity of sociological arguments offer a
plurality of resources and norms of conduct to explain and legitimize a wide range of
business behaviors. Systemic theories are therefore most useful in the study and
comparison of multinationals.
Furthermore, Systemic theories are a good starting point to explore the role of
public policies and how institutional changes can affect corporate strategy. It reminds us
about the all-important and intrinsic linkage between the industrial environment and
national economic outlook - a doctrine that is similarly embedded in Porter's diamond
model (1990). This is also precisely the reason to demand that the macro view given by
Systemic theories must be complemented by more in-depth studies of firms' behavior
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given by the Classical and Processual approaches. This, however, does not really amount
to a major shortcoming.
2.2.5 SUMMARY AND OTHER SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF STRATEGY
Table 2-1 summarizes the features, strengths and weaknesses of the four generic
approaches discussed previously. Although these four approaches would map out the
majority of past research efforts and theoretical development in strategy, there are other
specific aspects that either do not fit nicely within the framework or span across two or
more approaches.
A good example of such aspects is the topic of international management which
has also been substantially researched. With trends of globalization and firms attracted by
deregulation of market sectors abroad, innovative works by Bartlett and Ghoshal (1998),
Prahalad and Doz (1987), and George Yip (1992) have added a new dimension to the
field of strategy. Due to the complexity of the issues in international management, these
authors inevitably arrive at tools and matrices that contain classical favors, while drawing
on other Systemic theories to explain peculiar phenomena related to cultural and social
issues. In addition, they also emphasize on the challenge that destabilizes the internal
structure and corporate culture when handling cross-border issues, which naturally falls
under the regime of the Processual school of thoughts. Essentially, the search for
solutions in this area demands intellectual support from all these different schools of
thoughts. From the lengthy discussion of these schools of thoughts, there are apparently
both overlapping and conflicting concepts among them, which is what makes
international management particularly hard to tackle in the field of strategy.
41
Rational and analytical
Planning oriented
Economic rationale
Separation between strategy
formation and implementation
Structure follows strategy
Darwinian
Passive
Cost control oriented
* Emphasis on corporate culture,
human nature, micro-politics and
organizational behavior
* Strategy formation and
implementation inextricably linked
* Structure determines strategy
" Concern of external environment
including political, regulatory,
social and cultural issues
" Behavior of firms explained by
historical heritage and in a
sociological context
* Objective assessment and
methodology straightforward to
apply
* Long-term concern conforms to
corporate mission and overcome
short-term, myopic views
" Analytical tools and theories are
abundant especially from allied
disciplines such as finance and
economics
* Enunciates the brutality of
competitive and environmental
forces which demands for constant
strategy renewal
* Add a 'human' side to strategy
* Tackle 'soft' issues that are largely
ignored by Classical theorists
* Enunciates the importance of internal
mechanisms within firms
* Add the all-important external
environmental factors to corporate
strategy
* Provide intellectual linkages to
explore the impact of public policies
* Provide plausible explanations on the
impact of firms' origins
* Ignorance of 'soft' issues and
internal mechanisms within firms
* Naive separation of strategy
formation and implementation
* Models generally do not apply to
small organizations especially
during the Internet era
* Overly passive, indirectly
challenging the intellectual
foundation of academic theories and
managerial functions
* Succumb to short-term view
* Ignorance of market complexity and
heterogeneity
* Lack of control, transparency and
objective measures to compare
effectiveness of strategy adopted
* Primarily adopting a macro view
point, relegating the importance of
inter-company competition in some
industrial environment
* Needs to be complemented by
studies of firms' behavior especially
for cross-border competition
I L
TABLE 2-1 Summary of Characteristics, Strengths and Weaknesses of Four Generic Approaches
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As mentioned in Section 2.1, there are constantly concurrent developments within
allied disciplines such as finance and economics that extend into strategic management.
Ward (1993), for example, removes the restrictive assumptions that create the gap
between actual financial strategy and the real commercial world and demonstrates how
issues such as the organic stages of development, mergers and acquisitions, capital
raising, restructuring and privatization stand in the middle of both disciplines. Often
times, the solutions and models recommended by these authors possess characteristics
that are derived from at least one generic approach in Figure 2-1. A possible explanation
for this is that these authors do not come from the mainstream of strategic management
and hence are not preoccupied by the biased viewpoint of a particular school of thoughts.
Interestingly, this should be perceived as a positive outcome indeed.
2.3 Construction - Not a Typical Industry
Strategic decisions must also consider tactical concern. Theory ultimately delivers
its value through application in the practical field. Thus far, extensive sources of theories
have been introduced but the specific industrial context has been left out. This is done
intentionally because the field of strategy by itself is full of convoluted arguments as we
have seen. As civil engineers we surely would also appreciate the fact that the
construction industry is filled with numerous specificity and not typical at all. Some of
these unique factors, which deserve special attentions in applying any kind of strategic
concepts that have been reviewed, are presented in this section.
2.3.1 AN OVERVIEW OF CHARACTERISTICS THAT AFFECT STRATEGY
In general, the construction industry has low barriers to entry, creating a high
degree of fragmentation. To paint a rough picture of this highly competitive and
fragmented nature of the industry, consider the U.S. market whereby about $700 billion
of construction is put into place on an annual basis (Flanagan, 1998). The two largest
players, Bechtel and Fluor Daniel, each has a stake of only around 1% of the domestic
market volume as of 1998. In the international market, the top 225 international
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contractors, ranked by the Engineering News Record, secured a revenue level of $116.4
billion in 1998. Yet, Bechtel and Fluor Daniel each accounted for only $6 billion (5.2%)
or $5.3 billion (4.6%) of this pie (Engineering News Record, 1999), let alone the total
global construction volume. All these facts point towards a vastly different picture
compared to some manufacturing industries such as automobile or home appliances,
whereby top players retain relatively large market shares. In those industries, strategic
movement of a few dominant players might be sufficient to affect the rules of
competition. Likewise, the numerous competitors in construction, including some who
are indeed not profit-driven, has heightened the rivalry intensity within the industry. Price
is also far from being the only determining success factor (Macomber, 1999). To make
things worse, the exit costs in construction is generally high due to existing contractual
obligations, risky nature of projects and other specific investments that bear limited
transfer value.
Even under the waves of globalization and deregulation, construction largely
remains as a local business and domestic networks are always valuable. This somewhat
creates a multi-domestic setting, following Porter's (1998) parlance, although his
definition that competition only takes place on a country-by-country basis with little or
no linkage does not apply in entirety for construction. Since activities of production are
mostly conducted onsite, there are also limited economies of scale and a weakened
learning effect when considering all projects executed in different locations.
Concerning specific operating issues, human capital remains as a key asset,
especially within the service sectors of construction. Obviously, there is also a heavy
reliance on labor for the physical construction process, although automated construction
methods are constantly pioneered by mostly the Japanese contractors. Imperfect
communication and coordination among parties also gives rise to misunderstanding and a
consequential litigious nature of the business. Dispute resolution methods has been an
important area to explore both in practice and research. Insurance and various types of
bonds (bid, payment, and surety) serve as important tools of the trade for risk sharing,
transfer and avoidance.
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Next, consider the simplified value system shown in Figure 2-2 that is typical for
most sectors of the industry. Except for upstream activities of suppliers which are
product-based, it is observed that other activities within the value system are primarily
process-oriented. The differences between a product- and a process-based industry can be
crucial in terms of the nuances in operations, marketing, technology, 'product' design and
value added. This is the reason why models such as Porter's value chain, the development
of which is implicitly referenced to mostly other industries, do not fit perfectly with
construction. For example, although "inbound" and "outbound logistics" have clear
meanings for the value chain of a manufacturing company, they do not have similarly
clear-cut equivalents for an engineering design company or even a contractor.5
Suppliers
(Equipment, >1
Material)
Sub-
Contractors
General Operation,
Contractor Maintenance
> Sponsor/Engineering Devel per /and Design C
-->Owner
Short-term
Financing / End Users /
Long-term Consumers /
Financing Buyers
FIGURE 2-2 Simplified Value System for Typical Sectors in Construction
5 In his opinion, John D. Macomber, the former CEO of George B.H. Macomber Company - a Boston-
based contractor, would substitute "Sales; Estimating; Purchasing; Project Management; and Close-out" for
Porter's primary activities in the value chain model.
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Lastly, contractual conditions and delivery methods critically govern the rules of
the game, at least at the project level. The merits of different project delivery methods -
Design-Bid-Build (DBB), Design-Build (DB), Design-Build-Operate (DBO), and Build-
Operate-Transfer (BOT), are constantly debated and lobbied by their respective
supporters. Developed mainly from the public sector's perspective, Miller's (1995)
quadrant framework represents a novel approach in mapping out these delivery methods
along the two axes of "Integration of Delivery" and "Source of Finance". By providing
abundant evidence in the historical success of the U.S. government in the simultaneous
use of different delivery methods to suit the varying needs in managing a collection of
projects, Miller (2000) effectively refutes these futile debates over the merit of each kind.
More importantly, he also adds a strategic dimension to the role of delivery methods in
public procurement. Miller's insight thus creates a crucial linkage for meeting public
sector's needs by utilizing private sector's resources and expertise. Cheah et al. (2001)
illustrates the mechanics of such principles using three project portfolios in major urban
redevelopment settings. They concluded that the way public sectors structure the
procurement process would drive firm rivalries and affect firm strategy. This external
factor is an important addition to the planning agenda of corporate strategy.
2.3.2 PAST LITERATURES IN CIVIL ENGINEERING RELATED TO STRATEGY
Although the knowledge gap of strategic management still sustains until today,
some interests in exploring issues of strategy in construction did exist in the past. In the
United Kingdom, the 'Ashridge Studies' (Lea et al., 1974; Sadler et al., 1974; Lansley et
al., 1979) was a significant effort in studying corporate management issues in the 1970s.
Later, Hillebrandt and Cannon (1989) edited opinions on varying topics such as business
strategy, diversification and product differentiation, most of which using U.K.-based
players as the subjects of study. Male and Stocks (1991) likewise synthesized a wide
range of articles covering competitive advantage, economics, organizational behavior,
culture and sociology contributed by a number of civil engineering professionals
including themselves. Interestingly, though developed in the U.S., Porter's models had
created more ripples in the construction research environment of the U.K. at that time.
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All these culminated in the disagreement between Betts and Ofori (1992, 1993) and
Fellows (1993) on the relevance of Porter's models to both supply- and demand-side
analysis. In view of the embryonic development of understanding of such principles in
construction during that period, such debate really represents nothing more than a healthy
intellectual exchange to move our industry a step forward.
Likewise, Hasegewa (1988) documented the business strategies of leading
Japanese contractors such as Shimizu and identified factors that contributed to the
success of these players in the 1980s. It was suggested that the success was largely
attributed to the attention that these players had given to business strategy as opposed to
the lukewarm reception of similar concepts in other regions.
Strangely, although scholars in the U.S. are the ones who develop most
mainstream studies of strategy, their principles have not attracted great attention from
their construction fellows despite the proximity. Possible explanations include greater
fragmentation in the U.S. (thus without superior strategy, survival might still be possible
within the local market), larger national market volume (thus strategy to venture overseas
is perceived as less necessary), and of course, the traditional emphasis by academicians in
the U.S. on the more technical aspects of research. In fact, Chinowsky's (2000) recent
publication represents perhaps only the first text ever written by a construction
professional in the U.S. that focuses entirely on strategic corporate management.
2.4 The Call for an Open Model
The diverse meta-theories of strategy presented in Section 2.2 naturally calls for a
certain degree of integration. In the earlier period, both Allison (1971) and Murray (1978)
arrived at the conclusion that some combination of paradigms among classical models,
incremental models and individual management style models (the latter two being
Processual in nature) is required. Ruefli and Sarrazin (1981) even went further to develop
a strategic control model that incorporates elements from these different generic
approaches. More recently, Schoemaker (2001) again confirms that integration of
theories, though elusive, is nonetheless necessary to avoid reinventing the wheel every
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time a new situation arises. In his opinion, the field of strategy is well beyond the
classification stage, and the emphasis should now be devoted towards deeper integration
instead of continuing expansion of knowledge base in a pluralistic fashion.
In short, it is reasonable to conclude that a lack of integration will only result in a
slow, incremental, and never-ending search for solutions by industrial professionals such
as those in construction. However, what Schoemaker and others had probably left out, or
at least did not explicitly mention, is the variation of industrial contexts from one to
another, which could indeed be substantial. Integration should thus be sought
independently at the juncture of strategy and distinctive industries. It is believed that this
is a valid case for the construction industry due to its uniqueness as explained in Section
2.3.
The task at hand is thus the hardest among all - to develop a coherent model of
strategy that integrates all relevant but diverse theoretical content that is also applicable
to the industrial context of construction. This goal is depicted in Figure 2-3. The
diversified nature of theories coupled with the specificity of the industrial context can
only be reconciled via an 'open' conceptual model (as opposed to a 'closed-form'
solution) that would flexibly incorporate all these components. This is the core challenge
of this research. The next chapter explains the approach towards developing this
conceptual model.
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Complex interplay among
contractual conditions and
project delivery methods
High Local business 
-Fragmentation 
multi-domestic;
Onsite production
Human Industrial
Dimension is of Context of Limited
Utmost Construction Economies of
Importance Scale
- - -Low Entry Barrier;
Mostly Process- High Exit Costs
oriented (in general)
Sensitive to environmental factors (in
technical, engineering terms and also
political, social, regulatory issues)
An 'Open' Conceptual Model
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Diverse Theoretical Foundations of Strategy
> Four Generic Approaches
- Classical
- Evolutionary
- Processual
- Systemic
> Other Specific Aspects
- International Management
- Diversification
> Development in Allied Disciplines
- Finance and Economics
- Organizational sociology
- Cognitive psychology
- Management philosophy
- Political Science
- Decision Science
c:==
FIGURE 2-3 Toward an 'Open' Conceptual Model
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CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DATA ANALYSIS
"Earnings are distorted by accounting conventions that make it hard to compare
values from one to the next. But compare one must, if one has any hope of
applying rationality......
- P. Fuhrman (1988)
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3.1 Overview of Research Methodology
The overall methodology adopted in this doctoral research can be broadly divided
into two tasks:
(1) Fundamental analysis of the firm sample
* This includes data collection and analysis of financial statements of
companies. However, contrasting its common use in stock market analysis to
forecast companies' future stock price movements, the scope of fundamental
analysis is limited to the consideration of past records of assets, earnings,
sales, product, management and markets without any future projections of
these indicators. The data is analyzed to provide indications of recent success
or failure of the companies. This part is the core emphasis of this chapter.
(2) Development of a conceptual model for corporate strategy as called for in
Figure 2-3
* Together with the theoretical foundations of strategy reviewed in Chapter 2,
observations from the fundamental analysis of Part (1) are used as a guide to
develop a conceptual model for corporate strategy. The emanated framework
is presented in Chapter Four.
Figure 3-1 summarizes this overall research methodology.
It is important to recognize that the development process of this model is an
incremental one. Moreover, as components of the model start to form, the development
process itself becomes iterative since the knowledge base of the model is useful for
extracting more qualitative observations from the data. For example, from the analytical
findings of fundamental analysis, the gist of the structures, forms and actions that
international construction firms have adopted to improve their competitiveness would
seem to stand out. This creates an iterative loop as shown on the left in Figure 3-1.
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Data Collection, Development of an Review of the
Fundamental 'Open' Conceptual Mainstream Strategic
Analysis and Model and Theoretical Management Theories
Trend Observation Propositions concerning | and the Specific
associated with the Corporate Strategy in Industrial Context of
Firm Sample , Construction Construction
(Chapter 3) (Chapter 4 & 5) (Chapter 2)
An Iterative Loop
(refer Figure 3-2)
-----------------------
FIGURE 3-1 The Overall Research Methodology
Actual details of the study approach embedded in this iterative loop can be
roughly broken down into four steps:
(I) Building selected trends that depict the financial and operating
performance of the firms;
(II) Identifying significant trends and "out-of-the-pack" performers;
(III) Extracting strategic issues and characteristic information that underlie the
findings in Step (II) and expressing them in the parlance of the conceptual
model;
(IV) Deriving observations and conclusions, and refining the conceptual model
wherever necessary.
These steps are depicted schematically in Figure 3-2. In summary, it is believed
that the challenge of filling the gap between diverse strategic management theories and
traditional construction management practice can only be handled via incremental
refinement of the conceptual model and augmentation with some new theoretical
propositions. In this way, not only that the methodology is logically sound, it is also
supported by practical evidence from the outcome of data analysis.
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FIGURE 3-2 Detailed Study Approach Embedded in the Iterative Loop
3.2 Firm Selection and Data Collection
3.2.1 FIRM SAMPLE
A total of 24 firms have been selected as the sample for this study. This consists
of 8 firms from each of the following regions: Europe; the United States; and Japan. The
selection criteria of specific firms can be described as follows:
(1) The firms must be publicly listed.
* This serves as the most important criterion due to the priority given to data
availability, transparency of firm's policies (which is better associated with
publicly listed firms than privately owned firms), and wide coverage by the
media, professional journals, and electronic "infomediaries". Information
availability obviously has a large impact in a research study of this nature.
(2) Focus is only given to large, international contractors.
* The reasoning behind this selection criterion is the characteristics of the
competitive arena within which these players operate. Interesting issues such
as internationalization and diversification are frequently encountered.
Moreover, these players are normally engaged in integrated project delivery
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methods that include engineering and design services, thus providing a more
complete picture of the competitive nature of various segments of
construction.
* The Engineering News Record's Top 225 International Contractors ranking
(ENR, 1999, 2000a, 2001 a) is used as a guide for the selection process. In this
ranking format, companies are ranked according to their international
construction revenue in the previous year. As many as 22 firms from the
sample secured a place among the top 50 in the year 2000 ranking (based on
international construction revenue in 1999).
(3) Sub-categorization of specific market and firm characteristics.
" The third criterion provides further screening to facilitate a more uniform
comparison of strategy between firms. For example, in the process of
selecting the U.S. sample, it is realized that a majority of the firms are very
active in the power and energy sectors. Therefore, to provide a more
meaningful comparison of strategy among these firms, Stone & Webster
(currently a subsidiary of the Shaw Group) has been included in the sample
even though it was not ranked within the Top 50 in ENR's ranking. In fact,
such uniformity of the U.S. sample has formed the basis of numerous
theoretical propositions that are discussed in Chapter 5.
" Other signposts that are adopted include ENR's Top 25 or 50 International
Contractors ranking in separate major industrial sectors (such as Power,
Petroleum, Industrial Process etc.), firm characteristics (such as diversified
conglomerates versus specialty firms), and special events (such as
bankruptcy). In short, the third criterion also calls for qualitative judgment in
consideration of possible comparison of certain strategic issues.
Table 3-1 lists out the selected firms, their geographical origins and corresponding
ENR rankings for the past three years.
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ENR 's ToP 225 INTERNATIONAL
GEOGRAPHICAL CONTRACTORS RANKING, Note (a)FIRM ORIGIN 1999 2000 2001
Kvaerner PLC Group Norway - 2 -
Skanska AB Sweden 4 3 2
Bouygues S.A. France 3 4 5
Halliburton/Kellogg Brown & Root U.S. 5 5 7
Fluor Corp. U.S. 2 6 10
Vinci (SGE) France 8 9 4
Groupe GTM France 7 11 Note (b)
TECHNIP Group France 15 13 11
Foster Wheeler Corp. U.S. 12 14 15
Philipp Holzmann AG Germany 10 15 8
AMEC PLC U.K. 13 16 12
JGC Corp. Japan 14 18 23
Raytheon Engineers & Constructors U.S. 35 23 Note (c)
Kajima Corp. Japan 21 27 18
Toyo Engineering Corp. Japan 19 28 39
McDermott Int'l. Inc. U.S. 28 33 38
Obayashi Corp. Japan 18 35 30
Chiyoda Corp. Japan 16 37 58
Kumagai Gumi Co. Ltd. Japan 44 39 165
Nishimatsu Construction Co. Ltd. Japan 20 42 62
Penta-Ocean Construction Co. Ltd. Japan 32 43 43
Jacobs U.S. 50 57 48
Stone & Webster U.S. 53 77 Note (d)
Morrison Knudsen Corp. U.S. 82 78 Note (c)
Notes:
(a) The 1999, 2000 and 2001 ENR's Ranking are based on international construction revenues of the
firms in 1998, 1999 and 2000 respectively.
(b) Groupe GTM has merged with Vinci in year 2000.
(c) Both Morrison Knudsen Corp. and Raytheon Engineers & Constructors were acquired by
Washington Group International, Inc (WGI). WGI was ranked 32 in the year 2001 ranking.
(d) Stone & Webster was acquired by the Shaw Group after filing for bankruptcy in the year 2000. The
Shaw Group was ranked 80 in the year 2001 ranking.
Table 3-1 List of Firms Selected as Data Sample
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3.2.2 SOURCES OF DATA
The primary data used to conduct fundamental analysis is extracted from the
annual reports of these 24 firms. Data is collected over a 4-year period from 1997 to 2000
for most companies. There are however several exceptions due to special events such as
mergers and acquisitions and bankruptcy filing during the period. Thus, for firms such as
Groupe GTM, Stone & Webster, Morrison Knudsen/Washington Group International,
and Raytheon Engineers and Constructions, data from annual reports is limited to a 3-
year period. Other than annual reports, companies' Internet home pages also provide
valuable information and occasionally linkages to their internal technical publications.
There are also other sources of information that are supposed to be unbiased.
These include the 10-K Statements filed by the U.S. companies with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), press releases, and articles from publications such as the
ENR and coverage reports by electronic "infomediaries" such as www.Hoovers.com.
3.3 Data Analysis
3.3.1 THE ANALYTICAL TEMPLATE
An analytical template is constructed to organize all data extracted from the
annual reports and other sources of information in a systematic fashion. Broadly, the
template is divided into five components: Background Information; Market Segmentation
Matrix; Operating and Financial Performance; Observations on Strategy; and Issues
dealing with Opportunity and Threat. Some components of the template are formed on
specific theoretical basis. Examples of these include the organizational structure and
market segmentation matrix. Appendix A shows a sample of the complete template that
has been constructed for Skanska. Appendix B, then, provides a complete set of data
collected for the remaining 23 firms for components of Background Information; Market
Segmentation Matrix; and Operating and Financial Performance. The last two
components are omitted since the findings identified in those sections have been
consolidated with the discussion of the proposed conceptual model in Chapter Four and
Five.
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A brief description of each component is given below.
3.3.1.1 Background Information
This section includes the ownership structure; trends of number of employees,
shareholders and shares outstanding; organizational structure; and other general
information such as year founded and whether there has been a change in the firm's CEO
or Chairman during the period of study.
The ownership structure provides a sense of corporate governance. On the other
hand, the trends of number of employees and shares outstanding, coupled with any
changes in top executives, may signal that a particular firm is in distress.
In a broad sense, information regarding the organizational structure is arranged
into three parts: Technical Infrastructure; Operating Core; and Support Operations. This
adopted format is inspired by Mintzberg's (1979) work on the structuring of organization.
Thus, the components here resemble three of the five basic parts of his organizational
model (the other two being "Strategic Apex" and "Middle Line"). However, the
definitions and meanings of Technical Infrastructure and Support Operations differ
slightly from Mintzberg's "Technostructure" and "Support Staff'.
The Technical Infrastructure mainly consists of divisions and groups that deal
with technology development and formulate strategy for existing and new market
ventures. An obvious candidate would be the R&D Department and the Strategic
Planning Division. The Operating Core is the main production network of the firm. The
structure of the Operating Core is often designed and organized along one of these three
dimensions: Market (or Business Areas, which can either be product- or process-
oriented); Geography; or Functions (such as material procurement and engineering
design). Lastly, the Support Operations consist of the finance division, legal counsels and
other administrative divisions.6
6 The classification adopted here for "Support Operations" follows the traditional mindset. It is later
proposed that finance should not be viewed as a mere supporting operation but as a key component of
overall corporate strategy.
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Obviously, numerous details would exist within a firm's organizational structure.
Only information that bears significance to the overall corporate strategy will be listed in
the template of the firms.
3.3.1.2 Market Segmentation Matrix
The Market Segmentation Matrix is intended to map out the primary activities of
a firm so as to paint a picture of its area of focus or extent of diversification. Although
formulation of the matrix follows closely the method that is recommended by Porter
(1985), his definitions of "Buyers Type" and "Product Type" for the two axes are not
followed strictly. Instead, the market is segmented by various industrial sectors (the
horizontal axis) and activities along a value system (the vertical axis). This format is
deemed more suitable for the construction business. For example, residential projects
differ vastly in terms of characteristics from infrastructure projects, while new ventures
that go beyond the conventional realm of construction can be classified under
"Diversification". On the other hand, the vertical axis would dictate whether a firm has
integrated into upstream/downstream activities beyond the conventional AEC provisions.
This mapping exercise therefore constructs a general outlook of a firm's generic
strategies (Porter, 1985) - ranging from a focus, differentiated strategy to a broad,
diversified strategy.
3.3.1.3 Operating and Financial Performance
This section compiles all the numerical data to keep track of a firm's operating
performance and financing structure. It contains the yearly trends of various operating
and financial data and the associated ratio analysis. In addition, subjected to data
availability, revenue, backlog and new orders are presented in terms of percentages as
determined by different geographical regions and business areas. This will provide better
insights concerning the sources of superior/inferior operating performance for the
company.
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There are other technical issues and debates related to the methodology used in
analyzing financial and operating performance data. These details are discussed under
Section 3.3.2.
3.3.1.4 Observations on Strategy
Observations on strategy in general and any critical success factors (CSFs) for
specific business areas are noted in this section. The theoretical foundations of strategy as
described in Chapter 2 are notably useful in this section by adding a qualitative
dimension to the analysis. As mentioned previously, observations are also expressed in
the context of the conceptual framework of Chapter 4 that is developed incrementally
during the course of research.
3.3.1.5 Issues on Opportunity and Threat
This last section represents more of a 'catch-all' area that encompasses issues that
are not covered by other sections. However, attention is also devoted to the identification
of imminent opportunities and threats that the firm is facing. At the very least, this would
include an environmental scan in an attempt to understand the dynamics of the operating
environment of the firm (Macomber, 1991). Specific topics that bear significant influence
on corporate strategy can then become the focal point going from here.
The most commonly encountered example is none other than the growing
importance of environmental issues (in a technical sense).7 This includes environmental
preservation, waste elimination (both at source and the recycling of material), energy
preservation, and other environmental engineering systems and services at large. In terms
of social awareness and offering of service provisions, all these issues are closely related
to the construction business. They can take on either direction in becoming opportunities
or threats, depending on a firm's strategy and policy.
7 The term 'environmental issues' can sometimes be referring to: (i) general factors in political, social,
cultural and industrial contexts; or (ii) topics that are more technical in nature relating to environmental
engineering. To avoid such confusion, phrases such as "technical sense" or equivalent are used to
distinguish the latter.
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3.3.2 BUILDING TRENDS OF OPERATING AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE
3.3.2.1 Monitoring Data Comparability and Classifying Interpretation
Tasks
While most sections of the analytical template are relatively straightforward in
their meanings and functions, the section on Operating and Financial Performance Data
deserves further elaboration. The methodology of trend building and reliance on annual
reports is constantly under attack. In particular, it is becoming a common belief that
corporate managers frequently manipulate financial reports to hide losses and to present
an incorrectly favorable picture to external investors. Given past cases of scandals and
class-action lawsuits, there is some truth behind such arguments. However, it is also
believed that this picture is incomplete and information extracted from the annual reports
should still be granted with some merit.
Firstly, annual reports is one of the most objective sources of information
available simply because it follows standardized rules for reporting purposes such as the
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Furthermore, regulatory bodies such
as the SEC and FASB in the U.S. constantly scrutinize firms to ensure their conformity to
the standards set. Cases of infringement and acts of violation are investigated, and
penalties are brought up against unscrupulous corporations to ensure that rules are strictly
enforced. Moreover, new regulations and practices are designed to uphold and improve
transparency in financial reporting and patch up any loopholes. By the same token, third-
party auditors are governed by the ethical conduct and regulations of their own
profession. Given all these mechanisms, cases of scandals should be treated as isolated
cases rather than the norm.
It is thus fair to comment that there is limited room for manipulating reported
elements as allowed by regulations and the scrutiny of regulatory bodies and auditors.
Even if certain 'resources' such as hidden reserves could exist, these are typically not
non-exhaustive and eventually firms will come to the point whereby they have to
confront with previously accrued losses and liabilities (Pratt, 2000).
With a reasonable level of confidence established with the source of data, it is
more of a matter of how to use it wisely. For analytical purposes, it is useful to relate the
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tasks of interpretation to different levels of details, which can be classified as the
following:
(1) Eyeballing the general outlook;
(2) Studying the time-series pattern of individual firms;
(3) Making cross-comparison of firms from the same region or with similar
reporting practices;
(4) Making cross-comparison of firms from different regions.
The first task gives a sense of the general operating conditions, such as the order
of magnitude and the cyclical nature or idiosyncrasies (if any) of the trends. It thus has
the least concern with differing accounting practices and "gimmicks".
In contrast, the second task provides more specific hints on the sample of firms. It
keeps track of how firms perform individually over a period of time rather than viewing
the firm sample as a whole. In this way, recent performance record of a specific firm
could be linked to its specific strategy adopted for a particular market.
The third task becomes even more useful in terms of extracting issues underlying
the trends that are related to differing corporate strategy and outlook of the firms. In this
task, compatibility in comparison measures becomes essential, and it is important to
study in more details to ensure that similar reporting practices are adopted.
The final task is notably the most challenging one. All nations have different
histories, economics, cultures, and political and regulatory systems. Therefore, firms
from different regions usually adopt different financial reporting practices. However,
harmonization of world accounting standards is continually propelled by profound
economic forces of international trade and capital movement and lobbied by the
International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) (Haskins et al., 2000). The
linkage between the European Union and the IASC further holds the promise that the two
most active and influential players in the harmonization movement will create widely
acceptable standards (IASC, 1996). By virtue of such forces, some parts of the financial
statements in different countries indeed follow a more standardized structure even though
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the overall statement is still influenced by the regional contexts.8 The key is to distinguish
the varying degree of discrepancies among the hundreds of figures reported in an annual
report. Some indicators and ratios are more compatible for cross-comparison purposes as
compared to the others. For example, it is reasonable to assume that a cross-comparison
of Total Asset Turnover [Revenue/Average Total Assets] has less concern of
incompatibility, contrasting a cross-comparison of the Return-on-Equity [Net
Income/Average Shareholders' Equity]. This is because there are likely to be more
distortions of the Net Income reported as compared to Revenue.
Ultimately, most caveats mentioned in financial and accounting literatures are
meant for the purpose of security valuation. It should be reminded that the goal of this
research is to study the corporate strategy of the firms. Indicators obtained from financial
and operating performance data are simply used as pointers and signposts. Consequently,
the level of accuracy required is of secondary importance as compared to that in security
pricing.
3.3.2.2 Segmenting Financial Statements
When coupled with an understanding of the financial reporting contexts
(discussed next in Section 3.4), the task classification given in the previous section
provides a strong intellectual basis to derive observations from the data collected from
the annual reports. Discrepancies among differing financial reporting practices can be
filtered out through a prudent selection of trends and cross-comparison measures.
Essentially, one can "segment" the balance sheet and income statement into categories
that comply with different degrees of compatibility required by the interpretation tasks.
For example, an analyst may be overly concerned about two firms adopting
different revenue recognition practices. In this case, the data may not be used for the third
and fourth tasks of comparing those two firms directly, but this should not subdue its
usefulness to track the individual performance of the two firms in the second task. On the
8 A good example is related to revenue recognition policies. Many Japanese and European construction
firms in the sample have recently switched from the "completed contract" method to the "percentage-of-
completed work" method, which is more commonly adopted internationally especially in the U.S.
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other hand, other ratios are more 'generic' and are not tainted by different revenue
recognition practices, hence allowing cross-comparison between these two firms for this
matter. These include most Liquidity Ratios (such as the Cash Ratio and Quick Ratio).
The same is true for segmenting the income statement from the top line to the
bottom. For example, refer to Figure 3-3, which shows some common components of the
income statement in a simplified form. It is clear that there are many items to go through
prior to arriving at the bottom line of Net Income. Put in another way, there is less room
to distort Gross Profit as compared to Operating Income, and the same argument holds
when comparing Operating Income to Net Income. Extraordinary Items, for example, is a
popular ground for manipulating figures since they are both unusual and infrequent.
Gains/losses due to disposal of a business segment, for instance, is partly derived from
subjective market assessment.
Gross Revenue
Cost of Goods Sold
Gross Profit
Sales, General & Administrative Expenses
Depreciation
Miscellaneous Operating Expenses
Operating Income Unusual
Other Revenues OR
Other Expenses Infrequent
Earnings Before Interests & Taxes (EBIT)
Interest Payments
Earnings Before Taxes (EBT)
Income Tax Provisions / Benefits
Earnings Before Extraordinary Items Unusual
Extraordinary Items, Net of Taxes } AND
Net Income Infrequent
FIGURE 3-3 Anatomy of the Income Statement - Typical Components
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The implication of this is that for cases in which cross-comparison of Net Profit
Margin [Net Income/Revenue] and Return-on-Equity (ROE) is a concern - perhaps due
to suspected manipulation of Other Revenues/Expenses or Extraordinary Items, a similar
concern may not be warranted for similar comparison of the Gross Profit Margin [Gross
Profit/Revenue] or Operating Profit Margin [Operating Income/Revenue]. This is
because both Other Revenues/Expenses and Extraordinary Items are recorded after
Operating Income has been calculated, thus any the manipulation of these items do not
necessarily imply similar distortions of the upper figures.
An example would further clarify this concept of segmentation. Company laws in
Japan and Germany impose looser criteria for companies to establish contingency
reserves. In contrast, criteria of the U.S. GAAP are much more stringent. Thus, it is
relatively easier for companies in Japan and Germany to smooth earnings as compared to
their U.S. counterparts. During a bad year, transfer from the reserve account is typically
reported under the account rubric Other Income. As such, the Net Profit Margin and ROE
of Japanese and German firms may not be compared to that of the U.S. firms, but one
should not immediately draw a similar conclusion for the comparability of the Gross
Profit Margin and Operating Profit Margin.
3.3.3 ESTABLISHING OTHER INDICATORS
The financial ratios: Leverage ratios, Profitability ratios, and Liquidity ratios,
established under the "Operating and Financial Performance Data" section of the
template are very typical of most ratio analysis elaborated by finance texts such as
Brealey and Myers (1996). In the template, however, other indicators are established to
keep track of issues that are not so commonly monitored by conventional ratio analysis.
These include the (Revenue)t-to-(Backlog)t-1 ratio; the R&D Expenses-to-Sales ratio; the
Cash Flow Profile subsection; and the Expected Volatility subsection.
The logic behind these indicators is explained in Appendix C. In general, they
provide useful information on strategy, financial and operating performance of the firm.
Not all categories of these indicators are available for each company, and such
establishment is limited by data availability.
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3.4 The Context of Financial Reporting
In any kind of financial analysis, it is important to understand the context within
which financial reports are made. This is especially important in this research,
considering the fact that the data sample has an international dimension, which inevitably
creates some disparities in the forms and meanings of the figures presented. As such,
developing an appreciation of these contextual issues would tremendously help to
'calibrate' the findings extracted from the reports. More importantly, it adds a qualitative
judgment to comparison analysis. For example, due to the unique contextual issues that
affect customary financial reporting practices in Japan (to be discussed later), one should
not be too alarmed to find that the Return-on-Equity of a Japanese construction firm is
way below that of a U.S. competitor - even though both are achieving the same level of
profitability.
The current section focuses on the important characteristics of different contextual
issues of financial reporting, which have profoundly affected the "language of business".
It effectively complements the previous section on Data Analysis which is more
methodological in nature.
3.4.1 ACCOUNTING AND ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS
Common to a widely held opinion, Adhikari and Tondkar (1992) comment that
"accounting reporting and disclosure standards and practices do not develop in a vacuum
but reflect the particular environment in which they are developed". Haskins et al. (2000)
further posit that this includes the cultural, legal, political and business environment.
More specifically, the following contextual factors are relevant: a country's dominant
culture; system of taxation (this being a resultant of political and legal influences); role of
capital markets; and business-government relations.
In associating a country's dominant culture to its nation-specific form of financial
reporting practice, Haskins et al. find that Hofstede's (1991) definitions of cultural
"dimensions" are especially insightful. These dimensions encompass: power distance;
individualism; long-term orientation; and uncertainty avoidance. In a broad sense,
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societies with high scores of power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and long-term
orientation and a low score of individualism signify more conservatism and uniformity in
their financial reporting approach, fewer financial disclosures, more emphasis on thrift,
perseverance toward steady results and willingness to subordinate oneself to a long term
goal and collective purpose. Obviously, candidates that potentially fall under this
category include Japan and South Korea, which are in direct contrast with the other
extreme of the U.S. and the U.K.
Under legal environment, the most significant consideration is the relationship
between financial reporting system and tax law. Unlike in the U.S. and the U.K. whereby
companies are allowed to prepare separate set of books for financial statements and tax
returns, Japanese, German and even Swedish firms have to record their expenses in
financial statements for these figures to be qualified for deductions in their tax returns.
This usually results in an understatement of profitability as compared to their U.S. and
U.K. counterparts. Further, since tax law is formulated by national legislative bodies in
response to varying political and economic agendas, the general political environment
also bear an indirect influence on the eventual outcome of financial reporting practices.
The state of capital markets in a nation plays an influential role between the
general business environment and the corresponding financial reporting practices. If
firms primarily secure their source of capitals from the open stock and bond markets (as
in the U.S.), it is only natural to put more weight on financial disclosure so that investors
would not view these firms as risky and impose a 'premium' on the securities issued.
Conversely, in countries like Japan and Germany, banks play a prominent role as both
lenders and investors. Since internal corporate information can be obtained more easily,
external reporting is more of a formality and tax consideration. As such, disclosure is
more likely to be de-emphasized. Furthermore, this form of corporate governance
structure allows firms to adopt a longer term mindset in the pursuit of market share and
growth instead of short-term profitability and margin which is given a heavier emphasis
in the U.S. and the U.K.
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3.4.2 ANALYTICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE FIRM SAMPLE
As shown in Table 3-1, the sample in this research is composed of firms
originating from Japan, the U.S., the U.K., Germany, France, Sweden and Norway. The
environmental factors described above obviously have a varying impact on financial
ratios calculated for the firms. In the process of roughly gauging the relative similarities
and differences among the countries, main observations, conclusions and the associated
impact on the financial ratios can be summarized.
3.4.2.1 Net Profit Margin and Return-on-Equity
For this type of indicators, Japan and the U.S. stand at two extremes. A survey of
the Japanese cultural and business environment gives rise to the following characteristics:
(1) Public duty, not individual rights, stands as the highest value.
(2) Group membership being a dominant factor and business relationships are
expected to proceed on the basis of mutual trust. Interlocking ties, such as
those that exist in keiretsus under the aegis of a major bank or a large
trading company, minimize principal-agent problem and information
asymmetry between debt-holders, shareholders and managers.
These characteristics portend that hostile takeovers are unusual, and thus managers are
able to focus on long-term objectives rather than short-term profitability. Coupled with
hefty corporate taxes, firms only have a strong incentive to keep reported earnings down.
Furthermore, propelled by the cultural elements of mutual trust and group harmony, legal
reserves and contingency accounts are permitted, which provide avenues to smooth
income between good and bad times. On average then, both Net Profit Margin and
Return-on-Equity for Japanese firms would be lower than that of the U.S. firms.
As in Japan, book and tax income in Germany and Sweden are required to be
substantially the same. This linkage between fiscal and financial reporting has thus
reinforced the similar conservatism in earnings measure. The use of 'hidden' and untaxed
reserves is also a common practice in Germany and Sweden. As such, the Net Profit
Margin and Return-on-Equity of firms that have their legal domicile in Germany and
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Sweden are also expected to be lower. Similar indicators of firms from other countries in
the sample are perceived to be more in line with the U.S. practice. In both the U.K. and
France, for example, discretionary reserves are generally not permitted except for
liabilities and losses that can be reasonably estimated.
3.4.2.2 Leverage Ratios
With the unique role that banks play in the corporate world, Japanese firms have a
higher propensity to finance capital needs via debt. In addition, these debts are carried at
face value rather than present value - the practice adopted in the U.S. The combination of
these factors tends to cause Japanese companies to appear to be less solvent than their
U.S. counterparts.
Though caused by a different factor, the solvency ratios of German firms arrive at
a similar outcome. In this case, equity is often understated due to permission by the
German tax law to adopt excess depreciation (up to three times the straight-line rate).
Furthermore, goodwill write-off is more liberally done and amortized over a shorter
period compared to standard practice in the U.S. All these have the effects of understating
shareholders' equity, thereby lowering total assets while increasing the various Leverage
Ratios (e.g., Total Debt Ratio, Long-term Debt Ratio and Non-current Liabilities Ratio -
all these having debt values in the numerator).
On the other hand, although British firms similarly apply a relatively heavy hand
in writing off acquisition-related goodwill (with the use of the charge-to-equity method in
the past before being replaced by a short amortization period), this effect is offset by
other factors. These other factors include the revaluation of assets above historical cost
(not permitted by the U.S. GAAP except for certain current assets) along with the parallel
creation of an equity revaluation reserve, which cause a systematic upward bias in total
assets and shareholders' equity of British firms. It is thus assumed that the opposing
effects neutralize each other and the Leverage Ratios of British firms are more in line
with that of the U.S. firms.
Lastly, all debt is also commonly valued at face value in France. Thus the
Leverage Ratios of French firms could be slightly overstated, but the difference is not
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perceived as substantial due to closer resemblance in environmental factors. For example,
French companies are allowed to separate tax and financial reporting considerations, thus
shareholders' equity is not understated to the extent of that of German and Japanese
firms.
3.4.2.3 Summary
An understanding of the contextual issues and their impact on financial reporting
practices obviously enhances the quality of the findings from data analysis. Especially for
firms that lie in the middle of the extreme between the U.S. and Japan or Germany
(notably France and Norway), it can be concluded from their financial statements and
associated footnotes that many aspects in their reporting practices do not differ
substantially from the U.S. and U.K. GAAP. This observation is largely attributed to the
fact that the sample consists of major international construction firms (recall that they
rank within the Top 50 in ENR's ranking) which place a heavy emphasis on attracting
businesses and capital from the global marketplace. Naturally, confusing potential
investors and customers with hazy financial nuances is the last thing that they desire.
3.5 Observations and Findings
Using the quantitative data gathered from the Operating and Financial
Performance component of the analytical template, and relying on the different tasks as
classified on page 62, a series of charts can be built for comparison purposes.
Interpretation of these graphs is done in conjunction with the qualitative observations
gathered from the other parts of the template and the understanding of accounting
contextual issues that has been explained at length.
Most of the graphs are built by using the average values of the chosen indicator
determined over the study period (3 to 5 years). The data of some firms and periods have
to be omitted because only a stable average is desired. This is important to ensure a closer
representation of the long-run equilibrium. For example, a substantially negative ROE
during a year of restructuring is omitted in the calculation of the average value.
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3.5.1 COMPARISON OF OPERATING AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE
3.5.1.1 Gross, Operating and Net Profit Margins
Figure 3-4 compares the Gross Profit Margin (GPM), Operating Profit Margin
(OPM) and Net Profit Margin (NPM) of the firms. Firms from the same region are
clustered together along the horizontal axis. On average:
GPM (European firms) > GPM (U.S. firms) > GPM (Japanese firms)
Furthermore, except for the Japanese firms, there are large disparities of GPM within
each region. However, the trend disappears when it comes to both the OPM and NPM. In
those cases, firms with the highest GPM do not necessarily end up with higher values of
OPM or NPM.
Figure 3-5 plots the difference between the GPM and OPM for the firms, which is
arranged in a descending order. From basic definitions of the GPM and OPM, it is
thought that the difference would provide a proxy for the fixed and overhead costs
incurred by firms. Again, the largest difference is associated with most European firms.
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30.0% -
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15.0% - OPM
0 NPM
10.0% -
5.0% -
0.0%
(Clustered by each corresponding region; Arranged in descending order of GPM)
Figure 3-4 Gross, Operating and Net Profit Margins of Firms
(Clustered by each corresponding region; Arranged in descending order of [GPM - OPM]
FIGURE 3-5 Differences between GPM and OPM - Proxy for Overhead Costs
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These observations give rise to following possible conclusions:
(a) In general, costs associated with wages, social benefits and workers'
compensations are notoriously high in some European countries. Thus,
high GPM is correspondingly offset by higher costs of these items, thereby
arriving at an equally low OPM.
(b) The difference could also be partially due to the financial reporting
practices adopted by some European firms. Apparently, some components
of the labor and overhead costs could be reported "below the line",
whereas they would have been lumped with the associated Cost of Goods
Sold (COGS) according to the U.S. GAAP or in other countries.
Nonetheless, it is unlikely that such effect will totally account for the large
differences observed in Figure 3-4 and 3-5.
(c) The fact that higher GPM does not ensure higher OPM or NPM signals
that material and overhead cost control itself is far from being a complete
strategy. This directly challenges the aggressive cost cutting measures that
some managers have adopted, most of which have ended up ineffective or
even destructive to the firm.
3.5.1.2 The "Profit Margin - Volume/Growth" Tradeoff
By definition, Return-on-Assets is the product of Net Profit Margin (NPM) and
Total Asset Turnover (TAT). Neoclassical economic theory posits that firms constantly
face competitive and capacity constraints in order to achieve a high ROA. To certain
extent, these two constraints are reflected by NPM and TAT respectively (Haskins et al.,
2000). Competitive constraint ensures that firms in industries whose products are
undifferentiated or close to commodity like in nature face an upper limit on the profit
margin that they can achieve. To them, it may be wiser to pursue a higher turnover of the
assets. Conversely, some industrial sectors are handicapped by various capacity
constraints - either due to supply (high fixed costs and limited production capacity) or
demand (consumer and market size) factors. In this case, since a large turnover is harder
to attain, it is better to target for a high profit margin. Others may also associate the above
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dichotomy with 'the appropriate' business strategy - cost leadership for the former, and
product differentiated for the latter, although it should be noted that this matching
relationship only holds in a loose sense.
Plainly put, it is perhaps more useful to interpret from the angle of a tradeoff
between profit margin and volume/growth. By plotting NPM against TAT, Figure 3-6
tests whether such phenomenon exists for the firm sample. Two modifications, however,
have been made to produce this graph. Firstly, to increase the number of data points,
eight additional firms have been included. Details of the Operating and Finance
Performance data for these eight firms are compiled in Appendix D. Secondly, the NPM
of Japanese firms have been adjusted upwards by three-fold. This is to compensate for
the knowingly understatement of profitability by these firms (as explained in Section
3.4). It has been reported that the average ROE for Japanese publicly listed companies
consistently runs approximately 300% less than for U.S. companies (Haskins et al.,
2000). The adjustment will make the figures more comparable and the plot more
meaningful.
From Figure 3-6, two main observations can be made. First, there are a number of
firms that cluster around the region between 1% ~ 3.5% (for NPM) and 0.5 ~ 1.3 (for
TAT). Apparently, these firms are struggling with the commonly known characteristics of
the construction industry. Effectively, high fragmentation and intensive rivalry among
firms forge a low margin, low turnover (volume) business environment surrounding these
firms. For others who manage to break off from this vortex, the "profit margin -
volume/growth" tradeoff is illustrated by the negative slope of the trend line. In fact,
ignoring the data of the Japanese firms (thus eliminating potential distortion due to the
second modification outlined above), the correlation between NPM and TAT has been
determined as -0.23. Table 3-2 provides the actual figures adopted for the plot and
analysis.
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Figure 3-6 The "Profit Margin - Volume/Growth" Tradeoff
The two observations naturally lead to the following conclusions:
(a) Even though the selected firms in this sample represent a reputable bunch
based on ENR's ranking, some still struggle to escape from the typical low
margin, low turnover feature of the construction industry.
(b) Achieving both high margin and high turnover is tough. Firms usually face
a tradeoff between the two, and it is important to invest their resources
wisely corresponding with a chosen strategy. For example, they can
choose to pursue a focus, differentiated strategy that would lead to a high
profit margin; they can alternatively choose to pursue an aggressive, high
growth strategy to capture higher volume and market share (although this
does not necessarily imply the pursuit of cost leadership strategy that some
might have claimed).
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FIRMS Average Net Profit Margin Average Total Asset Turnover
Technip 6.1% 1.23
Skanska 5.8% 1.42
Centex 5.7% 1.35
Halliburton 4.9% 1.59
Granite 4.1% 2.02
Hochtief 3.2% 1.01
NCC 3.0% 1.20
Stone & Webster 2.6% 1.70
Perini 2.5% 2.15
Jacobs 2.4% 2.71
Bouygues 2.4% 1.11
WGI 2.2% 2.25
Groupe GTM 1.9% 0.98
AMEC 1.8% 2.60
Foster Wheeler 1.6% 1.19
Vinci 1.5% 1.14
Fluor 1.4% 2.80
Bilfinger+Berger 1.3% 1.27
Correlation Coefficient: - 0.23
Nishimatsu 1.4% (4.2%) 0.80
Penta-Ocean 1.1% (3.3%) 0.95
Obayashi 1.0% (3.0%) 0.61
Kajima 0.9% (2.7%) 0.70
Kumagai Gumi 0.9% (2.7%) 0.58
JGC 0.8% (2.4%) 0.91
Shimizu 0.7% (2.1%) 0.73
Taisei 0.4% (1.2%) 0.69
Notes:
1) The correlation coefficient is determined without considering the data for the Japanese firms
2) For the Japanese sample, numbers in brackets are 3x the originally determined average, following
the second modification described in the body text. The inflated numbers are used in the plot in
Figure 3-6.
TABLE 3-2 Data Used in the NPM- TAT Plot and Determination of
Correlation Coefficient
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3.5.1.3 Return-on-Asset and -Equity
Figure 3-7 plots the ROA and ROE of the firms, arranging in a descending order
of ROA within each region. Because these firms either experienced huge losses or
incurred substantial restructuring charges in some years, the figures for Chiyoda, Toyo,
Kumagai Gumi, Philipp Holzmann, Kvaerner, Raytheon E&C and McDermott are very
unstable and have been excluded in the comparison analysis.
35.0%
30.0%
25.0% -
20.0% - M ROA
15.0% - - ROE
10.0% -
5.0% -
0.0% 1 "
FIGURE 3-7 Return-on-Assets and -Equity of Firms
On average, the ROA and ROE of Japanese firms are lower than those of their
U.S. and European counterparts. However, this should not come as a surprise due to their
propensity to understate profitability. Likewise, although relative comparison between
the ROA of the U.S. and European firms is largely inconclusive, it should be noted that
the order of ROE does not follow that of the ROA. In other words, firms with a low ROA
may end up with a high ROE in relative comparison. This is due to the leverage effect,
and apparently the policies on capital structure adopted by firms are quite diverse. For
example, the high value of ROE of Vinci is partly due to a highly leveraged capital
structure that the firm has adopted. In fact, it can be observed from Figure 3-11 that Vinci
has the highest level of Total Debt and Non-current Liabilities after Philipp Holzmann
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among the European sample (the latter is known to have experienced financial hardship
during the period of study).
3.5.1.4 Other Operating and Financial Indicators
Other operating indicators that have been chosen include the (Revenue)t-to-
(Backlog)t. ratio; the Capital Intensity [Non-current Assets/Total Assets] ratio; and the
Average Collection Period. Along with the others, the definitions and purposes of these
indicators are explained in Appendix C. Figure 3-8 to 3-10 present these indicators
correspondingly.
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FIGURE 3-8 The Conversion Ratio: [Revenue(t)/Backlog(t-1)]
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A few conclusions can be made from these figures:
(a) On average, the (Revenue)t-to-(Backlog)t.1 ratio of the Japanese firms are
lower than those of the U.S. and European firms. One possible explanation
is that a relatively large portion of projects won by the Japanese firms
were either deferred or cancelled. This is plausible in view of the
prolonged recession and stagnant outlook of the domestic construction
market. The situation was indeed exacerbated by the Asian Crisis in 1997
and 1998, as most of these players have traditionally been quite active in
the South East Asia market.
(b) On average, American firms are more capital intensive than the European
sample, which in turn is more capital intensive than the Japanese firms.
Within each region, however, the choice of operating leverage adopted by
individual firms is again very diverse.
(c) Although the Average Collection Period of individual firms takes on a
wide range, on average the Japanese firms have higher collection period as
compared to the European sample. The American firms also seem to fare
better in collecting their receivables. Although it is hard to prove, it is
suspected that the relatively high collection period of the Japanese firms is
linked to their business and cultural environment. With ubiquitous
business group formations and a culture of dealing by mutual trust and
understanding, collection of receivables is perhaps determined more by
'mutual adjustment' to the parties' convenience rather than textbook-style
management fundamentals.
Likewise, financial performance of the firms is captured by various debt and
liquidity ratios. In Figure 3-11, firms within each region are arranged in a descending
order of the Total Debt Ratio, with their corresponding Non-current Liabilities Ratio and
Long-term Debt Ratio being shown alongside. In Figure 3-12, all firms are arranged in a
descending order of the Current Ratio, coupled with the corresponding Quick Ratio. In a
glimpse, it is noted that Kumagai Gumi, Chiyoda and Philipp Holzmann have high level
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of debts (either in terms of total, non-current and/or long-term); Kumagai Gumi and
Chiyoda incidentally maintain the lowest liquidity ratios.
In fact, by using the data of all firms, Table 3-3 demonstrates that high debt ratios
are usually associated with low liquidity ratios. A closer look at the relative value of these
figures further proves their validity. For example, the more negative correlation
coefficients of Total Debt with Liquidity Ratios, as compared to those of Non-current
Liabilities, imply that Current Liabilities are more influential in liquidity management.
This is especially true given the fact that some items under Non-current Liabilities (such
as Deferred Tax Liabilities) have no impact on immediate cash flow.
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0.9
0.8
0.7-
0.6 - Total
0.5 M NCL
0.4 0 LT
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
A 00
5z 0
S 0
(Clustered by each corresponding region; Arranged in descending order of Total Debt)
FIGURE 3-11 Total Debt, Non-current Liabilities, and Long-term Debt Ratios
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FIGURE 3-12 Current and Quick Ratios of Firms
Total Debt Ratio Non-current Long-term Debt
Liabilities Ratio Ratio
Current Ratio - 0.59 - 0.34 - 0.42
Quick Ratio - 0.49 - 0.34 - 0.47
C.)
H
10 .00
C.)
0 U U W14CA
14
Cn
~0
0
0
W
TABLE 3-3 Correlation Coefficients among Leverage and Liquidity
Ratios
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3.5.1.5 The Bottom Line
Although some conclusions drawn from previous observations of the charts have
provided insights towards the general outlook of the firm sample, the primary purpose is
to use the charts to identify the "out-of-the-pack" performers, consistent with Step (II) of
the study approach presented on page 53. In addition, these charts are also useful in
providing hints about the collective forces contributing to the failure of other firms. The
isolation process is the focus of the next section.
3.5.2 THE ISOLATION PROCESS
It is useful to categorize firms by considering whether they have 'outperformed'
or 'underperformed' their peers, or simply bear a moderate outlook during the study
period. This is particularly helpful in drawing inferences on corporate strategy, so that
factors contributing to success or failure (whether temporary or permanent) are at least
consistent with their relative performance during the period. That said, the categorization
process should not be resolved to strict statistical measures. Firstly, while cross-
comparison can be augmented with qualitative knowledge built into the study, techniques
such as running regressions require far greater accuracy of the figures. Secondly, the
appropriateness of such techniques is questionable given the many broad, "soft" issues
captured under the veil of corporate strategy.
The method adopted here follows these rules of thumbs:
(a) Firms that have 'outperformed' are judged by their relative ranking within
each region in four profitability measures: ROA, ROE, NPM and OPM.
This is as shown in Table 3-4. Objectively, it is fair to conclude that those
which are ranked 1 't or 2nd in three or more categories are deemed to have
outperformed the others.
(b) The identification process of 'underperformance' is much more
comprehensive. Not only that the charts presented in Figure 3-4 to 3-12
are used to identify potential problems that these firms are struggling to
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overcome, but their case is also confirmed by reviewing other qualitative
information. This is discussed in more details below.
(c) The remaining firms that have not been classified under either category in
the above are simply assigned to be having a moderate outlook during the
period.
Regional Size Regional Ranking based on Profitability Measures
Ranking based Return on Return on Net Profit Operating
on Total Assets Assets Equity Margin Profit Margin Rating
Halliburton 1 1 2 1 1 0
Fluor 2 5 5 6 6 M
Foster Wheeler 3 6 6 5 5 M
McDermott 4 N/R N/R N/R 4 M
Jacobs 5 2 1 3 2 0
Raytheon E&C 6 N/R N/R N/R N/R M
WGI 7 3 3 4 3 U
Stone & Webster 8 4 4 N/R U
Bouygues 1 4 6 4 2 M
Vinci 2 6 4 7 5 M
Skanska 3 1 1 2 4 0
Groupe GTM 4 5 5 5 7 M
Kvaerner 5 N/R N/R N/R N/R U
Holzmann 6 N/R N/R N/R 3 U
AMEC 7 3 3 6 6 M
Technip 8 2 20 1 1
Kajima 1 4 4 4 6 M
Obayashi 2 3 3 3 2 M
Kumagai Gumi 3 N/R N/R N/R 4 U
Nishimatsu 4 1 1 1 1 0
Penta-Ocean 5 2 2 2 5 0
JGC 6 5 5 5 3 M
Toyo 7 N/R N/R N/R N/R U
Chiyoda 8 N/R N/R N/R N/R U
Notes:
N/R = Not Rated, due to: (1) Excessive fluctuation in study measures; or (2) Data unavailability
0 = Outperformed the others in the sample; U = Underperformed; M = Moderate performance
TABLE 3-4 A First Look at Relative Performance of Firms
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3.5.2.1 Preliminary Evidence of Underperformance
A total of seven firms have been classified as "underperformed" relative to their
peers for the period of study: Toyo, Chiyoda, Kumagai Gumi, Kvaemer, Philipp
Holzmann, WGI and Stone & Webster. The preliminary evidence of such
underperformance can often be obtained from the "Background Information" component
of the analytical template. The usefulness of the background information should never be
underestimated. Frequently, practical hints are embedded under seemingly trivial
information such as resignation/firing of top executives, trends of dividend payout and
number of employees. Some of this information is summarized in Table 3-5.
From the table, six out of the seven underperforming firms have experienced a
concurrent change in leaders and elimination of dividend payout during the period
(except Stone & Webster, which, although did not cut dividend, nonetheless brought in a
new CEO in 1996 in the hope of a turnaround). These are strong signs of distress.
Furthermore, substantial reductions in the number of employees are observed for the
Japanese and European underperforming firms.
In contrast, three "outperformers" - Technip, Skanska, and Jacobs actually
enlarged their human capital base by more than 50% during the period. Both Technip and
Skanska in fact increase their dividend payout; Jacobs, on the other hand, has chosen a
zero payout ratio to retain all its earnings for its internal growth (this policy, for example,
is similar to that of companies pursuing high growth such as Microsoft).
3.5.2.2 Factors Contributing to Underperformance
As a starting point, some of the potential problems can be linked to miserable
operating and performance based on the data presented in Figure 3-4 to 3-12. This is
summarized in Table 3-6.
Detailed examination of data summarized in the analytical template
corresponding to each of these seven firms further discloses other strong evidence for
their underperformance. A brief description of these issues is given for each company
below.
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Year Changed leader during term? % Change in No. of Yearly Trend of Dividend
Company Founded (If yes, in what year?) (a) Employees during Term per Share (in local currency)
Chiyoda 1948 Yes (1999) -32.2% 0, 0, 0, 0
Kumagai 1898 Yes (1998) -17.6% 3, 0, 0, 0
Toyo 1961 Yes (1999) -26.9% 6, 6, 0, 0
JGC 1928 No -20.4% 10, 5, 0, 3
Nishimatsu 1937 No -14.1% 12, 10, 10, 10
Penta 1896 No -25.7% 7.5, 7.5, 0, 0
Kajima 1840 No N/A 9,9,7,7
Obayashi 1892 No -6.3% 8, 8, 8, 8
WGI 1911 Yes (1998) N/A 0,0,0
Stone & Webster 1889 Yes (1996) N/A 0.6, 0.6, 0.6
McDermott 1924 Yes (1996, 2000) -52.0% 0.6, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2
Halliburton/KBR N/A Yes (2000) (b) -8.8% 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5
Foster Wheeler 1892 No -8.3% 0.84, 0.84, 0.54, 0.24
Jacobs 1947 No 96.4% 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
Fluor -- No -22.4% 0.76, 0.8, 0.8, 1.0
Kvaerner 1853 Yes(1998, 2001) -49.1% 7,0,0,0
Holzmann 1849 Yes (1999) -40.6% 0, 0, 0, 0
Skanska 1887 No 70.2% 11, 12, 16, 13.5
Bouygues 1952 No 12.5% 3.89, 3.89, 3.89, 0.54
Vinci 1910 No 78.9% (d) 0.61, 1.40, 1.60, 1.65
Groupe GTM 1891 No 1.4% 1.3, 1.5, 2.35
AMEC 1848 No 13.6% 5, 6.25, 7.5, 8.5
Technip 1958 (c) Yes (1999) (b) 53.1% 2.21, 2.45, 3.0, 3.3
Note:
(a) Year of change as inferred from annual report. Since fiscal year in Japan ends in March, the actual change
might have occurred in the previous calendar year. "Leader" refers to Chief Executive Office (CEO), Chairman
or President of the corporation.
(b) Change of leader in these case are not likely to be related to underperformance of the corporation. In the
case of Halliburton, Dick Cheney resigned to run for vice president of the U.S. In the case of Technip, it is due to
the retirement of Chairman cum CEO.
(c) Year incorporated.
(d) Figure includes change due to merger with GTM in year 2000.
TABLE 3-5 Selected Background Information of Firms
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Operational Performance Financial Performance
Profitability Revenue Conversion Collection Period Leverage Liquidity
Toyo Engineering Low Low High O.K. O.K.
Chiyoda Low O.K. O.K. High Total Debt Low
Kumagai Gumi O.K. Low High High Very Low
Kvaerner O.K. O.K. O.K. High Long-term Debt O.K.
Philipp Holzmann O.K. O.K. O.K. High Low
Stone & Webster O.K. Low O.K. O.K. O.K.
WGI O.K. O.K. O.K. O.K. O.K.
TABLE 3-6 Comparison of Operating and Financial Performance of Underperforming Firms
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Toyo Engineering Corporation
Toyo has suffered large liquidation losses for its financial subsidiary (TEC
International) in 1998 and operational losses in 1999. Signs of trouble are possibly
verified by the fact that financial institutions and foreign investors reduced their
shareholdings (as a percentage of total equity of the firm) from 34% in fiscal year 1997 to
11.4% in 2000; these institutional investors are more informed than individual investors
in general.
Other specific business factors include Toyo's lack of diversification. On average,
the firm has more than 80% of its revenue related to hydrocarbon processing industries
(HPI). HPI are known for their cyclical nature moving with global outlook of the energy
and oil & gas market. Incidentally, a downturn in large-scale plant investment in the
petroleum and petrochemical sector was experienced during that period. The late 1990s
also witnessed some transformation in the upstream, with major oil & gas companies
consolidating with numerous mergers and acquisitions. Pending for such restructuring,
many projects have been put on hold.
Geographically, Toyo also had more than 60% of its backlog tied up in South East
Asia, South West Asia and Africa. The market outlook in South East Asia was especially
bleak during the Asian Crisis.
Chiyoda
Net cash flow from operations (CFFO) has been consistently running negative
during fiscal years 1997 to 2000. Financial distress in Chiyoda culminated in capital
infusion by Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR) in 1999. Concurrently, a representative from
KBR has been elected as an executive vice-president. Number of shares outstanding
increased from 195 million to 248 million in that year. All these are clear signs of trouble.
In its annual report, Chiyoda claimed to have suffered from similar factors given
by Toyo related to the market outlook of HPI.
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Kumagai Gumi
Running with huge debt level, Kumagai Gumi was calling on its creditors to write
off some of its debt at the turn of the century. Together, Chiyoda and Kumagai Gumi
probably have the worst liquidity problem in the entire firm sample. Unlike Chiyoda,
however, Kumagai Gumi does not compete in HPI. It is also less internationalized, with
more than 90% of its revenue tied to the domestic construction market, 30% of which
involving works from the public sector. Essentially competing head-to-head with firms
larger than its size such as Kajima and Obayashi in the domestic market, Kumagai Gumi
consistently ran a negative corporate financing gap during the period. In other words, it
had been relying substantially on external capital to finance its ongoing operations and
investment needs. Given the lack of financial slack on its balance sheet, it is no surprise
to observe a distressed pattern for the firm.
Kvaerner
During the months of October and November 2001, Kvaerner was wrestling with
its two largest shareholders in securing a rescue package to save itself from bankruptcy.
Apparently, the two largest shareholders, Aker Maritime and Yukos Oil, had come out
with different financial restructuring plans. In fact, there had been a year-long stand-off
between Aker and Kvaerner when Aker initially planned to force through a merger of the
oil & gas operations in the two companies (Financial Times, 2001a,b, c). Such corporate
governance problem and restructuring opportunity (from Aker's point of view) remotely
echo the wave of hostile takeovers in the U.S. in the 1980's. Basically, Aker is no
different from the corporate raiders at that time which would seek to break up a
conglomerate such as Kvaerner and extract value from more profitable pieces of
operations.
In short, the cause of Kvaerner's problem could simply be due to excessive
diversification. This is best manifested by the fact that it has the highest difference
between GPM and OPM (see Figure 3-5), which implies significant inefficiencies within
the conglomerate. A study of its structure also reveals a number of overlapping activities
housed within related market segments. When Kvaerner started to divest loss-making
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operations such as shipbuilding and operations in the pulp and paper industry, it realized
that the exit costs are high and economically unjustifiable. The time coincided with a
broad market downturn, and assets have to be sold off at deeply discounted prices, not to
mention the difficulty of finding a credible buyer in the first place. To make things worse,
the divestment process called for lengthy negotiations, due diligence process, follow-up
and settlement completion, all of which adding tremendous strain on the management.
Philipp Holzmann
Throughout the study period, both net cash flow from operations and corporate
financing gap of Philipp Holzmann ran into negative figures. In November 1999,
Holzmann's problematic financial situation came to light when it also ended up with a
negative equity value for the fiscal year. At that time, the Group was able to escape
bankruptcy through internal financial restructuring when German Chancellor Gerhard
Schroder intervened and orchestrated discussions among key members from the Builders'
Union (IG BAU), the Central Works Council of Philipp Holzmann, and the major lending
banks. A subordinated, equity capital-replacing loan from the state-owned Reconstruction
Loan Corporation amounting to DM 150 million was also offered (Philipp Holzmann
Annual Report, 1999). Any hope of recovery, however, was curtailed when the firm
continued to record losses and finally became insolvent in March 2002.
To certain extent, Holzmann's cause of problem could be traced back to the mid-
1990's when the domestic construction market in Germany slowed down. It was only till
1997 - still with 62% of its revenue derived from the local market, that Holzmann started
to develop its U.S. operations to hasten geographical diversification. As of 2000, revenue
from the U.S. even exceeded that from Germany, making up 52% of its total revenue.
Similar to Kvaerner, Holzmann has high overhead costs, as illustrated by a total
of 40 branches within Germany itself and some 600 affiliated companies at home and
abroad by the end of 1999. It also experienced high exit costs to close down certain
operations, but this is largely due to tough negotiations entered to renegotiate layoff or
employment terms during the time of crisis. Redundancy-related exceptional charges are
often incurred in cushioning the social impact of job losses.
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An important lesson learnt from Holzmann's crisis is the significance of corporate
culture. In its Year 1999 Annual Report, Holzmann claimed that its worst financial crisis
in the 150-year history was due to:
(a) Initial insistence on volume growth at any price, which led to an emphasis
on major projects.
(b) As part of a series of moves to define itself as a project developer in such
major projects, it has chosen to take on rental guarantees and provide
preliminary financing.
(c) Eventually, the company was not prepared to take on such new business
roles and high level of economic risk when its historical culture and
success was founded on entrepreneurial spirit and technical realization of
construction projects.
Washington Group International (WGI) and Stone & Webster
Similar to Philipp Holzmann, these two U.S. companies also ended up with
bankruptcy filing under Chapter 11. Paradoxically, both of them do not show significant
problems in operating and financial metrics in Table 3-6 (in fact, WGI achieved
admirable profitability as shown in Table 3-4). Causes that triggered the bankruptcy of
these two companies are somehow unique, although it is also observed that both have
diversified extensively (e.g., WGI into mining operations; Stone & Webster into
refrigeration services and warehousing).
Stone & Webster ran into a substantial cash flow problem starting from 1998
when cost overrun was recorded for a few international lump sum contracts. The change
from 1997 to 1998 was sharp: net cash flow from operations drop from $83.2 million to
negative $72.5 million a year later; corporate financing gap went from $34.3 million to
negative $126.7 million. Defensive effort was finally pierced when construction delays at
a gas-fired power plant in Rhode Island forced it to take a $27.5 million charge in 2000.
On the other hand, WGI's case was triggered after pursuing some aggressive
moves in acquisitions. In fiscal year 1999 alone, net cash flow from investment ran
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deeply negative into $148.7 million, with $132 million out of this number being spent on
business acquisitions. In 2000, WGI consummated the acquisition of Raytheon Engineers
& Constructors, which eventually proved to be too large a deal to digest. The details of
this event are explained in the discussion of boundary issues in Chapter 5.
3.5.2.3 Prediction of Corporate Bankruptcy - the Altman's Z-Model
Armed with the previous identification of firms that have apparently failed or
underperformed relative to the others, it is interesting to explore whether there are tools
that would have raised the red flag prior to such debacles. As one of the common
methods used in the prediction of corporate bankruptcy, Edward Altman's Z-model
(1968) can be conveniently applied simply because most of the factors inherent in his
model (except for market value of equity) can be extracted from financial reports.
Without going into details about the derivation of the Altman's Z-model, below is
a summary of the essential components of the model:
Ratio used to Predict Bankruptcy Notations Weighting Attached
to Each Ratio
Working Capital / Total Assets X1  0.012
Retained Earnings / Total Assets X2 0.014
Earnings Before Interest & Taxes (EBIT) /X3 0.033
Total Assets
Market Value Equity / Book Value of Total Debt X4 0.006
Sales / Total Assets Xs 0.999
Overall Index, Z = 0.012 X, + 0.014 X2 + 0.033 X3 + 0.006 X4 + 0.999 X5
Note: In using the above formula, X1 through X4 should be expressed as absolute percentages, while X5
should be expressed as a ratio.
TABLE 3-7 Basic Components of the Altman's Z-Model
92
In his original study to derive this model, Altman found that a minimum value of
1.81 for the Z-score is required for safety. However, it should be mentioned that there
exists a "zone of ignorance" for Z-scores between 1.81 and 2.67 in his study, where
misclassifications of corporate bankruptcy category can occur.9
4.E
4.0
3.5r
3.0
2.5 E
2.0
1.
1.0
0.5 r
0.0
0.M
4.'
0
N
Cutoff
Level of 1.8
r . ...... N 7 0
0A 00
oE
(Clustered by each corresponding region; Arranged in descending order of Z-score)
FIGURE 3-13 Prediction of Bankruptcy for Firms using the Altman's Z-model
By applying the model to the sample firms in this research, the above graph
summarizes the Z-score calculated for each firm.10 If the cutoff value of 1.8 is strictly
applied to the above, some interesting observations can be made:
0 The "outperformers" in the U.S. and European regions (i.e. Halliburton;
Jacobs; Skanska; and Technip) have such high level of Z-scores that would
9 It should be mentioned at this point that "corporate bankruptcy" as implied by Altman's Z-model should
be referred to both technical insolvency (e.g. inability to meet cash obligation) and bankruptcy in the
formalistic, legal terms. This is analogous to the meaning of "failure" throughout this chapter. This
interpretation is further supported by the "classification chart" that will be presented in a moment.
10 Z-scores for GTM and RE&C have not been computed for obvious reasons: the former has merged with
SGE/Vinci, whereas the latter is a subsidiary of a larger corporation.
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undoubtedly imply a remote possibility of a bankruptcy problem.
" All Japanese firms in the sample have Z-scores that are below 1.8, thus posing
an obviously flawed conclusion that all these firms are facing potential
corporate bankruptcy.
* Only five out of the seven "underperformers" previously identified (i.e. WGI,
Kvaerner, Philipp Holzmann, Chiyoda, and Kumagai Gumi) are picked up by
the Z-model as facing potential bankruptcy danger.
* The model has, on the other hand, picked up some "moderate performers"
(such as Vinci and Bouygues) that actually did not show any signs of potential
dismal failure.
The conclusions on the effectiveness of the Altman's Z-model in predicting
corporate bankruptcy, as gathered from the above observations, are at best mixed. The
model has done a good job in isolating the "outperformers" from bankruptcy possibility,
but nonetheless does poorly in picturing the status of Japanese firms. Some plausible
explanations can be given to clarify on this second point.
After going so far in this chapter in setting the scene for financial analysis and
addressing accounting issues, the low Z-scores of the Japanese firms are obviously
explained by their propensity to report low profitability (which affects X3 and possibly X2
in the long run) and relatively high level of "leverage" (which affects X4). Furthermore,
Altman originally developed the parameters and weightings of the model using only U.S.
firms. Cross application of this model to foreign firms is obviously questionable, let alone
using a similar (and subjective) cutoff mark! Even if an analyst believes that the
fundamental relationship between bankruptcy and the associated factors remain
unchanged and transferable, the cutoff mark that signals a financial distress for Japanese
firm should be a lower value than 1.8.11
As for the third and fourth points, an initial explanation that can be given to
defend the Z-model is that no statistical model is perfect and some misclassifications
" Given that two of the "big five" in Japan, namely, Kajima and Obayashi, do not seem to fare well in
terms of Z-score, an assumption of similarity in fundamental relationship in Japan should be challenged.
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should be expected. In order to explore this statement further, the results are arranged in a
classification chart or "accuracy-matrix" similar to the format presented in Altman's
original paper. In effect, the results are arranged in two different tables: one by
interpreting "bankruptcy" strictly as a legalistic process; the other being interpreted as
equivalent to "failure" as defined for the case of the seven firms identified in this chapter.
Due to their low (and probably unreliable) Z-scores, the eight Japanese firms have been
left out.
Predicted Category
"Formalistic" Bankruptcy
(using 1.8 as cutoff mark)
Bankrupt Not Bankrupt
7 Bankrupt 1 1
< Not Bankrupt 6 6
(a) Results Cassified according to Actual Bankruptcy in the Formalistic, Legal sense
Predicted Category
Failure / Underperformance
(using 1.8 as cutoff mark)
Failed Not Failed
i Failed 3 1
Not Failed 4 6
(b) Results Classified according to Failure (Broader Interpretation of 'Bankrupt'")
Predicted Category
Bankrupt Not Bankrupt
' Bankrupt Right Conclusion Type I Error
Not Bankrupt Type II Error Right ConclusionU
(c) Statistical IMlications
FIGURE 3-14 Accuracy-matrices for Results of Z-model
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Figure 3-14(a) seems to imply that the predictive power of the Z-model is not
very impressive, with 50% of the firms being misclassified. However, when the
interpretation of "bankruptcy" is broadened to include both technical insolvency and
other potential indications of failure consistent the earlier definition in this chapter (which
affects "actual category" in Figure 3-14(b)), the predictive power has improved to 64%.
Thus, this supports the view that the Z-model is more suited for signaling signs of
financial distress rather than predicting whether a firm would ultimately seek protection
under the Bankruptcy Act. This is especially true for governance structure that would
allow influential debt or equity holders to bailout a company and avoid formalistic
bankruptcy - although the company could very well be experiencing financial distress or
technical insolvency.
As far as misclassification is concerned, the Z-model seems to err more on Type
II error (i.e. accepting the null hypothesis - "this firm is bankrupt", when it is actually
false) rather than Type I error. This implies that an analyst is more likely to make a
wrong conclusion when the computed Z-score is low (hence inferring that a firm has
failed) as compared to the situation when the computed Z-score is high.
Obviously, a more concrete conclusion can only be arrived with a larger sample
size (given the fact that only 14 data points are available in this case).
3.5.2.4 "Beta" as a Proxy for Risk
The notion of "beta" long forms the cornerstone of the Capital Asset Pricing
Model (CAPM) (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965; Mossin, 1966), which serves as a proxy for
"systematic" risk, or simply, how capital (equity and debt) and operating assets are
correlated to the market risk. For the firm sample, it is thought that firms that have failed
or under-performed might have been exposed to a more risky operating environment and
would be indicated by a higher value of asset beta (although as will be seen, the riskiness
of an equity holder's position is a separate matter).
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Firms ranked by Equity P Firms ranked Unlevered P
Equity Beta by asset beta
Kvaerner 1.479 Halliburton 0.48
Bouygues 1.387 Technip 0.25
Halliburton 1.161 Bouygues 0.25
Ho-lzman 1.115 Kvaerer 0.25
TOYO 1.110 JGC 0.20
Chiyoda 1.036 Toyo -0.20
ai Gumi 0.977 McDermott 0.19
McDermott 0.862 Jacobs 0.17
AMEC 0.852 AMEC 0.14
Penta-Ocean 0.838 Skanska 0.13
Obayashi 0.828 Nishimatsu 0.12
Technip 0.824 Obayashi 0.12
Kajima 0.770 Penta-Ocean 0.11
Vinci 0.719 Foster Wheeler 0.09
JGC 0.702 Jolzmann 0.08
Foster Wheeler 0.665 Kajima 0.08
Nishimatsu 0.597 yoda 0.07
Skanska 0.434 Vinci 0.06
Jacobs 0.429 Kumagai Gumi 0.05
TABLE 3-8 Equity and Asset (Unlevered) Betas of Firms
Table 3-8 has been produced to examine if this hypothesis is valid.' The five
firms shaded in gray are those that have been previously identified as "under-
performers". On the left-hand side of the table, these "under-performers" appear to
cluster around a higher level of equity beta. Thus, preliminary evidence seems to support
the hypothesis if risk assessment concerns only the equity holder. After controlling for
different capital structures by unlevering (assuming that beta for debt is approximately
zero - an assumption that is commonly used in such procedure), the ranking of these
firms becomes dispersed. Apparently, the high level of equity risk is due to high leverage
rather than riskiness of the operating assets themselves.
12 Due to different events, beta values for Stone & Webster, WGI, Fluor, Raytheon E&C and GTM are
either not meaningful or unavailable. The first two firms have filed for bankruptcy; Fluor's equity has been
trading as "new" shares after the spin-off of AT Massey; beta for RE&C as a subsidiary of a larger
corporation is hard to assess; while GTM has long merged with SGE/Vinci. Inclusion of data for these
firms are only meaningful when beta values before these events occurred are obtainable.
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Lastly, by definition, beta only relates to market risk. Total risk (which includes
idiosyncratic risk specific to a firm) is more meaningful for analytical purposes of
strategy. As will be mentioned in Chapter Five, the expected volatility of equity option of
a firm can be used as an indication of the riskiness of assets or firm operations, although
this parameter would still be distorted by the effect of leverage.
3.5.3 MAJOR CONCLUSIONS AND IMPACT ON THE DERIVATION OF
CONCEPTUAL MODEL
From the discussions of factors contributing to underperformance, apparently
there is no single trend of failures that can be determined. In short, firms fail for different
reasons. One might have performed tremendously well in some categories of indicators,
but fail simply because it has overlooked one or two other critical factors. WGI, for
example, has been making relatively good profit margin and adopting a conservative
capital structure; yet it still could not escape the fate of seeking Chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection.
Likewise, in the process of building the conceptual model as elaborated in the
next two chapters, factors that contribute to the success of good performers are diverse,
and there is no single company that places itself at the top in all measures. Based on the
outlook presented from Figure 3-4 to 3-12 and other data given in Appendix B for all
firms, one can easily verified that successful companies do not consistently provide a
near-perfect performance outlook at all times.
Simply put, there is more than a single formula towards success. This argument
can be examined by looking at the frequently debated issue of focus versus
diversification. In Table 3-9, based on the activities of each firm as mapped out in the
Market Segmentation Matrix component of the template, firms are classified into three
categories as defined in the table. It is immediately obvious that there are
underperformers in all categories, and outperformers are not constrained to only one
category as well (although it should be observed that the "most diversified" category still
does not seem to be favorable to outperformers)! A second example can be given on size.
Referring back to Table 3-4, the six outperformers identified in this table come from
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different range of total asset values. This refutes certain rhetorical statements such as "big
is beautiful" or "the small and nimble speeds past inflexible behemoths".
Focus and/or Differentiated Broader Target Most Diversified
SSingle vertical market; Multil vriamarkets; Multiple vertical markets,
Limited OR multiple roles in a Limited role in most of the Multiple roles in most of the
single value system value systems value systems
Firm Rating Firm Rating Firm Rating
Halliburton 0 Jacobs 0 Bouygues M
Technip 0 Penta-Ocean 0 Vinci M
McDermott M Nishimatsu 0 Groupe GTM M
Foster Wheeler M AMEC M Fluor M
Toyo U Kajima M Stone & Webster U
Obayashi M WGI U
Kumagai Gumi U Kvaerner U
Holzmann U
Ghiyeda - - Chiyoda U
Skanska 0 4 - Skanska
Raytheon M 4 - Raytheea
JGC - - JGC M
Note:
1) It is noticed that Chiyoda, Skanska, Raytheon and JGC has moved from one category to another around
the study period. For example, Raytheon Engineers & Constructors (RE&C) originally joined others
(Raytheon Systems, Raytheon Commercial Electronics and Raytheon Aircraft) as part of the larger
Raytheon Company - hence developing a fully diversified profile. Subsequent to its sale to WGI, RE&C
alone became isolated as a conventional engineering and construction firm under the "Broader Target"
category.
2) Diversification can generally be pursued along a few dimensions - industrial market segments;
geographical regions; and types/nature of clients served. The definition of the third category in the table -
"Most Diversified", refers only to the dimension along industrial market segments. Firms fall under this
category may experience different degrees of diversification along the other two dimensions.
TABLE 3-9 Classification of Firms consistent with Market Segmentation
Matrices
All the evidence, observations and conclusions determined in this chapter thus
link back to the earlier call for a "open, generic" conceptual model. This can be
succinctly described by two major points:
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(1) Firms, especially in the construction business, have to consistently check
on the downside risks of ALL measures - operational, financial, business,
environmental factors and others. It might take only one or two critical
factors to initiate a crisis.
(2) On the other hand, there are numerous routes towards success. Critical
success factors can be derived from all areas of financial, operational,
technological, human-related, and others. This argument essentially
makes up the form of the conceptual model in Chapter Four.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Re-conceptualizing Strategy, and Linking it All Together
"While there are no generally successful strategies, there are some general
principles of strategic planning that can improve performance."
- Sharon M. Oster (1999)
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4.1 Introduction - Toward a Generic Model
This chapter and the next formally outlines the components and propositions of
the conceptual model. Given the diversity of firm characteristics, causes of success and
failure, and continuous debate in the various schools of theories, an optimal solution and
methodology arguably does not exist. As there are few absolutes then, a format akin to
that of a contingency model is adopted, rather than falsifying a step-by-step approach
towards successful corporate strategy. In other words, the use of the model is situational,
depending on specific internal issues and external factors faced by corporate executives at
a particular point in time. In view of this objective, the model should be generic enough
to be useful in differing circumstances, yet sufficiently specific to identify critical issues
and principles to react to dynamically competitive forces.
The starting point of the basic model realizes that any discussions of corporate
strategy should always go parallel with the mechanisms within an organization, as
depicted in Figure 4-1. Within corporate strategy and organization, there are distinctive
components anchoring each of the two areas and driving the interaction between them.
These individual components will be explored in sequence.
CORPORATE ORGANIZATION
STRATEGY
FIGURE 4-1 Two-way Flow between Corporate Strategy and Organization
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4.2 Inside Corporate Strategy - The Seven Strategic Fields
To keep the model open and flexible, the corporate strategy main stream has been
decomposed into seven 'strategic fields' as shown below 13:
Business
Strategy
Financial Operational
Strategy Strategy
CORPORATE
STRATEGY
Human IT
Resource Strategy
Strategy
Technology Marketing
Strategy Strategy
FIGURE 4-2
Supporting
Activities
{
Seven Strategic Fields of Corporate Strategy
Firm Infrastructure
Human Resource Management
Technology Development ;
=_ Procurement
Inbound
Logistics
Operations Outbound
Logistics
Marketing
& Sales
Service
Primary Activities
FIGURE 4-3 Porter's Generic Value Chain Model
[Sources: Porter (1985)]
13 Throughout the thesis, the seven fields are italicized to distinguish their roles in this conceptual model
from their meanings in a more general context.
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At first sight, it may appear that the concept bears some similarities to those value
activities presented in Porter's (1985) value chain concept, hereby reproduced in Figure
4-3. For example, the two supporting activities of "Human Resource Management" and
"Technology Development" in Figure 4-3 might seem to resemble the Human Resource
Strategy and Technology Strategy fields in Figure 4-2. Yet, the crucial difference lies on
the perception of the scope of the strategic fields. Ever since the value chain concept was
developed in the 1980's, individual strategic fields as defined in Figure 4-2 have grown
to capture new levels of importance. In effect, all of them rightly claim to be separate,
major components within the realm of corporate strategy. Instead of merely serving as
value activities and drawing attention on the identification of cost and unique drivers, the
strategic fields have practically evolved into broad disciplines that dictate separate
strategic planning and execution consideration. The key then becomes how to integrate
these fields effectively to arrive at an overall coherent corporate strategy.
For example, technology development is far from being just a "supporting
activity" as in Figure 4-3. In the 1990's, numerous small, nimble firms evolved that
mainly concentrated in selling technological products or technical knowledge and strove
without putting heavy investment in the physical distribution process of the products.
These firms rightly reverse the definition of "primary" and "supporting" functions from
their perspectives. In short, comparing with Figure 4-3, the proposed concept in Figure 4-
2 leaves the question open to individual firms as for the determination of the relative
importance of these strategic fields.
Whereas many of these strategic fields are broad disciplines with a wide scope of
activities, some are more closely linked to corporate strategy than the others. Therefore,
contingent upon the outlook of a particular firm, an advertising campaign may be less
related to corporate strategy. For others that perceive it as part of brand management and
reputation building process (such as being a new entrant in a new market), these activities
are far from being routine. A brief description of the common issues that are pertinent to
each strategic field is given to provide a more concrete picture of its scope.
14 A good piece of evidence is that most business schools nowadays offer separate courses (especially for
inner-depth studies) for each of these fields after a general treatment of strategic management in an
introductory subject.
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4.2.1 BUSINESS STRATEGY
The distinction between "business" and "corporate" strategy is often made.
Frequently, business strategy is referred as strategies adopted to ensure successful
ventures of individual business units, whereas corporate strategy concerns the operations
of the entire firm. This distinction is obviously consistent with the model, as Business
Strategy remains as only one of the seven core fields of the overall structure.
As perhaps the most popular field among researchers and theorists, Business
Strategy formally deals with the development of competitive advantages and core
competencies. In particular, Porter's (1980, 1985) techniques such as the determination of
unique and cost drivers; the "Five Forces" model; and market segmentation matrix are
still proven to be some of the most useful tools in formulating Business Strategy. Other
theorists choose to forget about rhetorics and instead resolve to addressing simple (yet
subtle) fundamental questions such as "what market are we in?" and "what values are we
creating for our customers?".1 5
In short, Business Strategy is traditionally the primary area of concern. It focuses
on the products and services that the firm could offer, should offer or is targeting to offer.
4.2.2 FINANCIAL STRATEGY
No business ventures can operate without consideration of financial issues. There
are two fundamental aspects in Financial Strategy: investment decisions and financing
decisions.
On investment decisions, firms are confronted with the challenges of capital
budgeting and financial resource allocation. In order to make better decisions of
investments, managers have to select the appropriate tools for project analysis and
evaluation, which include the Net Present Value (NPV) method, decision tree analysis,
portfolio planning and the real option approach. The main principles behind these tools
15 The oftentimes related question of "how are we going to deliver these created values" is more
specifically concerned with process. This is classified under Operational Strategy in the conceptual model.
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are mostly built on the understanding of relationship between risk and return.
Financing decisions are concerned with issues of capital structure. Firms have to
understand the relative pros and cons of using various kinds of debt and equity
instruments in raising capital and the corporate governance structure associated with
these financing decisions. For example, simple capital structures usually reduce
restructuring costs. Complex structures with a combination of secured private debt and
numerous subordinated public debt issues have been found to be strong impediments to
out-of-court negotiations and settlements (Asquith et al., 1994). Arguably, in Philipp
Holzmann's first escape from bankruptcy in 1999 (see Chapter 3), having a relatively
small number of primary stakeholders might have facilitated a smoother negotiation
process (albeit it should not be forgotten that in this case a substantial extent of political
influence was also present).
Modern corporate financial theories on investments and capital structure have also
been revolutionized by an increased understanding of issues concerning real options,
financial distress, managerial agency problem and risk management. In providing the
detailed mechanics within these areas, Grinblatt and Titman (1998) also showed how
these could impact corporate strategy as a whole.
In the context of construction industry, conventional contractual elements such as
surety bonds and insurance policies are closely related to Financial Strategy. For
example, strong balance sheet is one of the primary necessities to continually secure
surety bonds for ongoing project procurements. Reliance on insurance for risk transfer is
also intrinsically linked to risk management policies of a firm.
Lastly, some major construction firms have gone beyond the use of Financial
Strategy as a mere internal tool. In effect, these firms offer their knowledge and network
relationships in this area as additional services to clients in terms of structuring
innovative financial packages.
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4.2.3 OPERATIONAL STRATEGY
Operational Strategy is primarily concerned with execution and implementation -
how firms manage their operational processes to convert different inputs into the final
products or services sold to their customers or clients. These activities might include the
inbound and outbound logistics, procurement functions, production and manufacturing
processes for physical products and other procedures for services. For contractors, these
activities are analogous to most project management functions such as material
procurement, physical construction of the structure, and the management of labor and
machinery. Likewise, service firms utilize their expertise and knowledge to assist clients
in achieving their needs and goals, such as performing planning, design and engineering
functions.
As mentioned at the beginning of this thesis, research efforts in civil engineering
traditionally focus on mostly pure technical areas (as in engineering design and analysis)
or management issues at the project level. Therefore, going by the scope definition of
strategic fields in this conceptual model, most of the knowledge developed by
conventional research efforts is directly related to Operational Strategy. However, it is
important to realize that common issues addressed by civil engineers often go beyond the
boundary of Operational Strategy. For example, project execution onsite calls for a basic
control of quality, costs and time. However, quality, costs and time can be profoundly
affected by technological factors, which are in fact related to the kind of Technology
Strategy that the firm has all along been adopting. Project costs also bear an impact on
cash flow at the corporate level, the sufficiency of which is again related to a specific
Financial Strategy pursued. In addition, the choice of project delivery methods not only
has an impact on physical executions, but also greatly influenced by both Business and
Technology Strategies. Many cases illustrated by Miller (2002) strongly reflect these
characteristics.
Obviously, the conceptual model embraces the fact that there are at least six other
core fields to consider for corporate strategy to create more chances of success. The
model is thus consistent with the basic hypothesis of this thesis.
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4.2.4 TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY
Tatum (1988) effectively suggests five possible technology-based strategies for
construction firms: borrowing and applying technology from other industries; using
technology for efficiency gains; specializing in construction technology R&D; creating
an organization structure that demands better technical solutions; and using technology
for forward and backward technical integration. All said, choices made on the type of
technology development, and the means through which the development is being carried
out, still remain as the most basic questions in Technology Strategy. Besides, it is also
useful to examine three other important issues that are commonly encountered.
The first typical question in Technology Strategy that has withstood the test of age
is the notion of "pioneer versus follower". Not surprisingly, whether one should be at the
'bleeding edge' of the technology wave as a first mover is always a tough decision to
make. This is especially true when the trend of technology is shaped by uncertain
environmental factors. In the case of technology development in power generation, for
example, there is still no clear winner among the various technologies corresponding to
the different kind of fuel sources - coal, natural gas, hydropower, nuclear power, non-
conventional renewable energies (wind, solar, tidal) and others. When environmental,
economic, technical and political factors are to be considered collectively, each of these
stands a chance to emerge as the eventual winner(s).
In the old days, many firms managed to establish operational advantage by
achieving economies of scale through vertical integration. Nonetheless, it is not clear if
scale and integration will still provide advantage in terms of technology development in
these days. For example, Chesbrough and Teece (1996) define innovations as either
autonomous or systemic, each of which will determine the appropriate alternative
between outsourcing and internalized technology development. Thus, if technological
innovation for a particular process or product has to be driven by integrating functions
along a value chain, it is more inclined to be systemic and scale and integration may
provide distinctive advantage. The converse, however, is also true.
Third, firms also have to assess the relative importance between basic and applied
research in order to allocate resources accordingly. This importance is well illustrated by
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the structure of Kajima Corporation, which houses most of its R&D efforts in two
different groups - the Technical Research Institute (TRI) and the Advanced Technology
Departments that are directly related to different market divisions (refer to Kajima's data
set in Appendix B). While the latter group is more oriented towards developing
applications in each respective market, the former group focuses more on basic
research. 16
It is evident that the answers to most of the questions above are contingent upon
corporate strategy as a whole.
4.2.5 INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (IT) STRATEGY
In the conceptual model, IT Strategy is separated from Technology Strategy.
Specifically, IT Strategy focuses mainly on the use of technology to leverage information
to a firm's advantage rather than other types of technology development in general in
Technology Strategy. This distinction is justified by the fact that information technology
has grown into an important market sector and research area by itself since mid-i 990s.
Similar to the other fields that get increasing in scope, it is necessary to trim down
the "bells and whistles" of IT in the conceptual model. Basically, emphasis is directed
towards building a stronger appreciation of how IT can provide an impact on corporate
strategy rather than muddling in the technological aspects per se. To achieve this, it is
firstly essential to grasp a sense of the current state and the role of IT within the
construction industry. Appendix E provides a brief overview and discussion on this.
To establish the linkage between IT and corporate strategy, Ross and Rockart's
(1999) "IT Infrastructure Pyramid" model is very insightful (Figure 4-4). The model
basically suggests that the upper level components are built upon the lower ones, with
corporate strategy being the cornerstone of all the others. In Ross and Rockart's opinion,
IT-related components (Systems, IT Infrastructure and IT Architecture) should be utilized
as an "enabler" to connect the corporate strategy of a firm with its operational processes.
16 This piece of information is gathered from an interview with Koji Kato, an engineer from the Civil
Engineering Design Division of Kajima Corporation. Mr. Kato's contribution is gratefully acknowledged.
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From the viewpoint of the conceptual model as proposed in this thesis then, IT Strategy is
a critical field that closely interacts with Operational Strategy to shape up part of the
overall corporate strategy of the firm.
Process
Systems
IT Infrastructure
IT Architecture
Corporate Strategy
FIGURE 4-4 The IT Infrastructure Pyramid
Incidentally, an "enabler" should not be confused with a "driver" of corporate
strategy. From the overview given in Appendix E, it is clear that the current trend of IT
investments and implementations within the construction industry appears to follow very
fuzzy goals. Too often, participants from the industry (at least during the initial era)
investing in IT have forgotten their original identity as firms that provide construction
services, thereby putting their core competitive advantages at stake. In most cases, these
investments are lacking in terms of establishing linkages between processes and
corporate strategy in the long run. True enough, anything that is preceded by an "E-" had
stimulated capital infusion especially from venture capitalists during the late 1990's.
However, since the 'crash' of technology stocks in May 2001, those days are over.
Rationality, once again, has come back to reign.
Similar to the arguments in Technology Strategy, the question of outsourcing
versus internalization is dependent upon how IT Strategy can be managed to link
processes with corporate strategy and should be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Since
individual firm strategy is (and should be) unique, it is often difficult to manage the
development process in collaboration with external parties. Likewise, although
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purchasing "off-the-shelf' platforms and systems available in the market would turn out
to be a less costly and risky option, these might be found to be too generic in nature if the
intention is to utilize IT to support long-term competitive advantages.
4.2.6 HUMAN RESOURCE (HR) STRATEGY
This is a field that constantly encounters 'soft' issues. It should not be confused
with the usual strategy of manpower deployment among different sites or resource
allocation for different work tasks of a project - these issues are more related to
Operational Strategy. In essence, HR Strategy is more concerned about aspects of
managing the organization's human assets. This often turns out to be a daunting task,
which requires due consideration of internal and external issues. These issues include, but
are not limited to:
(i) Personnel management (e.g., training programs; job rotation among
functions and regions);
(ii) Industrial relations (e.g. employment law; union-management
relationship; negotiation tactics and strategy);
(iii) Incentives and compensation policies and systems;
(iv) Restructuring concerns (e.g. downsizing)
Simply put, the goal of HR Strategy is to have an effective system for obtaining
(recruiting), training, mobilizing, and managing the organization's human assets to
systematically carry out business operations and new ventures.
4.2.7 MARKETING STRATEGY
As the terminology implies, Marketing Strategy requires one to look at the entire
marketing mix in light of the strategy of a firm. To certain extent, the conventional "Four
P's" concept of Product, Price, Place and Promotion in marketing management is still
relevant in every sense, though the change in environment (especially technology and the
Internet) has redefined the boundary and meaning of each of these components. With a
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tremendous overlap with Business Strategy, this field is especially important in designing
products that create value and also signaling the value of the product or services offered
by the firm in order to demand a premium. As Porter (1985) would aptly comment,
differentiation is meaningless unless customers are able to perceive the value added in the
product to suit their unique needs. To achieve all these, firms need to identify both needs
(demand) and resources (supply factors) and choose the most efficient selling formats.
In short, among many others, some common corporate involvement in Marketing
Strategy includes: umbrella branding and reputation building; logistics issues (thus
supply chain management can be perceived as an overlap between Operational and
Marketing Strategies); cross-selling (by using shared sales forces) versus focused
promotion strategy; and gathering information about customer needs.
4.3 The Internal Mechanisms of Organization
Similar to the fields of strategy, there are several components that are critical to
the functioning of an organization. The few aspects that receive the most attention are
organizational structure, corporate culture, organizational development and
transformation. All these belong to (or are at least closely related to) the study of
organizational behavior, an applied behavioral science that is built upon contributions
from disciplines such as psychology, sociology, anthropology and political science
(Robbins, 1998). By tracing the roots, it is evident that corporate strategy has some
overlapping foundations with the study of organization. As mentioned at the beginning of
this chapter, corporate strategy always goes parallel with the internal mechanisms of
organization - both form the heart and soul of a corporation.
For the purpose of the conceptual model, the internal mechanisms of an
organization are confined to only two fundamental and complementary components:
organizational structure and corporate culture. Unlike organizational development and
transformation, these two mechanisms are the most basic and quintessential mechanisms
for an organization to function. In contrast, issues on organizational development and
transformation focus more on the element of change over a particular time horizon, rather
112
than the day-to-day functioning of the organization. Furthermore, change is usually
initiated by external environmental forces, and these issues are more appropriately
perceived as emerging from firm boundary modification (discussed in Chapter Five).
Therefore, organizational development and transformation are more contingent in nature,
as opposed to being the basic mechanisms of a firm.
While it may seem intuitive that structure is the formal mechanism of governance
and culture is the informal opposite, in reality these two can exist separately in both
formal and informal ways. Some examples are given in Figure 4-5 to illustrate how
structure and culture can exist in both formal and informal ways. It is also necessary at
this point to mention the perceived difference between HR Strategy and the two internal
mechanisms of organization. Despite the intrinsic links that exist among them, the unit of
analysis in HR Strategy is mainly the individuals, whereas structure and culture are
basically elements capturing group level and organization systems level dynamics.17 That
said, since the behavior of individuals and groups are profoundly affected by the
corporate environment that is housing them, it is sometimes difficult to draw an exact
line. Conceptually though, the more variables one can identify, the more flexibility and
options one would have for strategy formulation.
Structure
ORGANIZATION
Culture
FIGURE 4-5 Internal Mechanisms of Organization
17 Readers can refer to Figure 1-8 in Robbins (1998) for a concrete diagrammatic representation.
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FORMAL INFORMAL
Grouping and Linking Empowerment,
Example: Decentralization
A Matrix Structure Example:
A Network Structure
Artifacts, Espoused Values Basic Assumptions
(Schein, 1992) (Schein, 1992)
Example: Example:
Missions, credos, goals Trusts, beliefs, norms
4.3.1 FIRM STRUCTURE
Designing and structuring an organization is a complex task. Frameworks on
structure as proposed by past researchers are useful in formalizing tasks, grouping
members into effective teams, and linking these various processes and teams to produce
the final output of a firm. The gaps that exist within the system of formal authority in an
organizational structure are often filled by the system of informal and social
communication flow.
Structural Prime Key Part of Type of
Configuration Coordinating Organization Decentralization
Mechanism
Simple Structure Direct Strategic apex Vertical and horizontal
supervision centralization
Machine Bureaucracy Standardization Technostructure Limited horizontal
of work processes decentralization
Professional Standardization Operating core Vertical and horizontal
Bureaucracy of skills decentralization
Divisionalized Form Standardization Middle line Limited vertical
of outputs decentralization
Adhocracy Mutual Support staff Selective
adjustment decentralization
TABLE 4-1 Mintzberg's Configuration Hypothesis
[Source: Mintzberg (1979)]
In his "configuration hypothesis", Mintzberg (1979) postulated that effective
organizations have to achieve an internal consistency among their design parameters,
hence developing a logical configuration of these parameters as presented in Table 4-1.
Essentially, Mintzberg proposed that firms exist in one of the forms of structural
configurations and adopt the matching primary coordinating mechanism. Firms also
choose ways to delegate (or aggregate) decision making authority to some levels,
resulting in the distribution (or concentration) of power within certain parts of an
organization. Mintzberg's framework is a useful starting point to understand the interplay
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between formal and informal structure. As an illustration, one might interpret that
"machine bureaucracy" is based more heavily on a formal structure, while the
"adhocracy" relies more on an informal structure to accomplish an activity.
However, it is fair to say that large multinational firms in these days need not
necessarily fit themselves neatly into all the 'fives' presented above. The informal
communication flow that drives an "adhocracy" configuration, for example, might play
an important, complementary part even within a "machine bureaucracy" that adopts a
strict functional structure. In other words, it is essential for firms that have adopted a
primary configuration to look beyond and learn about the coordinating mechanisms that
have driven the other configurations into effect. By adopting this mindset, firms would be
able to strike a balance between both formal and informal structure and leverage on the
relative advantages of both.
Ultimately, it is important to realize that a chosen structure is simply a means to
achieve the ends of producing something that is valuable to the customers. The structure
hence serves as a bridge to deliver the value created in the first place by adopting some
prescribed Business Strategy. In the course of settling on a chosen structure to deliver
these values, firms typically face various tradeoffs that many researchers have brought
out. Figure 4-6 illustrates these tradeoffs by showing a continuum of structures that a firm
can adopt, depending on its propensity towards functional focus or market/product focus.
For multinational firms, the complexity adds on with a third dimension of geography in
the process of developing an organizational structure.
In the firm sample, all of these three forms of structure commonly appear as either
the primary or secondary setting. Incidentally, some firms also pursue a fourth dimension
of client (not shown in Figure 4-6) nowadays, particularly those that have key accounts or
repeated business from a few major clients. The presence and significance of these
structural forms is discussed next.
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Functional
Focus
1
2
3
4
5
Market/Product
Focus
Geography
LEGEND : (Definitions of 2, 3, and 4 are drawn from Wheelwright and Clark (1992))
I Functional silos, each with clear defined disciplines such as engineering,
marketing, financial planning etc.
2 "Li2htwei2ht" team structure with liaisons "volunteered" from each functional
department to coordinate the workflow in delivering a specific product or
executing a certain project.
3 "Heavywei2ht" team / matrix structure with project managers or process
owners who have the authority to draw resources from each of the functional
departments or coordinate with the functional heads to deliver a specific product
or execute a certain project.
4 Autonomous or "Ti2er" team with individuals from the different functional
departments formally assigned and dedicated to accomplish a specific project that
is usually temporary in nature.
5 Process-based settin2 or Product teams, which, unlike the "tiger" team, is more
permanent in nature and emphasizes on the delivery process of a particular
product. Thus whereas the functional silos leverage the vertical depth of
functional expertise, the process-based setting counts on a seamless horizontal
flow of making the product. The product teams have a cross-functional mix, and
many have argued that this is more amenable to product innovation.
FIGURE 4-6 The Dilemma of Structural Configuration
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4.3.1.1 Outlook of Structure for the Firm Sample
Table 4-2(a) to 4-2(c) (on page 121 through 123) summarize the information
related to structure that is gathered from the analytical template of the firms. Since
information is mostly available at the corporate level, the focus is limited to the aggregate
setting, although it is conjectured that microstructures would exist within these larger
settings.
For half of the firms, a single primary structural form can be observed. This is
specified explicitly in the tables. Occasionally, a 'special' division, adopting a setting
other than the primary one, also exists (as in the case of Foster Wheeler). Such divisions
are marked by the symbol 'v". For the other half of the firms (especially the Japanese
firms), a multidimensional or hybrid alignment is more prominent. All dimensions are
perceived as being given more or less equal weighting, and thus all of them are denoted
by the symbol '/'. Further clarification is given under the "Comments" column.
The outlook given in Table 4-2(a) to 4-2(c) is interesting. Firstly, the earlier
comment on the fourth dimension centering upon client can be observed in firms such as
Fluor, McDermott and WGI, which have indeed set up separate divisions to handle
projects associated with specific clients. Such clients include the Department of Energy
(DOE) and the Department of Defense (DOD), for which Fluor Corporation has set up its
Government Services Operating Company; McDermott with its Babcock & Wilcox
Government Group; and WGI with its Morrison Knudsen and Westinghouse Government
Services companies. In general, the operations of divisions dedicated to serve specific
clients can range from the provision of liaison interface to fully functional capabilities in
seeing through the project from inception till completion.
In broad terms, it also seems that firms from each region tend to adopt a particular
dominant form of structure. All the U.S. firms in the sample are prone to adopt
market/product divisions as their primary setting. On the other hand, the Japanese firms
seem to have inclination towards a multidimensional or hybrid setting. The outlook for
the European firms is probably mixed, although market/product focus is slightly more
prominent.
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Intuitively, this outlook could be shaped by a complex interaction of various
systemic factors (historical, cultural etc.) consistent with the Systemic school of thoughts
(recall Chapter 2). The following comments are nonetheless plausible explanations:
(1) The fact that the U.S. has a larger domestic market means that venturing
overseas is an option rather than a must. Foreign subsidiaries are probably
viewed as appendages, and companies are more inclined to set up structure
that centers upon market and products.
(2) Although many European firms have far smaller domestic markets as
compared to the U.S., the regional effect of the European Union market
has probably influenced the adoption of the market/product setting as the
primary structural setting.
(3) Two exceptions nonetheless stand out among the European firm sample -
Philipp Holzmann and Skanska, both of which seem to place a heavy
emphasis on geographical setting as the first layer. A more detailed study
reveals some specific reasons. For Philipp Holzmann, the firm would have
liked to separate the U.S. operations from the domestic ones, since the
market outlook in these two countries differs vastly in the past few years.
The fact that Philipp Holzmann was able to grow its U.S. businesses
despite a slump in the German market is mostly owed to the natural
isolation effect of the geographical setting. On the other hand, a
geographical setting is also amenable to Skanska's acquisition strategy
and venture into new markets. Effectively, it implies "grab it first,
integrate later".
(4) The settlement on a hybrid structure could be due to a constant pull of the
three different dimensions. On the functional side, the Japanese firms
spend the most percentage of their revenues on research and development
as compared to the U.S. and European counterparts. This naturally sets up
a functional setting to isolate the department. Emphasis on technical
knowledge at large has also allocated much power to functional managers
that erect invisible walls among the 'silos'. On geography, many Japanese
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contractors have ventured into the South East Asia more than three
decades ago. The current slump in the domestic market can only reinforce
the importance and autonomy of overseas operations. Lastly, with a scale
of operation that is essentially the largest among all construction firms,
these firms have traditionally operated in different markets, serving their
role as part of the keiretsu family. The improved time-to-market and
product focus given by product divisions are certainly attractive features.
In short, most Japanese seek to balance the need in these three dimensions
in their organizational structure.
Just as there is no optimal configuration among the strategic fields, a perfect
organizational structure is illusive. Some contemporary practitioners praise product teams
for their great responsiveness to market condition and customers' needs. It is also true
that the structure of product teams (or at the aggregate level, a division with multiple
product teams within a single market segment) lends itself to profit & loss (P&L)
performance evaluation and accountability - something that is harder to achieve with a
functional setting. On the other hand, bureaucracy embedded within a functional
hierarchical structure does serve its purpose of increasing control over specific resources
(especially technical secrecy), and a functional setting is more amenable to the
development of technical expertise within a specific discipline.
Similarly, having peripheral geographical units poses both advantages and
disadvantages. In terms of benefits, geographical units are relatively easier to be disposed
or downsized when market turns sour. Exiting from a certain geographical market is
potentially less chronic, less painful and even less costly than pulling out from a market
segment altogether. Furthermore, it is also easier to consolidate a few geographical
operations into one, as opposed to integrating product and functional divisions.
Conversely, the disadvantage of a geographical setting obviously lies in its failure to pool
knowledge and expertise under one roof in order to create innovative solutions for
complex problems.
Thus, depending on the context of corporate strategy, it is hard to conclude which
structural form is more superior. The study and categorization of structural forms adopted
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by firms in the sample confirms the point that a single prominent, ideal structure probably
does not exist. Firms have adopted different forms of structure commensurate with their
corporate strategy.
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Market/Product Geographical Functional Comments
Fluor Primary Client setting exists for to serve DOE, DOD,
Procter & Gamble.
Stone & Webster Primary
Raytheon Company Primary
Foster Wheeler Primary V Functional setting exists separately for the
Global Project Finance Group
McDermott Primary Client setting exists for to serve DOE, U.S.
Naval Reactors Program.
Halliburton Primary
Washington Group Primary Client setting exists for serve DOE, DOD.
Jacobs Information available is not conclusive.
TABLE 4-2(a) Structural Forms adopted by U.S. Firm Sample
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Market / Geographical Functional Comments
Product
Kajima V / - Market segments focusing on Building Engineering; Civil
Engineering; Environmental Engineering; Maintenance Services.
- Geographical divisions also exist: Kajima USA Inc.; Kajima Europe
B.V.; Kajima Overseas Asia Pte. Ltd.; International Division that
oversees the Middle East and Africa market; and of course the
centralized headquarters in Japan for domestic market.
- Functional setting retained for R&D; Engineering Design bases.
Obayashi - Market segments focusing on Building Construction; Civil
Engineering; Nuclear Facilities.
- Functional setting retained for Arch. &Eng. Design; Technology.
JGC Primary - Primary functional setting for Project Systems; Engineering;
Procurement; Sales and Project Management.
- Market (Hydrocarbon; General Industries) and geographical
substructure mostly housed under these functional departments.
Penta-Ocean More like a network of functional divisions operating under the umbrella
of two main markets: Civil Engineering and Architectural (see template
of Penta-Ocean). International divisions exist for some functions.
Kumagai Gumi
Chiyoda Primary
Nishimatsu Information is not conclusive.
Toyo Engineering Information is not conclusive.
TABLE 4-2(b) Structural Forms adopted by Japanese Firm Sample
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Market/Product Geographical Functional Comments
Groupe GTM Primary
Vinci Primary
Philipp Holzmann Primary - Geographical setting adopted for domestic market(Regional Divisions: North, East, South, West, Central) as
well as to distinguish overseas operations (PH USA Inc.;
European businesses conducted by subsidiaries in each
country; PH International Ltd. conduct all the others)
- Market setting for more specialized sectors (prefabricated
structures and structural steel; transportation systems and
materials; infrastructure project development; facilities
management.
Technip Primary
AMEC Primary
Bouygues Primary
Skanska V Primary Except for project development, real estate, facilities
management and telecom networks, the operations of various
civil engineering market sectors (residential, commercial,
roadworks, underground construction etc.) are housed under
three primary geographical divisions: Sweden, Europe, USA.
Kvaerner Primary
TABLE 4-2(c) Structural Forms adopted by European Firm Sample
123
4.3.2 CORPORATE CULTURE
Whereas structure is important in defining the individual responsibilities within
the process of workflow, a congruent culture will ensure that these responsibilities are
carried out with minimum resistance by individuals. More importantly, strong culture
dictates the way that things should be done and creates expectations shared by group
members, which are not outlined explicitly by a formal structure. In an attempt to clarify
what "culture" really means, O'Reilly (1989) views culture as social control systems and
normative order. The social control systems represent the common agreements that exist
among people about what constitutes appropriate attitude and behavior, and the norms set
the socially created standards that help the interpretation and evaluation of events
governed by such control systems.
On top of the daily beliefs or norms held by individuals at all levels of the
organization, top management in particular is ordained to build the vision that shapes the
direction of the firm. Thus the corporate culture, starting from this higher level, is often
guided by the mission and philosophy of the firm, and addresses the question of why the
firm exists in the first place. This is true especially when the founding member of a firm
still exerts tremendous influence on the culture. In many ways, the actions of top
management highly dictate the fortune of keeping the original culture alive through
policies on succession of top executives (e.g. promoted from within versus "injecting new
blood" from external) and setting themselves as role models.
On the relationship between culture and strategy, an interesting question that
naturally evolves out of the conventional wisdom is whether strong organizational culture
is always a functionally positive phenomenon. Obviously, the now abundant research
findings on organization transformation and change have shed new light on this question.
Despite the many positive enhancements that a strong culture can bear on strategy
formulation and implementation, there are at least three liability aspects of a strong
culture: (1) barrier to change; (2) barrier to diversity; and (3) barrier to mergers and
acquisitions (Robbins, 1998). These could lead to negative outcomes such as groupthink
in strategy formulation and rigid response in reacting to a changing external environment.
Therefore, although imposing changes in corporate culture is notoriously difficult,
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chronic and full of resistance within the organization, sometimes such changes are
necessary for long-run benefit and survival. Some firms even went further to create crises
in order to stimulate cultural change in their organization (Dumaine, 1993).
4.4 Zooming Out to the Big Picture
At this point, the primary building blocks of corporate strategy and organization
have been laid out. A strategist would hope to make the best decision in choosing a
proper configuration of these building blocks that would enable his or her firm to
compete successfully. Nonetheless, although firms stand as the relevant units of analysis,
they do not compete in isolation. During the course of strategy formulation, the strategist
will soon find that in order to define input variables, evaluate alternative configurations
and arrive at a final execution plan, he or she has to define the boundary of the firm
subjected to the dynamic forces imposed by the larger industrial and external
environment. This is depicted in Figure 4-7.
" Political and Regulatory Environment
- Social and Cultural Environment
" Economic Environment
" Industrial Environment
- Global Environmental Issues (technical) Firm's
Boundary
Influence Exerted
CORPORATE
il STRATEGY ORGANIZATION
Figure 4-7 The Big Picture of the External Environment, Corporate Strategy
and Organization
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While the broad definitions of political, social and economical environment are
generally clear, one should distinguish the differences between external cultural
environment and internal corporate culture. The external cultural environment, together
with political and social environment, is taken as a priori and is usually beyond the firm's
ability to change. On the other hand, internal corporate culture can be cultivated and
aligned with the kind of environment that a leader envisions his/her organization should
have. As such, corporate culture should not be taken easily as a predefined condition.
Lastly, the industrial environment is closely related to Business Strategy as
discussed previously. In fact, Porter's "Five Forces" model is a good starting point to
paint the picture for the industry or market segment chosen.
Highly influenced by these external environmental factors, decisions made to
define boundary conditions are contingent upon concurrent analysis of corporate strategy
with due consideration of the internal mechanisms of organization. Also, the wavy line
shown in Figure 4-7 represents the irregularity of firm boundary to be defined. It implies
that the extent to which a firm chooses to enlarge or shrink its boundary will
correspondingly alter the amount of influence exerted by these environmental factors.
Among others, some important factors to be considered in determining the boundary
condition of firms are as follows:
" Types/number of industries and market segments to compete (e.g.
diversification vs. focus)
" Types/number of roles to engage along the value system in the industry or
market segment (e.g. forward and backward integration)
" Mode of expansion (e.g. full integration, acquisition, merger, joint venture or
alliance)
" Geographical expansion (e.g. local, regional or global)
Thus, firms that choose to confine their boundaries to a local, focus, single niche market,
for example, will have less concern about the global economic and political conditions.
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Due its large implication on corporate strategy, an entire chapter is devoted to
further discussion of these boundary issues, thus representing a key branch of the
conceptual model.
4.5 Implications of the Conceptual Model
4.5.1 STRATEGIC FIELDS, STRUCTURE AND CULTURE ARE VARIABLES
The external environmental factors shown in Figure 4-7 are not static but instead
becoming increasingly tumultuous and dynamic in the modern days. Ironically, as a usual
way of life, firms often have to treat these factors as given and find ways to maneuver
around obstacles. This indirectly causes the breakdown of closed-form models, as they
are based on fixed or slow-to-change boundary conditions, which in turn result in a rigid
way of strategic planning.
The findings of the previous chapter also underpin the above statement. In view of
the fact that firms fail or succeed due to different factors, the development of an open,
generic conceptual model is necessary, which has been illustrated in this chapter. As a
corollary to the model then, it is important to treat the seven strategic fields and the two
internal mechanisms of organization as variable building blocks of corporate strategy.
Effectively, these variables create the 'fluidity' of the firm boundary that is shown in
Figure 4-7. "Variables" often imply built-in flexibility and dynamism, and this is
essential to counteract with tumultuous and ever changing external environmental
pressure.
The second corollary drawn from the model is that firms have to continually
reassess their corporate strategy and organizational configuration against the external
environmental factors in the light of this open concept. In other words, they have to
ensure a proper fit among corporate strategy, organization and the external environment.
While a frequent change in strategy and organization will be disruptive, performing such
a check in a regular manner will enable a firm to have great foresight to plan before a
crisis dawns.
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To evaluate the sound logic of these two corollaries, consider the scenario below
extracted from another industry (adapted from the Harvard Business School Case #9-
399-102). The scenario appropriately demonstrates the need to treat structure and culture
as variables.
In the consumer electronics industry, both Philips and Matsushita had been
experiencing tremendous difficulty to strike the right balance between global integration
and local responsiveness. Historically, Philips was one of the first firms to globalize.
With its expansion abroad, individual "national organizations" were established on a
geographical basis. Due to trade protectionism and the event of World War II,
communication between the headquarters and the national organizations was hindered.
Over time, national organizations had gained ground and power, with headquarters
having minimal control over them. Effectively, Philips has evolved into a highly
decentralized structure, and was thus strong in local responsiveness but weak in global
integration. As a result of this structural development, corporate culture was also
embodied with an autonomous mindset. Individual groups and divisions, each having
their own agenda, did not border to perceive the world market as a whole for cross-border
collaboration within the corporation.
The story for Matsushita is more or less the opposite. Matsushita was a latecomer
at globalization. It had a much larger home market than Philips, and one that grew very
rapidly in the postwar period. Thus traditionally, personnel, technology, material, and
capital was mostly localized and derived from domestic resources. Production was
dispersed only to certain closed markets abroad. Effectively, Matsushita had developed a
highly centralized structure, and was strong in global integration but weak in local
responsiveness in individual geographical markets overseas. On the part of culture, the
overseas operations were over-reliant on Japan for both production and innovations.
For firms like Philips and Matsushita that have a long history, conventional
settings of structure and culture "inherited" from the old days frequently develop into an
'administrative heritage' (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1998). It took Philips 30 years (and many
changes in CEOs) to "tilt the matrix" from national organizations towards global product
divisions, and it took Matsushita several years to begin to shift real power and autonomy
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to the foreign subsidiaries so that they would act more responsively towards the local
markets. Ironically, their administrative heritage, which had once served as core
competency that contributed towards the firms' past success, became core rigidity when
market situations and operating environment called for a change.
Evidence as such demonstrates that changing the structure and culture is a
daunting task. More importantly, the evidence also points out that taking no challenge to
change could be more disastrous in the long run. This constitutes the reason why both
Philips and Matsushita, despite the painful transformation process, insisted on the move
in order to rejuvenate their competitive strengths in the new market environment.
Strategic fields, structure and culture should not be taken as fixed conditions simply
because they are hard to change or determine. All of them serve as essential levers that
drive corporate strategy. When a firm grows along the evolutionary path, operating
environment typically changes and past strategy, structure and culture are rendered
inappropriate. Incidentally, this is also one explanation for the increasing attention being
placed on the area of organizational transformation.
4.5.2 INTERACTION AMONG VARIABLES
In his description of the value activities in the value chain, Porter (1985) placed
significant emphasis on identifying the linkages among these value activities:
Linkages are relationships between the way one value activity is
performed and the cost or performance of another. Linkages can
lead to competitive advantages in two ways: optimization and
coordination.
The concept on linkages is a noble one, though the context of linkages that exists
here among the strategic fields, structure and culture is slightly different from that that
exists among value activities. While optimization of value activities may be feasible, the
interaction among the strategic fields and the internal mechanisms is more fluid, thus an
optimal configuration may not exist. Although optimization is a separate matter,
examination of these linkages remains the key towards a successful corporate strategy
with the following proposition:
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Stated formally, strategic actions that are derived from the
interactions between two or more strategic fields are more
powerful in shaping a sustainable and successful corporate
strategy than those that are confined, both in terms of origination
and impact, within only one single field.
These can be referred to as the "higher order" effects, just as a
differential equation will capture more dynamic effect by
incorporating higher order derivatives and more independent
variables to provide a better picture in solving an engineering
problem.
The concept of treating those seven strategic fields and the two
internal mechanisms as dynamic, interdependent variables is
fundamentally important.
From previous discussion of individual strategic fields, it is obvious that the
strategic fields have overlaps among one another functionally. In many manufacturing
sectors, the distribution function has much to do with Marketing Strategy as well as
Operational Strategy. That said, overlaps are fundamentally different from interactions,
which form the gist of the proposed model. Overlap effectively implies duplication. On
the other hand, interaction represents more of a phenomenal function that derives a
meaningful output, which in this case is the overall corporate strategy. 18
4.5.2.1 An Example of Interaction among IT, Financial, Operational
Strategies and Organizational Structure
This example serves to illustrate how the study of interaction between two or
more strategic fields can provide valuable insights towards constructing corporate
strategy as a whole. It also illustrates the linkages between corporate strategy and
organization, and demonstrates the importance of maintaining consistency among the
various components. The four components used for illustration (three strategic fields and
one internal mechanism) are arranged under Figure 4-8.
18 Those with a mathematical bend may find the following analogy illustrative:
Overlap between A and B: (A n B)
Interaction as a function of A & B to derive C: C =f(A,B)
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Characteristics of
Information
Source
Scope
Level of Aggregation
Time Horizon
Currency
Required Accuracy
Frequency of Use
Operational Control
Management
Control
Largely internal
Well defined, narrow
Detailed
Historical
Highly current
High
Very frequent
Strategic Planning
r- External
-* Very wide
-> Aggregate
-> Future
-* Quite old
-> Low
-* Infrequent
Relevant Partsof the
Organizational Structure
(Definitions following
Mintzberg, 1979)
Relevant Types of
Investment Evaluation
and Resource Allocation
Methods
Operating Core
(Site engineers,
supervisors)
Linear Programming,
Optimization
Middle Line
(Regional Managers,
Project Managers)
Decision tree
Strategic Apex
(Senior Mgmt,
Functional V.P.s,
Regional Managers)
Real option
Portfolio aggregation
FIGURE 4-8 Interaction among Financial, IT, Operational Strategies and
Organizational Structure
The top half of Figure 4-8 summarizes some general observations about the
categories of management activities and the characteristics of information that
management requires for decision-making purposes. The three categories of management
activities - operational control, management control and strategic planning, have largely
differing nature and follow separate procedures. The configuration adopted might be
derived from a specific Operational Strategy of the firm. On the other hand, the
characteristics of information basically falls under the regime of IT Strategy, since
managers have to decide on the type of data to collect, the way to build the database
system, the way to classify these data, and the type of information to rely on as relevant
input for decision-making purposes (Gorry and Scott Morton, 1971).
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Likewise, the bottom half of the diagram shows some common analytical and
quantitative methods that managers use for resource allocation and investment
evaluation, thus this is related to Financial Strategy (recall that the scope of Financial
Strategy can be broadly classified into investment decisions and financing decisions).
What seems striking is the way that the characteristics of information fit with the nature
of the input factors required in these analytical models. Take the real option approach for
example, which is matched with the various characteristics of information under the
"Strategic Planning" column (i.e. external source, very wide scope, aggregated level,
predicting on future trends, and low requirement of accuracy). Also assume that the real
option approach is applied to evaluate a toll road project.
Given this scenario, one can treat the fluctuation of traffic volume over time to be
analogous to the 'volatility' parameter of the underlying asset in the real option model. It
is a well-known fact that quantifying 'volatility' with a high accuracy is a difficult task,
and this is especially true in a toll road project for traffic volume forecast. Nonetheless, if
the matching characteristics of information as suggested by Gorry and Scott Morton is
plausible, then the level of data accuracy for applying the real option approach (in this
case for the purpose of strategic planning) does not necessarily have to be high!
This makes intuitive sense for the following reasons. First, strategic planning,
unlike operational control, deals with an extremely uncertain external environment. If
things are going to change tremendously, the accuracy of data from the past is less of a
concern but the use of an appropriate evaluation model is critical. Second, as time goes
by, some of these uncertainties or volatility will unfold and estimates can be refined on an
ongoing basis. In the case of strategic planning, this refinement process is feasible and
acceptable since the task at hand is dealing with a very wide scope of issues that would
provide sufficient room to maneuver and adjust over the long term.
On the other hand, historical data on operational performance is often available
from operational controlling functions. Examples of such kind of data include the number
of man-hours required for concreting, for bricklaying and machine hours utilized for a
particular work task. The characteristics of such data fit nicely with the use of
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methodologies such as linear programming and system optimization, which are powerful
resource allocation tools derived from the field of operational research.
Lastly, the middle horizontal portion of the picture presents the relevant parts of
the organizational structure that are likely to use the corresponding categories of
information and investment evaluation or resource allocation tools. Again, the matching
makes intuitive sense, as verified by the type of personnel from each group and the nature
of day-to-day decisions that they make.
In short, there is a fit among IT, Financial, Operational Strategies and
organizational structure. By adopting the mindset that is embedded in the conceptual
framework, the powerful interactions among these building blocks of corporate strategy
can be captured in a more explicit manner.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Boundary - the Alchemy behind a Simple Definition
"Every piece of business strategy acquires its true significance only against the
background of that process and within the situation created by it."
- Joseph A. Schumpeter (1976)
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5.1 Introduction
The past few decades had witnessed the production of a plethora of articles and
literatures written on globalization, diversification, integration and topics of similar
nature. The common denominator among these issues is none other than the boundary of
a firm. Boundary is ubiquitous. It is a simple word to start with, but often a difficult
concept to manage pragmatically.
Being such a powerful concept, a separate discussion is warranted for issues
related to firm boundary. This chapter thus extends the conceptual model by presenting
and categorizing principles dealing with boundary issues. These principles are supported
and drawn from the study of the U.S. firm sample. Primarily active in the power and
energy sector, these firms also compete in the engineering and construction industry in
one way or another. The industry value system thus serves as a good starting point to
analyze the actions of the different parties when reacting to boundary changes.
Since each firm occupies a different space within the value system, each of them
deals differently with the boundary issues confronted. These differences provide great
insights and facilitate the comparison of the strategic intentions behind the chosen
postures. While some actions initiated by these firms are legitimate, others are grown
merely out of unjustified desire to build larger empires.
The derived principles are found to complement the basic conceptual model that
is proposed in the previous chapter. The chapter finally closes with a demonstration of
the intimate relationship between corporate strategy, organization, boundary and the
environment, thus completing the theory and intuition behind Figure 4-7.
5.1.1 DEFINITION OF FIRM BOUNDARY
In the context of the model depicted in Figure 4-7, firm boundary is defined as the
interface between those activities that a firm directly manages and the external
environment that it typically has no direct control. Arguably, it is difficult to draw an
exact line to divide the subsets that lie within or beyond the firm boundary. In most cases,
the situation is further complicated by the subtle difference between direct control and
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indirect influence that a firm can sometimes exert on external environmental conditions.
For example, although a firm has no direct control over government policies, it can exert
influence by joining factions that lobby for an outcome in line with the interests of a firm
(Lowi, 1979). In other cases, a firm might have so much bargaining power over its allies
that it effectively controls most decisions made within those firms.
In short, firm's boundary is a fluid concept. For the purpose of this research, the
following point is made to minimize the disparities among different views - the ultimate
"shape" of a firm boundary has to be defined in a way that will be consistent and
meaningful for strategic planning and management purposes. Take the previous example
of the firm that has a lot of bargaining power over its allies. In this case, if management is
confident that they can persuade (or even dictate) their allies to move in the direction
demanded by a new strategy, these allies should logically fall within the firm boundary
for strategic planning purposes.
5.2 Why Boundary Aspects are Important
In any exercise that deals with strategy, boundary aspects cannot be ignored due
to three major reasons.
First, although a firm may choose to optimize its performance to suit a current set
of operating conditions, the environment at large is dynamic in nature. Hence, boundary
conditions are not fixed forever, and changes over time would render a previously
determined strategy irrelevant or questionable. A formula for success today typically does
not guarantee similar invincibility in the coming future.
Second, even when the operating environment remains largely stagnant at one
point, the competitive landscape may still be changing as a result of some improvements
made by a firm's competitor. When market reacts to such improvements and demand
starts shifting away from the complacent firm, boundary will in turn change to an
unfavorable fashion against the firm concerned, thereby calling for a renewed strategy to
reinstate its competitiveness. The morale is simple: the wave of competition will push
those who remain stagnant backwards.
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The third reason stems from a natural phenomenon. As firms develop, they
encounter stages of evolution and revolution (Greiner, 1998). During such stages of
growth and crisis, firms would have to constantly reassess the appropriateness of
previous corporate strategy and practices in view of the new boundary that will be
encountered as a condition to grow. Thus, contrary to the preceding first and second
factors concerning changes that are caused by the external environment, here the need to
assess boundary issues is initiated by the internal growth of the firm.
To illustrate the changing nature of boundary and its importance, consider the
operations of marine construction services of McDermott, which primarily functions in
upstream exploration and production activities in the oil and gas industry. The level of
activity in exploration and production depends on the amount of capital expenditures that
clients - mainly the oil and gas companies, spend in a particular year. These expenditures
in turn are influenced by the selling price of oil and gas along with the cost of production
and delivery, the terms and conditions of offshore leases, the discovery rates of new
reserves offshore and the ability of the oil and gas industry to raise capital in the financial
market. Adding to these uncertainties are the local and international political and
economic conditions, with various extent of governmental influence. A slight change in
any one of the many factors may be amplified along the line, creating both temporary and
permanent changes to the boundary of McDermott's marine construction services.
5.3 The Different Perspectives on Boundary
It is interesting to note that at least four main disciplines - economics, finance,
law and strategy, view the very same issue of firm boundary from different angles. These
views, however, are not mutually exclusive. In fact, each stream adds valuable substance
to the knowledge field that contains boundary.
In economics, the issue of firm boundary can be traced back to 1937 when Ronald
Coase, in his famous article entitled "The Nature of the Firm", first posed what initially
seemed to be an innocuous question: "Why do firms exist?" It sparked off a quiet
revolution in economic theory, and for decades economists have formulated theories that
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centered on the issue of transaction costs of using pricing mechanism in the general
market. Not surprising, research efforts naturally evolved to those related issues of
vertical integration, strategic alliances and business groups such as the keiretsu in Japan.
The central tenet lies on the fundamental choice between internalizing certain functions
within the firm and purchasing required goods and services from the general market at
some level of transaction costs. The transaction cost approach has also been applied by
Williamson (1975, 1979) and Eccles (1981) to support the theoretical existence of the
'quasi-firm' and subcontracting practices in the construction industry.
Due to the tremendous amount of hostile takeovers, leveraged buyouts (LBO) and
management buyouts (MBO) in the 1980s, mergers and acquisitions have become a
major topic of interest within the finance profession. Valuation of targeted companies,
bidding and defensive strategies are the main areas of focus. Since the focus is mainly
placed on 'deal making' and actions are mostly represented by numbers and currencies, it
is not immediately obvious that these are very much related to boundary issues as well.
For example, valuation techniques often call for a forecast of the cash flow generated by
the target or the combined entity. Forecasting these cash flows is very much an issue of
boundary assessment especially when synergy or operational efficiencies is sought.
Liabilities and taxation are two areas that are commonly covered in business law.
When a sole proprietor seeks to shelter his or her personal assets from the potential
claims of lawsuits arising from the normal course of business, he or she can choose to
form a separate legal entity by incorporating the business. Obviously, the entrepreneur
now faces double taxation at both corporate and personal level. Limited liability and
taxation therefore forms the fundamental tradeoff that sometimes lies in the way of
boundary expansion. For example, a firm that expands its boundary into new markets
may want to seek for legal separation between the new operation and the original
company. Such decisions are often relevant to the construction industry when claims filed
on lawsuits are common. Babcock and Wilcox, a subsidiary of McDermott, Inc. that is
active in the power industry, filed for bankruptcy on February 22, 2000 due to extensive
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asbestosis claims. The legal undertakings, nonetheless, did not directly affect other
operations of McDermott such as marine construction services. 19
Last, but not least, is the study of boundary from the perspective of strategy. The
discussion of boundary issues in this chapter mainly falls into this category. From the
strategic standpoint, boundary modification is usually initiated with intentions that
include an increase in market share (either in existing or new markets) or enhanced
market power of a firm. These issues are examined in detail in the remaining sections.
5.4 Three Dimensions of Boundary Modification
There are three primary dimensions along which firms can modify their existing
boundary: geographical expansion; expansion in the market segments served; and skill
and knowledge enhancement.
Geography
* Regionalization
Market Segments
* Current value system
* New or exploratory markets
Skill & Knowledge
* Core Competencies
* Internationalization New processes
------.---------------------- --------
Structure
CORPORATE
STRATEGY ORGANIZATION
SCRAtEGY
-- 
-
-- 
-
FIGURE 5-1 Three Dimensions of Boundary Modification
19 In this case though, the parent company may still be affected due to its exposure as a guarantor of
outstanding letters of credit and other indemnification obligations. Furthermore, firms are also subjected to
other types of indirect costs of financial distress (Brealey and Myers, 1996).
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5.4.1 GEOGRAPHY
When a firm expands its operation into other regions within a nation or the
international market, it is said to be pursuing the geographical dimension of boundary
modification. In general, the motivation of such pursuits can be classified into two main
categories, namely, the market-seeking motive and the resource-seeking motive.
When the intention is that of market-seeking, the firm attempts to capture
additional sales volume by utilizing its current expertise and resources to execute projects
in the new regions. Unlike other product-oriented industries (such as consumer goods),
which can typically achieve some economies of scale with a higher utilization level of the
existing plant, most construction firms are not equipped with such advantages. Largely
attributed to the business nature, construction firms have limited ground to exploit
operating leverage and generally possess a lower ratio of fixed-to-total assets.
Furthermore, construction projects are localized in nature and do not come in the form of
a continuous stream that allows for production optimization.
The resource-seeking motive has been a common strategy for centuries. Firms
that originate from a nation with high labor and material costs often seek to transfer some
of their operations to locations that are endowed with comparative advantages in these
input factors or other natural resources. However, for the same reasons stated that
dampen the benefits of the market-seeking motive, even cheaper resources found are
usually difficult to be transferred to a localized project site in a cost-effective manner.
Consequently, compared to most other industries, the geographical dimension of
expansion brings a relatively higher level of risk to the construction business. A practical
example is given by Stone & Webster's liquidity crisis (and subsequent bankruptcy) that
was initiated by losses suffered in a few international projects (Stone & Webster Annual
Report, 1998). However, if a firm could potentially capture benefits that would be more
than adequate to compensate for the initial risk of geographical expansion, it might
become justifiable for the firm to take the risk. By utilizing its international presence and
building relationships with many suppliers, for example, Foster Wheeler subsequently
gains preferential access to worldwide procurement sources, thereby allowing it to obtain
optimum conditions of price and delivery (Foster Wheeler Annual Report, 1997). With
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such a network in place, the risk of further geographical expansion would also be
minimized. Thus, what initially seemed to be a threat was turned into a competitive
advantage that others find it hard to imitate.
5.4.2 MARKET SEGMENTS
Expansion in targeted market segments by the firm is conventionally classified as
either horizontal diversification or vertical integration. Unfortunately, this classification
is not sufficiently precise for the purpose of formulating strategy. In the past few decades,
the outlook of industrial dynamics has evolved into a new setting which renders terms
such as "diversification" and "integration" potentially misleading. For example, firms can
be innovative in ways to transfer their original expertise in one market to a new market -
an act that would be classified as "diversification" in a conventional sense, but by no
means as "disconnected" as it is sometimes perceived to be. Similarly, the meaning of
"integration" becomes blurred when alternative ties like business groups and strategic
alliances are ubiquitous these days to virtually integrate their operations along a value
system.
Due to the vagueness of the terminology, a more meaningful way to consider
boundary modification along the market segment dimension is by adopting Porter's
(1985) value system concept. Focus should be placed on the roles that are currently being
occupied within the value system of the industry served. By mapping out those activities
that firms currently engage in the value system, the boundary forces confronting the firms
become more explicit, which provides a huge advantage in studying boundary
modification. Alternatively, in the process of transferring expertise to another industry,
firms can immediately examine the variation in boundary forces by comparing the two
different value systems and analyzing the bargaining power of downstream and upstream
players from the new market segments.
2 Boundary modification along the dimension of market segments should not be confused with the
"market-seeking" motive that has been discussed previously under geographical expansion. The former
involves expansion into segments that are not currently served within a value system or ventures in new
markets altogether. The latter merely pursues geographical expansion while staying within the same
segments.
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In short, the following classification of market segment expansion provides far
more intuition:
* Engaging in additional roles within an existing value system by venturing
upstream/downstream;
" Exploring new market segments or value systems in which the firm currently
does not play a role.
5.4.3 SKILL AND KNOWLEDGE ENHANCEMENT
This last dimension of boundary modification may seem a little abstract at first,
but nonetheless becomes increasingly distinctive in the field of corporate strategy. The
prominence of the core competency theory by Hamel and Prahalad (1994) augments the
importance of this dimension. It entails acquisition of new functional or management
skills and knowledge that would add value to existing activities of a firm. This can be
achieved either through direct acquisition of another firm, external contracting, or
internal accumulation of the desired skills.
A good illustration comes from the study of Halliburton. The company executes
many acquisitions and alliance formation that are geared towards knowledge expansion
as opposed to market expansion. These include:
* A multi-year agreement with BP Amoco to standardize its drilling, reservoir
engineering, geology and geophysics applications;
* Joint forces with SAP Germany to develop a seamless interface that integrates
oil and gas production operations, allocation and accounting processes;
" Acquisition of Economic Analysis Systems - the developer of TERAS*
which is an industry-leading software for economic analysis, portfolio
planning and risk management.
In all cases above, Halliburton extends its skill and knowledge boundary by
tapping the intellectual capacity of the counter-parties. Obviously, the mode adopted will
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bear different impact on integrating such skill and knowledge with other activities of the
firm.
Another example of boundary modification along this dimension is manifested by
the birth of the Information Technology era. When IT suddenly erupted into a seemingly
quintessential function for firms' operations in the 1990s, firms sought different routes to
extend their boundary in order to ride on this new wave of knowledge revolution. In one
scenario, Bechtel Group, Inc. made an equity investment in Cephren (now known as
Citadon after a merger with Bidcom) as a "non-controlling shareholder". Presumably, the
intention is to keep itself abreast on the current technological trend and observes any best
practices before implementing a larger strategic move to 'internalize' IT into its business
processes. In another contrasting scenario, Halliburton adopts a more tightly-knitted IT
strategy through its Landmark division by developing a new technology that extends
integration across the entire enterprise. In both cases, the firm boundaries are modified
accordingly when their competitive power changes with the new knowledge acquired via
direct and indirect pursuits.
5.5 Decision Factors for Boundary Modification
Obviously, the three dimensions of boundary modification are not mutually
exclusive. Certain strategic plans may include concurrent modification of firm's
boundary along two or three dimensions. In most cases, the extent of boundary
modification is determined by five key decision factors:
(a) Clients and customers;
(b) Diversification - core competencies tradeoff, and resource allocation;
(c) Risk profile of business and project portfolios;
(d) Mode of boundary modification;
(e) Options inherent in boundary modification actions.
The purpose of examining these key factors is to decide upon:
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" Whether firms should be aggressive in modifying its boundary (the active
posture) or simply react to boundary changes initiated by the external
environment (the passive posture)
" Why firms should engage in the more risky active posture in certain cases
* In the case of an active posture, which dimension(s) should a firm pursues for
boundary modification
In this section, the relevant issues associated with each key factor are described
and illustrated with findings that are gathered from the study of the U.S. firm sample.
5.5.1 CLIENTS AND CUSTOMERS
5.5.1.1 From Executing One-Off Projects to Building Long-term
Relationships
Pricing or bidding policies sometimes differ depending on the likelihood that the
client served would become a repeated customer. For one-off projects, in which a firm is
typically dealing with the client for the first time, firms may bid at a higher margin to
compensate for the risks associated with the unfamiliar client (such as credit risk,
coordination issues, special procedures required by the client). On the other hand, if the
firm is more concerned with the long-term to build a relationship with the client so as to
secure other benefits, it may be willing to sacrifice current profit margin in order to
increase the chances of attracting repeated business from the client.
Other than pricing policies, however, there are important boundary issues to
consider in order to ensure repeated business and success in building a long-term
relationship with their clients. One consistent finding among the sampled firms is the
attempt to set an irreplaceable presence in the client's value chain, and this may take
different forms depending on individual firms.
In the case of Fluor Corp., the company has a separate operating company known
as PACE, which exclusively provides engineering, procurement and construction (EPC)
services to Procter & Gamble (Fluor Corporation Annual Report, 1997). The alliance is
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obviously a strategic one from P&G's perspective, since it would enable P&G to utilize
Fluor's broad geographic scope and readily expand its production to serve new markets.
P&G can therefore meet increased global demand for its product in a shorter time span.
With PACE 's operations currently working in seven countries, this initiative has surely
demonstrated its scale and has modified Fluor's boundary in terms of operating structure.
In fact, using the parlance that is introduced in the previous section, Fluor has effectively
extended its boundary along the market segment dimension by melding its services into
the global expansion program of P&G. It is hard to imagine if such an action could have
been derived from the traditional thinking of vertical integration (a partial integration at
best in this case), but it is not difficult to conclude that the power of boundary
modification in this case lies on the change in business dynamics that has created a win-
win situation for both parties. In exchange for the benefits that the arrangement has given
to P&G, Fluor gets repeated business and reduces the fluctuation of its revenue. In fact,
Fluor Corporation as a whole is reported to have 80% of its business coming from
repeated customers.
Similarly, Foster Wheeler typically maintains long-term relationship with blue-
chip firms, with half of its work being accounted for by only 20 worldwide clients. It
locks in long-term relationship by tailoring process technology to suit the individual
operating condition of the client's plant. In essence, Foster Wheeler has a foot at the door
when clients plan their regular upgrades since the company would have known the
technology best. Lastly, Jacobs' management has attributed the successful growth and
expansion of the company to their unique business model - a relationship-based approach
with approximately 70% of their work derived from long-term partnerships and alliances.
Obviously, the merit of adopting such a strategy is open to debate. Some might
suggest that too much concentration of businesses with few clients would expose a firm
to the volatility dictated by business cycles that are experienced by its clients. This may
cause problem to construction firms that typically do not have as much resources as the
blue-chip firm to tide over the troughs of those cycles. Here, the main point is
nonetheless clear: firms modify their boundary to set a presence in their clients' value
chains, and they rely on some core competencies to achieve the goal.
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5.5.1.2 Changing Industry Nature or Characteristics of Clients
Occasionally, firms have to reassess their boundaries because the nature or
characteristics of their customers have changed. In the deregulated power industry, for
example, construction firms are now building plants for independent power producers
(IPPs) rather than previously regulated utilities. These merchant plant owners are much
more demanding especially in terms of speed and operating efficiency, and firms have to
reassess their boundary to acquire new operating skills or marketing channels to target
the new clients.
5.5.1.3 Changing Structure of Clients
Client-service provider interface typically varies in different industries or market
segments. In some value systems, a change in the client's organizational structure could
initiate a corresponding (and appropriate) change in the service provider's firm boundary.
For example, Foster Wheeler has reported that many of its clients have reorganized their
structures along business lines instead of geographical regions (Foster Wheeler Annual
Report, 1999). This partly negates the competitive advantage that Foster Wheeler
possesses through geographical diversity. Understandably, if Foster Wheeler provides a
new client interface by changing its own structure, the dimension of boundary
modification along geography would not have the same level of importance as before.
5.5.1.4 Public versus Private Sectors
As with the changing industry nature of private clients, boundary issues can be
substantially different when dealing with public contracts. As a starting point, the
contracting environment and conditions are more regulated, and they differ greatly from
one sovereignty to another, thus complicating matters in international expansion. Second,
opportunities to offer an integrated package of services by pursuing market expansion
along a value system may be minimized in certain cases. For example, by statute in most
American states and for the federal government, segmented Design-Bid-Build has been
made the prominent project delivery method for design and construction of public
infrastructure (Miller, 2000). Thirdly, issues such as security and safety become more
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sensitive (and easily politicized), which call for an extra effort to develop skill and
knowledge enhancement in these areas. All these factors would affect boundary that
might have remained as status quo if not for the public contracting environment.
These are only a few examples that demonstrate the need to reevaluate corporate
strategy and boundary when competing for contracts in the public sector.
5.5.2 RESOURCE ALLOCATION TRADEOFFS: DIVERSIFICATION VERSUS CORE
COMPETENCIES
The world of corporate strategy is filled with fundamental tradeoffs. Making a
wise choice among various tradeoffs is often a challenging task that may have a profound
impact on the final outcome. The tradeoff between diversification and development of
core competencies (assuming that firm's resources are limited - usually a reasonable
one), is among one of the most important considerations.
Diversification obviously represents an act of boundary modification. Advocates
of diversification often quote the main advantage as hedging one's risk by "putting all
eggs in different baskets." Similar to the two (out of three) dimensions of boundary
modification as discussed previously, diversification can take either the form of
geography or market segment. It is important to note that both forms are subtly different
and have different risk hedging functions.
Take Foster Wheeler as an example. In a normal year, the company has project
operations in 30 countries over 6 continents. It also maintains manufacturing facilities in
the U.S., Finland, Spain, Poland and China, which handles offsite prefabrication of some
modular components of a plant. Effectively, the project and manufacturing operations are
geographically diversified. Foster Wheeler is hedging the company as a whole against a
regional economic downturn such as the Asian Crisis in 1997. Although revenue decline
is inevitable in the case of a regional downturn, the company can obviously survive better
than others that concentrate their entire businesses in that region. However, Foster
21 Professor Massood Samii's insight on this issue is gratefully acknowledged.
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Wheeler is not very diversified along the dimension of market segments. A bad year for
the energy and power sectors would drive down Foster Wheeler's profits substantially.
Working against the desire to diversify is the need to develop core competencies
in certain markets. As defined by Hamel and Prahalad (1994), core competence is "a
bundle of skills and technologies that enables a company to provide a particular benefit to
customers." Undoubtedly, for the case of construction whereby projects are deeply rooted
with locational factors, gaining a superior understanding of the operating environment in
a region can also lead to the development of core competencies. In any case, since core
competence represents a sum of learning across individual skill sets and organizational
units, the cultivation of core competence requires time and resources.
When time, resources and managerial attention are too much devoted to
diversification, the development of core competencies is often overlooked. Conversely,
over-concentration in one area exposes the company to substantial risk. Instead of taking
sides on any one of the two tradeoff factors, it is better to suggest that the ultimate choice
depends on the level of resources (in terms of time, finance and human capital) that a
company poses.
As depicted in Figure 5-2, a company should go through the thinking process of
mapping its current position on the figure by evaluating its business portfolio and
assessing the level of core competence that it needs to develop in each business area. If a
company is solely concentrated in only one narrow market segment, this position will
plot on the horizontal axis. At the other extreme, a pure holding company structure that
invests in multiple business segments, but has no expertise to operate directly in any of
these segments, will plot along the vertical axis. Most companies would fall in between
lying within the quadrant. The exact position will be determined by the choice of
resource allocation - whether the firm prefers to allocate more resources towards
developing core competencies or diversifying its operations. When a firm wants to extend
its boundary by pushing out its "resource frontier" towards the northeast direction, it
would require additional level of financial and human resources.
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FIGURE 5-2 Typical Tradeoff between Resources used for Diversification and
Core Competencies Development Purposes
Conceivably, the exact level of "resource frontier" is hard to quantify. However,
some judgment can be made with the aid of a few pointers. Incidentally, these pointers
are linked to two of the strategic fields that the author has defined in the previous paper.
First, if a proper Human Resources (HR) Strategy were in place, the firm would
be able to develop a proper training program to fully capitalize on its human capital and
maximize the extension of the frontier. Second, with proper incentive measures - a tool
that is also part of the HR Strategy, a firm can motivate its staff to further expand its
frontier beyond its current limit. Hamel and Prahalad (1994) describe this as the "stretch"
of strategy, which they argue that resourcefulness, not resource level, is a more important
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Trading off 1 unit of Ay for 1
unit of Ax or vice versa. The
relative values will depend on
cost functions of the firm.
factor for getting to the future. Third, the Financial Strategy of a firm would be flawed
without proper financial evaluations such as analyzing the trend of its liquidity and debt
ratios to keep track of the level of financial resources used to push out the frontier. Thus,
when signs of excessive strain on human resources start to surface and key financial
ratios start heading into the red zone, it becomes apparent that the firm should push the
boundary out no more.
A good illustration of the relevance of this decision factor for boundary
modification comes from the decision that Foster Wheeler has to make on technology
development. The choice of technology is highly contingent upon the prediction of the
type of fuel that utility plants would use to generate energy in the near future. On one
hand, there is increasing pressure worldwide calling for more stringent environmental
standards and advocating for cleaner fuel sources such as the natural gas or LNG. On the
other hand, economic fundamentals might dictate the final choice of the fuel source. A
recent analysis of power generation economics by Resource Data International, Inc.
reveals that coal-fired generation will be very competitive if the average annual price of
natural gas settles above $4/mmBtu (Kern, 2001).
Ideally, Foster Wheeler would have liked to develop its technology and expertise
in all processes utilizing these different kinds of fuel sources so that it remains
competitive regardless of the type that would eventually dominate. However, in order to
pursue this diversification strategy, Foster Wheeler would have to dispense tremendous
resources since each fuel technology and process is unique. Instead, Foster Wheeler
devotes most of its resources towards developing clean-coal energy products and
processes that compete directly with competitors who construct utility plants that
generate power using the natural gas. It is not clear if Foster Wheeler has made the right
choice, but it certainly shows that the company would rather not lose focus by
specializing in too many kinds of technology.
Finally, the "resource frontier" in Figure 5-2 need not always follow a one-way
expansion. The frontier may shrink when market situation calls restructuring and
downsizing actions. In year 2000, Fluor Corporation spun off one of its major
subsidiaries, A.T. Massey, in the coal mining business, effectively shrinking the firm's
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boundary. Such decisions are sometimes initiated by a renewed direction of the Financial
Strategy, but in other occasions they represent strategic actions to change the risk profile
of the firm's boundary - the third decision factor that will be discussed next.
5.5.3 RISK PROFILE OF BUSINESS AND PROJECT PORTFOLIOS
Diversification typically modifies the risk profile of a firm's business portfolio.
Assuming that the market efficiency theory holds, a reasonable proxy for the risk profile
of the firm as a whole is given by the expected volatility that is assumed in evaluating the
stock option of the firms. These values of volatility can be obtained from market
analysts' reports or annual reports of the firms. Figure 5-3 plots the values of expected
volatility of equity of the firms that are sampled in this study.
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FIGURE 5-3 Trends of Expected Volatility of the U.S. Firm Sample
22 In principal, this is really the volatility of the equity and not the assets/firm as a whole (which would be
lower after "unleveraging"). However, just like maximizing shareholder value has always been a core
mission of firms, the objective of minimizing either type of volatility (equity or assets) stays the same in
strategic planning. Hence, in the main text, no explicit distinction is made between the two.
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In general, the values given in Figure 5-3 are consistent with the profile of the
business portfolios of the firms. Starting from the lower end, Raytheon was well
diversified with its core business in defense systems, commercial electronics, aircraft
manufacturing and the RE&C arm in construction back in 1997. With a large part of its
businesses associated with the defense sector (which is known to have low correlation
with the market in general) and about 20% of revenues derived from construction (which
highly fluctuates with the market economy), the low correlation between the components
of its portfolio has resulted in a low volatility of 15%. Then, after having a bad year in
1999, Raytheon consolidated some of its functions and subsequently sold RE&C to the
Washington Group International in 2000. The narrowing in targeted market segments is
reflected by a steep increase in volatility to 35% - 40%.
Similarly, Stone & Webster, with businesses in a broad range of sectors ranging
from power and process to software design and refrigeration, have the second lowest
volatility values. Being active in the engineering and construction activities multiple
industrial markets, Jacobs Engineering followed closely with the third lowest volatility
values as indications of its diversified profile. Not surprisingly, those that reside at the
upper end are focus, differentiated players like Halliburton, Foster Wheeler and
McDermott whose main activities remain concentrated in the energy and power sectors.
The above discussion obviously supports the fundamental tradeoff that was
previously brought out: focus, differentiated players face the challenge of managing
business cycle fluctuation of the market that they concentrate in; diversified players,
though have lesser fluctuation as a whole, face the risk of losing focus on any particular
vertical market and imposing too much stress on firm resources. In fact, the last stated
reason was widely stated as a factor that initiated the demise of Stone & Webster (which
was briefly discussed in Chapter 3). All said, the real intention here is to illustrate that
firms should evaluate the risk that it is absorbing (or reducing) as a whole before
committing to such acts of boundary modification. Specifically, the assessment of risk
has to be made in the light of changes imposed on the overall risk profile of the business
portfolio - and not just isolated risk changes produced by the action alone.
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In making such assessment, the intuition behind the portfolio theory (Markowitz,
1952) adopted from the world of finance provides some good insight. The goal of the
theory is to develop an efficient frontier between expected return and risk. In
mathematical form:
Let xp , xn represent the approximate portions of the level of activities that the
firm would engage in the present and new segments respectively
(using indicators such as asset investments or revenues as proxies);
UP represent the volatility of the present business portfolio;
Cyn represent the volatility of the newly targeted business segment;
and cov(rp,rn) represent the covariance between the average returns of the present
portfolio and the new segment;
then the resultant volatility, 0 total , is given by:
Gtotai = xp2 2 + xn2an2 + 2xP xn cov(rp,rn)
The parameter T, can be obtained from market analysts' reports or annual reports of
representative firms that compete in the newly targeted business segment. The parameter
cov(rp,rn) can also be estimated from past returns of the firm and those of the
representative firms in the new segment. As a matter of fact, so long as the present
business portfolio and the new business segment is not perfectly correlated, the new risk
profile after boundary modification will surely be improved (which forms the cornerstone
of diversification).
Since our goal is to compare the options facing the firms, the above method can
be used to assess the different risk profiles of the various options. These can then be
plotted on the same graph together with the projected returns of the combined new
ventures as shown in Figure 5-4. The better options would be the ones that provide a
higher return and/or less risk for the new business portfolio - those that are lying close to
the so-called "efficient frontier". Yet, unlike in the case of applying the theory to a
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financial portfolio with many possible choices of securities, the efficient frontier in this
case is probably not observable given the limited options that a firm typically faces
during the process of boundary modification. Nonetheless, one could still rely on the
principle to eliminate bad choices. As shown in the figure below, although we cannot
immediately deduce whether option 1 or 2 is more superior, we can safely conclude that
option 3 is obviously inferior to both option 1 & 2.
Expected Return of New
Business Portfolio 'Efficient Frontier -
o Direction of a Better Unobservable for
iein of aOBtir practical purposes ofChoice of Options strategic planning
+2
+..- 3
Risk Profile (Volatility)
of the New Portfolio
FIGURE 5-4 Choice of Boundary Modification Option using Portfolio Theory
Other than new business ventures (defined as entry into a new value system), the
concept can also be applied to activities along a currently served value system. AMECO,
Fluor Corporation's subsidiary in the equipment retailing business, has expanded into the
complementary after-market parts and services businesses. Since the revenue of the after-
market businesses is more stable than that of equipment retailing, this strategy lowers the
volatility of the combined risk profile of AMECO.
Lastly, besides assessing the risk profile of the business portfolio, construction
firms also have to worry about the risk profile of the projects that they are handling. For
example, the working capital requirement at any point in time varies considerably with
the mix, stage of completion (e.g. the conventional S-curve representation of cumulative
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cost) and commercial terms stated in the contract for different projects in the portfolio.
Resource allocation of manpower and equipment is commonly addressed in most
conventional textbooks of project management. By the same token, management has to
realize that financial requirements of each project are aggregated at the firm level as a
whole. Certain mix of projects may concurrently demand financial resources that are
beyond the limit of the firm, thus causing financial distress. It may then be better off not
to take on some of those projects in the first place. This is especially true for an overseas
project where more uncertainties are present and the risk profile of a project would have a
large impact on the risk profile of the firm as a whole.
5.5.4 MODE OF BOUNDARY MODIFICATION
The importance of the type of modes used by firms to modify their boundaries
effectively speaks for itself. Hundreds of books and articles have been written on mergers
and acquisitions (M&A), joint ventures, strategic alliances and licensing issues. The
intention here is to elaborate only on specific issues that would affect the decision making
process when dealing with boundary modification.
Beyond the hype that has been stirred up by all these buzzwords, most have
overlooked the fact that it is indeed the three dimensions of boundary modification that
begets the various chosen modes. In other words, whether firms choose to engage in
M&A activities or form joint ventures, they do so for the purpose of geographical and
market access or even to acquire new skills and knowledge. Unfortunately, too often
management gets too immersed in the detailed activities of the mode and loses sight of
the more important transfer of value that would help to push the corporation forward as a
whole in the long term.23
As a decision factor, firms choose different modes because they expect that values
are created differently from M&A, JV and alliances. In fact, a firm may also pursue two
or three different modes at the same time in the process of boundary modification. To
23 Hamel, Doz and Prahalad (1989) emphasize this point in illustrating the differences of learning mindset
between western companies and Japanese firms in strategic alliances.
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strengthen its position within the pharmaceutical sector, Fluor acquired Marshall
Contractors in 1996, thus adding construction management strength and expertise in the
sector, and allowing it to capitalize on Marshall's client relationships in the market. To
penetrate the Japanese market (in terms of serving Japanese multinational companies), it
worked with Hitachi and JGC to serve these multinationals on global projects. Lastly,
Fluor also formed strategic client alliances with Eli Lilly, Amgen and Genentech to
design and deliver world-class manufacturing activities for these clients (Fluor
Corporation Annual Report, 1997). The challenge is to reconcile the value derived
differently from these various modes to enhance its strategic position in the sector.
5.5.4.1 Joint Ventures (JV) and Strategic Alliances
With the exception of some issues on contractual and financial arrangement, the
dynamics behind JVs and alliances are mostly similar. Unlike M&A, the firm does not
have complete ownership and control in these two modes. As such, the main concern in
choosing these two modes is how much value (in terms of learning, intellectual property,
profits etc.) can be extracted from the JVs and alliances and redirected back to the
corporation.
This value is often maximized when the JV effort or alliance has a long-term
nature. In such cases, it can incorporate a long-term strategy, which combines the core
competencies and expertise of all partners. This might lead to a product or services that
may not be feasibly developed with a single firm's effort. For example, under a non-
exclusive agreement, McDermott's B&W Power Generation Group, together with
equipment suppliers General Electric and Westinghouse, formed an integrated team to
upgrade the complete steam and power cycle for the clients. Over a longer period, each
partner also has more opportunities to learn from one another. For the same reasons, the
collaboration effort may also be improved if it represents a worldwide effort as it fully
utilizes the partners' network and exploits both economies of scale and scope.
Stone & Webster pursued just such kind of strategy in the area of joint venture. In
1997, the firm launched a joint venture with Fluor Daniel to combine its proprietary
ethylene technology and EPC resources with Fluor Daniel's worldwide execution
157
capability. The JV represented a worldwide effort, and this seems logical since their
targeted clients are global companies anyway. To Stone & Webster, Fluor Daniel's role
resembles a special marketing and executing channel to promote its technology. In the
process, the company had the chance to learn about the best way to market this
technology to global clients. The JV also represents a virtual extension of its firm
boundary along the value system by borrowing market share from the downstream
partner as a leverage to jack up the effort of technology development.
As mentioned earlier, the incomplete ownership and control in these two modes
causes potential problem on the level of commitment to be made and the value to be
recouped by each party. This is especially true when firms view this only as one (of the
many others) alternative for boundary modification and resources could be channeled to
other modes. An interesting rule of thumb as proposed by Judy C. Lewent, the Chief
Financial Officer of Merck & Co., Inc., is that JV should be a 50-50 arrangement to
minimize asymmetrical value- and profit-sharing (or, in the case of alliance, an equal
commitment of resources and profit-sharing). Arguably, it is easier to delineate financial
commitment, but more difficult to assess the level of complementary expertise that is
contributed to the venture. Nevertheless, the point emphasized by Lewent is that parties
should expect equal value of going in and coming out of the venture. In such cases, less
energy is wasted on unworthy disputes and more efforts are concentrated on the common
interest and strategic pursuit of the venture.
Though impossible to test the rule quantitatively, some evidence from the firm
sample does support this argument. Among the three larger JVs of Halliburton, two of
them are 50-50 split ownership, while the third is slightly short with 49% ownership.
Incidentally, the two 50-50 jointly-owned operations have been very profitable with net
income of $341 million and $316 million in 1997 and 1998 respectively, and interest in
the third venture was sold in 1999. It is also noted that both the 50-50 JVs are poised to
enhance Halliburton's core competencies in offering integrated energy services to its
clients. The first JV, European Marine Contractors, is part of Halliburton's Energy
24 "The Real B2B: Contracts, Acquisitions and Joint Ventures," a lecture on Strategy and Organization by
Judy C. Lewent on April 2 nd, 2001 at the Sloan School of Management, M.I.T.
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Services Group and specializes in engineering, procurement and construction of marine
pipelines. The second JV, Bredero-Shaw, specializes in pipe coating. Apparently,
Halliburton is leveraging external resources to complement its internal operation that may
turn out to be a transition route to achieve a more permanent new boundary.
5.5.4.2 Mergers and Acquistions (M&A)
Most mergers and acquisitions fall apart or fail to realize the "integration value"
that the deal is supposed to deliver. If anything, M&A actions in the construction industry
can only be more risky. The nature of the construction business has especially made
M&A much more complicated to evaluate the potential benefits and liabilities in the deal.
There are at least six reasons that the author can identify to support such a claim:
(a) There are usually some projects in progress during the time of the deal. Hence,
regardless of whichever party agrees to take the responsibility to complete those
projects, the uncertainty in future revenues or subsequent deviation of costs from
initial estimation would potentially trigger a lawsuit - often blaming on the course
of "insufficient disclosure" a priori.
(b) In construction, the seller sometimes retain certain liabilities associated with the
initial securing of projects such as letter of credits, performance bonds, parent
company guarantees and other support agreements at the time of sale. In the case
of non-performance of the contract by the acquirer, the beneficiaries of such
guarantees and support agreements would still seek resource from the seller. In
short, there is a prolonged period even after the completion of the deal that the
seller has to be "on guard".
(c) Pending change orders in some projects complicate the transition process and add
uncertainties to projected profits from uncompleted projects.
(d) It is also difficult for the acquirer to judge its own effectiveness and competence
to handle projects that are passed on through the deal. For example, a project may
initially be projected as profitable precisely because it suits the expertise of the
seller. The same project, nonetheless, might impose too much strain on the
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acquirer who may not have similar resources or expertise to achieve the same
level of profit margin.
(e) The engineering and construction business is essentially a service business as
compared to asset-intensive production business like manufacturing.
Consequently, the costs, risks or even benefits are harder to estimate - starting
right from the analysis of the balance sheet! There are simply too many
intangibles (such as human assets that forms a major part of the business) and
potential liabilities (including unforeseeable lawsuits like in cases of asbestosis
claims) that get buried under the numbers.
(f) Acquirers commonly use their stocks to secure, in part or in whole, an M&A
transaction. Typical construction firms, however, are known to have low price-
earning (P/E) ratios in the capital market. This makes the common channel
relatively expensive, while on the other hand construction firms are not known to
be cash-rich as well.
In short, M&A are high-risk transactions for construction firms. Most of the
problems listed above exist due to the long-term and litigious nature of construction
projects. It results in a high exit cost for companies who want to quit the business.
A recent example of an unsuccessful M&A transaction is the acquisition of
Raytheon Engineers & Constructors by the Washington Group International, Inc. (WGI).
As of the date when this chapter is written, issues remain unresolved and pending in the
litigation process. Meanwhile, WGI had filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 on May
14, 2001. Before that, the company had walked off two huge Massachusetts power
projects that it acquired from Raytheon Corporation - the completion of which would
have required an additional funding of $380 million but ended with a projected loss
(according to WGI) of $54 million (Engineering News Record, 2001b). Obviously,
Raytheon Company, as the guarantor, was exposed to potential liability to complete the
two projects. These projects (among several others) were projected to be profitable before
the transaction. Again, it is hard to tell whether the decrease in margin - all the way down
to the red mark - is due to the incompetence of WGI or inflated profits as reported by
Raytheon during the transaction (which is what WGI claims).
160
Raytheon Company alleged that WGI's bankruptcy was mainly caused by the
acquisition of a company that was effectively double of its size. As of 1999, WGI's total
assets were reported to be $1,196 million (WGI Annual Report, 1999), whereas the
identifiable assets of RE&C were $1,521 million (Raytheon Corp. Annual Report, 1999).
As a rule of thumb, many analysts believe that any acquisition that exceeds 30% ~ 35%
of the market capitalization of the acquirer would be 'difficult to digest', not to mention
the possibility of extracting 'integration benefits' that was sought after in the transaction.
Putting aside all these convoluted arguments, one conclusion is clear - pace is another
big factor. WGI initially merged with Morrison Knudsen in 1996, and it then increased its
assets by 50% through the acquisition of Westinghouse Government Services in 1999.
With the acquisition of RE&C in 2000, this represents at least a 300% increase in size
within a five-year time frame! Yet most companies require years to integrate a new
company into its existing operation.
There are other examples in the sample that firms learn about hidden costs of
M&A in a hard way. In 1998, McDermott, Inc. had to write off a $262.9 million charge
for goodwill associated with its previous acquisition of Offshore Pipeline, Inc., which the
management concluded no longer had value. Subsequently, the acquisition of minority
interest in its subsidiary J. Ray McDermott in 1999 had resulted in an increase in
goodwill of $333.2 million, which might again set a prelude for another write-off if the
price paid for the stock repurchase subsequently turn out to be unjustifiably high. It is
important to note that these charges have the same order of magnitude as the operating
income (reported as $355.5 million in Mar-98 and $217.4 million in Mar-99), and will
impose a large toll before arriving at the net income level. In other words, it represents a
huge cost to the shareholders.
Even Halliburton, which had prior experience in making various strategic
acquisitions, had to incur a $980 million charge related to the merger with Dresser
Industries, Inc. (Halliburton Annual Report, 1998). Out of this total, $509 million were
asset-related charges including impairments and write-offs of intangible assets. In the
process of aligning the strategy between the two firms, some of the assets of Dresser
would not be utilized for their originally intended usage, therefore lowering projected
cash flows and resulting in impairment charges.
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To summarize, M&A is tough especially for construction firms that may not have
sufficient financial resources to absorb some of the inevitable charges associated with the
transaction, even though value can be extracted in the long-run. Often times, original
product lines have to be de-emphasized especially during the period of "rationalization"
of the acquired assets. Ultimately, the cost incurred (especially additional goodwill) has
to be justified by means of strategic assessment (for the long-term value) and financial
evaluation (for the price paid and the level of financial resources to absorb the "shock" of
various charges). Meanwhile, Halliburton has decided to divest its Dresser Equipment
Group in the year 2000, possibly due to non-realization of the real asset value and a move
to recoup some of the losses in the impairment charge incurred. For other companies
without the level of resources similar to Halliburton's, such acquisition and divestment
cycle could possibly cause a crunch in financial liquidity that may end up with a Chapter
11 filing.
5.5.5 OPTIONS INHERENT IN BOUNDARY MODIFICATION
The fifth and final decision factor is the exploitation of options that may be
inherent in certain boundary modification actions. In most of Michael Porter's work
during the 1980s, the focus is on capturing market share. Some critics have since
commented that Porter's model is 'static' in nature. From Hamel and Prahalad's (1994)
viewpoint, market-based competition - the main focus of Porter's model - only
represents the final stage in competing for the future when new opportunities become
matured and the industry structure settles into an equilibrium. The key point of success,
they argued, lies on the competition for opportunity share and intellectual leadership - by
developing industry foresight and crafting strategic architecture during the first stage of
the competition. 25
In the context of boundary modification, pursuing opportunity share can be
interpreted as making initial investments in areas that will potentially evolve into a whole
new expansion of the firm's boundary. In the boundary model of this thesis, however, the
2 In between these 1st and 3rd stages, Hamel and Prahalad (1994) had defined Stage 2 as the competition to
shape and foreshorten the migration paths between today's and tomorrow's markets and industry structure.
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vocabulary of opportunity share need not be limited to intellectual leadership or core
competence development - which is only one out of three dimensions of boundary
modification. Opportunity shares also exist along the other two dimensions.
For example, the execution of a project in a country that is new to the firm can
potentially be viewed as a smaller-scale investment for further expansion into the new
market.26 Effectively, the firm is trying to capture an opportunity share to set a permanent
foothold in the new market - just like most firms trying to achieve in China and India.
The mindset adopted here also differs from mere geographical expansion on a regional or
worldwide basis, which may be more temporary in nature by simply executing "one-off'
projects in those countries. In many cases, the difference is reflected by the
organizational structure adopted in the host country, which sets the primary difference
between a subsidiary, a representative office and a project office (in a descending order
of permanence).
From another point of view, pursuing a smaller-scale investment along those
dimensions may make more sense because of the risk of a large-scale boundary
modification. Thus, before executing a cross-border merger or acquisition that is
notoriously risky, it may be preferable to gain prior exposure to the operating conditions
of the foreign country through a joint venture or alliance of a similar nature (both of
which usually involve a lesser extent of commitment).
Conceptually, this decision factor is analogous to identifying real options that are
inherent in some projects (such as oil exploration and plant expansion), except that here it
is being applied at the corporate level. Thus, the strategy adopted in the above example of
a project in a new geographical region can be modeled as a sequential investment and a
compound option (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, for example).
26 The project is "smaller-scale" only in a relative sense - when compared to the scale of operation in the
future state with a more permanent presence. The absolute size of the project itself could be large.
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5.6 Strategy, Organization, Boundary and Environment in Perspective
Since boundary lies at the intersection of strategy, organization and the external
environment (refer again to Figure 4.7), its modification cannot be isolated from these
components. In fact, these components drive the changes in boundary, as suggested in
Section 5.2. Upon addressing how boundary can be modified (the three dimensions) and
what determines the extent of modification (the five decision factors), it is appropriate at
this stage to step out and put things in perspective in order to elicit the rationale of
boundary modification within the larger context of corporate strategy.
There are obviously infinite ways that boundary could interact with the seven
strategic fields and the two internal mechanisms of organization (as defined in the
previous paper). Hence, it is not practical to provide a comprehensive list of these
interactions. Nonetheless, since such interactions really are the crux of the entire model,
two strategic fields - Business and Operational Strategy, and an internal mechanism -
Structure, are chosen in this section to illustrate how their interactions with boundary can
bear practical implications for corporate strategic planning purposes.
5.6.1 BUSINESS STRATEGY AND BOUNDARY
Industry structure analysis commonly forms the first level of business strategy
assessment. Since its inception in the 1980s, the value system concept (Porter, 1985) has
proven to be useful in laying out the connections among the different players within a
particular sector or industry. The tool is hereby used to map out three value systems to
facilitate the discussion of the interaction between business strategy and boundary. These
are shown in Figure 5-5(a), 5-5(b) and 5-5(c), respectively, for the simplified versions of
the following value systems:
(1) Upstream operations in the oil and gas sector, which includes exploration
and production;
(2) Downstream activities in the oil and gas sector, primarily refining
operations;
(3) Upstream activities in the power sector, primarily in power generation.
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Suppliers
(Equipment,
Material)
MD* (Vessels, Pile
driving hammers);
HB (Pumps - through
a JV with Ingersoll,
subsequently divested)
Specialized
Subcontractors
MD (Platform installation &
fabrications);
FL (Pipelines & Marine Systems)
HB (Drilling operations)
* Refer to the next page for legend
General Operation,
Contractor Maintenance
& Production
MD; FL; -:FL; HB; JE
HB; JE - - - - - - -I-- - -
ClientEngineering
and Design (Oil & Gas companies
such as ExxonMobil,
BP Amoco, RoyalMD; HR; JE' Dutch/Shell)
FIGURE 5-5(a)
Suppliers
(Equipment, )
Material)
FW* (Boilers);
HB (Dresser Equipment'
Group, divested in 2000) 1
L--------.------
Subcontractors
(Piping etc.)
A Simplified Value System of Upstream Operations in the
Oil & Gas Sector
General Operation,
Contractor Maintenance
i HB (through Kellogg' HB (through Kellogg
Brown & Root); Brown & Root);
'FL; FW; SW; FL; FW; SW; JE
WGI; REC; JE L--------
Client
Engineering > (Oil & Gas companies
and Design such as ExxonMobil,
BP Amoco, Royal
'HB (through Kellogg Dutch/Shell)
Brown & Root);
FL; FW; SW;
WGI; REC; JE
* Refer to the next page for legend
FIGURE 5-5(b) A Simplified Value System of Downstream Activities in the Oil
& Gas Sector (Primarily Refining Operations)
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Suppliers
(Equipment,
Material)
FW (Steam Generators);
MD (Boilers, through:
Babcock & Wilcox)
--------.. . ..-
Subcontractors
FIGURE 5-5(c)
General Operation,
> Contractor Maintenance
FL; FW; SW; SW; FW; (Both specialize in
'WGI; REC plant upgrades as well)
MD (Boiler cleaning, replacement)
-A I FL (facility management)
- -- -- -------- -- -- -- -- -- ---
Engineering
and Design
FW; SW; (Both specialize Clients
in proprietary processes) (Utilities, Merchant
FL; WGI; REC
F WG REC.. ___Plant Owners,
Independent Power
Producers)
Fuel Suppliers
(Coal, Natural Gas, LNG,
Petroleum residuals and
distillates)
FL (through A.T. Massey); ~~~ ~ Downstream operations:
WGI (through equity positions in Transmission and
some mining properties); Distribution of Power
SW (JV in wholesale gas marketing)
A Simplified Value System of Upstream Activities in the Power
Sector (Primarily Power Generation)
Legend for Figures 5-5(a), 5-5(b) & 5-5(c)
MD - McDermott
HB - Halliburton
. FL - Fluor
FW - Foster Wheeler
- SW - Stone & Webster
WGI - Washington Group International
REC - Raytheon Engineers & Constructors
JE - Jacobs Engineering Group
Notes:
Notes:
1)
2)
3)
Kellogg Brown & Root is Halliburton's EPC subsidiary in the downstream
petroleum and other industrial process sectors;
Babcock & Wilcox is McDermott's subsidiary in the power generation business.
The subsidiary has filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in year 2000.
A.T. Massey is Fluor's subsidiary in coal mining and production. It has been spun
off in year 2000.
166
.
-
The dashed-boxes placed alongside each value chain list out those firms in the
sample that have a considerable amount of business activities in the areas concerned. All
firms take on at least a "box" along a particular value system; and when it enlarges its
boundary to include two or more, it is traditionally said to have "vertically integrated"
some upstream/downstream activities. An interesting proposition is that when a firm
takes on more and more of these "boxes", it naturally meets a 'virtual' limit to expand -
when it takes on all the value activities in the value system. This boundary limit is said to
be 'virtual' precisely because of the way that a typical value system is being drawn or
defined. The concept itself is not flawed, but most overlook the fact that one value system
connects to another. A client or end user defined in one value system may mark the end
of that value system, but it may become a supplier or upstream party in another value
system. In fact, one can view Figure 5-5(a), 5-5(b) and 5-5(c) as one large, interconnected
value system.
The implication of this proposition is an important one. Firms that can envision
the flow of products and services from one value system to another can become more
efficient, at least in terms of filtering and processing critical information, when it operates
(either directly or through other modes) in multi-linked value systems. The concept is
analogous to the idea of 'arbitrage' when investors attempt to profit by exploiting the
slightest price discrepancies of financial instruments in two different countries. Here, it is
more of a case of exploiting information that gets bounded within a single value system
in order to 'optimize' the strategy of operating across two value systems.
Halliburton, for example, is practically ubiquitous in the Figure 5-5(a) and 5-5(b).
Incidentally, both value systems have the same type of clients - large multinational oil
and gas companies. By enlarging its boundary to encompass two intimately linked value
systems, Halliburton is obviously better positioned to respond to the needs of those
clients and address eminent changes in the environment. Furthermore, it can exploit
"missing" linkages between the upstream and downstream value system of the oil and gas
sector. For example, after exploration and production upstream, crude oil has to be
transported to refineries and Halliburton could choose to expand into transportation and
storage facilities, a function which does not naturally appear in either value system. It is
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easy to miss out such important linkages that fall in between two interconnected value
systems when they are being drawn separately.
Other players such as Fluor and Foster Wheeler also have their boundaries
covering separate value systems. The caveat is that ubiquitous positioning alone does not
necessarily count for an effective business strategy. Those activities have to be
meaningfully connected. McDermott, for example, have operations in both Figure 5-5(a)
and Figure 5-5(c), but those operations are too remotely linked to one another. Whatever
events that have happened in upstream oil & gas exploration may not have an immediate
effect on McDermott's operation in the power generation sector. As such, those
operations of McDermott do not provide the full advantage of functional optimization or
informational efficiency, thus resembling more of the usual course of market
diversification.
5.6.2 OPERATIONAL STRATEGY AND BOUNDARY
Project delivery Project delivery and contractual methods are two main pillars of
the construction business. Parties are brought together in different ways: from the issue of
tender offer calling for competitive bids; to pre-selection followed by subsequent
negotiation.
When a project is completed, the relationship between contracting parties usually
comes to an end - at least until the next one starts. In certain cases when two parties
contract with each other more and more often (e.g. sole-source procurement from a
familiar subcontractor in a subcontracting network as described in Eccles' (1981) notion
of the "quasi-firm"), the transacting parties may make specific investments (both tangible
and intangible) to enhance their individual operations for the repeated business dealings.
Indirectly, such specific investments create ties between the two parties and inflexibility
for each to deal with a third party - thereby foregoing exogenous market mechanisms.
Provided that the relationship does not turn sour, a possibility of contractual hold-up can
be created (Klein, 1988).
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To minimize potential disruption to the operational conditions of either firm (so
that each can concentrate on other corporate strategic issues at large), one of them may
seek to acquire the other. Due to the absence of legally constructed constraints upon
completion of the acquisition, there would be a decreased possibility of contractual hold-
up. More importantly, corporate planning becomes more flexible as a whole and it
liberates the field of Operational Strategy of the firm. This is particularly important given
the basic argument of the conceptual model in favor of openness and versatility: each
strategic field has to function effectively as variables to cope with the dynamism of the
external environment.
Since construction is largely a fragmented business, however, contractual hold-up
is generally not a large and common problem in our industry. On the other hand, it is
noted that such phenomenon exists quite frequently in the study of the U.S. firm sample
in this chapter (and the common denominator among the firms being that each has some
activities in the power and energy sectors). One possible reason is that specific
investments are more necessary and commonplace in the power, oil and gas sectors, since
processes are technologically sophisticated and unique. The same generality might not be
true for the residential and commercial building sectors. Finally, at the upstream of the
value system where businesses are less fragmented (e.g. some specialized construction
materials may be supplied by only a few large vendors), the example given on the
interaction between Operational Strategy and boundary could also become more
relevant.
5.6.3 STRUCTURE AND BOUNDARY
Just as the type of modes adopted (acquisitions, alliances etc.) represents a critical
decision factor to determine an external structure when boundary is modified, boundary
changes may similarly demand for a corresponding alteration of the internal structure. In
recent days, firms providing services to large multinationals commonly set up some
variations of global account management organization to present a single interface to
these global customers (Galbraith, 2000). In most cases, the account management setting
is necessary to increase the responsiveness and consistency to meet clients' needs. In
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some cases, the account manager is even given the authority to overwrite the decisions of
the project manager and other functional managers if conflict arises.
Another fashionable trend that is evident in the sample is the emphasis on
maintaining autonomous business divisions that can be readily integrated to provide a
bundled package or solution to the client, while each capitalizing on external growth
opportunities independently. The design is a direct response to maintain a fluid firm
boundary. This type of structure can be found in Fluor and Foster Wheeler. Figure 5-6
shows the organizational structure of Fluor Corporation in year 2000, arranged in a
format that is partly conformed to Mintzberg's (1979) model. Effectively, services
provided by the strategic business units (SBU) of Fluor Global Services and Fluor
Signature Services can be bundled with the operations of Fluor Daniel to provide
integrated packages, but each of them has separate profit-and-loss accountability and can
be readily spun off.
Technostructure Operating Core Support Functions
Fluor Leadership Institute
SBE Fluor Daniel SBE Fluor Signature Services (FSS)
- Focus purely on EPC opportunities - Provide business and administrative
SBU Energy & Chemical support to Fluor operating units and
SBU Manufacturing & Life Sciences external clients
SBU Mining
SBU Infrastructure - Organized into individual lines of
businesses in areas of finance, IT,
SBE Fluor Global Services safety, HR, office services and
- Integrated portfolio of services performance solutions
capitalizing on opportunities outside
the traditional EPC value chain
SBU American Equipment Company
SBU Fluor Federal Services
SBU Telecommunications
SBU Operations & Maintenance
SBU Asset Management Services
SBU Property Services
SBE A.T. Massey Coal (Spun-off in 2000)
SBE: Strategic Business Enterprise SBU: Strategic Business Unit
FIGURE 5-6 Organizational Structure of Fluor Corporation in Year 2000
27 From the interview with Dr. Uwe Kruger, Head of Corporate Development, Hochtief AG, Germany.
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The above-mentioned structure may look ideal, but one should be aware that as a
company divisionalizes and fractures into smaller business units, competencies in turn
become fragmented and weakened (Hamel and Prahalad, 1994), especially when
innovative solutions demand for cross-functional effort or business cooperation. Such
compromise in core competence development consequently lessens the ability to
spearhead future boundary modification.
5.6.4 FACING CHALLENGES POSED BY EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT
At the beginning of this chapter, the concept of boundary is defined in such a way
that the external environment is typically beyond the direct control of a firm. In fact, most
case studies drawn from the firm sample confirm that this is often the case. Expanding on
the example of the choice of technology development faced by Foster Wheeler, recent
changes in environmental factors have put even more immense pressure demanding for
boundary modification with a new Technology Strategy. In Europe, new stringent fuel
standards have been set by the European Commission. In response, Foster Wheeler has
been focusing on the new market of refinery modifications and facility upgrades with
advanced technology to accommodate the new regulations. Similarly, as a major supplier
to the U.S. Naval Reactors Program of nuclear fuel and reactor components, McDermott
is exposed to unique boundary issues related to environmental factors that are mostly
beyond its control including political issues, since the demand of its products and services
is related to defense budget and military spending.
In view of the increasingly turbulent nature of environmental factors, some have
questioned the usefulness of strategic planning functions when something that is planned
today might not be applicable tomorrow. Instead, they adopt the view that strategy should
be derived externally by solely reacting to changes in environmental factors. This is much
like the philosophy embraced by the Evolutionary school of thoughts (refer Chapter 2).
Although there is some basis behind such argument, passively reacting to external
changes will guarantee, at best, average performance in the industry. The study of firms
in this research demonstrates that firms do actively modify their boundaries in
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expectation to better exploit opportunity and market shares even though the future
environment is highly unpredictable.
To reconcile the disparity, it is worthy to note that any rational economic
decisions have to consider the equations on both sides of supply and demand. The entire
planning exercise should resemble an iterative loop - by examining external
environmental factors while assessing internal capabilities and determining what should
be improved. Boundary, then, serves as the pivoting point of the loop to put together a
coherent strategy. Management has to assess the fit between the internal variables
(corporate strategic fields and organizational mechanisms) and the external environment,
and redefine boundary when incompatibility exists. The modification dimensions and
decision factors identified in this chapter will provide better insights to achieve this.
Through the numerous examples given and the repeated emphasis on the
important characteristics of the conceptual model, it should now be clear that the model
really gathers selected viewpoints from the various schools of thoughts in Figure 2-1. The
next chapter will look at how the model can fit into general strategic management
functions.
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CHAPTER SIX
Model Application in the Context of Strategic Management
"In many ways, strategy has been discredited over the past several years.
Consulting companies that once focused on strategy are now turning to
operational issues. Strategic planning departments are being disbanded. The
view that "strategy is the easy part, implementation is the hard part" goes
unchallenged in many quarters. Most strategic planning is strategic in name
only, ritualistic and formulaic, seldom deeply creative. No wonder strategy has
lost much of its credibility. But make no mistake - strategy is hard work.
Creating a compelling view of tomorrow's opportunities and moving
preemptively to secure the future are tasks for neither dilettantes nor the merely
intellectually curious."
- Gary Hamel and C.K. Prahalad (1994)
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6.1 Linking the Conceptual Model to Strategic Management
The publication of "From Strategic Planning to Strategic Management" edited by
Ansoff et al. (1976) came to clarify the subtle difference between the strategic planning
process and the broader scope encompassed by strategic management. Since then, people
have come to accept the notion that strategic management is really more of an ongoing
commitment beyond the planning process itself. Grinig and KUhn (2001) define the three
subsystems of strategic management as being strategic planning; implementation of
strategies; and strategic control. In essence, this broader view ensures the understanding
that realization of strategies is as important as the planning process.
Grunig and KUhn also point out that the three subsystems basically form a larger,
single process. Building on this standpoint, a prototype of this process is developed in
this section. This prototype serves as a basis to demonstrate how the conceptual model is
related to the general strategic management functions. It will be seen that the conceptual
model truly augments the analytical power of strategic planning with due consideration of
its linkages with the two other subsystems (implementation and control). To provide a
more concrete picture, the second half of the chapter closes with a case illustration using
the U.S. company Stone & Webster.
6.1.1 THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL AS A PARALLEL PROCESS
The application of the conceptual model can be construed as a process that runs
parallel to the mainstream of typical strategic management functions. This is depicted in
Figure 6-1, whereby the subsystems of strategic management are further broken down
into roughly five stages.
The parallelism between the two processes is explained by the fact that most input
required for assessing the interactions among variables in the conceptual model (i.e., the
seven strategic fields and two organizational mechanisms) comes from the usual strategic
management functions. As will be explained later in detail, each part of the strategic
management functions is principally related to one or more components of the conceptual
model. Essentially, the conceptual model takes these inputs to check and validate the
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compatibility of strategies derived from the mainstream. Consequently, potential conflicts
arising from incompatibility of strategies are identified more effectively. Moreover, new
insights dealing with interaction and higher order differentiation effects can be created,
thus serving as a feedback to the mainstream.
Mainstream of
Strategic Management
Stage 1
Assessment of
Preconditions
Stage 2
Strategic Analysis &
Strategy Development
Stage 3
Choice
Formulation
Stage 4
Implementation of
Strategies
Stage 5
Monitoring and
Strategic Control
FIGURE 6-1 Parallelism between the Conceptual Model and the Mainstream
of Strategic Management in General
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* Seven Strategic Fields
- Business Strateg
- Financial Strateg
- Operational Strateg
- Technology Strategy
- Information Technolog Strategy
- Human Resource Strateg
- Marketing Strategy
* Two Internal Mechanisms
- Structure
- Culture
* Boundary Issues and the
External Environment
- Three dimensions of
boundary modification
- Five decision factors
Key features:
1) Treatment of strategic fields
and mechanisms as variables
2) Interaction among variables
3) Interplay of variables, firm's
boundary and the external
environment
6.1.2 ASSESSMENT OF PRECONDITIONS
Stage 1 of the strategic management functions basically consists of three steps as
shown in Figure 6-2.28 In general, there is no particular order in conducting these three
steps and the sequence is immaterial. Also listed are components of the conceptual model
29that are principally related to the steps concerned. In other words, during the process of
going through the steps in the mainstream, the strategist should also interpret the problem
at hand from the standpoint of the conceptual model and note down any pertinent issues
related to those components of the model. By following this methodology, issues and
data aggregated will allow concurrent analysis using the conceptual model. Lastly,
comments on the dominant stream of theory that is deemed inherent in each step are also
given, following the four different schools of thought elaborated in Chapter 2.
Review of
Firm's Mission,
Corporate Environmental Internal Scrutiny
Philosophy, Scan
Values and Goals
----------- -_ ------ Principally-related
Principally-related Principally-related Component:
Component: Component: All strategic fields &
Culture Boundary internal mechanisms
Dominant stream: Dominant stream: Dominant stream:
Systemic Systemic Classical
FIGURE 6-2 Three Steps for Assessing Preconditions
28 This viewpoint is inspired by Macomber (1991). The meaning of steps outlined in Stage 1 closely
resembles the first three steps in his article.
29 These components are said to be "principally" related because they are the most obvious in the respective
contexts. This does not imply that other components of the conceptual model would not be present.
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Firstly, the step of reviewing firm's mission, corporate philosophy, values and
goals is generally self-explanatory. Chinowsky (2000) in particular devotes an entire
chapter of his book to this area. Given the broad understanding of the role of the
reviewing process, this will not be elaborated any further.
The goal of environmental scan is to gather the latest information on the external
environmental factors so that it could be subsequently used for strategic analysis
purposes. This includes assessing the outlook of political, social, economic, regulatory,
environmental (in technical areas related to engineering) and industrial factors in general.
The assessment of industrial factors should also be done with consideration of the firm's
current market position and market offers (GrUnig and KUhn, 2001).
Throughout the years, many researchers and practitioners have developed their
own tools to guide the environmental scanning process. Some of the specific tools and
concepts include the Porter's (1990) diamond model and Hamel and Prahalad's (1994)
notion of capturing opportunity share. More generally, the industry life cycle model is
highly relevant to assessing the industrial outlook; and obviously the enormous range of
models developed in the field of macroeconomics is well versed for scanning the broader
environment.
Moving on, the step of internal scrutiny, as the name implies, is inward looking.
Among the main concerns are the assessment of firm's current competitive strength
(which is intrinsically linked to earlier assessment of market position and market offers);
internal resource analysis (both quality and abundance); and the mapping of current
business and project portfolios along the dimensions of market share, potential growth
and risks. In addition, as a direct link to Information Technology Strategy, the strategist
should also examine and compare the firm's enterprise resource planning (ERP) and
decision support systems to the current trend and state-of-the-art. The effectiveness of
current systems - in terms of fulfilling business needs, can thus be judged and compared
with other alternatives available in the market.
As with environmental scan, guiding tools and concepts abound. Those that are
more commonly known are listed below:
0 SWOT analysis
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0 Boston Consulting Group (BCG) portfolio matrix
* Industry attractiveness-competitive strength portfolio method developed
by the McKinsey company
* Hamel & Prahalad's (1994) notion of identifying core competencies
* Black & Boal's (1994) method for identifying rare and sustainable
resources
" Typical tools of fundamental analysis such as financial ratio analysis
" Altman's (1968) Z-model for the prediction of corporate bankruptcy (see
also Langford et al., 1993)
The above list is far from being exhaustive and the strategist can choose other
tools that would suit his/her needs.
6.1.3 STRATEGIC ANALYSIS AND STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT
Strategic analysis and strategy development have always been the prime area of
research and discussion, with a plethora of well-known tools and concepts available for
application in this stage. In general, it is useful to think that strategic analysis and strategy
development are really performed at four different levels within the organization:
(1) Corporate level
(2) Business units level
(3) Functional units level
(4) Project level
At the corporate level, the focus is mainly on issues of managing the company's
businesses as a whole. Some of these would include resource allocation for various
business units, development of an overall marketing image and the overall direction
towards a selected generic strategy (Porter, 1980). A diversified conglomerate or an
industrial group, for example, is always concerned with the disposition of unprofitable
business units and/or new foray into attractive business areas.
178
The strategy of individual business units appears below the corporate level. Here
the focus is more narrowed down to the specific contexts of industries that the units are
competing within. Also included are functions such as capital budgeting and making
formal appropriation request for each project proposal to be submitted for planning and
approval at the corporate level (Brealey and Myers, 1996).
Strategic analysis and strategy development can also be performed at the level of
functional units. This is true especially for firms that are technologically driven and have
separate functional units set up for R&D. For example, many large Japanese construction
firms such as Obayashi and Kajima have separate functional divisions focusing on
technology development and basic research. With special expertise and knowledge
housed within these units, functional specialists in these units would have a 'better feel'
about future direction of where the current trend (of technology, for example) is heading.
As such, they would possess some unique insights in terms of shaping the strategy and
defining future role of their functions within the larger corporation.
Lastly, core operations of a construction firm can never be divorced from the
notion of projects, just like "atoms constitute molecules", so to speak. Contractual issues,
project delivery methods and site management functions have always been playing a
central role in the civil engineering tradition. In many ways, choices ranging from
contractual and delivery methods to equipment and construction technology utilized at
site can often be associated with a way of strategic thinking. For example, a large part of
Jacobs Engineering Group's success is attributed to its business model - a relationship-
based approach, which is more amenable to negotiating contractual terms rather than
engaging in the usual price-based competition.
Logically, it is quite obvious that the analysis performed at one level could hardly
be isolated from the other in entirety. For example, it has been said that technical
specialists housed within the functional units are highly competent in dictating the
strategy and future role of their functions. For such strategy to be meaningful, it has to be
consistent with other developments at the corporate and business unit levels. "Rocket
science" would not add much value to the firm if this were only marginally related to the
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firm's business and overall strategy. Similarly, strategy development at the corporate
level sometimes has to take due consideration of the intricacy at the project level.
All these sound utterly familiar - in some ways the analysis at different levels are
linked through the interaction effect of the conceptual model. Table 6-1 provides further
clarification by associating each level with the principally related components of the
conceptual model. As mentioned earlier, thanks to the prime interests directed towards
strategic analysis and strategy development, strategists nowadays are blessed with the
availability of many guiding tools and concepts in this area (although the misery would
be to determine exactly just which ones are more suitable!). Again, some of the
commonly known ones are listed alongside in the table.
Level of Principally Related Guiding Tools & Concepts
Analysis Components within
the Conceptual
Model
Corporate Business Strategy; * The framework of parenting advantage
Financial Strategy; (Goold et al., 1994)
Marketing Strategy; Business Portfolio Management and the
Human Resource Strategy; "Dialogue Process" (Allen, 2000)
Structure ; Culture ;
Boundary * Industry and market segmentation; Five forces
------- ----------------------------------- model; Value chain analysis (Porter, 1985)
Business Units Business Strategy; * International dimension of management
Financial Strategy; 
- Location-specific Advantages (LSAs) and
Marketing Strategy Firm-specific Advantages (FSAs)
Functional Units Information Technology - Mobility of competitive advantages
Strategy ; Technolog - Local responsiveness versus global integration
Strategy; (Prahalad and Doz, 1987)
Strategy- - Globalization drivers (Yip, 1992)
Project Operational Strategy * Project delivery methods
- The Quadrant Framework (Miller, 1995)
- The CHOICESTM Model
(Miller and Evje, 1999)
TABLE 6-1 A Primer on Strategic Analysis and Strategy Development
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6.1.4 BRIEF COMMENTS ON CHOICE FORMULATION, STRATEGY
IMPLEMENTATION AND STRATEGIC CONTROL
The foci of Stage 3, 4 and 5 basically go beyond the scope of this thesis, hence
will not be elaborated extensively here. Rather, a few comments will be made for aspects
that are related to Stage 1 & 2 and the conceptual model.
It is always possible that Stage 2 (strategic analysis and strategy development)
would generate a few alternatives upon which decisions are to be made. The ultimate
choice could depend on, among others: the "objective function" of the firm; generic
strategy followed by the firm; degree of risk aversion of the decision maker;
sustainability of the strategy to be followed etc.
Regardless, some scenario analysis should be performed to project the most
optimistic and worst case scenarios before the final decision is made. Also, choices
should be considered in conjunction with the adoption of an offensive versus a defensive
posture for the planning horizon. An interesting point then comes from the realization
that each strategic field of the conceptual model could take on either posture in different
periods. For example, with a given level of resources, an aggressive CEO might choose
to take on an offensive posture for the firm even when recession dooms (leaving out the
issue whether such a decision is wise). This might lead to the devotion of more resources
to promote the firm's presence following an aggressive Marketing Strategy.
Concurrently, the IT Strategy may call for an expansion in its management information
system to provide a seamless integration of information flow between the new venture
and existing business operations. Conversely, a defensive posture might be preferred.
This might then lead to trimming manpower and restructuring, among the other choices
determined under Operational Strategy.
In general, implementation of strategies and control concerns at least the
following issues:
* Resource allocation
* Delegations of authority and job tasks
" Communication of strategy and program to all levels
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" Direct implementation versus indirect "nurturing", support and adjustment
" Criterion of monitoring
" Control systems (Anthony et al., 1989)
Again, each of these aspects is related to different components of the conceptual
framework: resource allocation would be in line with Financial Strategy; delegation of
authority has to be consistent with Structure and Culture; success of communication can
probably be ensured with a sound HR and IT Strategies in place. Likewise, many aspects
of implementation, monitoring and control are linked to Operational Strategy.
Consequently, it can be said that a forward-looking mentality is developed even
when analysis and planning are performed prior to Stage 4 and 5 - all because of the
linkages between the functions in these stages and the components in the conceptual
model. This supports the notion that the conceptual model is really a parallel process that
augments strategic management functions in the mainstream.
6.2 Case Illustration - Stone & Webster
This section demonstrates the practical application of the planning process
outlined in the last section in conjunction with the conceptual model developed in this
thesis. The firm chosen for illustration purposes is Stone & Webster, a technologically
prestigious firm that was established since 1889. As we have seen in Chapter 3, Stone &
Webster unfortunately suffered from a financial crisis and filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy in May 2000. The assets of the firm were subsequently purchased by the
Shaw Group, a supplier of fabricated piping systems, at a bankruptcy auction. Stone &
Webster currently remains as a subsidiary of the Group.
For case illustration purposes, it is presumed that the planning process is applied
in the early 1999, as the last annual report available was released for the year 1998. Only
the key points are summarized for each part of the process. The goal is to exemplify how
the conceptual model can expand the wisdom of a conventional strategic planning
process in terms of building higher order strategic actions and giving warning signals for
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incompatibility of strategies. Obviously, the task is simplified by the benefit of hindsight
on how the events surrounding Stone & Webster had actually evolved.
6.2.1 REVIEW OF FIRM'S MISSION, CORPORATE PHILOSOPHY AND VALUES
Simply stated, Stone & Webster's mission is to deliver superior returns to
shareholders, provide best-in-class full service to clients, and foster a challenging
environment for employees to achieve career satisfaction and professional achievement
(Stone & Webster Annual Report, 1998). In terms of goal setting, the firm strives to
become a leader in market share, revenue and technology.
The above-stated mission and philosophy might sound plain and routine, but if
one truly believes in the value stated, diversification into territories that are unrelated to
the core competencies of the firm (principally the engineering-construction services in
the energy and process industries) are in conflict with some of these mission statements.
For example, it is difficult, if not impossible, to provide "best-in-class" services in the
many fields that Stone & Webster was last involved in back in 1999. Here, mission,
corporate philosophy and values provide the first sense of direction towards which the
firm should be moving.
6.2.2 ENVIRONMENTAL SCAN
Here the attention is given primarily to environmental factors within which Stone
& Webster's core businesses lie - the power and energy sectors.
First of all, deregulation within the power sector had promoted competition to a
global level. Whereas opportunities in emerging economies abounded, Stone & Webster
also soon found that competition in the domestic U.S. market had also become more
intense due to the inflow of competitors both from foreign countries and other sectors that
had vertically integrated. Increased privatization in the power sector adds to the turmoil,
and the nature of client is changing. Independent power producers, for example, often
have a different set of priorities as compared to a traditional utility company. The
evolving structure of the demand conditions can be analyzed from the standpoint of
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Porter's "diamond" (1990) and how it interacts with the other components of the
"diamond".
The downstream was particularly fraught with waves of utility mergers and
restructuring. The U.S. utilities industry, for example, is rapidly dismantling its vertically
integrated power monopolies and replacing them with horizontal monopolies based on
new specializations and the larger markets that can be served by them (Flowers, 1998).
With the changing landscape at the downstream, it was clear that Stone & Webster had to
reassess the various aspects of services that it was capable of providing, including
technology, geographical coverage, time-to-market, costs, project packaging and delivery
methods. As a practical example, it might at first seem that coal-fired electrical
generation was the cheapest in the U.S. New techniques of gas-fired generation combined
with dramatically increasing world supplies of natural gas, however, dictated that gas-
fired generation might set the sustainable price of electricity in the near future. Thus the
linkage between pricing and technology had become more intimate that ever before, with
clients (the utilities) looking for the most innovative package.
Regulatory amendments concerning environmental issues (generally towards the
direction of increasingly stringent and tighter control) are also altering the business
landscape of Stone & Webster's clients in the energy and process industries. As
Moavenzadeh (1994) points out, the tighter regulations on one hand have indirectly
shifted the onus to construction contractors. On the other hand, all these issues have
created a large environmental marketplace, with new demand calling for the design and
engineering of "cleaner" processes; manufacturing of emission-control equipment;
remediation of hazardous sites; decommissioning and decontaminating nuclear power
plants; and upgrading and revamping of facilities, refineries and petrochemical plants.
This setting fits nicely with Hamel and Prahalad's (1994) argument of capturing
"opportunity share" that could be transformed into market share in the future. Thus, it is
important to assess whether resources should be devoted to develop competencies in this
area.
The overriding pros and cons from the economic, environmental, political and
technological perspectives have produced a convoluted scenario as to which energy
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source is the most desirable. With core businesses closely related to these areas, it is clear
that Stone & Webster was faced with a complicated picture in terms of developing
strategies dealing with each different type of energy sources and markets, so much so that
the associated environmental issues can either turn into an added burden or new
opportunity.
With more than 50% revenues derived from the foreign market, the global
outlook in general is also a main concern. By early 1999, Asia was yet to stabilize the
reminiscent effects of the financial crisis that the region suffered in 1997. Even the
outlook in the Middle East was uncertain, and Stone & Webster had earlier recorded
losses associated with contracts in Taiwan, Africa and the Middle East, while the
construction of a large ethylene and olefins complex in Indonesia was then suspended
indefinitely. Thus, to add to the earlier domestic picture, the international marketplace
was very volatile. Fixed contractual obligations such as lump sum contracts was
definitely not an attractive contractual mechanism.
6.2.3 INTERNAL SCRUTINY
Most of the information related to internal scrutiny is in fact summarized in the
data set for Stone & Webster (refer Appendix B). The discussion is hereby focused on
just two main areas: financial performance; and the basis of competitiveness.
Financial Performance
In general, the ratios given under the "Operating and Financial Performance"
component of the analytical template can be classified into four types: liquidity ratios;
activity or efficiency ratios; leverage ratios; and profitability ratios (Brealey and Myers,
1996). The 3-year time series of these ratios presented in the template can often be
compared to the industrial averages published by sources such as Dun & Bradstreet.
Table 6-2 on the next page presents a few selected industrial averages for year 1997 and
1998 obtained from Dun & Bradstreet. However, due to lack of further information
regarding the basis of which these averages were determined (which could be quite
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different from the assumptions given in Appendix C, for example), these figures should
be only used as a rough guide to gather preliminary evidence.
The decreasing trend of Stone & Webster's liquidity ratios is obvious. Further, the
ratios are way below the industrial averages in 1997 and 1998. These ratios provide hints
towards potential cash flow problems. Further examination of the cause of problem might
possibly trace back to cost overruns and suspensions of international lump sum contracts
for which losses were recorded in the annual report.
Industrial Averages Stone & Webster
(Dun & Bradstreet) (from Appendix B)
1997 1998 1997 1998
Liquidity Ratios:
Current Ratio 1.7 1.6 1.38 0.83
Quick Ratio 1.3 1.2 0.97 0.68
Activity/Efficiency Ratios:
Average Collection Period (days) 48.2 41.3 49.9 66.7
Total Asset Turnover 1.9 3.4 1.85 1.59
Leverage Ratio:
Total Debt-to-Assets 0.53 0.33 0.53 0.65
Profitability Ratios:
Return-on-Assets 5.7% N.A. 4.8% -5.9%
Return-on-Equity 13.1% 8.1% 10.1% -15.5%
Net Profit Margin 3.5% 2.7% 2.6% -3.7%
TABLE 6-2 Comparison of Financial Ratios of Stone & Webster with
Industrial Averages
As for efficiency ratios, Stone & Webster seems to take longer to collect its
receivables relative to the average. This was especially true in 1998, and presumably
some of its clients were also facing some squeeze financially. This would definitely have
spillover effect to cash flow problem. On top of that, the firm had substantially
underutilized its assets to generate a sufficient volume of business in 1998, the sudden
increase (from 1997) in Dun and Bradstreet's figures also seemed unusually high.
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The total debt of Stone & Webster increased substantially in 1998. Nonetheless,
in view of the marginal increase and low level of non-current liabilities, a large part of
the increase in total debt was probably attributed to short-term borrowing used to tide
over liquidity issue. Lastly, the profitability ratios of the firm had been fluctuating and
not faring particularly well.
One can also examine the difference between Gross Profit Margin and Operating
Profit Margin of Stone & Webster to get a sense of its overhead costs relatively to other
U.S. counterparts (note that Stone & Webster's figures have not been included in Figure
3-5 earlier due to the unstable figures posted over the 3-year period - see Appendix B).
Assuming that the figures in 1997 is a good proxy for its average operating performance,
the difference between GPM and OPM is 5.2%. This is higher than the other four U.S.
companies presented in Figure 3-5 (Foster Wheeler, Halliburton, Washington Group
Int'l. and Fluor).
Basis of Competitiveness
Internal scrutiny of competitive strength overlaps substantially with strategic
analysis in Stage 2 of the process (refer Figure 6-1). It is nonetheless worthwhile to
briefly review the origin of competitive strength - Hamel & Prahalad's (1994) notion of
core competencies of Stone & Webster prior to a more detailed analysis in the next stage.
It is fair to state that Stone & Webster's strong reputation is built upon its
expertise in providing design and construction services in the power and process
industries. In particular, it employs proprietary process technology to provide cost-
effective solutions for petrochemical, refining and gas processing applications. Its Ultra-
Selective Conversion (USC) cracking and Advanced Recovery System (ARS) have
existed for decades and still stand as effective technologies serving the world's olefin
market (for example, these can be traced back to Stone & Webster's Annual Report in
1967). It is no doubt that technological innovation remains as Stone & Webster's core
competency.
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Categories/Sectors Stone & Webster's ranking among
DESIGN FIRMS CONTRACTORS
Power 1 12
Petroleum / Process 19 >25
Nuclear Power* 2
Nuclear Waste* - 9
Hazardous Waste* >25 15
Industrial Processes - 16 >25
Chemical Plants
*Note: Ranking of these 3 sectors is based on domestic level (i.e. only U.S. Contractors);
others on international level.
TABLE 6-3 Indication of Stone & Webster's Competitiveness based on
ENR's Ranking in 1998
Evidence supporting Stone & Webster's excellence in the power and process
industries can be summed up in the ENR's ranking for firms competing in these sectors
based on revenue recorded in 1998. Table 6-3 summarizes the findings. In most
categories, Stone & Webster was ranked among the top 25.
Over the years, however, the firm has diversified into other areas, both within and
beyond the value systems of the power, process and industrial sectors. As of 1998, the
overall portfolio includes businesses in the environmental, infrastructure (rail, rapid
transit, highway, airport, bridge projects), software (with applications in aerospace,
automotive and telecommunications) and logistics markets (cold storage, food handling
and distribution). Within the value systems of its core businesses, it has also integrated
forward to provide management consulting services in the gas, power and water
industries. Whether such a diversified portfolio adds to its competitive strength is not
immediately obvious, but the analysis in the next stage provides a partial answer.
6.2.4 STRATEGIC ANALYSIS
A good starting of strategic analysis is the industry and market segmentation
matrix. In the case of Stone & Webster, the segmentation matrix given in the template
does not present the entire picture since the firm is involved in many sectors within the
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"Industrial" category. As such, Figure 6-3 provides a more detailed breakdown of the
matrix.
From Figure 6-3, one can immediately conclude that Stone & Webster is more
diversified than it seemed from the segmentation matrix presented in the template. In
view of the size of the firm as compared to other similarly diversified engineering firm
such as Fluor Corporation (which incidentally has total assets of more than five times of
that of Stone & Webster), it is an irony that the firm might have diversified too
excessively given its current capacity. Thus, the first critical question that should be
posed for future strategy development is the necessity to move from a broad target,
differentiation type of generic strategy (Porter, 1980) to a narrow target, differentiation
strategy.
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FIGURE 6-3 Market Segmentation Matrix of Stone & Webster with Subcategories
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The "Five Forces" model (Porter, 1980) can subsequently be applied to analyze
the attractiveness of each of the segments within the matrix. For illustration purposes, the
focus here is placed on the core business sectors - power and process. It is also thought
that the "five forces" faced by Stone & Webster in these two sectors do not differ by
much, hence the "five forces" diagram and the associated discussion would be applicable
to both sectors.
Low-Medium Level of
Entry Barrier
Low Suppliers
Bargaining Power High Buyer's
Bargaining Power
High
Rivalry
Medium Level of Threat
of Substitutes
(a) Desgn/E ngineering in
Power & Process
Medium Level of Entry
Barrier
High
1* Rivalry
Medium Level of
Suppliers'
Bargaining Power +
Low T
High Buyer's
Bargaining Power
hreat of Substitutes
(b) General Contracting /
CM in Power & Process
FIGURE 6-4 "Five Forces" of Two Different Segments in the Power & Process
Sectors
The reasoning behind Figure 6-4 goes as follows:
A design firm typically requires less capital investment since the value of service is
added through knowledge and expertise as compared to that of a general contractor
who has a higher level of fixed assets. In that sense, the entry barrier of a designer is
lower. On the other hand, knowledge and expertise in proprietary technology will
raise the entry barrier of the design/engineering sector. In general, however, the entry
barrier for these two segments is conceivably lower in these days with deregulation
and reform of the industry that have created alternative channels (such as pooling of
resources, acquisitions by vertically integrated players) that might not be feasible in
the old days.
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" A designer typically requires only computers, software and office commodities to
perform his/her work (a very competitive supply market), as compared to a contractor
who has to negotiate good terms with equipment suppliers and more specialized
subcontractors in constructing a plant. Hence, the latter typically faces higher
supplier's bargaining power. For procurement of commodities such as piping, the
contractor would face a lower supplier's bargaining power.
" The threat of substitutes for both segments again differs slightly. Sophisticated clients
- large multinational oil companies such as ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch/Shell and BP
Amoco all have strong in-house design capability. For relatively routine upgrading
and revamping of processes, external designers might not be needed. On the other
hand, it is hard to imagine a substitute for plant construction or modification other
than procuring the services of an external contractor directly.
" According to the environmental scan discussed previously, consolidation of buyers
downstream could only heightened the buyer's bargaining power.
" Lastly, the rivalry among players competing in these segments is typically intense.
One can also carry out value chain analysis for each division of Stone & Webster.
As an example, Figure 6-5 lists out some key drivers of the value chain of Nordic
Refrigerated Services - a subsidiary of Stone & Webster in cold storage and frozen food
handling business.
The analytical process can also be furthered by using other tools and models listed
in Table 6-1. The reassessment of international management and strategy is particularly
important, given Stone & Webster's recorded losses in Africa, Taiwan and the Middle
East. Contracts abroad should be sought more selectively since Account Receivables have
been piling up while the Average Collection Period is increasing. The decision factors of
boundary modification discussed in Chapter 5 will be useful in examining whether some
businesses (in the aspects of clients and geographical operations) should be eliminated to
conserve liquidity. Again, this type of assessment interacts with the strategic fields.
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FIGURE 6-5 Key Value Activities for Nordic Refrigerated Services, Inc.
6.2.5 APPLYING THE OPEN CONCEPTUAL MODEL IN STRATEGY
DEVELOPMENT
Subsequent stages in the strategic management process - strategy development,
strategic choice formulation, implementation and control can be routinely determined.
Much of the details in these stages are contingent upon a thorough understanding of the
firm assets, employee profiles and operational procedures. As such data is usually hard to
obtain, making wild assumptions about these details simply for the sake of proceeding
with those stages of management process is apparently too far of a stretch. Instead, the
focus of this last section is devoted to demonstrating how the parallel process of checking
compatibility and validating strategy by using the open conceptual model in this thesis
can tremendously augment the wisdom in strategy development.
The main theme of the conceptual model is to treat each strategic field as a
variable and examine the interaction among them. Interestingly, brainstorming critical
unique and cost drivers within the value chain can become an intuitive exercise if one
follows the philosophy of variables interaction within the conceptual model. This
phenomenon can be illustrated by examining the three value chains given in Figure 6-6,
6-7 and 6-8.
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FIGURE 6-6 Some Key Drivers and Value Activities to serve the Power & Process Sectors
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FIGURE 6-7 Key Drivers & Value Activities of S&W Management Consultant
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Firstly, Figure 6-6 lists out some of the key drivers required to excel in the power
and process value chains. In addition, Figure 6-7 and 6-8 also show the value chains of
two other divisions - Stone & Webster Management Consultants, Inc. and Prescient
Technologies, Inc. Of the key drivers listed in these diagrams, many are formulated
through the thinking process of identifying interactions. Some examples are as follows:
" A proper hedging strategy for international projects should be assessed
considering the interaction between Business and Financial Strategies.
" It is evident that the factors for recruitment and training of human resources
described are structured by considering the interaction between HR, Marketing
and Operational Strategies.
" By nature, the component of "Technology Development" in the value chain
model would have some relationship with Technology and IT Strategies of the
conceptual model. Most of the drivers are derived by identifying the interactions
between these two strategic fields and primarily with Operational Strategy. A
good example is the development of a technology platform for materials
procurement, something that has been achieved with great success by JGC, for
example.
* Most important of all, some two-way linkages exist among the three value chains
as represented by the block arrow symbols " < ". For example, Prescient
Technologies specializes in developing engineering software for reducing cycle
times and improving product quality for manufacturing companies. Nonetheless,
the operating nature of certain industries served currently (especially aerospace)
demands diversion from what Stone & Webster probably knows best - the
energy and petrochemical processes. As such, one valuable option to consider is
to divert the software development skills from the current focus towards
reinforcing the role of IT in the EPC value chain of Figure 6-6 as indicated by the
block arrow. Effectively, this is a decision that should made in considering the
interaction among IT, Operational, Financial and Business Strategies (the last
two are relevant because it involves a decision to allocate resources away
from/towards applications in selected industries).
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To conclude the discussion of the use of the value chain model in conjunction
with the conceptual model, it should now be clear that interactions among Business,
Operational, Technology, IT and HR Strategies are helpful in identifying key drivers and
linkages among the value chains. As an EPC contractor equipped with additional
expertise in management consulting and knowledge-based software development, Stone
& Webster has a great potential to move up the "value curve" (Bartlett and Ghoshal,
2000) even within the same industry. This will transform the "five forces" into its favor,
provided that it can streamline these extra components into seamless, value-added
activities. This strategy is valuable considering the fact that there are signs of clients
within the power and process industries favoring integrated delivery packages which
incorporate innovative solutions that cannot be otherwise created through a segmented
process. The factors mentioned in this section will lead to a more coherent strategy and
implementation plan.
6.2.6 OTHER INSIGHTS AND APPLICATIONS OF THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL IN
GENERAL
More Interaction between Business and Financial Strategies and Boundary
From Internal Scrutiny, it is obvious that strengthening the balance sheet and
liquidity position would be a primary focus within the Financial Strategy. In addition, the
outlook of market segmentation matrix, relatively high overhead costs (refer page 187)
and the reexamination of generic strategy (refer page 189) all point towards a major
conclusion in the Business Strategy: the firm might have diversified too excessively.
The interaction between the two converges to a central issue: Business Strategy
will not be sustainable with the current situation of financial strength. It is thus critical for
Stone & Webster to review its business portfolio and divest some non-core businesses
and assets in order to raise cash, conserve liquidity, and even potentially lower the
overhead costs. In that sense, Business and Financial Strategies have to be assessed
hand-in-hand in determining the right businesses to divest.
Even with just a brief analysis conducted previously, there are strong hints that
the infrastructure business, the refrigerated services business, selected portions of the
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industrial and software businesses not directly related to the energy and process sectors,
are potential candidates for divestiture. This is simply because these candidates do not
leverage on the core competencies of Stone & Webster (refer back to Internal Scrutiny,
for example). The key drivers for Nordic Refrigerated Services in Figure 6-5, for
example, require an investment mindset, skills and technology development that are
vastly different from those inherent in the value chain of divisions serving the power and
process industries (shown in Figure 6-6). Based on the key conclusion of interaction -
one of which is to conserve financial resources, it is not advisable to stretch resources too
thin in developing the drivers in too many types of value chains.
Note that this is also a boundary issue, in the sense that it deals with the risk-
return profile of business portfolio. The third decision factor of boundary modification -
risk-return profile of business portfolio, could thus provide more information on how
divestment of one particular business unit would affect the outlook of the entire portfolio.
The approach outlined in Section 5.5.3 is hereby applied with the (assumed) divestment
of Nordic Refrigerated Services to illustrate the point.
The first step of the approach requires collection of information on "close
comparables" that have similar business characteristics of Nordic. In the absence of a
perfect "clone" in refrigerated services that is publicly listed, the following companies
from the logistics sector (the business nature of which provides a reasonable proxy for
Nordic) are selected to retrieve relevant information as compiled in the table below:
"Close Comps" OE Debt-Equity Volatility 1 A (Asset) ~ = x E/(D+E)
(Equity) Ratio (assuming that $D 0)
Hub Group 0.74 0.92 40% 0.39
Offshore Logistics 0.72 0.61 40% 0.45
Vitran Corp. 0.76 1.01 - 0.38
Average: - - 40% 0.41
Source: Annual reports of selected companies; and the website: http://finance.yahoo.com .
TABLE 6-4 Selected Data on "Close Comparables" of Nordic Refrigerated
Services
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The second step entails the determination of values of input variables in the
formula given in Section 5.5.3. It should be noted in the case of divestment, the formula
is applied indirectly to "back-out" the expected return and volatility of the remaining
portfolio. For further clarification, the notations in Section 5.5.3 indeed carry different
meanings in this case:
xp represents the approximate portion of the level of activities that the
firm would engage in the remaining segments (to be determined);
xn represents the approximate portion of the level of activities that the
firm engages in the segment to be divested (Nordic);
UP represents the volatility of the remaining business portfolio after
30.the divestiture of the said segment3,
On represents the volatility of the segment to be divested;
cov(rp,rn) represents the covariance between the average returns of the
remaining portfolio and the segment to be divested;
rp represents the expected return of the remaining segments (to be
determined);
rn represents the expected return of the segment to be divested;
rtotal represents the expected return of the current business portfolio;
Gtotal represents the volatility of return of the current business portfolio
From the 1998 Annual Report of Stone & Webster, the book value of total assets
is given as $834,682 thousands, whereas the identifiable assets of its cold storage
segment amount to $124,301 thousands. Therefore, it can be estimated that:
124,301
Xn 834,682 01
Also, in Table 6-4, an has been estimated from the data of "close comparables" to be
40%.
30 As mentioned in Footnote No. 22 in Chapter 5, for practical purposes it is easier to estimate the volatility
of the equity due to readily available information on the stock price. The volatility measure referred here is
actually the volatility of equity invested in the related business segment rather than the volatility of
operating assets. The implication on strategy remains unchanged though.
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The determination of cov(rp,rn) in the case of divestment is more tricky, since
theoretically it would require historical values of rp (and rn) which is indeed not available
(given the fact that the returns of the remaining portfolio are yet to be observed)! It is
nonetheless possible to estimate indirectly the covariance between the two returns from
their "betas", which represent their individual correlation with the market return. The
procedure will go as follows:
(1) $n (for the segment to be divested) estimated to be 0.41 in Table 6-4;
(2) 0 of Stone & Webster's equity, according to Multex Investor® at
http://yahoo.marketguide.com, is 0.22. Given that the total debt ratio is 0.65 (refer
to template of Stone & Webster), $totai is thus 0.22x(1-0.65) ~ 0.08;
(3) Since f tal = xfp + xn$3 ,
0.08 = (0.85 x $p) + (0.15 x 0.41)
$p (of the remaining portfolio after divestment) = 0.02
(4) It can be proven mathematically that the following relationship holds31:
cov(rp,rn) = p x On x [variance(market return)]
The volatility of market return (with the S&P 500 index as a proxy, for example)
is widely perceived to be about 20% - 25%. Assuming this to be 20%,
cov(rp,rn) = 0.02 x 0.41 x (0.2)2 3.28 x 10-'
3 From CAPM, rp = (1-$p)rf + $p rm; and ra = (1-jn)rf+ 0, rm . Applying Theorem A on page 131 of Rice
(1995) will lead to the stated results. Nonetheless, due to empirical weakness of CAPM (specifically, 0 as
the sole factor in a linear model will provide only limited explanation for the variation in the dependent
variable - the expected return), this equation only gives an approximate result for the covariance.
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Equipped with these intermediate calculations, the Capital Assets Pricing Model
(CAPM) (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965; Mossin, 1966) can be used to estimate the
expected returns. The risk-free at the end of 1998 was about 4.5% and the market risk
premium (rm - rf) is assumed to be 8%.32
rp = rf + PP x (8%) = 4.5%+ 0.02x8% 4.7%
r. = r, + P. x (8%) = 4.5% + 0.41x8% 7.8%
rtoa = r + PtotaIx (8%)= 4.5%+ 0.08x8% ~ 5.1%
Lastly, using the data from the template that gives an approximate value of 0 total=
23.7% in 1998, and thus the volatility of the remaining portfolio after divestment can be
calculated from the following equation:
=x 2 2 2 +2x x cov(rp,rn)
0.2372 = (0.852 x ap2)+ (0.152 x 0.402) + (2 x 0.85 x 0.15 x 3.28 x 10-')
-> p27.0%
The calculated values of the expected return and volatility of remaining business
portfolio (if Nordic were to be divested) can thus be compared with those parameters of
the existing portfolio by constructing a diagram that is similar to Figure 5-4 - hereby
produced in Figure 6-9 using the figures obtained in the Nordic example.
32 Estimation of risk-free rate is based on the 3-month treasury constant maturity rate obtained from the
interest rate data of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
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23.7% 27.0% Risk Profile (Volatility)
of Business Portfolios
Figure 6-9 Change of Risk-return Profile due to Divestment
It can be seen that if Nordic Refrigerated Services were to be divested, the risk-
return profile of the business portfolio actually becomes worse (since the position
migrates towards the southeast direction which implies larger risk but lower return)! This
should not come as a surprise due to two facts:
(1) Nordic is in fact a profitable business unit, posing an operating margin of
24.7% and 31.5% in 1998 and 1997 respectively (Stone & Webster Annual
Report, 1998). With the average operating margin of businesses as a
whole below these figures, the divestment of Nordic will obviously pull
down the average.
(2) The extremely low correlation between Nordic and the remaining business
portfolio implies that Nordic is in fact a good hedge for diversification
purposes. It thus follows that its disposition will lead to an increase in
volatility.
With the findings from this example (which in general going against the
divestment of Nordic) contrasting the earlier argument in strategic analysis, should the
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decision be reversed then? Probably not, particularly if the following counter-arguments
are taken into consideration:
(1) Assessment of risk-return profile only represents one of the many other
decision factors and strategic considerations. Including such factor to
make a more rational judgment does not necessarily imply that it should
overrule the other factors.
(2) Overall, Nordic only represents a minor part of the entire operations (15% in
terms of asset value). As such, strategic analysis on core operations and
competencies that focus on the larger part of the remaining business
portfolio should be given a much heavier weight towards the ultimate
decision.
(3) Following the previous point, in view of the financial squeeze, craving of
liquidity and importance of cash in such a period of crisis, the fact that
Nordic can probably demand a good price (due to its profitable track
record) would only make it a more ideal candidate for divestment to save
the other core operations!
In any case, the point here is simply to illustrate a case of interaction between
Business Strategy, Financial Strategy and Boundary and how a decision factor discussed
in Chapter 5 can be pulled in to enhance (and challenge) the analysis and planning
procedure.
More Interaction between IT, Marketing, Operational Strategies and Boundary
A key component of IT Strategy (which also appears in the value chain diagrams
previously) is to develop software and platform that will facilitate efficient information
flow among different operations within the firm. If such coordination can be extended
into the client's organization (which has become a common form in corporate travel
businesses), the technology established can effectively become a major marketing
channel. Operationally, the workflow among the owner's personnel, sales engineer,
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design engineer, and even the construction manager that is based on a related set of
information can be coordinated more efficiently.
When such a product exists, the boundary question of 'mode' cannot be
overlooked in extending the use of the product. Much like the issue faced by FreeMarkets
OnLine, Inc. for delivering its bidding software (Harvard Business School Case #598-
109), the firm has to consider how to market the new product:
(i) Either opening up the usage on a project-by project basis to clients who
concurrently has design/construction work with Stone & Webster;
(ii) Or licensing to an external third party and charging a fee.
Interaction between Business, HR Strategies and Culture
All the strategy development so far seem to point towards a narrower target,
differentiated type of generic strategy and focusing particularly on the power and process
industries related to energy (e.g. petrochemical and refining). This advice is deemed
reasonable considering the cultural dimension of Stone & Webster. The basis of core
competencies originally evolved as a focus differentiator with proprietary technology.
Presumably, the type of employees that had driven Stone & Webster to its past success
was functional specialists with high technical competence. There exists a strong cultural
influence reinforcing the aspects of human, knowledge and process.
On the other hand, it is true that environmental conditions have changed since the
old days (such as those prominent in 1967), calling for a deeper appreciation of client's
business needs in the downstream. This change is depicted in Figure 6-10, whereby
employees now have to possess interdisciplinary skills to augment their technical skill in
order to achieve strong delivery of solutions for the clients. Even then, it can be said that
the type of interdisciplinary skills desired are still related to the same industrial contexts
and not fundamentally different. In other words, in-depth knowledge about the vertical
markets remains important.
In contrast, managing a portfolio in various industrial sectors such as the one that
Stone & Webster held in 1998 would demand skills that are far more diverse than simply
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augmenting technical fundamentals with business and management capabilities.
Therefore, when pursuing skill development that is way too diverse from the technical
origin, cultural compatibility might become a critical question when current managers
come from a background that is acquainted with the old process of working and thinking.
Adding on to these miseries is the dwindling level of resources that the firm currently
faces, which potentially limit the use of a broader HR Strategy to attract talents and
experts to manage the different areas of businesses. Again, the conclusion to shrink the
territory would avoid some of these problems.
Practice
Centered
Business
Business
Centered
Practice
Strong Delivery
Strong Service
Strong Idea
P Business
Centered
Business
FIGURE 6-10 Skill Types Valued by Changing Business Environment over
Time
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
"As engineering becomes increasingly central to the shaping of society, it is ever
more important that engineers become introspective. Rather than merely revel in
our technical successes, we should intensify our efforts to explore, define, and
improve the philosophical foundations of our profession."
- Samuel C. Florman (1987)
"You won't be given any answers, but from what you have here and your own
experience, you should finish by thinking differently... [and] emerge with your
own coherent philosophy of strategy, something that will be a resource and
guide in all the unforeseeable, non-standard events and opportunities that may
make up your managerial life."
- Richard Whittington (2001)
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7.1 Conclusions and Implications
7.1.1 CHALLENGES AND RESPONSE IN GENERAL
From the study of firms in this research, it is apparent that the corporate world in
the construction industry constantly faces challenges - not only the new ones that evolve
due to constant change in environment, but also old obstacles that would not go away.
Firstly, many of the conventional civil engineering services are getting more and
more standardized and "commoditized". For example, design and construction of high-
rise building, that demanded much knowledge and innovations to conquer a few decades
ago, no longer command a high degree of competitive advantage when an increasing
number of firms can equally get the job done in one way or another.
Fragmentation of the industry persists, and entry barrier continues to lower in
conventional design and construction marketplaces. This is especially true when the roles
concerned are the typical ones that are sandwiched in the middle of the value system.
Referring back to Figure 2-2, for example, most general contractors and designers would
fall under this category. At the downstream, clients typically possess more bargaining
power since more services have become commoditized and substitutions abound.
Pressure continues to exert, not only in terms of pricing, but also of speed and
knowledge. 'Total solutions', not services, are sought for. Similarly, it is hard for typical
designers and contractors to inquire better terms from the upstream. Suppliers, notably
those with proprietary products, are more insulated from the downstream pressure and
better protected by their resemblance to the manufacturing sector. They do not yield
much to pricing pressure since profit margin is more stable, in relative terms, as
compared to their counterparts in the middle of the value system. Most important of all,
economies of scale are often achievable - something that designers and contractors
usually do not enjoy due to the nature of construction projects. Furthermore, let's not
forget the perennial professional liabilities that designers and contractors are exposed to,
creating a curiously high risk-to-potential reward ratio.
Is it time to give up, or strive along but accept the notion purported by the
Evolutionary perspectives (recall Chapter 2)? Is further research and innovation in the
technical aspects of engineering the only way to exit from this viscous cycle? Would
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improvements in management aspects at the project level naturally alleviate these
problems? Shouldn't majority of these problems be confronted at the corporate level or
in combination instead? Regardless of whether one would classify construction as a
"perfectly competitive" market or a "contestable" market, it is evident that economic
forces have played their part. To improve long-term economic return then, construction
players have to embrace a larger part beyond their conventional roles.
Although it is too excessive to assert that strategy matters the most, it is certainly
legitimate to state that one can only ignore strategy at its peril. In many ways, the
conceptual model developed in this thesis helps to renew our thinking. By including an
all-rounded definition of strategy, construction professionals effectively follow a broader
philosophy of thinking about new service provisions, carving out new territories that are
worthwhile to explore and develop value-added components. Not all is gloom though, as
the importance of IT, technology and finance have obviously received more attention in
our industry in the past decade or so. A similar picture, however, cannot be concluded for
the effects of marketing management that are often taken lightly, while the design of
human resource policies is commonly viewed as just another routine undertaking.
7.1.2 SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS FROM THIS THESIS
From the literature review given in Chapter 2, the evolvement of strategy as a
field has shown that it has received considerable attention mostly from other industries
and its popularity has sustained for a few decades. So if this were really management
school rhetoric, it would have died down long ago. Due to its complicated procurement
systems (delivery methods and contractual issues) and production (construction) process,
it would appear that civil engineering professionals are better suited to venture into the
study of strategy for their own industry.33
33 Most strategy researchers in general do not seem to show too much interest in the construction industry.
The author offers at least two reasons behind this: (1) High growth industries such as biotechnology, the
internet and telecommunication has stirred up so much publicity that researching these industries would
derive a better 'return'; (2) Construction poses many complex and unique issues that cannot be easily
studied without a thorough understanding of and experience in the industry.
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If one remains skeptical about the importance of strategy, the study of operational
and financial performance of some of the largest international construction firms in
Chapter 3 provides more facts to support the argument. In essence, it is observed that
there is more than one route towards success, but many pitfalls to evade. The urgency
however comes from the fact that many are still frustrated by the confrontation with a
low margin, low volume profile (see Figure 3-6). A detailed study of individual firms,
many examples of which have been presented in this thesis, reveals that the cause of
problem can originate from different nature - just to quote a few examples:
* strong ties with public works that cannot be severed even when the
domestic economic has turned south (primarily factors related to the
Systemic school of thought);
* poor business and financial planning, e.g., diversification strategy that is
not commensurate with the level of resources (primarily factors related to
the Classical school of thought);
* incompatibility of strategy and failure to extract synergy through a
coordinated workflow in many M&A transactions (primarily factors
related to the Processual school of thought).
Evading such pitfalls, and developing various routes towards success, need not be
segregated into two separate tasks in strategy formulation. Some main conclusions
derived from Chapter 4 to 6 would shed some light to such concerns:
* A dynamic model is required to deal with dynamic changes. By definition,
the structure of the model captures dynamism by identifying fundamental
variables (the seven strategic fields and two internal mechanisms) and
emphasizing the 'fluidity' of firm's boundary;
* The notion of interaction among variables is by default dynamic. In the
process of searching for interaction effects, not only that a higher-order
competitive advantage can be designed, compatibility of strategy is also
indirectly ensured. In this way, developing success factors and evading
pitfalls are handled concurrently;
210
* From an "input-output" standpoint, the application of conceptual model
stands as a process that runs parallel to the common strategic management
functions - by taking the issues faced in mainstream as inputs, and feeding
back conclusions from the model (on interactions and compatibility
checks) as outputs to aid further planning and analysis in the mainstream.
7.1.3 THREE BUSINESS IMPERATIVES
The conclusions discussed in the previous sections further channel the attention to
the confirmation of three business imperatives: profit margin; volume; and risk.
Achieving high profit margin and capturing large market share (volume) have
long been the two main business imperatives. One might remember, however, the lessons
learned in Figure 3.6 - that there is often a tradeoff between the two. It is often difficult
to move diagonally across from a low-margin, low-volume status towards a high-margin,
high volume outlook directly. When resources are constrained, firms simply have to settle
with one of these two imperatives (at least initially) before an over-aggressive strategy
backfires.
The story however does not merely end with the potential tradeoff between profit
margin and volume. The study of boundary issues in Chapter 5 reveals that a third
imperative - managing risk and volatility of businesses, cannot be ignored. Although risk
management has now become a main topic of research within the industry, one should
not limit his/her perception of risk management only to the project level. Construction
professionals, especially senior managers who handle corporate issues, should also get
acquainted with managing other risk such as financial liquidity and risks associated with
new business ventures through different modes. Due to the negative skewness of
profitability in construction, competitive margins earned in ten projects may not be
sufficient to cover up losses arising out of even one bad mistake. For new initiatives such
as mergers and acquisitions, skewness further increases when such actions are pursued at
a fast pace without prior experience.
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A main concern for risks comes from a firm's venture into the international
marketplace. On one hand, the level of risks increases naturally by virtue of the act of
internationalization itself - either imposed by the firm's unfamiliarity with host country
environment, or due to its exposure to a larger set of uncertain factors such as the
contractual structure (e.g. a lump sum contract denominated in an inconvertible, foreign
currency). On the other hand, geographical diversification effect would help to lower the
overall risk level of the firm's businesses and/or projects. The combined effect of the two
leads to numerous feasible outcomes, one of which is described next. The example,
though abstract, serves to illustrate how risk management can sometimes create an
unexpected result on strategy determination.
Imagine for the moment that the cumulative contribution to risk due to each effect
can be expressed as a relative percentage of their respective maximum levels. When a
firm internationalizes, it is assumed that the marginal diversification effect due to
increasing geographical operations is constant, thus the cumulative effect on risk would
decrease by following a linear fashion (see Figure 7-1). On the other hand, when a firm
ventures overseas, it is reasonable to assume that its risk profile increases sharply at first
(due to inexperience in setting up and managing foreign operations). Thereafter, the firm
would be able to shrug off similar challenges when it gains experience and knowledge
about foreign operations and host market conditions. Therefore, due to the skewness
effect faced by the firm when it first internationalizes, the rate of contribution to risk
would exceed that of the diversification effect at first, before it dies off and matches that
of the latter. This scenario is depicted by an initially higher slope of the cumulative effect
on risk arising naturally due to internationalization, which becomes flatter when the
degree of internationalization increases.
When viewed in aggregate, the net effect is an interesting one. Following the
conditions imposed in this example, there exists a hurdle (represented by the hump in the
picture) that a firm has to cross when it expands its operation overseas.
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Figure 7-1 A Risk Hurdle in Internationalization
Effectively, the above example has been constructed with the following
propositions in mind:
0 The low end of internationalization is practically exemplified by players
who primarily concentrate on the local market. These players convert local
knowledge and network to their full advantage, although they would suffer
from their ties to the cyclicality of the local economy. To a large extent,
the two opposite effects cancel each other; thus the combined risk level
would generally be low.
* Similarly, at the high end, with a large international network, the
geographical diversification effect is substantial. The threat posed by the
volatility of individual markets - resembling a form of idiosyncratic risks,
make up a larger percentage of the total risk of the global operations
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which can be diversified away. Again, it is perceived that the combined
risk level would generally be low.
* The same story does not apply when the degree of internationalization is
appreciable but not sufficient to provide a meaningful geographical
diversification effect. By this, it means that international works contribute
about 10% to 25% of total volume, typically when an established domestic
firm ventures into overseas in an appreciable scale. Within this range, the
risk level increases at a sharp rate due to the skewness effect - whereby a
firm is potentially exposed to a large cash drain and/or huge loss, while
not enough volume to average out these potential losses.
Despite its simplicity, an important lesson can be learned from this hypothetical
example: when a firm ventures into the international marketplace, it is important to
ensure that sufficient amount of resources are available to ride over the 'hump' and
counteract the skewness effect. Alternatively, the pace should be slowed down to allow
for more learning about the foreign environment, and lowering risk to an absorbable level
commensurate with limited resources.
In summary, it goes without saying that the need to understand and manage risk
wisely deserves to form the third business imperative.
Finally, it should be cautioned that the context of business imperatives cannot be
isolated from the Systemic theorists' view of environment. For example, a profit-seeking
motive is not always an objective of top priority. This is especially true in an environment
that views social responsibility (for example, maintaining a stable level of job provisions)
as a major role of a firm. Hence, the relative importance among business imperatives
should be judged in accordance with the different contexts.
7.2 Recommendations on Future Research Directions
In a way, recommendations given on future research directions are meant to
overcome the limitations of this doctoral research as discussed in Section 1.4.
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7.2.1 IN-DEPTH STUDIES OF INTERACTIONS AMONG SPECIFIC COMPONENTS
First of all, it has been mentioned that this research adopts a broad view aiming to
absorb the many schools of theories on strategy. A natural outcome would be to sacrifice
on more specific studies of detailed interactions between any two or more strategic
components. It is hoped that the model presented in this thesis would help civil
engineering researchers to:
(1) Think about expanding their traditional role by incorporating knowledge
from the other strategic fields (IT, marketing, finance, etc.) more formally
based on the notion of interactions among strategic fields;
(2) Change their philosophy of thinking about how their works can bear an
impact on corporate strategy in construction instead of constraining them
to become isolated studies.
Although the conceptual model in this thesis captures the philosophy, it is the
author's honest belief that specific interactions can only be meaningful determined by the
collective efforts of experts in each of these fields. It is hard to imagine anyone could
have specialized in all the components in the model in order to study the interaction
among these variables at an in-depth level. Specialists should pick those few strategic
components (e.g. IT and Business Strategies) that they are most familiar with and study
the interaction effects. In addition, the author also adopts the viewpoint that civil
engineers should take the lead role in becoming such "specialists" and "experts" because
of their familiarity and appreciation of the unique characteristics of the construction
industry.
With a reasonable exposure to the area of finance, the author, for example, has
spotted the following potential ground for developing future research:
(1) A deeper understanding of how the use of credit derivatives can benefit
the construction business transactions and its impact on developing
Business Strategy (e.g., choice of projects, clients, suppliers).
* Credit derivative usage has been growing dramatically, with the notional size
of the market being predicted to reach $1.6 trillion by 2002 according to The
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British Bankers' Association. Significant credit exposures often accrue in
Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO) (or Build-Operate-Transfer) projects
with a take-or-pay commitment made by a certain party. With many
construction firms taking up equity stakes as sponsors for such type of
projects, they would have a need to understand how effective use of credit
derivatives can help to lower their risk exposure and weigh this against the
additional costs.
(2) A deeper understanding of the nature of derivative instruments in general
that would help to minimize the fluctuation in revenues from some of the
projects.
* While the previous point deals with credit risks, the use of derivative
instruments is now very common to reduce a party's exposure to market risks,
especially those associated with the revenues of projects. Again, this is more
relevant for those firms that expand their involvement beyond the completion
of construction - by taking up equity stakes in the operation of DBFO projects
such as toll roads or power plants. Derivatives on energy products, for
example, are now commonly available in the over-the-counter (OTC) market,
which can be used to hedge revenue risk in the electricity production of power
plant if such risk cannot be addressed explicitly in the power purchase
agreement.
* An example is adopted from another industry to illustrate the idea. A car tire
manufacturer, who has just borrowed a significant amount of debt for plant
expansion on a floating-rate basis, is subjected to a tremendous amount of risk
in the event of an increase in interest rate. This is because an increase in
interest rate typically reduces demand on new cars, which in turn reduces the
sale of tires to car manufacturers. This reduction in revenue could not have
come at a worse time when debt obligation increases as well. To prevent too
much exposure to a potential liquidity crisis, there are at least two ways to
hedge the revenue risk - in this case due to an increase in interest rate: (1) by
entering into a "pay fixed, receive floating" swap arrangement; (2) by shorting
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interest rate futures (e.g. treasury bond futures and eurodollar futures) that
would increase in value when interest rate increases. In this way, it is hoped
that the gain in the derivative instruments held would offset the loss in
revenues of the physical operations of the business. 34
It should be mentioned that these derivative instruments can be very complex, and
in some cases the exact execution strategy should be consulted with financial experts.
That said, it remains the client's (in this case the construction firm) responsibility to
express its needs so that the cheapest or most effective instruments can be selected -
again leading to the necessity to understand at the basic level how these instruments
work. Disasters arising from misuse of derivatives abound, often leading to the
misconception that the use of derivatives is either ineffective or "evil". However, past
disasters were mostly due to inadequate understanding of how a derivative position might
affect the firm's financial position as a whole or, in some cases, using the instruments for
speculation rather than hedging purposes. While many industries have started to learn
and appreciate how these instruments could benefit risk management, again we do not see
a similar interest in the construction industry to possibly take advantage of one of the
most significant financial innovations for the past few decades.
While the above illustration focuses on the interaction between Business and
Financial Strategies, it is hoped that similar insights can be derived as new research
agendas in other areas that would benefit the construction industry.
7.2.2 SPATIAL BEHAVIOR OF FIRMS AND STRATEGIC COMPONENTS
The template constructed in this research provides a setting to organize and
collect data over time. By building up a database over time, there is more factual
information available to analyze how operating and financial factors might change,
thereby providing a dynamic view on strategy. Moreover, only with an adequate amount
of data points that powerful statistical methodology can be applied to better identify and
34 Due to "basis risk", gain and losses from the two sides of the hedging strategy might not match perfectly.
In effect, the real gain is simply to minimize the fluctuation or volatility of revenues.
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understand factors that might bear profound implications on strategy.
For example, econometric models are commonly used to determine the
relationship between a dependent variable (say, the operating profit margin) and a set of
explanatory/independent variables (which could either be straightforward numerical
variables such as the debt ratio or a dummy variable that attempts to mimic differences in
the organizational structure). There are also associated methodologies that systematically
eliminate those independent variables that are deemed insignificant (at least statistically)
in affecting the dependent variable. As can be imagined, the use of such tools would
expand our horizon in understanding corporate strategy in construction.
Similarly, hypothesis testing is applied commonly in some technical fields of civil
engineering (e.g. in transportation - for assessing the effectiveness of a road hump in
reducing the average speed of motor vehicles). In many occasions, such tools can be
transferred and applied to the study of corporate strategy by civil engineering
professionals.
7.3 Another Case for Education Reform?
By nature, the conceptual model substantiates the needs for understanding
interdisciplinary topics. With the current outlook of the academic program and research
environment as described in Chapter 1, it is evident that this outlook is not quite in sync
with the dynamic requirement of the real business world. Even at the graduate level of
studies, most academic programs and research still focus on technical and project
management issues, both of which, though remain as core competencies required in civil
engineering, are far from making up the entire business and project delivery processes.
How about the financing issues for projects or the company as a whole - at the
very least, have we understood well enough what an optimum capital structure might be
like? How about marketing your skills and knowledge - would we get hired
automatically by clients simply because we have the most technically competent
engineers? Or should we firstly determine whether our strength would actually match the
client's needs for that project? Unfortunately, our educational experience typically has
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limited exposure to these other disciplines. It is not to say that we must possess a similar
depth of understanding as those who have majored in those disciplines in earning their
degrees. On the contrary, we are placed at the other extreme - knowing far too little about
these aspects that surprisingly play an important role in our day-to-day construction
business. Isn't it time to tilt the scale a little towards the weaker side by devoting more
efforts towards these areas that similarly have a significant impact on the industry? Is our
workforce and resource allocation correspondingly balanced with the significance of each
technical and non-technical component that collectively makes up the entire business and
project delivery process? Is civil engineering practice really "civil engineering" per se?
In the November/December 1997 issue of the Journal of Management in
Engineering, this challenge of educational reform was brought out prominently in the
editor's letter. Inside the same issue, Farr (1997) has taken a neutral role in outlining the
pros and cons of the reform. Through the findings developed in this thesis, the author
believes that any remaining doubt should be eliminated. It is no longer an issue, but a
necessity for civil engineers to take on those topics that will enable them to understand
their role from a system perspective (just recall the failure causes of the
"underperformers" studied in the firm sample). There is also an urgent call for such
reform as the definition of projects starts to incorporate a larger scope and 'total
solutions' are sought.
Referring back to the conceptual model, full determination of interactions could
only come from the collective efforts of those who can think "out-of-the-box" and
appreciate the existence and importance of other fields. In the practical world, a company
can only succeed when top executives - the CEO, CFO, CIO and VPs in charge of
various lines and functions, speak the same language in identifying those higher order-
differentiating factors. In order to play a successful leading role in a unique profession
and industry, civil engineers should really learn to forget the past and take on the new
role and challenge.
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APPENDIX A
A SAMPLE OF THE COMPLETE ANALYTICAL TEMPLATE
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Skanska - Background Information
INAME COUNTRY YEAR
SKANSKA Sweden 1887
No. of Employees
No. of Shareholders
No. of Shares Outstanding
(Including both Series A & B)
Changed Leader during term of study?
Ownership Structure
Swedbank mutual funds
Sparbankerna mutual funds
Custos, AB (investment company)
Swedish National Pension Insurance Fund
AMF Pension
Industrivarden, AB (investment company)
Nordbanken mutual funds
Others
NO.
1997
13.9%
6.2%
6.0%
3.8%
3.4%
66.7%
100.0%
1998 1999 2000
13.4% 14.0% 11.4%
6.5%
7.4%
3.5%
82.6%
100.0%
6.7%
4.6%
7.1%
4.4%
77.2%
100.0%
5.8%
6.7%
2.8%
84.7%
100.0%
Appendix A
1997
,37,240
61,772
113,854,968
1998
39,246
59,160
113,854,968
1999
45,063
62,050
113,854,968
2000
63,368
64,181
113,854,968
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Skanska - Background Information (continue)
Organizational Setting
Technostructure
Skanska Management Institute
Skanska Institute of Technology
Centers of Excellence (6)
Skanska IT Solutions Housed under
Skanska Services
Skanska Teknik starting in 2000
These are restructured in 2000
under a single group known as
Construction Services. Individual
business units under the group
reports directly to the Senior
Executive Team.
Operating Core
M
0G
G
G
M
G
G
G
F
M
M
M
M
M
M
G
G
G
G
M/P
P
G
M
M
M
G
M
G
M
Skanska Project Development and Real Estate
Skanska Project Development Sweden
Skanska Project Development Europe
Skanska BOT Projects
Skanska Real Estate Stockholm
Skanska Real Estate Gothenburg
Skanska Oresund
Skanska Sweden
(Also responsible for civil engineering project exports)
Business Development
Skanska Residential Construction
Skanska Commercial Buildings
Skanska Road Construction
Skanska Asphalt and Concrete
Skanska Underground Construction and Bridges
Skanska International Civil Engineering
Skanska Europe
(Also responsible for building construction project exports)
Skanska Jensen (Denmark) These are restructu
Skanska Oy (Finland) * Skanska Central a
Skanska Entreprenor (Norway) * Skanska Internati
International Building * Skanska Scandin
Components and Service * Skanska UK (acq
* Skanska Western
Skanska USA
Slattery Skanska; Koch Skanska; Tidewater (civil contractors);
Sordoni Skanska (northeast); Beers Construction (southeast);
Spectrum Skanska (high-end real estate development)
SADE (Latin America) (Acquired in 1999)
Skanska Services
Skanska Facilities Management
Skanska Telecom Networks
Created in Mar 2000
Support Operations
Skanska Capital
Skanska Project Finance Skanska
Financial
Skanska Cash Manageme t Services
Corporate Finance
Skanska Invest
(Management of shares and financial assets)
Skanksa Forsakrings (insurance)
SCEM Reinsurance
red in 1999 into:
knd Eastern Europe
)nal
avia
uired from Kvaerner)
Europe
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Notes: 2000
The most significant acquisition in the year is no doubt the acquisition of the construction division from Kvaerner. This not only strengthens Skanska position in the UK
but also brought the firm substantial interests in businesses in Hong Kong (through 50% owned Gammon) and India.
To form closer links between the business units and the Group's Senior Executive Team so as to react more quickly to new market trends and transfer of resources across
business units, the various business units above are no longer differentiated geographically or in terms of market. Rather, these will report directly to the Senior Executive Team.
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Skanska - Market Segmentation Matrix
Residential Institutional Commercial Industrial Infrastructure Environment Diversification
D I D I D I D I D I D I D I
Supply 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Feasibility studies * * * * * * * * 2 2
& Planning
A&EDesign * * * * * * * * 2 2 4 4
Construction * * * * * * * * 2 2 4 4
O&M * * * * * * 4 4
Renovation
Finance 3 3 3 3 2 2
Own / Develop! 3 3 3 3 2 2
Equity Investment
Combined * * * * * * 2 2
1 Building component companies that manufacture flooring, kitchens, windows etc. Also holdings in buildable land, gravel pits and
quarries, asphalt plants and concrete mixing plants plus prefabricated building element factories.
2 Skanska has a separate business unit (Skanska Project Development and Real Estate) to target the market for infrastructure projects
in Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America. This business area collaborate with other Skanska units for design and construction
of the projects.
3 Skanska is one of Sweden's largest private real estate owners, with property holdings, excluding those for own operations, totaling
3.6 million square meters. Most of this (3.5 m) resides within Sweden, particularly in Stockholm, Gothenburg and Oresund regions.
The firm sometimes provides financing itself in developing properties when it is confident that these can be sold profitably upon
completion (i.e. weighing the market timing opportunity and risk).
4 Skanska ventured into the data and telecommunications industry through an alliance with MasTec Inc. The joint efforts focus on
development of fiber-based networks; planning, design and construction services; and performing maintenance of large data and
telecommunications systems.
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1) Operational Performance (SEK millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Revenue 54,847 63,935 79,128 108,022
Growth 20% 17% 24% 37%
COGS 47,409 57,252 70,314 97,243
Growth 23% 21% 23% 38%
Operating Income 1,766 1,407 2,259 2,571
Growth -22% -20% 61% 14%
Net Income 7,889 2,856 4,379 5,999
Growth 95% -64% 53% 37%
Backlog 53,070 68,398 93,686 160,675
Growth 31% 29% 37% 72%
Order Received 62,133 80,150 96,984 127,031
Growth 19% 29% 21% 31%
2) Capital Structure (SEK millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Equity + Minor Int. 18,973 13,790 16,683 18,928
Non-current Liab. 15,093 9,222 11,210 11,688
Long-term Debt 6,892 1,650 3,841 5,772
Total Liabilities 33,626 31,093 34,655 58,253
Total Assets 52,599 44,883 51,338 77,181
Current Assets 17,970 21,421 29,955 47,861
Current Liabilities 18,533 21,871 23,445 46,565Quick Assets 14,052 16,908 23,681 38,277
Acct. Receivables 8,148 10,036 13,772 26,167
Note: Minority interests are insignificant.
3a) Backlog by Business Areas/Regions (SEK millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Sweden
USA
Europe
Services
14,074 14,223 13,553 19,581
27,642 43,050 67,124 93,597
10,029 11,125 13,009 47,291
206
51,745 68,398 93,686 160,675
4a) New Orders by Business Areas/Regions (SEK millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Sweden 21,726 22,625 23,430 30,054
USA 22,021 38,869 50,278 60,210
Europe 15,203 18,656 23,186 31,648
Services 1,981
58,950 80,150 96,894 123,893
5a) Revenue by Regions (in SEK millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Sweden 24,089 20,260 22,214 24,841
Other Nordic Ctry. 6,403 10,235 11,963 16,585
Europe, Other 6,411 7,043 7,687 14,063
North America 15,650 24,759 32,896 46,678
Other Countries 2,294 1,638 4,368 5,855
54,847 63,935 79,128 108,022
6a) Revenue by Business Units (in SEK millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Skanska USA 15,410 24,472 35,437 49,356
Skanska Sweden 21,528 22,677 23,561 24,630
Skanska Europe 13,493 18,560 20,959 30,184
Services 1,867
Proj. Dev. & R.E. 1,316 1,265 1,309 1,387
Eliminations etc. -2,170 -3,039 -2,138 598
49,577 63,935 79,128 108,022
Key Financial Ratios
Yr.
Dividend (SEK/share)
Net Income/share
Dividend Payout ratio
NCL/(NCL+Equity)
LT Debt/Total Capital.
Total Debt ratio
Current Asset/Total A
Non-Current Asset/Total
Current Liab./Total Liab.
Current Ratio
Quick Ratio
Avg. Collection Period
Total Asset Turnover
Rev(t)/Backlog(t-1)
ROA
ROE
Gross Profit Margin
Operating Profit Margin
Net Profit Margin
Assumed Tax Rate
Yr.
97 98 99 00
11 12 16
62.6 24.4 37.6
0.18 0.49 0.43
0.44 0.40 0.40
0.27 0.11 0.19
0.64 0.69 0.68
0.34 0.48 0.58
0.66 0.52 0.42
0.55 0.70 0.68
0.97 0.98 1.28
0.76 0.77 1.01
49.7 51.9 54.9
1.05 1.31 1.64
1.352 1.205 1.157
16.6% 6.8% 10.1%
45.9% 17.4% 28.7%
13.6% 10.5% 11.1%
3.2% 2.2% 2.9%
15.7% 5.2% 6.1%
98
28%
I 97
13.5
53.6
0.25
0.38
0.23
0.75
0.62
0.38
0.80
1.03
0.82
67.5
1.68
1.153
10.3%
33.7%
10.0%
2.4%
6.2%
99 00
Interest Payment 1,033 614 650 904
NI + (1-t)*Interest 8,633 3,298 4,847 6,650
3b) Backlog by Business Areas/Regions
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Sweden 27% 21% 14% 12%
USA 53% 63% 72% 58%
Europe 19% 16% 14% 29%
Services 0% 0% 0% 0.1%
100% 100% 100% 100%
4b) New Orders by Business Areas/Regions
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Sweden 37% 28% 24% 24%
USA 37% 48% 52% 49%
Europe 26% 23% 24% 26%
Services 0% 0% 0% 2%
100% 100% 100% 100%
5b) Revenue by Regions
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Sweden 44% 32% 28% 23%
Other Nordic Countries 12% 16% 15% 15%
Europe, Other 12% 11% 10% 13%
North America 29% 39% 42% 43%
Other Countries 4% 3% 6% 5%
100% 100% 100% 100%
6b) Revenue by Business Units
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Skanska USA
Skanska Sweden
Skanska Europe
Services
Proj. Dev. & Real Estate
Eliminations & Others
31% 38% 45% 46%
43% 35% 30% 23%
27% 29% 26% 28%
0% 0% 0% 2%
3% 2% 2% 1%
-4% -5% -3% 1%
100% 100% 100% 100%
6c) Operating Profit by Business Units (in SEK millions) 6d) Operating Profit Margin by Business Units
Yr. 97 98 99 00 Yr. 97 98 99
Skanska USA 321 398 851 1,004
Skanska Sweden 485 496 737 1,002
Skanska Europe 358 370 674 400
Services 82
Proj. Dev. & R.E. 780 1,585 1,390 2,386
Eliminations etc. -1,148 1,527 3,249 2,316
796 4,376 6,901 7,190
6e) Return on Capital Employed by Business Units
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Skanska USA 39.4% 40.7% 42.9%
Skanska Sweden 16.1% 15.3% 18.6% 17.6%
Skanska Europe 8.3% 7.1% 10.2% J
Services 33.9%
Proj. Dev. & R.E. 10.0% 20.3% 15.7% 23.6%
Skanska USA
Skanska Sweden
Skanska Europe
Services
Proj. Dev. & Real Estate
00
2.1% 1.6% 2.4% 2.0%
2.3% 2.2% 3.1% 4.1%
2.7% 2.0% 3.2% 1.3%
4.4%
59% 125% 106% 172%
7) Research & Development Expenses (in SEK millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Product Dev.
Process Dev.
Build-up of Knowledge
Total
% of Sales
120 N/A N/A N/A
95 N/A N/A N/A
35 N/A N/A N/A
250
0.5%
8) Cash Flow Profile (SEK millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Net Cash Flow from Operatns. 3,462 (707) 2,603 1,347
Net Cash Flow from Investmnt. 9,614 228 1,834 (593)
Capital Expenditure 4,453 2,226 4,016 5,295
Corporate Financing Gap 13,076 (479) 4,437 754
CAPEX Ratio 0.78 -0.32 0.65 0.25
Cash Balance at Year End 2,553 3,505 5,583 6,769
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Skanska - Observations on Strategy
General
1) Structure: Skanska adopts a hybrid structure that is organized geographically and by products: A Project Development and Real Estate business
area; three geographic business areas that are roughly equal in terms of sales volume - Skanska Sweden; Skanska Europe and Skanska USA.
* The geographical business units are responsible for the building consturction and civil engineering services in the respective markets. They
are organized geographically to facilitate more effective markeing efforts and achieve better overview and focus on the local markets.
* Separate project organization is adopted for large projects especially those in Quadrant II (BOT). The structure is staffed by employees from
Skanska units in different parts of the world and by internationally recruited personnel and local employees.
2) Another good indicator to keep track of is the % of repeat business. This gives a direct reflection of client relationship and effectiveness of
tapping into their value chain. E.g. Skanska USA's 80% repeat business validate its effectiveness in targeted clients (Fortune 500 comps.)
3) Segmenting the balance sheet/income statement: in an industry characterized by narrow margins, every item counts in terms of sensitivity
to the bottom line.
4) Growth strategy both by means of organic growth and acquisitions (for new geographical areas, mostly the latter method). Essential
criteria for acquistions are that the company has strong fundamentals (market position, management) but required financial resources to
accelerate its growth and profitability - resources of which Skanska can readily provide. Strong local or niche brand names are focused upon.
* Becoming 'local' through acquisitions.
* An increasingly competitive landscape has caused medium-sized firms to look for new owners or seek mergers with larger companies. This
may mean attractive expansion opportunity for Skanska that has a strong financial base.
5) Financial Strategy: Increase the level of borrowed funds relative to shareholders' equity in order to achieve a more efficient capital structure
and thereby a lower WACC. (1998pl2)
* Divest most of the financial assets that Skanska holds and use the resulting funds for further development of its core business (acquisition
moves). Excess funds are transferred to shareholders in a tax-efficient way. In the past, Skanska has distributed more than SEK 20 billion
to its shareholders by means of regular cash dividends, share redemption, sale of shares at a discount price and spin-off of profitable
subsidiaries to shareholders (e.g. Drott)
6) Skanska correctly point out the importance of distinguishing the common and differing factors among a group of countries especially if one
is adopting a geographical setting:
* Financial and economical risk: there is not much difference among most countries in SEA since most are having similar economic policies
* Political and economical risk: the same might not be true in Central and Eastern Europe. While there is substantial growth as a whole,
each country differs widely in terms of stability in the risk factors. This is in general true for emerging markets. (analogy of correlation
among growth and value stocks)
- This is a "higher order" assessment to examine the geographcial and risk profiles determine in the first steps of corporate strategic planning.
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Skanska - Observations on Strategy (continue)
7) Financial strategy: Pooling of resources and expertise - risk assessment takes place in line operations (where they have better knowledge
* of first-hand operational risks), while insurance coverage, financial hedging etc. are carried out by central support functions.
* To minimize liquidity risks, the maturity structure of Group's borrowing is spread over time, with at least 75% having a remaining maturity of
more than 1 year (1997p24)
8) The private sector clearly prefers Quadrant II, > IV, since these projects allow for their offering of integrated services and expertise and
* more differentiated provisions - Skanska key motive is to offer the services in the entire value chain and life cycle (Concept & Planning ->
Construction -> Service Life/aftermarket)
9) Active assessment of business portfolio: Unlike the other companies (e.g. Kvaerner) that divest non-core assets (after redefining identity)
when they need cash, Skanska is actively managing its portfolio and divesting non-core assets even when they are profitable. The strategy
is to make use of the financial resources freed up and invest in the expansion of core businesses (geographical and product breadth, local
knowledge depth).
10) Skanska is challenging its capability to expand the frontier at both fronts: new businesses and new geographical markets. This may be a
bit of a stretch but it has no sign of slowing down currently due to its abundent financial resources to pursue this strategy, thanks to
gain on disposal of some non-core businesses in recent years. (2000p8)
* More than once, Skanska mentioned that the one important factor that can hinder this strategy is the lack of capable human resources.
CSFs of Various Business Areas
Project Development and Real Estate
1) To mitigate the risks involved in the development business, Skanska typically seek buyers prior to employing capital to commence project
development. (1998p12). A similar strategy is adopted by Holzmann after its huge loss in the real estate business.
* General conclusion: contractual conditions, negotiations and delivery methods still represent critical tools in Bus/Op. Strategy.
2) Skanska has developed a very unique strategy that synergizes the expertise of its financial services division and even its external client
like IKEA. Firstly, the business unit has a diverse portfolio holding of lands especially in Sweden. It then creates a new market for small
households by building affordable and standardized housing for the group by combining its expertise in building, property development and
leasing and IKEA's product concepts and home furnishings know-how. Further, it takes on the role of a financial intermediary by offering and
providing loans for some of these products (and its financial services division has the resources and know-how to do so).
Construction
1) In the US, Skanska adopts a strategy that is much like Cisco's - acquiring businesses in states with high growth. The firm views the
fragmentation of the industry as a large potential for continued growth. Its reputation and strong capital base and resources make it
attractive for smaller firms to be acquired to pursue higher growth rate that they themselves are not capable in achieving.
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Skanska - Issues on Ornortunitv and Threat
1) Environmental concerns:
* Opportunity to provide additional services to clients. Construction projects will increasingly embody environmental standards, which include
environmental management systems, selection of materials, energy solutions and waste management.
* Preventive measures of liabilities, e.g., unintended incidents such as the toxic leak at the Halland Ridge rail tunnel project (1997)
* Since the incident Skanska has introduced environmental management systems for all its units and strived for certification of all units by 2000.
* Increase in environmental awareness in general among the society. Construction and development companies are perceived to bear even more
social responsibility in a broader sense.
2) Regional environmental changes:
* assessing the impact of Euro in the company's operations especially in the area of foreign exchange risk management. In general the effect is a
positive one since repatriation of profits and procurement activities in other coutries within the Euro is now denominated in a single currency.
* Macroeconomic factors: interest rate movements - systematic risk/opportunity.
* Regional & product niche differences - idiosyncratic threat/opportunity.
* Classification of risk level - remote: international economic conditions affecting clients in private business sector that are dependent on exports.
3) Though closely related to construction in the value system, real estate development requires special expertise about trends in vacancy rates,
rental rates, interest rates, property prices and knowledge of tenants and local market conditions. As such, it has to be structured as a separate
business unit within the company to provide focus on the market and functions required to track business and market performance. Further,
since real estate is a local business, geographical divisions within this business unit also makes sense.
* Real estate investment is particularly sensitive to interest rate movements - low rate generally stimulates more interest in investment. Thus
this market has a vastly different posture compared to upstream: different risk control techniques required (VAR may be necessary); different
competitive strategy due to more concentrated market structure (game theory for oligopolistic market vs. a competitive market upstream).
* Yet, linkage has to be maintained with other construction operations of the company to have first-hand knowledge on development costs
and time.
* Holzmann's loss in this market is due to the treatment of this segment as a simple extension of vertical integration.
* Once becoming knowledgeable and profitable though, the return can be very attractive. Skanska has a high turnover of property development
and it partly makes use of the cash available (through various divestments of properties and other fixed financial assets) to pursue growth
through acquisitions.
* Because it has its own property portfolio, which is continuously being renewed, Skanska has developed a good knowledge of the rental market.
* Because of its relatively high level of holdings in property investments, Skanska's Fixed/Total Asset ratio is high. The firm better makes sure
that the value of its property portfolio does not decrease considerably as to trigger a huge writedown and losses.
- A high risk, high return quadrant (aggressive) (compare the structure and logic with Holzmann, see (I999p14)
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Skanska - Issues on Opportunity and Threat (continue)
4) Construction operations are characterized by narrow margins but high capital turnover, thus imposing a distorted scale of risk (1997p27).
side is that it has little tie-up capital (offset by large current liabilities though - thus managing liquidity is a key), thus giving a potential
high return. Efficiency, quality and cost control are three mandates in such low margin business.
* On the other hand, real estate operations tie up the most capital because of the large portfolio of investment properties and sizable investment
in new projects. When the market has the upswing, it has the highest growth in capital gains and asset value.
5) A reminder of the fragmented nature of construction, which varies across geographical locations, market segments and value systems:
* The U.S. construction industry has more than SEK 5000 billion in annual sales, with a half million contractors competing. Only 70 of these
have more than 1000 employees and none has an overall market share exceeding 1%. (19 9 8p2 2 )
* The Swedish construction industry has 23000 companies, while Skanska has approximately 15% market share.
6) HR Strategy and structural concern:
- Due to its growth and acquistion strategy, most of Skanska's operations still remain relatively independent. The structure evolves naturally
to one that is highly decentralized. The management realized that each business unit must therefore handle employee issues relatively
independently. On the other hand, a balance must be struck at the Group level to coordinate manager evaluation and development, so as to
ensure a good succession of managers in key positions to manage the decentralized units. A common set of values and coherent culture also
has to be instilled among managers to stimulate collaboration and mobility between companies and countries. Skanska achieve this partly
through appropriate training and development programs at the Skanska Management Institute.
7) Skanska Risk Management Philosophy - the fallacy of the insurance principle:
* The firm claims that its operations can be compared to an insurance portfolio, with systematic risk spreading.
* This may not be true if the increase in number of projects/client categories/geographical markets comes with an increase in scale due to its
active acquistion and growth strategy. In such cases, risk pooling (i.e. accumulating independent risky prospects) does not act to eliminate
risk.
* It has been reported that given n number of independent random events, while the volatility of the rate of return decreases by a factor of
sqrt(n), the standard deviation of the dollar return (i.e. in absolute $ terms) increases by a factor of the sqrt (n ). In other words, the liquidity
risk that the firm faces actually increases due to the increase in scale of the firm's project investments and operations, even though the
fluctuation of the rate of return sought has decreased. Lastly, since construction projects are rarely totally uncorrelated (since most are
fundamentally related to the general economical condition), the risk is in fact more than what has been described above.
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NAME ICOUNTRY YEAR
AMEC U.K. 1848 (The Matthew Hall Group of Companies was originally founded in 1848, but was brought into AMEC Group in 1988)
1997 1998 1999 2000
No. of Employees 23,694 22,031 20,571 26,909
No. of Shares Outstanding 205,243,407 208,880,212 215,522,626 229,313,927
Changed Leader during term of study? NO.
Staff Composition by Business Segments
Capital Projects
Services
Housing and Proj. Investment
TOTAL
flr nIatinnM Sattina (After 1OOO)
71%
26%
3%
66%
31%
3%
67%
32%
1%
56%
44%
0%
100/0 1000/ 100% 100%
232
Strategic Apex
Audit Committee Nomination Committee Remuneration Committee
- comprises all non-executive - comprises the Chairman, the - comprises all non-executive
directors chief executive and the senior directors
non-executive directors
Technostructure Operating Core Support Operations
M Client Support Services Sector
M Consulting and Design
M Operations Support
M Capital Projects
M Construction Management
M Construction
- Infrastructure, manufacturing and process industries
M Investments
M Property Development
M Project Investment / Public Private Partnerships
Notes: 1997
The business objective of the Process and Energy business continues to be to change the balance of activities from fabrication to engineering and service work.
AMEC acquired the onshore process division of Babcock Intemational in line with this objective.
AMEC also acquired a 41.6% stake in Spie Batignolles, a French company with strong core businesses in mechanical and electrical engineering
and contracting businesses.
(As of 1997, AMEC has 220/ of revenues from M&E, but 45% from building and civil engineering. Note the two areas complement each other for large projects.
There is notable success especially in the area of rail systems. The AMEC SPIE Rail Systems partnership won the contract to build the rail link infrastructure
between the Channel Tunnel and Swanley in Kent in January 2000.)
Notes: 1999
The various market segments are restructured under three business sectors: Capital Projects, Client Support Services, and Investments.
Fairciough Homes, the housing development arm of AMEC, was sold to Centex Corp. of U.S.
Notes: 2000
Acquired AGRA, a North American engineering and professional service group.
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AMEC - Market Segmentation Matrix
Residential Institutional Commercial Industrial Infrastructure Environment Diversification
D I D I D I D I D I D I D I
Supply 4 4 6 6
Feasibility studies * * * *
& Planning
A&EDesign * * * * * * * * 3 3
Construction * * * * * * * * 3 3
O&M 5 5* * 3 3
Renovation
Finance * *
Own / Develop 2 2 * *
Combined 1 1 1 1
Notes:
1 Active participant (either independently or through JV and consortium) of the PFI schemes in projects such as toll roads and
hospitals.
2 Fairclough Homes - AMEC's housing development arm of the group (sold in 1999).
3 Rail and lubrication business; transmission sector in the power industry.
4 Wallsend - Fabrication facilities for oil & gas construction
5 Offshore O&M service business through the acquisition of Grootcon.
6 Tunnel lining segments; factory engineered concrete accomodation units; other precast prestressed concrete elements.
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AMEC (Consolidated)
1) Operational Performance (E millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00 01
Revenue (inc. JV) 3,370.9 3,392.8 3,062.5 3,980.0
Growth 16% 1% -10% 30%
Revenue 2,774.3 2,721.9 2,427.5 3,195.9
Growth 0.2% -2% -11% 32%
COGS 2,601.9 2,522.5 2,239.6 2,901.2
Growth -1% -3% -11.2% 30%
Operating Income 41.4 56.9 58.2 83.3
Growth 189% 37% 2% 43%
Net Income 44.7 47.3 57.0 53.3
Growth 111% 6% 21% -6%
Backlog 3,000 3,000 3,300 5,000
Growth 9% 0% 10% 51.5%
Order Received N/A N/A N/A N/A
Growth
2) Capital Structure (E millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00 01
Equity + Minor Int. 194.8 202.2 258.8 302.2
Non-current Liab. 110.7 163.9 129.5 400.6
Long-term Debt 69.1 48.3 46.9 291.3
Total Liabilities 992.9 1,135.4 1,000.0 1,646.9
Total Assets
Current Assets
Current Liabilities
Quick Assets
Acct. Receivables
Notes:
1,187.7 1,337.6 1,258.8 1,949.1
1,017.6 1,099.2 1,016.5 1,364.7
882.2 971.5 870.5 1,246.3
817.2 890.0 947.2 1,289.5
629.2 697.5 757.7 1,038.7
Key Financial Ratios
Yr.
Dividend (pence/share)
Net Income/share
Dividend Payout ratio
NCL/(NCL+Equity)
LT Debt/Total Capital.
Total Debt ratio
Current Asset/Total A
Non-Current Asset/Total
Current Liab./Total Liab.
Current Ratio
Quick Ratio
Avg. Collection Period
Total Asset Turnover
Rev(t)/Backlog(t-1)
ROA
ROE
Gross Profit Margin
Operating Profit Margin
Net Profit Margin
Assumed Tax Rate
Yr.
Interest Payment
NI + (1-t)*lnterest
97 98 99 00 01
5 6.25
15.5 16.5
0.32 0.38
0.36 0.45
0.26 0.19
0.84 0.85
0.86 0.82
0.14 0.18
0.89 0.86
1.15 1.13
0.93 0.92
83.0 89.0
2.86 2.69
1.009 0.907
4.6% 4.4%
21.6% 23.8%
6.2% 7.3%
1.5% 2.1%
1.6% 1.6%
98
31%
I 97
7.5
19.6
0.38
0.33
0.15
0.79
0.81
0.19
0.87
1.17
1.09
109.4
2.36
0.809
5.0%
24.7%
7.7%
2.4%
2.1%
8.5
18.7
0.45
0.57
0.49
0.84
0.70
0.30
0.76
1.10
1.03
102.6
2.48
0.968
4.9%
19.0%
9.2%
2.6%
2.0%
14.0 11.5 11.3 36.5
54.4 55.2 64.8 78.5
1) Minority Interests are insignificant.
2) Gross and Operating Profit Margin are evaluated without consideration revenues of joint ventures and other associated investment (principally SPIE) to
maintain consistency in assessing operational efficiency.
3a) Revenue by Regions (in E million)
Yr. 97 98 99 00 01
U.K. 2,010.3 2,066.2 1,700.5 1,873.5 0
Rest of Europe 714.3 600.5 584.3 676.0
Americas 460.9 501.7 576.2 1,174.8
Rest of World 185.4 224.4 201.5 255.7
3,370.9 3,392.8 3,062.5 3,980.0
4) Operating Profit by Regions (in E million)
Yr. 97 98 99 00 01
U.K. 54.4 69.6 81.4 99.2 0
Rest of Europe -3.6 1.7 5.6 11.0
Americas 0.2 2.0 -4.2 22.0
Rest of World 5.7 3.2 -1.1 4.2
Corporate Costs &
Unallocated Items -4.1 -4.1 -4.5 -20.1
52.6 72.4 77.2 116.3
6a) Revenue by Business Areas (in E millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00 01
Capital Projects 2,383.2 2,172.5 2,101.0 2,475.3
Services 778.9 859.9 975.5 1,356.7
Prop. Developmt.
& Proj. Investmt. 252.7 418.4 76.2 200.6
Internal Turnover -43.9 -58.0 -90.2 -52.6
3,370.9 3,392.8 3,062.5 3,980.0
7) Operating Profit by Business Areas (in E millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00 01
Capital Projects
Services
Prop. Developmt.
& Proj. Investmt.
Internal Turnover
9.5 20.6 34.5 55.0
31.0 38.3 46.5 60.5
16.2 17.6 10.5 20.9
-4.1 -4.1 -14.3 -20.1
52.6 72.4 77.2 116.3
3b) Revenue by Regions
Yr. 97 98 99 00 01
U.K. 60% 61% 56% 47% 0
Rest of Europe 21% 18% 19% 17%
Americas 14% 15% 19% 30%
Rest of World 6% 7% 7% 6%
100% 100% 100% 100%
5) Operating Profit Margin by Regions
Yr. 97 98 99 00 01
U.K. 2.7% 3.4% 4.8% 5.3% 0
Rest of Europe -0.5% 0.3% 1.0% 1.6%
Americas 0.0% 0.4% -0.7% 1.9%
Rest of World 3.1% 1.4% -0.5% 1.6%
6b) Revenue by Business Areas
Yr. 97 98 99 00 01
Capital Projects 70% 63% 67% 61%
Services 23% 25% 31% 34%
Prop. Development &
Project Investment 7% 12% 2% 5%
100% 100% 100% 100%
8) Operating Profit Margin by Business Areas
Yr. 97 98 99 00 01
Capital Projects 0.4% 0.9% 1.6% 2.2%
Services
Prop. Development &
Project Investment
4.0% 4.5% 4.8% 4.5%
6.4% 4.2% 13.8% 10.4%
9) Cash Flow Profile (in E millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00 01
Net Cash Flow from Operatns. 54.2 51.8 -5.5 32.8
Net Cash Flow from Investmnt. (7.6) (30.7) 15.8 (333.2)
Capital Expenditure 20.2 23.1 21.1 38.1
Corporate Financing Gap 46.6 21.1 10.3 (300.4)
CAPEX Ratio 2.68 2.24 -0.26 0.86
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NAME COUNTRY YEAR
BOUYGUES France 1952 (Founded; went public in 1970)
1997
No. of Employees 105,668
No. of Shares Outstanding 25,573,108
A ten-for-one split was initiated in July 2000.
Changed Leader during term of study?
Ownership Structure
SCDM
Artemis
Bouygues Group Employees
Groupe Arnault
Schroder I.M.
Others
1998 1999 2000
103,350 111,352 118,892
26,167,178 30,340,472 332,074;968
NO.
1997 1998
14.7% 16.2%
15.2%
6.5% 6.0%
6.3%
6.8%
78.8% 49.5%
1999
15.9%
14.5%
7.9%
9.8%
4.6%
47.3%
2000
15.7%
14.2%
6.7%
9.8%
53.6%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Notes:
SCDM is a holding company controlled by Martin (Chairman and CEO of Bouygues) and Olivier Bouygues.
Corporate governance is tight. As a successor of the founder Francis Bouygues, Martin has been holding the top spot since 1989.
Composition of Employees
Building & Civil Works
Roads
Property
Public Utility Management
Media
Telecommunicaions
Other activities & holding co.
36.9%
35.0%
0.9%
19.7%
2.2%
2.7%
2.7%
34.6%
36.0%
0.8%
21.5%
2.3%
4.1%
0.7%
34.8%
37.3%
0.7%
19.9%
2.3%
4.6%
0.5%
30.9%
40.2%
0.7%
19.7%
2.4%
5.9%
0.3%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Notes:
About 230 members of the Group's staff work in R&D. This constitutes 0.2% of total employees. (cf. Obayashi 1.9%)
Oraanizational Setttna
Technostructure
Bouygues Management Institute
(set up in 1999)
Colas University and research centers
M
M
M
G
Operating Core
Building & Civil Works (100%)
- Bouygues Construction (Building and Civil Works)
- Bouygues Offshore (Oil and gas contractor)
I - ETDE (Electrical Works)
* Construction Subsidiaries France & International
Support Operations
M Roads (COLAS) (96%) (Publicly Listed)
G Subsidiaries in U.S. and other parts of Europe - decentralized locally
M Property (100%)
- Bouygues Immobilier
M Public Utilities Management (Water, waste management, energy, facilities management)
- Saur (100%)
G Regional centres
M Media (Broadcasting , Advertising, publishing/distribution,
thematic channels, sale of audiovisual rights, investment in film production)
- TF1 (40%) (Publicly listed)
M Telecommunications
- BDT -> Bouygues Telecom (54%)
- Infomobile
Notes: 1999
Building and civil works were made a subsidiary within Bouygues Construction in 1999. At the same time, Bouygues sold 100% of ETDE and 51% of Bouygues Offshore
to Bouygues Construction. All these internal restructuring and spun off is simply a move to create a holding structure by the parent company.
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Bouygues - Market Segmentation Matrix
Residential Institutional Commercial Industrial Infrastructure Environment Diversification
D I D I D I D I D I D I D I
Supply 5 5 3 3 1
Feasibility studies * * * * * * * *
& Planning
A&EDesign * * * * * * 2 2 4 4
Construction * * * * * * 2 2 4 4 1
O&M * * * * * * 4 4 4 4
Renovation
Finance 6 6 * *
Own / Develop! 6 6 * *
Equity Investment
Combined * * * * * * * *
Notes:
1 Includes businesses in the media and telecommunications industry; food businesses.
2 Offshore works in the oil & gas sector including construction of FPSOs; and DBO of power and communication networks.
3 Ownership of quarries, binder plants and coating plants; provision of road equipment in the roadworks sector.
4 Bouygues has a separate business arm, Saur, in public utility management. Saur merged with Cise, France's fourth largest
water and sewage management company, in 1997. Saur's second core business covers solid waste collection (from sorting to
processing).
5 Saur International, a joint subsidiary of Saur and Electricite de France (EDF), has business activities in gas production and
distribution, power generation, transmission and supply.
6 Bouygues Immobilier is the Group's property development arm. Its business portfolio and operations are mostly contained within
France. (>90%)
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Bouveues (Consolidated)
1) Operational Performance (Euro millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00 01
Revenue 13,884 14,789 15,857 19,060
Growth 24% 7% 7.2% 20%
COGS 10,096 10,662 11,614 14,335
Growth 27% 6% 8.9% 23%
Operating Income 389 440 474 812
Growth 131% 13% 8% 71%
Net Income 227 213 244 627
Growth 15% -6% 15% 157%
Net Income
(Group Share) 115 81 62 421
Growth 15% -30% -23% 579%
Backlog N/A N/A N/A N/A
Growth
2) Capital Structure (Euro millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00 01
Equity (w/o Minor) 1,253 1,288 2,178 4,500
Equity + Minor Int. 1,901 1,998 3,036 5,168
Non-current Liab. 3,869 3,781 4,645 5,431
Long-term Debt 1,682 1,618 2,453 2,859
Total Liabilities 10,533 10,879 13,607 16,015
Total Assets 12,434 12,877 16,643 21,183
Current Assets 7,975 8,069 9,960 12,802
Current Liabilities 6,664 7,098 8,962 10,584
Quick Assets 4,766 4,658 5,177 7,585
Acct. Receivables 3,433 3,593 4,118 5,354
3a) Revenue by Regions (in Euro millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00 01
France 8,924 9,465 10,073 11,999
Europe, Other 1,808 2,122 2,238 2,926
Africa 1,420 1,350 1,511 1,473
Middle East 46 97 140 92
North America 619 896 1,098 1,489
Latin America 7 44 36 53
Asia Pacific 1,062 815 762 1,029
13,885 14,789 15,858 19,061
4a) Revenue by Business Areas (in Euro millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00 01
Bldg. & Civil Wrks 5,211 5,229 5,097 5,948
Roadworks 3,973 4,359 5,251 6,475
Property Dev. 602 892 824 923
Utility Mgmt. 2,073 2,133 2,274 2,388
Media 1,540 1,630 1,806 2,211
Telecom. 92 210 578 1,091
Others 395 336 28 25
13,885 14,790 15,858 19,062
4c) Operating Income by Business Areas (in Euro millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00 01
Bldg. & Civil Wrks N/A 100 126 116
Roadworks N/A 102 156 222
Property Dev. N/A 28 42 59
Utility Mgmt. N/A 118 110 116
Media N/A 219 304 423
Telecom. N/A -126 -211 -105
Elimination etc. N/A -1 -32 -19
440 495 812
4e) Operating Profit Margin by Business Areas
Yr. 97 98 99 00 01
Bldg. & Civil Wrks N/A 1.9% 2.5% 2.0%
Roadworks N/A 2.3% 3.0% 3.4%
Property Dev. N/A 3.1% 5.1% 6.4%
Utility Mgmt. N/A 5.5% 4.8% 4.9%
Media N/A 13.4% 16.8% 19.1%
Telecom. N/A -59.9% -36.5% -9.6%
6) Revenue Breakdown by Types of Contract
Yr. 97 98 99 00 01
France, Public 42.6% 38.3% 35.1% 33.0%
France, Private 57.4% 61.7% 64.9% 67.0%
Int'l., Public 42.7% 47.5% 50.5% 35.0%
Int'l., Private 57.3% 52.5% 49.5% 65.0%
Combined, Public 42.6% 41.6% 40.9% 34.0%
Combined, Private 57.4% 58.4% 59.1% 66.0%
Key Financial Ratios
Yr. 97 98 99 00 01
Dividend (Euro/share) 3.89 3.89 3.89 0.54
Net Income/share 4.5 3.1 2.3 1.3
Dividend Payout ratio 0.86 1.25 1.69 0.41
NCL/(NCL+Equity) 0.67 0.65 0.60 0.51
LT Debt/Total Capital. 0.47 0.45 0.45 0.36
Total Debt ratio 0.85 0.84 0.82 0.76
Current Asset/Total A 0.64 0.63 0.60 0.60
Non-Current Asset/Total 0.36 0.37 0.40 0.40
Current Liab/Total Liab. 0.63 0.65 0.66 0.66
Current Ratio 1.20 1.14 1.11 1.21
Quick Ratio 0.72 0.66 0.58 0.72
Avg. Collection Period 74.6 86.7 88.7 90.7
Total Asset Turnover 1.18 1.17 1.07 1.01
Rev(t)/Backlog(t-1) N/A N/A N/A N/A
ROA 2.4% 2.2% 2.2% 3.8%
ROE 9.9% 6.4% 3.6% 12.6%
Gross Profit Margin 27.3% 27.9% 26.8% 24.8%
Operating Profit Margin 2.8% 3.0% 3.0% 4.3%
Net Profit Margin 2.0% 1.9% 2.1% 3.7%
Assumed Tax Rate 38%
Yr. 97
Interest Payment 79
NI + (1-t)*Interest 276
98 99 00 01
112 133 138
282 326 713
3b) Revenue by Regions
Yr. 97 98 99 00 01
France 64% 64% 64% 63% 0
Europe, Other 13% 14% 14% 15%
Africa 10% 9% 10% 8%
Middle East 0% 1% 1% 0%
North America 4% 6% 7% 8%
Latin America 0% 0% 0% 0%
Asia Pacific 8% 6% 5% 5%
100% 100% 100% 100%
4b) Revenue by Business Areas
Yr. 97 98 99 00 01
Building & Civil Works 38% 35% 32% 31%
Roadworks 29% 29% 33% 34%
Property Development 4% 6% 5% 5%
Utility Management 15% 14% 14% 13%
Media 11% 11% 11% 12%
Telecommunications 1% 1% 4% 6%
Others 3% 2% 0% 0%
100% 100% 100% 100% 0
4d) Operating Income by Business Areas
Yr. 97 98 99 00 01
Building & Civil Works N/A 23% 25% 14%
Roadworks N/A 23% 32% 27%
Property Development N/A 6% 8% 7%
Utility Management N/A 27% 22% 14%
Media N/A 50% 61% 52%
Telecommunications N/A -29% -43% -13%
Elimination & Others N/A 0% -6% -2%
100% 100% 100% 0
5) Research & Development Expenses (in Euro millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00 01
Bldg. & Civil Works N/A 34 34 21
Roadworks N/A 24 30 32
Property Development N/A 5 7 7
Utility Management N/A 4 5 4
Media N/A 3 2 2
Telecommunications N/A 11 28 51
Total 83 106 117
As % of Sales 0.6% 0.7% 0.6%
7) Cash Flow Profile (Euro millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00 01
Net CF from Operations 641 937 704 1,382
Net CF from Investment (963) (991) (1,850) (1,930)
CAPEX 706 792 922 1,358
Corporate Financing Gap (322) (54) (1,146) (548)
CAPEX Ratio 0.91 1.18 0.76 1.02
Cash Balance, Year End 1,180 933 936 2,060
8) Revenue Breakdown by Business Areas and Regions
Yr. 97 98 99 00 01
Building & Civil, France 50.2% 48.7% 46.0% 45.4%
Building & Civil, Int'l 49.8% 51.3% 54.0% 54.6%
Roadworks, France 64.0% 60.2% 60.3% 58.5%
Roadworks, Int'l. 36.0% 39.8% 39.7% 41.5%
Property, France 96.6% 97.2% 91.5% 92.8%
Property, Int'l. 3.4% 2.8% 8.5% 7.2%
Utility Mgmt., France 64.9% 66.8% 64.7% 64.4%
Utility Mgmt., Int'l. 35.1% 33.2% 35.3% 35.6%
Media, France 98.2% 97.5% 96.8% 91.0%
Media, Int'l. 1.8% 2.5% 3.2% 9.0%
Telecom., France 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Telecom., Int'l. 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
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CHIYODA JJapan 1948
No. of Employees
No. of Shareholders
No. of Shares Outstanding
1997
2,954
9,461
195,224,059
1998
2,825
12,532
195,224,059
1999
2,334
18,125
248,357,059
2000
2,003
19,324
248,357,059
Changed Leader during Term? YES. (1999)
Nicholas Gallinaro, a non-Japanese, was elected as a new executive vice-president, a representative from KBR after the capital infusion by the company to bailout Chiyoda.
Appendix B 238
Organizational Setting
Technostructure Operating Core Support Operations
Tokyo Engineering Center (closed in 1999) M Hydrocarbon Processing Industry (HPI) Consolidated Division Contract Administration Division
- Petroleum, Petrochemical, gas-related
Chiyoda Research Park Mgmt Controllers' Office
M Non-HPI Consolidated Division (internal auditing)
Technowave Office
M Technology, Engineering and Logistics Division
Notes:
Chiyoda consolidates liked-markets to achieve economies of scales, functional collaboration. It also splits between low growth and high growth markets to formulate tailored
strategies for different groups of market. The three market divisions are treated as profit centers to facilitate control, evaluation, accountability and compensation purposes.
Business development, project execution and technical support functions are integrated into each division to enhance communication: effectively downplaying
the importance of functional settings.
Divisions are headed by senior executives to provide more political clout and resources.
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Chivoda - Market Segmentation Matrix
Residential Institutional Commercial Industrial Infrastructure Environment Diversification
______ D I D I D I D I D I D I D
Supply
Feasibility studies * * * *
& Planning
A&E Design * * * * 4 4 2
Construction 3 3 1 1 4 4
O&M
Renovation
Finance
Own / Develop
Combined * *
1 The non-HPI diversification is still highly related to industrial sectors: power plant, automotive plants, metal processing,
pharmaceutical manufacturing, food processing
2 Space development. Contracted by National Space Development Agency of Japan to develop an image processing unit for data
transmitted from space in cooperation with the Space-Missions Service Division of Lockheed Martin Corp.
3 Amusement facilities: theme park development
4 Environmental preservation projects are highly related to industrial/HPI sectors. The flue gas desulfurization process is very
marketable as investment in environmental systems by electric power companies continued to be strong.
Chiyoda established an Environmental Project Division to consolidate Chiyoda's environment-related skills and technologies.
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Chivoda (Non-consolidated)
1) Operational Performance (V millions)
Yr. 97 98
Revenue 411,976 272,674
Growth 13.1% -33.81%
COGS 446,001 298,256
Growth 28.9% -33.13%
Operating Income -50,191 -39,481
Growth -11854% 21.34%
Net Income -48,265 -53,754
Growth -2324% 11.37%
Backlog 436,851 517,318
Growth -18.9% 18.42%
Order Received 327,600 367,178
Growth 19.3% 12.08%
2) Capital Structure (V millions)
Yr. 97 98
Equity 59,084 5,330
Non-current Liab. 11,681 11,390
Long Term Debt 3,019 3,488
Total Liabilities 258,319 228,053
Total Assets 317,403 233,383
Current Assets
Current Liabilities
Quick Assets
Acct. Receivables
266,264
246,638
171,584
80,745
185,415
216,663
131,528
57,190
Key Financial Ratios
Yr.
Dividend (yen/share)
Net Income/share
Dividend Payout ratio
NCL/(NCL+Equity)
LT Debt/Total Capital.
Total Debt ratio
Current Asset/Total A
Non-Current Asset/Total
Current Liab./Total Liab.
Current Ratio
Quick Ratio
Avg. Collection Period
Total Asset Turnover
Rev(t)/Backlog(t-1)
ROA
ROE
Gross Profit Margin
Operating Profit Margin
Net Profit Margin
Assumed tax rate:
Yr.
Interest Payment
NI + (1-t)*nterest
97 98
1,254
-47,638
1,847
-52,831
3a) Revenue by Business Areas (V billions)
Yr. 97 98
Petroleum 139.5 64.0
Gas & Elec Power 100.2 73.9
Petrochemical 72.2 67.6
Chemical 23.3 14.4
Other 76.8 52.8
TOTAL 412.0 272.7
4) Revenue, New Orders and Backlog
by Regions (V billions)
Yr. 97 98
Rev., Domestic 39% 26%
Revenue, Int'l. 61% 74%
Orders, Domestic 24% 42%
Orders, Int'l. 76% 59%
Backlog, Domestic 29% 38%
Backlog, Int'l. 71% 62%
3b) Revenue by Business Areas
Yr. 97 98
Petroleum 34% 23%
Gas & Elec Power 24% 27%
Petrochemical 18% 25%
Chemical 6% 5%
Other 19% 19%
100% 100%
5) Cash Flow Profile (V millions)
Yr. 97 98
Net CF from Operations (82,589) (6,192)
Net CF from Investment 2,227 15,823
CAPEX N/A N/A
Corporate Financing Gap (80,362) 9,631
CAPEX Ratio N/A N/A
Cash Balance, Year End 27,026 31,439
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-247
0.00
0.17
0.05
0.81
0.84
0.16
0.95
1.08
0.70
65.9
1.30
0.765
-15.0%
-57.4%
-8.3%
-12.2%
-11.6%
50%
97
0
-275
0.00
0.68
0.40
0.98
0.79
0.21
0.95
0.86
0.61
92.3
0.99
0.624
-19.2%
-166.9%
-9.4%
-14.5%
-19.4%
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Chiyoda (Consolidated)
1) Operational Performance (V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Revenue 445,350 303,476 312,234 168,963
Growth 14.3% -31.9% 2.9% -45.9%
COGS 478,031 329,446 308,703 154,112
Growth 28.5% -31.1% -6.3% -50.1%
Operating Income -53,355 -42,559 -12,949 -153
Growth -22318% 20.2% 69.6% 99%
Net Income -53,368 -51,763 -11,685 710
Growth -3439% 3.0% 77% 106%
2) Capital Structure (V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Equity + Minor Int. 58,000 6,199 6,892 8,5837
Non-current Liab. 17,791 16,266 20,566 17,793
Long Term Debt 8,401 7,569 13,518 12,545
Total Liabilities 292,537 251,547 207,028 144,516
Total Assets 350,537 257,746 213,920 153,099
Current Assets 295,691 205,657 163,520 107,129
Current Liabilities 274,746 235,281 186,462 126,723
Quick Assets 196,217 145,375 126,347 82,752
Acct. Receivables 85,787 58,872 36,939 22,685
Note: Minority Interests are insignificant.
3a) Revenue by Regions (in V billions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Rev., Domestic 180.2 88.9 85.4 69.1
Revenue, Int'l. 265.2 214.5 226.8 99.8
445.4 303.5 312.2 169.0
4a) Revenue by Location of Subsidiaries (in V billions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Japan 429.9 288.0 296.3
Key Financial Ratios
Yr.
Dividend (yen/share)
Net Income/share
Dividend Payout ratio
NCL/(NCL+Equity)
LT Debt/Total Capital.
Total Debt ratio
Current Asset/Total A
Non-Current Asset/Total
Current Liab./Total Liab.
Current Ratio
Quick Ratio
Avg. Collection Period
Total Asset Turnover
ROA
ROE
Gross Profit Margin
Operating Profit Margin
Net Profit Margin
Assumed tax rate:
Yr.
Interest Payment
NI + (1-t)*Interest
3b) Revenue by Regions
Yr.
97 98 99 00
0
-273
0.00
0.23
0.13
0.83
0.84
0.16
0.94
1.08
0.71
66.0
1.27
-15.0%
-62.4%
-7.3%
-12.0%
-11.8%
50%
97
0
-265
0.00
0.72
0.55
0.98
0.80
0.20
0.94
0.87
0.62
87.0
1.00
-16.7%
-161.3%
-8.6%
-14.0%
-16.8%
0
-58
0.00
0.75
0.66
0.97
0.76
0.24
0.90
0.88
0.68
56.0
1.32
-4.5%
178.5%
1.1%
-4.1%
-3.4%
0
3
0.00
0.67
0.59
0.94
0.70
0.30
0.88
0.85
0.65
64.4
0.92
0.8%
9.2%
8.8%
-0.1%
0.9%
98 99 00
1,266 1,845 1,935 1,556
-52,735 -50,841 -10,718 1,488
97 98 99 00
Revenue, Domestic 40.5% 29.3% 27.4% 40.9%
Revenue, International 59.5% 70.7% 72.6% 59.1%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
4b) Revenue by Location of Subsidiaries
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Japan 96.5% 94.9% 94.9%
North America
Europe
Asia } 15.5
3.6 5.2
0.1 0.1
11.8 10.6
445.4 303.5 312.2
5a) Performance of Domestic Subsidiaries (V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Revenue 475,909 317,937 315,753
Op. Expenses 525,949 357,456 326,781
Op. Income -50,040 -39,519 -11,028
Operating Margin -11% -12% -3%
6) R&D Expenses (V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Expense N/A N/A 410 1,041
As % of Sales N/A N/A 0.13% 0.62%
North America
Europe
Asia
3.5%
1.2% 1.7%
0.0% 0.0%
3.9% 3.4%
100% 100% 100%
5b) Performance of International Subsidiaries (V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Revenue 22,553 21,125 24,110
Operating Expenses 24,668 23,670 25,945
Operating Income -2,115 -2,545 -1,835
Operating Margin -9% -12% -8%
7) Cash Flow Profile (V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Net CF from Operations (80,125) (14,188) (9,508) (16,524)
Net CF from Investment 2,514 19,285 29,951 20,716
CAPEX N/A N/A N/A N/A
Corporate Financing Gap (77,611) 5,097 20,443 4,192
CAPEX Ratio N/A N/A N/A N/A
Cash Balance, Year End 40,141 40,049 47,356 33,286
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NAME COUNTRY
FLUOR CORP. U.S.
Employees
Shareholders
Shares Issued
Changed Leader during term?
Organizational Setting
Operating Core (Prior to 1999)
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
C
C
M
M
M
M
F/M
F/M
F/M
M
Energy & Chemicals Group
- Alliances, JVs and Consortiums
e.g. ICA Fluor Daniel in Mexico (Petroluem)
- Production, Pipelines & Marine Systems (Upstream)
- Duke/Fluor Daniel (fossil-fuel Power Generation industry)
- Chemicals & Specialties
- Process
Industrial Group
- JVs and partnerships (Mining & Metals)
- ADP Marshall (electronics)
- Infrastructure operating company
- Strategic client alliances (pharmaceuticals, biotech & food)
- PACE (services for P&G, 1998: Consumer Products unit)
Government, Environment and Telecommunications Group
- Government Services operating company (serve DOE, DOD)
- Fluor Daniel GTI (environmental)
- alliances with service providers and equipment vendors (tele)
Diversified Services Group
- American Equipment Company (global equipment supply
and fleet management services)
- TRS Staffing Solutions (personnel management & staffing)
- Technical and Maintenance Services
e.g. Asystem Services International (ASI) for Europe
- Fluor Constructors International (union craft arm providing
construction management and direct-hire)
A.T. Massey (Coal)
j
Support Operations
Fluor Daniel
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1997
60,679
13,140
83,242,322
1998
56,886
12,640
75,793,796
1999
53,561
12,099
76,246,247
NO.
2000
47,113
11,725
74,609,050
Technostructure
Fluor Leadership Institute
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Operating Core (Since 1999) Support Operations (Since 1999)
M Fluor Daniel F/M Fluor Signature Services (FSS)
- Focus purely on EPC opportunities - Provide business and administrative support
M Chemical & Life Sciences 2000: combined into 2 to Fluor operating units and external clients
M Oil, Gas & Power SBUs - Energy & Chemical; - Organized into individual lines of business in
M Manufacturing Manufacturing & Life areas of finance, IT, safety, HR, office services
M Mining Sciences and performance solutions
M Infrastructure
M Fluor Global Services
- Integrated portfolio of services capitalizing
on opportunities outside traditional EPC VC
M AMECO (2000: Scope reduced to site and fleet services)
F/M TRS Staffing Solutions (2000: realigned under FSS)
M Fluor Federal Services
M Telecommunications
M Operations & Maintenance
M Consulting Services (eliminated in 2000)
M Asset Management Services (new in 2000) .-
M Property Services (new in 2000)
M A.T. Massey Coal (Spun-off in 2000)
Notes: 1997
1) Elimination of matrix decision-making, strengthening of the sales and marketing organization to enhance selectivity, and the consolidation of operating units into four global groups
which now have line-of-sight responsibility for all project activities.
2) Fluor Daniel's activities are organized into four global operating groups: Energy & Chemicals; Industrial; Government, Environment and Telecommunications; and Diversified Services.
Each group consists of specific operating companies, offices and functions with global responsibility.
Notes: 1998
1) Diversified Services have been separated from E&C. Fluor Daniel makes Mining & Mineral as its fourth global operating group instead.
2) The operating units under the Industrial Group is reorganized into four: ADP Marshall (electronics); Consumer Products (previously PACE); Infrastructure;
and Manufacturing (food, automobile, metals, etc.). Pharmaceutical and biotechnology is regrouped under the Process unit of the Energy & Chemicals Group.
Notes: 1999
1) The creation of FSS is hoped to free operating units to concentrate on core competencies, while at the same time consolidate some of the supporting
activities for cost reduction purposes.
2) To increase selectivity of higher margin projects, a global account management organization is formed, which directly reports to the CEO.
Notes: 2000
A.T. Massey Coal was spun-off from Fluor Corporation.
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Fluor - Market Segmentation Matrix
Notes:
Global energy, chemical and mining, manufacturing, pharmaceutical and biotechnology.
A.T. Massey, Fluor's coal operation and a subsidiary, ranks among the top 5 U.S. coal companies and produces steam coal for
the electric generating industry and industrial customers, and metallurgical coal for the steel industry.
American Equipment Company - equipment leasing subsidiary of Fluor Daniel.
Telecommunication
Provide expertise in sourcing and arranging for financing only. No equity investment.
Complementary services such as O&M and consulting services are housed in Fluor Global Services SBE.
Some equity investment in JVs.
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Residential Institutional Commercial Industrial, 1 Infrastructure Environment Diversification,4
D I D I D I D I D I D I D I
Supply 2,3 2 3 3 * *
Feasibility studies 6 6 6 6 6 6
& Planning
A&E Design * * * * * *
Construction * * * * * *
O&M 6 6 6 6 6 6
Renovation
Finance 5 5 5 5
Own / Develop 7 7
Combined * * * * * *
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
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Fluor (Consolidated)
1) Operational Performance ($ thousands)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Revenue 14,298,541 13,504,773 12,417,385 11,055,987
Growth 30% -6% -8.1% -11%
COGS 14,022,570 13,095,436 12,026,693 10,604,683
Growth 33% -7% -8.2% -12%
Operating Income 262,741 386,739 335,342 185,224
Growth -35% 47% -13% -45%
Net Income 146,187 235,344 104,187 123,949
Growth -45% 61% -56% 19%
Backlog 14,369,900 12,645,300 9,142,000 10,012,200
Growth -9% -12% -28% 9.5%
Order Received 12,122,100 9,991,900 6,789,400 9,644,200
Growth -3% -18% -32% 42%
2) Capital Structure ($ thousands)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Equity 1,741,050 1,525,609 1,581,372 1,609,257
Non-current Liab. 966,106 998,045 1,100,435 423,102
Long-term Debt 300,508 300,428 317,555 17,573
Total Liabilities 2,956,790 3,493,599 3,304,745 2,043,477
Total Assets
Current Assets
Current Liabilities
Quick Assets
Acct. Receivables
4,697,840
2,225,886
1,990,684
1,239,517
930,104
5,019,208
2,277,151
2,495,554
1,299,960
959,416
4,886,117
1,910,171
1,100,435
1,060,171
850,557
3,652,734
1,447,793
1,620,375
734,543
665,117
Note: Minority Interests not determinable - assumed to be insignificant.
3) Backlog by Regions
Yr. 97 98 99 00
U.S. 39% 47% 55% 57%
Europe 10% 8% 8% 8%
Mid East/Africa 17% 8% 4% 1%
Canada 1% 10% 14% 14%
Latin America 5% 9% 8% 14%
Asia 17% 12% 7% 2%
Australia 11% 6% 4% 4%
100% 100% 100% 100%
5) New Orders by Regions (for E&C Sector only)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
U.S. 45% 56% N/A N/A
International 55% 44% N/A N/A
100% 100%
7a) Revenue by Regions (in $ millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
U.S. 9,347.2 8323.6 7139 6347
Europe
Canada
Asia & Australia
Middle East
Latin America
1,420.0
328.2
1,544.5
549.3
1,109.3
,
1,196.2
315.4
1,434.4
993.0
1,242.2
,
1,228
855
1,575
795
825
714
1,421
832
151
505
14,298.5 13,504.8 12,417 9,970
Note: From year 2000, data does not include revenues from A.T. Massey Coal (spun-off)
8a) Revenues by Strategic Business Enterprises (in $ millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Fluor Daniel
F. Global Services
A.T. Massey
F. Sign. Services
10,180 9,736 8,403 6,998
3,038 2,642 2,931 2,953
1,081 1,127 1,083 1,086
19
14,299 13,505 12,417 11,056
Key Financial Ratios
Yr.
Dividend ($/share)
Net Income/share
Dividend Payout ratio
NCL/(NCL+Equity)
LT Debt/Total Capital.
Total Debt ratio
Current Asset/Total A
Non-Current Asset/Total
Current Liab./Total Liab.
Current Ratio
Quick Ratio
Avg. Collection Period
Total Asset Turnover
Rev(t)/Backlog(t-1)
ROA
ROE
Gross Profit Margin
Operating Profit Margin
Net Profit Margin
Assumed Tax Rate
Yr.
97 98 99 00
0.76
1.75
0.43
0.36
0.147
0.63
0.47
0.53
0.67
1.12
0.62
21.3
3.31
0.907
3.8%
8.6%
1.9%
1.8%
1.2%
34%
97
0.8
2.97
0.27
0.40
0.165
0.70
0.45
0.55
0.71
0.91
0.52
25.5
2.78
0.940
5.5%
14.4%
3.0%
2.9%
2.0%
0.8
1.37
0.58
0.41
0.167
0.68
0.39
0.61
0.33
1.74
0.96
26.6
2.51
0.982
2.8%
6.7%
3.1%
2.7%
1.1%
1.0
1.62
0.62
0.21
0.011
0.56
0.40
0.60
0.79
0.89
0.45
25.0
2.59
1.209
3.3%
7.8%
4.1%
1.7%
1.3%
98 99 00
Interest Payment 30,758 45,277 50,918 26,315
NI + (1-t)*Interest 166,487 265,227 137,793 141,317
4) Backlog by Business Areas (within E&C Sector only)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Diversified Services
Government
Industrial
Power
Process
5% 10%
7% 6%
36% 38%
8% 4%
44% 42%
100% 100%
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
6) New Orders by Business Areas (within E&C Sector only)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Diversified Services 7% 13% N/A N/A
Government 9% 8% N/A N/A
Power J N/A N/A
Industrial 34% 34% N/A N/A
Process 50% 45% N/A N/A
100% 100%
7b) Revenue by Regions
Yr. 97 98 99 00
U.S. 65% 62% 57% 64%
Europe 10% 9% 10% 7%
Canada 2% 2% 7% 14%
Asia & Australia 11% 11% 13% 8%
Middle East 4% 7% 6% 2%
Latin America 8% 9% 7% 5%
100% 100% 100% 100%
8b) Operating Profit by SBEs (in $ millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Fluor Daniel 70 161 160 128
Fluor Global Services
A.T. Massey
Fluor Signature Services
52 81
155 173
92
147
77
105
1
277 415 399 311
8c) Operating Margin by Strategic Business Enterprises
Yr. 97 98 99 00
0.7% 1.7% 1.9% 1.8%
1.7% 3.1% 3.1% 2.6%
14.3% 15.4% 13.6% 9.7%
5.3%
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Fluor Daniel
F. Global Services
A.T. Massey
FSS
Appendix B
97 98 99 00
9a) New Orders by Business Areas (within Fluor Daniel, in $ millions)
Yr. 97 98 99
Chem.& Life Sci. 4,166 3,053 1,211
Oil, Gas & Power 2,814 2,302 2,599
Manufacturing 1,741 1,856 785
Mining 1,595 464 26
Infrastructure 50 498 136
10,366 8,173 4,757
Note: Section 9(a) and 9(b) are reported according to Fluor Daniel's structure in 1999.
9c) New Orders by Business Areas (within Fluor Daniel, in $ millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Energy & Chem. N/A 4,756 3,363 3,923
Manu. & Life Sci. N/A 2,455 1,232 1,292
Mining N/A 464 26 691
Infrastructure N/A 498 136 169
8,173 4,757 6,075
Note: Section 9(c) and 9(d) are reported according to Fluor Daniel's structure in 2000.
10) New Orders by Region (for Fluor Daniel only)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
U.S. 37% 50% 47% 49%
International 63% 50% 53%
100% 100% 100%
51%
100%
11a) New Orders by Business Areas (Fluor Global Services, in $ m)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Federal Services 497 451 582 800
Telecommunicatn. 277 30 646 1,099
O&M 713 1,106 772 1,660
Consulting Serv. 269 232 32 10
1,756 1,819 2,032 3,569
12) New Orders by Regions (for Fluor Global Services only)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
U.S. 89% 84% 95% 83%
International 11% 16% 5% 17%
100% 100% 100% 100%
14) Cash Flow Profile ($ thousands)
Yr. 97
Net CF from Operations 328,624
Net CF from Investment (511,971)
CAPEX 466,202
Corporate Financing Gap (183,347)
CAPEX Ratio 0.70
Cash Balance, Year End 299,324
98
702,519
(563,317)
600,933
139,202
1.17
340,544
99
464,876
(375,179)
504,334
89,697
0.92
209,614
00
9b) New Orders by Business Areas (within Fluor Daniel)
Yr. 97 98 99
Chemical & Life Science 40% 37% 25%
Oil, Gas & Power 27% 28% 55%
Manufacturing 17% 23% 17%
Mining 15% 6% 1%
Infrastructure 0.5% 6% 3%
100% 100% 100%
9d) New Orders by Segments 2000 (Fluor Daniel)
Yr. 97 98 99
Energy & Chemicals
Manu. & Life Sciences
Mining
Infrastructure
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
58%
30%
6%
6%
100%
71%
26%
1%
3%
100%
00
65%
21%
11%
3%
100%
11b) New Orders by Business Areas (Fluor Global Services)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Fluor Federal Services 28% 25% 29% 22%
Telecommunication 16% 2% 32% 31%
O&M 41% 61% 38% 47%
Consulting Services 15% 13% 2% 0.3%
100% 100% 100% 100%
13) Expected Volatility assumed in Option Valuation
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Expected Volatility 24.6% 29.9% 33.8% 39.8%
141,800
(386,897)
495,566
(245,097)
0.29
62,946
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NAME COUNTRY YEAR
FOSTER WHEELER U.S. 1892
1997 1998 1999 2000
No. of Employees 11,090 11,120 10,220 10,170
No. of Shareholders 6,480 6,835 6,827 6,464
No. of Shares Outstanding 40,735,000 40,717,000 40,731,000 40,723,000
Changed Leader during term? NO.
Organizational Setting
Technostructure Operating Core Support Operations
Various Centers of Excellence M Engineering & Construction Group
M Energy Equipment Group
M Power Systems Group
- a holding company (FW Power Systems, Inc.)
- and a no. of special-purpose subsidiaries.
F/M Global Project Finance Group
Notes: 1998
There exists dedicated global operation specific to some industries such as the pharmaceuticals and fine chemicals industry.
In this case the three Centers of Excellence in U.S., U.K., and Italy, plus key supporting offices in Singapore, Basel, Paris
and Puerto Rico, serve clients such as Pfizer, Merck and Glaxo.
Notes: 1999
FW stated that it will eliminate the Power Systems Group as a separate reporting segment and combine it within the
Energy Equipment Group; the strategy is to decrease overhead and limit equity commitmnets by reducing FW's ownership
position in existing facilities and seeking third-party equity participation in new ventures.
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Foster Wheeler - Market Segmentation Matrix
Residential Institutional Commercial Industrial, 1 Infrastructure Environment Diversification
D I D I D I D I D I D I D I
Supply * *
Feasibility studies * * *
& Planning
A&E Design * * *
Construction * *
O&M * *
Renovation
Finance 2 2
Own / Develop
Combined * *
1 Industrial activities include petroleum and gas, petrochemical, pharmaceutical, chemical processing and power generation.
Supply of equipment include steam generators and auxiliary equipment, power-generation facilities, and fired heaters.
2 Although not directly involved in fund provisions and investment, the Global Project Finance Group of Foster Wheeler prepares
to offer customers the best trade or project financing package available. By drawing on sources from multilatemal, government
and commercial institutions, Foster Wheeler is able to develop stronger project profiles and manufacture goods more cost-
effectively.
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Foster Wheeler (Consolidated)
1) Operational Performance ($ thousands)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Revenue 4,059,965 4,536,800 3,867,000 3,891,400
Growth 1.4% 11.7% -14.8% 0.6%
COGS 3,816,748 4,166,300 3,569,200 3,565,100
Growth 8.7% 9.2% -14.3% -0.1%
Operating Income -24,809 117,100 -280,300 106,900
Growth -113% 572% -339% 138%
Net Income 5,624 -31,506 -143,635 39,494
Growth -93% -660% -356% 127%
Backlog 7,184,628 7,411,907 6,050,525 6,142,347
Growth 0.7% 3.2% -18.4% 1.5%
New Orders 5,063,940 5,269,398 3,623,202 4,480,000
Growth -9.1% 4.1% -31.2% 23.6%
2) Capital Structure ($ thousands)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Equity + Minor Int. 646,160 572,118 375,863 364,089
Non-current Liab. 1,283,151 1,424,224 1,590,694 1,658,836
Long Term Debt 855,668 990,714 702,754 561,305
Total Liabilities 2,720,203 2,922,901 3,062,246 3,113,439
Total Assets 3,366,363 3,495,019 3,438,109 3,477,528
Current Assets 1,545,271 1,672,842 1,615,096 1,622,976
Current Liabilities 1,437,052 1,498,677 1,471,552 1,454,603Quick Assets 1,058,680 1,098,296 1,106,219 1,082,875
Acct. Receivables 1,205,800 857,000 1,327,300 1,342,500
Note: Minority Interests are insignificant.
3) 1997 Revenue by Regions and Business Areas
(for Engineering and Construction Group)
Region Business Areas
Europe
North America
Middle East
Asia
Latin America
35% Chemical & Pharmaceuticals
34% Power/Industrial
17% Refining/Oil & Gas
8% Environmental
6%
100%
Key Financial Ratios
Yr.
Dividend ($/share)
Net Income/share
Dividend Payout ratio
NCL/(NCL+Equity)
LT Debt/Total Capital.
Total Debt ratio
Current Asset/Total A
Non-Current Asset/Total
Current Liab/Total Liab.
Current RatioQuick Ratio
Avg. Collection Period
Total Asset Turnover
Rev(t)/Backlog(t-1)
ROA
ROE
Gross Profit Margin
Operating Profit Margin
Net Profit Margin
Assumed Tax Rate
Yr.
Interest Payment
NI + (1-t)*Interest
97 98 99 00
0.835
0.14
5.96
0.67
0.57
0.81
0.46
0.54
0.53
1.08
0.74
94.0
1.18
0.569
1.2%
0.8%
6.0%
-0.6%
1.0%
34%
97
0.835 0.54
-0.77 -3.53
-1.08 -0.15
0.71 0.81
0.63 0.65
0.84 0.89
0.48 0.47
0.52 0.53
0.51 0.48
1.12 1.10
0.73 0.75
83.0 103.1
1.32 1.12
0.631 0.522
0.3% -3.1%
-5.2% -30.3%
8.2% 7.7%
2.6% -7.2%
0.2% -2.8%
98
0.24
0.97
0.25
0.82
0.61
0.90
0.47
0.53
0.47
1.12
0.74
125.2
1.13
0.643
2.4%
10.7%
8.4%
2.7%
2.2%
99 00
54,675 62,535 55,032 67,504
41,710 9,767 -107,314 84,047
4) 1997 Revenue by Regions and Business Areas
35%
27%
27%
11%
100%
( for Energy Equipment Group)
Region
Europe
North America
Asia
Other
Business Areas
24% Fluidized-Bed Boilers
27% Pulverized-Coal Boilers
44% Industrial Boilers
5% Service/Aftermarket
Other
100%
5) Revenue by Business Groups (in $ millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Eng. & Const. 2,928.6 3,459.5 3,015.9 2979.5
Energy Equip. 1,197.2 1,111.2 852.4 1,094.2
Power Systems 208.5 184.3 187.3
Elimination, Other -162.3 -158.0 -111.5 -104.3
4,172.0 4,597.0 3,944.1 3,969.4
6) Backlog by Business Groups (in $ million)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Eng. & Const. 5,295.6 5,867.8 4,741.5 4,534.6
Energy Equip. 1,604.5 1,383.5 1,309.4 1,727.4
Power Systems 255.0 213.5 136.4
Elimination, Other 29.5 -52.9 -136.8 -119.7
7,184.6 7,411.9 6,050.5 6,142.3
7) New Orders by Business Groups (in $ million)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Eng. & Const. 3,610.7 4,329.1 2,752.2 3,094.6
Energy Equip. 1,312.6 841.5 901.1 1,468.7
Power Systems 140.1 182.7 144.8 (Elim.)
Elimination, Other 0.5 -83.9 -174.9 -83.3
5,063.9 5,269.4 3,623.2 4,480.0
8a) Revenue by Regions (in $ millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
U.S. 1,755.7 1,877.9 1,430.5 1,897.0
Europe 2,478.2 2,806.2 2,533.7 2,099.5
Canada 100.4 70.9 91.4 77.2
Elimination, Other -162.3 -158.0 -111.5 -104.3
4,172.0 4,597.0 3,944.1 3,969.4
9) Backlog by Regions (in $ millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
U.S. 48.7% N/A 44% N/A
Europe 50.0% N/A 23% N/A
Canada 0.9% N/A N/A
Asia N/A 24% N/A
Middle East N/A 6% N/A
Latin America N/A 3% N/A
Elimination, Other 0.4% N/A N/A
100% 100%
11) R&D Expenditure (in $ million)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Corp-sponsored 16.1 14.1 12.5 12.0
% of Sales 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3%
Cust-sponsored 40.4 32.7 27.1 27.6
% of Sales 1.0% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7%
12) Expected Volatility assumed in Option Valuation
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Volatility
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Eng. & Const. 70.2% 75.3% 76.5% 75.1%
Energy Equip. 28.7% 24.2% 21.6% 27.6%
Power Systems 5.0% 4.0% 4.7%
Elimination & Others -3.9% -3.4% -2.8% -2.6%
100% 100% 100% 100%
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Eng. & Const. 73.7% 79.2% 78.4% 73.8%
Energy Equip. 22.3% 18.7% 21.6% 28.1%
Power Systems 3.5% 2.9% 2.3%
Elimination & Others 0.4% -0.7% -2.3% -1.9%
100% 100% 100% 100%
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Eng. & Const. 71.3% 82.2% 76.0% 69.1%
Energy Equip. 25.9% 16.0% 24.9% 32.8%
Power Systems 2.8% 3.5% 4.0%
Elimination & Others 0.0% -1.6% -4.8% -1.9%
100% 100% 100% 100%
8b) Revenue by Regions (in $ millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
U.S. 42.1% 40.9% 36.3% 47.8%
Europe 59.4% 61.0% 64.2% 52.9%
Canada 2.4% 1.5% 2.3% 1.9%
Elimination & Others -3.9% -3.4% -2.8% -2.6%
100% 100% 100% 100%
10) New Orders by Regions (in $ millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
U.S. 41.7% N/A N/A N/A
Europe 55.5% N/A N/A N/A
Canada 2.2% N/A N/A N/A
Corporate and Fin. 0.5% N/A N/A N/A
100% 0 0 0
13) Cash Flow Profile ($ thousands)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Net Cash Flow from Oper (120,057) (26,296) (5,620) (16,744)
Net Cash Flow from Inves (2,716) (106,950) 55,914 35,649
CAPEX 189,767 N/A N/A N/A
Corporate Financing Gap (122,773) (133,246) 50,294 18,905
CAPEX Ratio -0.63 N/A N/A N/A
Cash Balance 167,417 180,068 170,268 191,893
27.5% 33.1% 48.7% 59.2%
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NAME COUNTRY YEAR
Groupe GTM France 1891
No. of Employees
No. of Shares Outstanding 15,0
Changed Leader during term of study?
Ownership Structure
Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux Grp. 5
Mobil Oil
Public 4
Employee Mutual Fund
1
Composition of Emplovees
Groupe GTM and Concessions
Roads
Building and Civil Engineering
Industrial
Eng. Consult. & Real Estate
197 1998 1999
63,233 61,231 64,149
73,625 15,284,213 15,431,216
NO.
0.02%
3.90%
6.08%
0%
48.95%
2.53%
48.52%
0%
49.45%
2.52%
45.38%
2.65%
)0.00% 100.00% 100.00%
1.7% 1.6% 2.9%
27.2% 30.7% 30.3%
46.6% 39.9% 33.1%
22.7% 25.8% 31.6%
1.8% 2.0% 2.1%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Ornanizational Settina
Technostructure Operating Core Support Operations
M Concessions
- Cofiroute (33.5% equity stake)
- Car Parks (Les Parcs GTM)
- Infrastructure
M Building and Civil Engineering
- Dumez-GTM
- CFE (Belgium firm, with 44.5% stake)
- Soletanche Bachy (Foundations)
M Roads
- Entreprise Jean Lefebvre
M Industrial
- Entrepose
- Delattre-Levivier
- GTMH (Electrical Works)
- L'Entreprise Industrielle (Electrical) (acquired in 1999)
- ETPM (Offshore) (sold in 2000)
M Engineering Consultancy
- Ingerop
Notes: 1997
The merger of Soletanche Entreprise and Bachy. Alliance between ETPM and McDermott was terminated. GTM acquired MSCL to enter the deepsea exploration market.
Notes: 2QQ
Disengaged from offshore business by selling ETPM to Stolt Comex Seaway(SCS) in exchange for 7.9% in SCS.
This act is executed in accordance to the corporate strategic plan to exit cyclical business and concentrateinstead on "highly visible' activities such as concessions,
the road industry, and electrical and industrial maintenance.
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Groupe GTM - Market Segmentation Matrix
Residential Institutional Commercial Industrial Infrastructure Environment Diversification
D I D I D I D I D I D I D I
Supply 5 5 2 2
Feasibility studies * * * *
& Planning
A&E Design * * * * * * * * 6 6
Construction * * * * * * 2 2 6 6
O&M * * * * * * 3 3
Renovation
Finance * * * * * *
Own / Develop/ 4 1,4 1 1 1 1 1
Equity Investment
Combined * * * *
Notes:
1 GTM is active in the concession market for projects such as bridges, motorways, airports and even car parks, stadium and prisons.
2 Innovative product and process in waste recycling and removal of asbestos material.
3 As part of the concession business, Les Parcs GTM manages 155,000 parking places and over 200 facilities, some with long-term
leases.
4 GTM is involved in real estate development through its 80% stake in Elige, a residential and commercial property developer.
5 GTM's subsidiary in road works, Jean Lefebvre, is also involved in the production of materials: asphalt, binders, aggregate,
recycled concrete, clinker from domestic garbage incineration etc.
6 Electrical engineering works and telecommunications.
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Groupe GTM (Consolidated)
1) Operational Performance (million Euros)
Yr. 97 98 99
Revenue 6,631 6,882 7,696
Growth 9% 4% 12%
COGS 4,811 5,004 5,477
Growth 15% 4% 9%
Operating Income 94 128 174
Growth 36% 36%
Net Income 48 64 155
Growth 657% 33% 142%
Net Income
(Group Share) 39 65 143
Growth 67% 120%
Backlog 4,686 4,964 4,688
Growth 6% -6%
Order Received N/A N/A N/A
Growth
2) Capital Structure (million Euros)
Yr. 97 98 99
Equity (w/o Minor) 736 736 890
Equity + Minor Int. 891 867 1,023
Non-current Liab. 1,257 1,520 1,993
Long-term Debt 389 427 634
Total Liabilities 6,464 6,284 6,385
Total Assets
Current Assets
Current Liabilities
Quick Assets
Acct. Receivables
7,355
5,755
5,207
2,927
2,238
3) Backlog by Business Areas
Yr.
Roads
Building & Civil Engineering and
Foundation
Industrial
Engineering Consultancy, Real
Estate, and Miscellaneous
7,151
5,277
4,764
2,916
2,273
7,408
5,162
4,392
3,348
2,607
97 98 99
18.2% 22.0% 26.4%
59.1% 47.8% 51.3%
21.0% 27.6% 19.8%
1.7% 2.5% 2.5%
Concession
Roads
Building & Civil E.
& Foundation
Industrial
Eng. Consultancy,
Real Estate, Misc
Concession
Roads
Building & Civil E.
& Foundation
Industrial
Eng. Consultancy,
Real Estate, Misc
388 451 492
1,824 2,055 2,359
2,825 2,548 2,270
1,660 1,984 2,368
186 338 334
6,883 7,376 7,823
45 52 66
18 25 30
-27 1 31
31 13 13
-28 -26 3
39 65 143
Key Financial Ratios
Yr.
Dividend (Euro/share)
Net Income/share
Dividend Payout ratio
NCL/(NCL+Equity)
LT Debt/Total Capital.
Total Debt ratio
Current Asset/Total A
Non-Current Asset/Total
Current Liab./Total Liab.
Current Ratio
Quick Ratio
Avg. Collection Period
Total Asset Turnover
Rev(t)/Backlog(t-1)
ROA
ROE
Gross Profit Margin
Operating Profit Margin
Net Profit Margin
Assumed Tax Rate
Yr.
97 98 99
1.3
2.57
0.51
0.59
0.30
0.88
0.78
0.22
0.81
1.11
0.56
119.0
0.92
1.385
1.3%
5.4%
27.4%
1.4%
1.4%
37%
97
1.5
4.28
0.35
0.64
0.33
0.88
0.74
0.26
0.76
1.11
0.61
119.6
0.95
1.469
1.5%
8.8%
27.3%
1.9%
1.6%
2.35
9.35
0.25
0.66
0.38
0.86
0.70
0.30
0.69
1.18
0.76
115.7
1.06
1.550
2.8%
17.6%
28.8%
2.3%
2.6%
98 99
Interest Payment 74 74 74
NI + (1-t)*Interest 95 111 202
4) Revenue by Regions
Yr. 97 98 99
France 57.8% 56.4% 60.8%
Europe, Other 20.5% 23.2% 20.7%
North America 4.7% 6.2% 6.2%
South America 1.0% 1.2% 1.3%
Africa 7.1% 6.4% 6.8%
Middle East 2.1% 1.8% 1.5%
Far East 6.8% 4.8% 2.7%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
5b) Revenues by Business Areas
Yr. 97 98 99
Concession 5.6% 6.1% 6.3%
Roads 26.5% 27.9% 30.2%
Building & Civil Eng. and
Foundation 41.0% 34.5% 29.0%
Industrial 24.1% 26.9% 30.3%
Eng. Consultancy, Real
Estate, and Misc. 2.7% 4.6% 4.3%
100% 100% 100%
7) Net Profit Margin by Business Areas
Yr. 97 98 99
Concession
Roads
Building & Civil Eng. and
Foundation
Industrial
Eng. Consultancy, Real
Estate, and Misc.
11.6% 11.5% 13.4%
1.0% 1.2% 1.3%
-1.0% 0.0% 1.4%
1.9% 0.7% 0.5%
-15.1% -7.7% 0.9%
8) Cash Flow Profile (million Euros)
Yr. 97 98 99
Net Cash Flow from Operatns. 337 589 629
Net Cash Flow from Investmnt. (339) (352) (432)
Capital Expenditure 238 318 281
Corporate Financing Gap (2) 237 197
CAPEX Ratio 1.42 1.85 2.24
Cash Balance at Year End 358 363 595
Appendix B
100% 100% 100%
5a) Revenue by Business Areas (million Euros)
Yr. 97 98 99
6) Net Income by Business Areas (million Euros)
Yr. 97 98 99
252
INAME COUNTRY
HALLIBURTON U.S.
No. of Employees
No. of Shares Outstanding (in millions)
Changed Leader during term? YES.
Organizational Setting
(2000, but only because Dick Cheney retired and ran for vice president of the U.S.)
- . - - T I.
T ecnnostructure Operating Core
B/M Brown & Root Engineering and Construction
B/M B&R Government Services
B/M Halliburton Energy Services
- oil and gas exploration, development and produc
B/M B&R Energy Services
- E&C services for upstream oil and gas industry
B/M Landmark Graphics Corporation
- Exploration and production information systems,
software and services to help petroleum compani
find, produce and manage oil and gas reservoirs.
Becomes Kellogg Brown & Root and
Brown & Root Services in 1998
,tion
Forms the Energy Services Group
as to
Support Operations
B/M Halliburton Energy Development
- Integrated solutions of B&R Energy, Halliburton Energy
and Landmark
B/M Dresser Equipment Group (merged in 1998, then divested in 2000)
Notes: 1998
1) The merger with Dresser Industries added an additional "Dresser Equipment Group" that design and manufacture equipment used in the energy, refining
and petrochemical industries.
2) Operations are integrated into 3 main business groups , supported by a shared services organization across the entire company.
Notes: 2000
Halliburton subsequently divested its Dresser Equipment Group in 2000.
Appendix B
1997
102,000
436.1
1998
107,800
438.8
1999
103,000
443
2000
93,000
446
'
25 3
Halliburton - Market Segmentation Matrix
Notes:
1 Production sharing agreement in upstream oil and gas industries.
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Halliburton (Consolidated)
1) Operational Performance ($ millions)
Yr. 97 29L 99 00
Revenue 8,818.6 17,353.1 14,898 11,944
Growth 19% 97% -14.1% -20%
COGS 7,772 15,376.4 13,781 11,218
Growth 98% -10.4% -19%
Operating Income 798.1 396.5 650 462
Growth 91% -50% 64% -29%
Net Income 466.3 34.4 481 519
Growth 51% -93% -1298% 8%
Backlog 12,678 11,177 9,145 9,403
Growth 44% -12% -18% 2.8%
Order Received N/A N/A N/A N/A
Growth
2) Capital Structure ($ millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Equity + Minor Int. 2,604.4 4,231.4 4,440 3,966
Non-current Liab. 1,225.7 2,876.9 2,595 2,311
Long-term Debt 538.9 1,369.7 1,056 1,049
Total Liabilities 2,998.6 6,880.6 6,288 6,137
Total Assets 5,603.0 11,112.0 10,728 10,103
Current Assets 2,971.6 6,083.1 6,022 5,568
Current Liabilities 1,772.9 4,003.7 3,693 3,826Quick Assets 2,427.1 4,063.0 4,345 4,076
Acct. Receivables 2,205.8 3,860.4 3,879 3,845
Note: Minority Interests are insignificant.
Key Financial Ratios
Yr.
Dividend ($/share)
Net Income/share
Dividend Payout ratio
NCU(NCL+Equity)
LT Debt/Total Capital.
Total Debt ratio
Current Asset/Total A
Non-Current Asset/Total
Current Liab./Total Liab.
Current RatioQuick Ratio
Avg. Collection Period
Total Asset Turnover
Rev(t)/Backlog(t-1)
97 98 99 00
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
1.77 -0.03 0.99 1.12
0.28 -16.67 0.51 0.45
0.32 0.40 0.37 0.37
0.17 0.24 0.19 0.21
0.54 0.62 0.59 0.61
0.53 0.55 0.56 0.55
0.47 0.45 0.44 0.45
0.59 0.58 0.59 0.62
1.68 1.52 1.63 1.46
1.37 1.01 1.18 1.07
80.9 63.8 94.8 118.0
1.76 2.08 1.36 1.15
1.82 1.369 1.333 1.306
ROA 9.9% 1.5% 5.3% 5.9%
ROE 19.6% 1.0% 11.1% 12.3%
Gross Profit Margin 11.9% 11.4% 7.5% 6.1%
Operating Profit Margin 9.1% 2.3% 4.4% 3.9%
Net Profit Margin 5.6% 0.7% 3.9% 5.2%
Assumed Tax Rate 34%
Yr. 97
Interest Payment 42.7
NI + (1-t)*Interest 494.5
98 99 00
137 144 146
125 576 615
IThe drop in Operatig Income and Net Income in 1998 includes a special charge of $945 m ($722 m after-tax) to provide for consolidation, restructuring and
merger related expenses related to the merger with Dresser Industries, Inc.
* Financial data for the Dresser Equipment Group is not included in 2000 as Halliburton intends to divest the business and reclassified it as discontinued business
Profit margins in 2000 are thus computed without the inclusion of DEG's revenue in the denominator.
Similarly, the backlog of 1999 and 2000 does not include DEG for the purpose of calculating Rev(t)/Backlog(t-1)
3a) Revenue by Regions (in $ millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
U.S. 4,238.7 6,132.2 4,781 4,073
Europe/U.K. 2,443.2 2,246.7 1,740 1,512
Latin America 677.0 1
Other Areas 1,459.7J 8,974.2 8,377 6,359
8,818.6 17,353.1 14,898 11,944
4a) Operating Income by Regions (in $ millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
U.S. 617.1 N/A N/A N/A
Europe 101.2 N/A N/A N/A
Latin America 37.1 N/A N/A N/A
Other Areas 84.9 N/A N/A N/A
840.3
5) Operating Profit Margin by Regions
Yr. 97 98 99 00
U.S. 14.6% N/A N/A N/A
Europe 4.1% N/A N/A N/A
Latin America 5.5% N/A N/A N/A
Other Areas 5.8% N/A N/A N/A
6a) Revenue by Business Areas (in $ millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Energy Group 5,756.4 9,009.5 6,999 7,916
Eng. & Const. 3,062.2 5,494.8 5,314 4,028
Dresser Equip. 2,848.8 2,585
8,818.6 17,353.1 14,898 11,944
7a) Operating Profit by Business Areas (in $ millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Energy Group 706.4 971.0 222 526
Eng. & Const. 133.9 237.2 203 14
Dresser Equip. 247.8 249
840.3 1,456.0 674 540
8c) Operating Profit Margin by Business Areas
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Energy Group 12.3% 10.8% 3.2% 6.6%
Eng. & Const. 4.4% 4.3% 3.8% 0.3%
Dresser Equip. 8.7% 9.6%
10) R&D Expenses (in $ millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
R&D (Energy) 163.6 220.0 207 224
R&D (E&C)
R&D (DEG)
Total R&D
As % of Sales
1.1 3.9 4 7
84.2 36
164.7 308.1 247 231
1.9% 1.8% 1.7% 1.9%
3b) Revenue by Regions
Yr. 97 98 99 00
U.S. 48% 35% 32% 34%
Europe 28% 13% 12% 13%
Latin America 8% 0% 0% 0%
Other Areas 17% 52% 56% 53%
100% 100% 100% 100%
4b) Operating Income by Regions
Yr. 97 98 99 00
U.S. 73% N/A N/A N/A
Europe 12% N/A N/A N/A
Latin America 4% N/A N/A N/A
Other Areas 10% N/A N/A N/A
100%
6b) Revenue by Business Areas
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Energy Group 65% 52% 47% 66%
Engineering & Construct. 35% 32% 36% 34%
Dresser Equipment 16% 17% 0%
100% 100% 100% 100%
7b) Operating Profit by Business Areas
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Energy Group 84% 67% 33% 97%
Engineering & Construct. 16% 16% 30% 3%
Dresser Equipment 17% 37%
100% 100% 100% 100%
9) Expected Volatility assumed in Option Valuation
Yr. 97 98 99
Volatility
00
43.3% 38% 56% 54%
11) Capital Expenditures by Business Areas (in $ millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Energy Group 466.7 707 414 495
Engineering & Construct. 52.3 34 34 32
Dresser Equipment 73 73
General Corporate 58.1 100 72 51
577.1 914 593 578
12) Cash Flow Profile ($ millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Net Cash Flow from Operations 548.2 454.1 233 (57)
Net Cash Flow from Investment (686.7) (846.1) (159) (411)
CAPEX 577.1 914.3 593 578
Corporate Financing Gap (139) (392) 74 (468)
CAPEX Ratio 0.95 0.50 0.39 -0.10
Cash Balance 221.3 202.6 466 231
Appendix B
43.3% 38% 56% 54%
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NAME COUNTRY YEAR
PHILIPP HOLZMANN Germany 1849
1997
No. of Employees 38,562
No. of Shares Outstanding 4,387,500
Note: The effect of increase in equity capital to
Changed Leader during term of study?
1998 1999
30,048 28,380
5,704,000 5,707,000
reduce debt is evident.
YES (Dec 1999)
Oraanizational Settina
Technostructure
Competence Centres
- Marine, Habor and Inland Waterway Const.
- Tunneling
- Industrial Construction
Operating Core
Philipp Holzmann AG
Regional Divisions
- North, East, West, Central, South
imbau
(Prefabricated structures and structural steel construction)
Franki Grundbau
(Specialized civil engineering)
Deutsche Asphalt
(Construction of Transportation Systems and Extraction of
Construction Materials - primarily road construction business)
Planned divestment
L in 2001
M Philipp Holzmann Anlagen
(Infrastructure Project Development)
M HSG Philipp Holzmann Technischer Service GmbH
(Facility management and other construction-related services)
M Steinmuller } in 1998
(Energy and Environmental Technology) Divested
F Philipp Holzmann Planung
(Engineering)
G Philipp Holzmann International Ltd.
(Manages all major international projects,
excluding the US; closely involved in regional start-ups)
- PH's European business is predominantly conducted
by subsidiaries in each country. Many of these operations were
dissolved after the crisis (in Spain, Netherland, France)
G Philipp Holzmann USA, Inc.
- Lockwood Greene (Industrial design and construction, production technology)
- J.A. Jones (Construction and Infrastructure; Services; Development)
Notes: 2000
In Germany, the 5 Regional Divisions were disbanded in February 2000 and replaced by a network of 5 main and 10 associated branches to enhance
local presence and become more oriented towards domestic customers.
Support Operations
256
2000
22,900
13,317,000
Appendix B
a
Holzmann - Market Segmentation Matrix
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Holzmann (Consolidated)
1) Operational Performance (DM millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Output 14,415 12,054 12,083 12,506
Growth 2% -16% 0% 4%
Revenue 12,260 9,973 9,528 11,675
Growth 1% -19% -4.5% 23%
COGS 8,319 6,760 7,109 8,451
Growth 2% -19% 5% 19%
Operating Income 206 408 -389 352
Growth -38% 98% -195% -191%
Net Income -768 -36 -2,706 -156
Growth -603% 95% 7348%' 94%
Net Income (Group
Share) -790 -31 -2,703 -153
Growth -96% 8561% -94%
Backlog 13,543 11,685 14,516 13,593
Growth -13% -14% 24% -6.4%
Order Received 12,127 11,728 13,820 12,234
Growth -26% -3% 18% -11%
2) Capital Structure (DM thousands)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Equity (w/o Minor) 643,118 977,262 -1,686,533 201,823
Equity + Minor Int. 733,243 1,033,572 -1,639,972 246,806
Non-current Liab. 4,145,857 3,300,525 3,843,311 2,829,579
Long-term Debt 1,362,811 1,061,200 1,315,048 688,188
Total Liabilities 9,706,890 7,944,393 9,328,089 7,330,973
Total Assets 10,440,133 8,977,965 7,688,117 7,577,779
Current Assets 7,902,009 6,413,360 5,376,858 5,425,097
Current Liabilities 5,561,033 4,643,868 5,484,778 4,501,394
Quick Assets 5,325,617 4,280,655 3,353,261 3,529,451
Acct. Receivables 2,596,328 2,170,240 2,180,482 2,321,545
3a) Backlog by Regions (in DM millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Germany 6,147 5,012 4,615 3,563
Europe, Others 1,832 1,451 1,769 1,227
America 5,054 5,089 7,481 8,252
Asia, Africa, Aust. 510 133 651 551
13,543 11,685 14,516 13,593
4a) New Orders by Regions (in DM millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Germany 6,480 6,137 5,091 4,290
Europe, Others 1,448 1,201 1,529 1,256
America 3,823 4,216 6,526 6,410
Asia, Africa, Aust. 376 174 674 278
12,127 11,728 13,820 12,234
5a) Output by Regions (in DM millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Germany 8,967 6,652 5,591 4,986
Europe, Others 1,629 1,220 1,560 1,258
America 3,192 3,830 4,809 5,927
Asia, Africa, Aust. 627 352 123 335
14,415 12,054 12,083 12,506
6) Revenue by Domestic Market Segments
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Residential 18.2% 15.0% N/A N/A
Commercial 55.3% 54.2% N/A N/A
Public 26.5% 30.8% N/A N/A
Structural Eng. 76.7% 75.0% N/A N/A
Civil Engineering 23.3% 25.0% N/A N/A
8) Cash Flow Profile (DM thousands)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Net Cash Flow
from Operations (762,494) (824,428) (1,446,215) (674,754)
Net Cash Flow
from Investment 391,582 375,991 (47,228) (26,625)
CAPEX 290,353 306,908 275,424 179,846
Corporate
Financing Gap (370,912) (448,437) (1,493,443) (701,379)
CAPEX Ratio -2.63 -2.69 -5.25 -3.75
Cash Balance 1,698,062 1,162,000 614,679 579,296
Key Financial Ratios
Yr.
Dividend (DM/share)
Net Income/share
Dividend Payout ratio
NCL/(NCL+Equity)
LT Debt/Total Capital.
Total Debt ratio
Current Asset/Total A
Non-Current Asset/Total
Current Liab./Total Liab.
Current Ratio
Quick Ratio
Avg. Collection Period
Total Asset Turnover
Output(t)/Backlog(t-1)
97
0
-175.12
0.00
0.85
0.65
0.93
0.76
0.24
0.57
1.42
0.96
77.7
1.07
0.925
ROA -5.5%
ROE -73.9%
Gross Profit Margin 32.1%
Operating Profit Margin 1.7%
Net Profit Margin -5.2%
Assumed Tax Rate
Yr.
40%
I 97
98 99 00
0 0 0
-7.89 -474.21 -12.98
0.00 0.00 0.00
0.76 1.74 0.92
0.51 -4.05 0.74
0.88 1.21 0.97
0.71 0.70 0.72
0.29 0.30 0.28
0.58 0.59 0.61
1.38 0.98 1.21
0.92 0.61 0.78
87.2 83.3 70.4
1.03 1.14 1.53
0.890 1.034 0.862
0.8% -31.1% -0.3%
-3.9%- -75.6%
32.2% 25.4% 27.6%
4.1% -4.1% 3.0%
0.8% -27.2% -0.2%
98 99 00
Interest Payment 221 193 184 219
NI + (1-t)*lnterest -636 80 -2,596 -25
3b) Backlog by Regions
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Germany 45% 43% 32% 26%
Europe, Others 14% 12% 12% 9%
America 37% 44% 52% 61%
Asia, Africa, Australia 4% 1% 4% 4%
100% 100% 100% 100%
4b) New Orders by Regions
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Germany 53% 52% 37% 35%
Europe, Others 12% 10% 11% 10%
America 32% 36% 47% 52%
Asia, Africa, Australia 3% 1% 5% 2%
100% 100% 100% 100%
5b) Output by Regions
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Germany 62% 55% 46% 40%
Europe, Others 11% 10% 13% 10%
America 22% 32% 40% 47%
Asia, Africa, Australia 4% 3% 1% 3%
100% 100% 100% 100%
7) Sales by Business Segments
Yr. 99 00 00
General construction
Project business
Services
Road const. & Bldg Mat.
Eliminations
5,952 7,990 66.8% 70.0%
552 484 6.2% 4.2%
1,666 1,870 18.7% 16.4%
1,058 1,281 11.9% 11.2%
-317 -208 -3.6% -1.8%
8,911 11,417 100.0% 100.0%
9) Growth Trends of Industrial Design and Construction Segment
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Output (US$ millions) 227 278 385 792
Growth 22% 38% 106%
New Orders (US$ mil.) 236 324 686 850
Growth 37% 112% 24%
Backlog (US$ millions) 66 114 416 472
Growth 73% 265% 13%
Employees
Growth
1,843 2,056 2,108 2,140
12% 3% 2%
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NAME REGION YEAR
JACOBS ENGINEERING U.S. 19471
Employees
Shareholders
Shares Outstanding
1997
9,570
1,592
25,989,000
(Founded; incorporated in 1957; went public in 1970)
1998
10,080
1,352
26,096,000
1999
15,900
1,208
26,478,000
2000
18,800
1,115
26,473,000
Changed Leader during term of study? NO.
Jacobs - Market Segmentation Matrix
Notes:
Engineering/Construction/Startup support for extracting and processing mineral resources.
Environmental cleanups, systems operations and construction programs of the DOD, DOE, EPA and Army Corps of Engineers.
As the most diversified segment, specific industrial sectors targeted include: chemicals and polymers; pharmaceuticals and
biotechnology; petroleum; semiconductor; pulp and paper; other consumer product lines.
Appendix B
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Jacobs (Consolidated)
1) Operational Performance ($ thousands)
Yr. 97 98 99 00 01
Revenue 1,780,616 2,101,145 2,875,007 3,418,942 3,956,993
Growth -1% 18% 37% 19% 16%
COGS 1,546,898 1,830,618 2,477,678 2,983,247 3,452,320
Growth -3% 18% 35% 20% 16%
Operating Income 73,561 86,484 108,295 124,613 143,852
Growth 14% 18% 25% 15% 15%
Net Income 46,895 54,385 65,445 50,981 87,760
Growth 16% 16% 20% -22% 72%
Backlog 3,050,000 3,329,500 4,448,200 5,430,100 5,912,500
Growth 11% 9% 34% 22.1% 8.9%
Order Received
Growth #DIV/! #DIV/! #DIV/0!
2) Capital Structure ($ thousands)
Yr. 97 98 99 00 01
Equity 324,308 371,405 448,717 495,543 591,801
Non-current Liab. 94,177 67,736 186,487 204,970 264,580
Long-term Debt 54,095 26,221 135,371 146,820 164,308
Total Liabilities 419,895 436,084 771,469 888,833 965,239
Total Assets 744,203 807,489 1,220,186 1,384,376 1,557,040
Current Assets 503,921 566,007 729,620 851,023 946,159
Current Liabilities 325,718 368,348 584,982 683,863 700,659Quick Assets 459,173 514,651 639,487 776,827 866,423
Acct. Receivables 382,051 394,841 586,005 710,979 817,160
3a) Revenue by Business Activities ($ thousands)
Yr. 97 98 99 00 01
Project Services 734,619 861,608 1,318,027 1,809,309 2,340,304
Process Scientific
& Sys. Consulting 11,587 11,163 87,990 118,232 133,639
Construction 769,788 961,576 994,479 969,792 977,627
O&M 264,622 266,798 474,511 521,609 505,423
1,780,616 2,101,145 2,875,007 3,418,942 3,956,993
4a) Revenue by Business Areas ($ thousands)
Yr. 97 98 99 00 01
Chemicals & Poly. 490,347 785,727 796,501 693,034 653,573
Tech. & Manufact. 335,627 128,501 173,023 213,557 332,995
Oil & Gas Refining 248,799 255,579 243,311 280,942 451,103
Federal Programs 201,643 169,474 481,302 614,048 732,362
Buildings 169,286 314,293 454,589 539,691 457,488
Infrastructure 11,748 11,278 218,828 238,278 246,420
Pulp & Paper 154,135 191,595 99,189 254,861 182,456
Pharm. & Biotech. 140,545 211,501 373,520 481,947 715,407
Other Businesses 28,486 33,197 34,744 102,584 185,189
1,780,616 2,101,145 2,875,007 3,418,942 3,956,993
5a) Revenue by Regions (in $ thousands)
Yr. 97 98 99 00 01
U.S. 1,363,016 1,676,997 2,421,871 2,858,197 3,075,969
Europe 412,298 410,944 440,545 532,887 825,456
Asia & others 5,302 13,204 12,591 27,858 55,568
1,780,616 2,101,145 2,875,007 3,418,942 3,956,993
6) Cash Flow Profile (NOK millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00 01
Net Cash Flow
from Operations 43,943 90,458 83,512 81,301 15,108
Net Cash Flow
from Investment (69,541) (9,620) (220,639) (106,705) (63,628)
CAPEX 31,332 46,335 240,022 71,653 57,400
Corporate
Financing Gap (25,598) 80,838 (137,127) (25,404) (48,520)
CAPEX Ratio 1.40 1.95 0.35 1.13 0.26
Cash Balance 55,992 101,328 53,482 55,992 55,992
Key Financial Ratios
Yr.
Dividend ($/share)
Net Income/share
Dividend Payout ratio
NCL/(NCL+Equity)
LT Debt/Total Capital.
Total Debt ratio
Current Asset/Total A
Non-Current Asset/Total
Current Liab./Total Liab.
Current Ratio
Quick Ratio
Avg. Collection Period
Total Asset Turnover
Rev(t)/Backlog(t-1)
ROA
ROE
Gross Profit Margin
Operating Profit Margin
Net Profit Margin
Assumed Tax Rate
Yr.
97 98 99 00 01
0
1.8
0.00
0.23
0.14
0.56
0.68
0.32
0.78
1.55
1.41
67.5
2.70
0.65
0
2.08
0.00
0.15
0.07
0.54
0.70
0.30
0.84
1.54
1.40
67.5
2.71
0.69
0
2.47
0.00
0.29
0.23
0.63
0.60
0.40
0.76
1.25
1.09
62.3
2.84
0.86
7.3% 7.2% 7.0%
15.4% 15.6% 16.0%
13.1% 12.9% 13.8%
4.1% 4.1% 3.8%
2.7% 2.7% 2.5%
34%
97 98
0
1.93
0.00
0.29
0.23
0.64
0.61
0.39
0.77
1.24
1.14
69.2
2.63
0.77
4.5%
10.8%
12.7%
3.6%
1.7%
0
3.22
0.00
0.31
0.22
0.62
0.61
0.39
0.73
1.35
1.24
70.5
2.69
0.73
6.5%
16.1%
12.8%
3.6%
2.4%
99 00 01
Interest Payment 2,226 2,356 8,767 11,420 11,705
NI + (1-t)*Interest 48,364 55,940 71,231 58,518 95,485
3b) Revenue by Business Activities
Yr. 97 98 99 00 01
Engineering Services 41% 41% 46% 53% 59%
Process, Scientific &
Systemic Consulting 1% 1% 3% 3% 3%
Construction 43% 46% 35% 28% 25%
Operation & Maintain. 15% 13% 17% 15% 13%
100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
4b) Revenue by Business Areas
Yr. 97 98 99 00 01
Chemicals & Polymers 28% 37% 28% 20% 17%
Tech. & Manufacturing 19% 6% 6% 6% 8%
Oil & Gas Refining 14% 12% 8% 8% 11%
Federal Programs 11% 8% 17% 18% 19%
Buildings 10% 15% 16% 16% 12%
Infrastructure 1% 1% 8% 7% 6%
Pulp and Paper 9% 9% 3% 7% 5%
Pharmaceuticals & Bio. 8% 10% 13% 14% 18%
Other Businesses 2% 2% 1% 3% 5%
100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
5b) Revenue by Regions
Yr. 97 98 99 00 01
U.S. 76.5% 79.8% 84.2% 83.6% 77.7%
Europe 23.2% 19.6% 15.3% 15.6% 20.9%
Asia & others 0.3% 0.6% 0.4% 0.8% 1.4%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
7) Expected Volatility assumed in Option Valuation
Yr. 97 98 99 00 01
Expected Volatility 21.6% 24.2% 25.3% 27.6% 39.7%
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NAME COUNTRY YEAR
JGC Japan 1928
No. of Employees
No. of Shareholders
No. of Shares Outstanding
1997
2,527
11,476
176,408,547
Changed Leader during term? NO
Ownership Structure
Banks
Life and non-life insurance corporations
Securities corporations
Individuals and others
Foreign investors
Other domestic corporations
1998
2,436
14,237
176,408,547
24.72%
5.75%
1.51%
42.93%
9.05%
16.04%
100.00%
1999 2000
2,359 2,012
18,087 25,284
192,139,890 228,838,159
List of Major Financial and Institutional Owners
Nikki Shoji Co. Ltd.
Saneyoshi Scholarship Foundation
The Sakura Bank, Ltd.
The Sanwa Bank, Ltd.
The Fuji Bank, Ltd.
The Sumitomo Bank, Ltd.
The Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, Ltd.
The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Ltd.
The Sumitomo Trust and Banking Co. Ltd.
The Chase Manhattan Bank N.A. London
Technostructure
Research & Development Center
Nuclear Research Center
Kinuura Laboratory
F
F
F
F
M
M
F
G/F
G/F
Operating Core
(Engineering and Procurement) - Central
- Project Systems Division Have self-supporting
- Engineering Division accounting system
- Procurement Division f
(Sales and Project Management Divisions) - Central
- Hydrocarbon . Individual project
- General Indstries (Nonhydrocarbon)J divisions'
- Business Development Division
Worldwide Engineering Network
M.W. Kellogg (U.K.); JGC Dordtse Eng. B.V. (Netherland);
JGC Singapore Pte. Ltd.; Technoserve Int'l Co. Inc. (Philippines);
P.T. Pertafenikki Eng. (Indonesia); ADTECHS Corp. (U.S.)
Worldwide Procurement Network
JGC Corporation (Japan); JGC Corp. Europe B.V. (Netherlands);
JGC Singapore Pte. Ltd.; JGC USA Inc.
Support Operations
Planning & Administrative
- CATV Business Promotion Office
- Corporate Planning & Administration Division
- Operations Administration Division
Notes: 1997
1) Engineering & Project Execution:
Realize once-through engineering execution to substantially reduce man-hours and achieve shorter delivery times. The challenge is to develop multifunctional engineers by breaking
the walls between functional silos. The divisions have their self-supporting accounting systems for proper accountability, contribution to earnings and tracking of performance.
2) Sales and Project Management Divisions:
Previously each organized into 4 separate divisions: Domestic & Overseas hydrocarbon, nonhydrocarbon, nuclear and environmental-related markets.
3) Rapid response to client needs arising in a borderless business development division,
4) Planning & Administrative Divisions:
Previously four, now reduced to two to simplify and flatten organization - faster flow of decisions, elimination of middle managers. In 1996, JGC examined the idea of forming a
business for rationalizing its administrative functions and operation of business expansion into own real estate -> founded a new company known as Nikki Business Service Co. Ltd.
5) Co-locate key operations such as the admin & sales divisions and the eng. & project execution divisions which were previously divided geographically
=> achieve operational efficiency and communication
=> corporate LAN set up to enable high-speed, large-capacity data transfers, strengthening IT technology
6) Overseas affiliated companies or subsidiaries are mainly engaged in construction and engineering services. Other peripheral activities are mostly managed from offices in Japan:
catalysts and chemical equipment supply; information processing; broadcasting services; new materials; specialized consulting services; field work and maintenance services;
process licensing services; and office support services.
Notes: 1998
Procurement function and related personnel were moved to project management division to strengthen JGC's advantageous turnkey project execution system. On the other hand,
Information Management was centralized. Administrative divisions were reorganized: a new project support division was established to increase project efficiency, with the aim of
improving administrative staff producitivity. Unify R&D which had been conducted at various locations.
Notes: 1999
1) Leveling corporate hierarchy and accelerating decision making: Trimmed Board of Directors from 24 to 19. Produce a more horizontal corporate hierarchy by eliminating the
traditional support system and requiring all decisions to reach the President after only four levels of approval (still too many levels?)
2) Amidst cutting staff and overhead costs, JGC made very considerable efforts to develop overseas engineering centers, and to foster outsourcing in order to reduce engineering costs.
3) Introduced the chief engineer system. 18 new chief engineers were chosen from various specialized fields, and began working outside the boundaries of the traditional team system.
Engineers who excel in job knowledge and experience to become mentors for the others. Introduced a new staff performance evaluation system that links compensation to results.
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Oroanizational Seltina
4.7%
3.6%
3.4%
2.7%
2.7%
2.7%
2.0%
1.6%
1.1%
1.0%
25.5%
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JGC - Market Segmentation Matrix
Residential Institutional Commercial Industrial, 1 Infrastructure Environment, 2 Diversification
D I D I D I D I D I D I D I
Supply 5 5
Feasibility studies 8 6 6 * *
& Planning
A&E Design * * 7 7 * *
Construction * * 7 7 * * 9 9
O&M 4 4 * * * *
Renovation
Finance 3 3
Own / Develop
Combined * * * * * *
1 Nonhydrocarbon includes pharmaceutical, automobile, medical and welfare, power generation and regional development fields,
nuclear energy and social development
2 E.g. flue gas desulphurization plant, used car recycling factories, spent nuclear fuel reprocessing plant.
3 For clients operating at a smaller scale in the refining market.
4 Building Maintenance, document service, efficient management of owned real estate and utilization consultation
5 Sale of various plant equipment and materials
6 Fiscal 99: Venture into management consulting with the new Refinery Profitability Service (RPS), a consulting survey that provides
valuable advice for improving the profitability of refineries: (I) construction model that reflect processes; (ii) present improvement
proposals with priority driven by high ROI; (iii) taking full responsibility for service until customer achieves profit point
7 Enter specific niche of a market - research laboratory construction for major manufacturers. Complements plant construction
-> position as a unique service provider supporting the global management strategies of manufacturers worldwide
8 Make use of important technologies at the basic concept and planning stages of hospital, including proprietary estimates of future
demand for medical services. - integrate into client's functions - demand on new expertise is tough.
9 Software development business based on IT technologies and experience from EPC business . E.g. production information system
help manufacturers to realize supply chain management.
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JGC (Non-consolidated)
1) Operational Performance (V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Revenue 239,222 359,504 341,478 230,592
Growth -14.0% 50.3% -5.0% -32.5%
COGS 235,237 354,273 328,338 213,714
Growth -10.5% 50.6% -7.32% -34.9%
Operating Income -8,352 -5,686 3,290 7,597
Growth -586% 31.9% 158% 131%
Net Income -12,227 -10,207 67 1,383
Growth -647% 16.5% 101% 1964%
Backlog 657,966 649,710 578,134 537,237
Growth 20.1% -1.3% -11.0% -7.1%
New Orders 340,936 325,344 262,473 211,473
Growth 4.7% -4.6% -19.3% -19.4%
2) Capital Structure (V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Equity 91,463 79,492 98,932 109,195
Non-current Liab. 82,762 102,235 98,472 71,497
Long Term Debt 69,975 87,079 82,397 56,410
Total Liabilities 228,361 250,969 263,289 205,503
Total Assets 319,824 330,461 362,221 314,698
Current Assets 236,652 238,467 254,470 210,165
Current Liabilities 145,599 148,734 164,817 134,006
Quick Assets 151,368 160,400 192,100 162,325
Acct. Receivables 59,702 79,497 99,992 66,183
3a) Revenue, Backlog and New Orders by Regions (V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Rev., Domestic 78,682 N/A 90,375 64,971
Rev., International 160,540 N/A 251,103 165,621
Backlog, Domestic 181,055 208,031 176,180 167,164
Backlog, Int'l. 476,911 441,679 401,954 370,073
New Ord, Domestic 82,999 N/A 58,523 56,954
New Orders, Int'l. 259,937 N/A 203,950 154,519
4a) Revenue by Business Areas (in V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Petrol Refining 56,308 48,228 78,196
Petro. & Chemical 35,066 80,837 66,254
Gas Processing 82,866 164,229 117,299
Productn. Facilities 44,053 34,145 43,970
Nuclear energy 11,126 13,320 17,010
Social development 6,453 5,755 17,648
Other 3,350 12,990 1,101
TOTAL 239,222 359,504 341,478
5a) New Orders by Business Areas (in V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Petrol Refining 34,776 110,873 64,189
Petro. & Chemical 146,434 71,010 67,443
Gas Processing 80,368 46,545 87,113
Productn. Facilities 34,875 31,704 20,127
Nuclear energy 22,936 11,229 13,204
Social development 18,562 51,509 8,803
Other 2,985 2,474 1,594
TOTAL 340,936 325,344 262,473
6a) Backlog by Business Areas (in V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Petrol Refining 50,199 115,536 104,948
Petro. & Chemical 190,329 185,894 173,417
Gas Processing 236,689 147,009 135,651
Productn. Facilities 48,140 45,342 21,304
Nuclear energy 92,250 83,297 73,491
Social development 28,341 71,130 67,328
Other 12,018 1,502 1,995
TOTAL 657,966 649,710 578,134
Key Financial Ratios
Yr.
Dividend (yen/share)
Net Income/share
Dividend Payout ratio
NCL/(NCL+Equity)
LT Debt/Total Capital.
Total Debt ratio
Current Asset/Total A
Non-Current Asset/Total
Current Liab./Total Liab.
Current Ratio
Quick Ratio
Avg. Collection Period
Total Asset Turnover
Rev(t)/Backlog(t-1)
ROA
ROE
Gross Profit Margin
Operating Profit Margin
Net Profit Margin
Assumed Tax Rate
Yr.
Interest Payment
NI + (1-t)*lnterest
97 98 99 00
10
-69.3
-0.14
0.48
0.43
0.71
0.74
0.26
0.64
1.63
1.04
94.4
0.74
0.437
-3.3%
-12.4%
1.7%
-3.5%
-4.5%
50%
97
5
-57.9
-0.09
0.56
0.52
0.76
0.72
0.28
0.59
1.60
1.08
70.7
1.11
0.546
-2.6%
-11.9%
1.5%
-1.6%
-2.3%
0
0.38
0.00
0.50
0.45
0.73
0.70
0.30
0.63
1.54
1.17
95.9
0.99
0.526
0.5%
0.1%
3.8%
1.0%
0.5%
98 99 00
3
6.16
0.49
0.40
0.34
0.65
0.67
0.33
0.65
1.57
1.21
131.5
0.68
0.399
0.9%
1.3%
7.3%
3.3%
1.2%
3,091 3,614 3,162 2,991
-10,682 -8,400 1,648 2,879
3b) Revenue, Backlog and New Orders by Regions
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Revenue, Domestic 33% N/A 26% 28%
Revenue, International 67% N/A 74% 72%
Backlog, Domestic 28% 32% 30% 31%
Backlog, International 72% 68% 70% 69%
New Orders, Domestic 24% N/A 22% 27%
New Orders, International 76% N/A 78% 73%
4b) Revenue by Business Areas
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Petroleum Refining Projects 24% 13% 23%
Petrochemical & Chemical 15% 22% 19%
Gas Processing 35% 46% 34%
General Production Facilities 18% 9% 13%
Nuclear energy 5% 4% 5%
Social development 3% 2% 5%
Other 1% 4% 0%
HPI 73% 82% 77%
Non-HPI 27% 18% 23%
5b) New Orders by Business Areas
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Petroleum Refining Projects 10% 34% 24%
Petrochemical & Chemical 43% 22% 26%
Gas Processing 24% 14% 33%
General Production Facilities 10% 10% 8%
Nuclear energy 7% 3% 5%
Social development 5% 16% 3%
Other 1% 1% 1%
HPI 77% 70% 83%
Non-HPI 23% 30% 17%
6b) Backlog by Business Areas
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Petroleum Refining Projects 8% 18% 18%
Petrochemical & Chemical 29% 29% 30%
Gas Processing 36% 23% 23%
General Production Facilities 7% 7% 4%
Nuclear energy 14% 13% 13%
Social development 4% 11% 12%
Other 2% 0% 0%
HPI 73% 69% 72%
Non-HPI 27% 31% 28%
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JGC (Consolidated)
1) Operational Performance (V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Revenue 273,494 397,159 390,283 280,620
Growth -12.7% 45.2% -1.7% -28.1%
COGS 262,454 383,826 367,076 254,076
Growth -9.2% 46.2% -4.4% -30.78%
Operating Income -7,432 -3,981 5,627 11,023
Growth -268% 46.4% 241.3% 95.89%
Net Income -13,831 -13,495 347 1,123
Growth -687% 2.4% 103% 224%
2) Capital Structure (V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Equity + Minor Int. 104,541 88,556 110,704 120,434
Non-current Liab. 87,930 109,145 105,615 77,556
Long Term Debt 72,142 89,849 85,137 58,348
Total Liabilities 249,500 275,538 294,091 229,353
Total Assets 354,041 364,094 404,795 349,787
Current Assets 261,385 264,353 287,984 238,211
Current Liabilities 161,570 166,393 188,476 151,797
Quick Assets 171,190 189,459 220,018 186,077
Acct. Receivables 71,181 91,464 114,497 79,716
Note: Minority Interests are insignificant.
3a) Revenue by Regions (in V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Japan
SEA
Middle East
Africa
Other
108,781 93,451 129,334
131,441 72,848
164,713 90,860 54,329
55,144 55,724
26,263 78,048
273,494 397,159 390,283
Key Financial Ratios
Yr.
Dividend (yen/share)
Net Income/share
Dividend Payout ratio
NCL/(NCL+Equity)
LT Debt/Total Capital.
Total Debt ratio
Current Asset/Total A
Non-Current Asset/Total
Current Liab./Total Liab.
Current Ratio
Quick Ratio
Avg. Collection Period
Total Asset Turnover
ROA
ROE
Gross Profit Margin
Operating Profit Margin
Net Profit Margin
Assumed Tax Rate
Yr.
Interest Payment
NI + (1-t)*Interest
3b) Revenue by Regions
Yr. 97
Japan 40%
SEA
Middle East 60%
Africa
Other
98,272
26,427
37,642
32,489
85,790
280,620
97 98 99 00
10
-79.32
-0.13
0.46
0.41
0.70
0.74
0.26
0.65
1.62
1.06
98.4
0.76
-3.4%
-12.5%
4.0%
-2.7%
-4.5%
50%
97
5
-77.94
-0.06
0.55
0.50
0.76
0.73
0.27
0.60
1.59
1.14
74.7
1.11
-3.2%
-14.0%
3.4%
-1.0%
-2.9%
0
0.75
0.00
0.49
0.43
0.73
0.71
0.29
0.64
1.53
1.17
96.3
1.02
0.5%
0.3%
5.9%
1.4%
0.5%
3
1.96
1.53
0.39
0.33
0.66
0.68
0.32
0.66
1.57
1.23
126.3
0.74
0.7%
1.0%
9.5%
3.9%
1.0%
98 99 00
3,259 3,804 3,383 3,176
-12,202 -11,593 2,039 2,711
98 99 00 01
24%
33%
23%
14%
7%
33%
19%
14%
14%
20%
35% #DIV/O!
9% #DIV/O!
13% #DIV/O!
12%
31% #DIV/0!
100% 100% 100% 100% #DIV/01
4) Cash Flow Profile (V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00 01
Net Cash Flow from Operations (35,338) 20,425 (7,786) 43,500
Net Cash Flow from Investment 6,139 (13,485) (1,195) (2,635)
Capital Expenditure 3,780 18,336 6,189 5,293
Corporate Financing Gap (29,199) 6,940 (8,981) 40,865
CAPEX Ratio -9.35 1.11 -1.26 8.22
Cash Balance at Year End 57,699 51,086 77,863 79,018
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NAME COUNTRY YEARI
KAJIMA Japan 1840
Changed leader during term?
Organizational Setting
Technostructure
R&D Committee - chaired by senior management
Technical Research Institute (TRI)
Advanced Technology Department
- Construction Research in technology is also
- Civil Eng. organized by market to provide
- Environmental I interface with practical applications.
Environmental Committee (HQ)
Chair: president
Members: GMs of each bus.group
and branch offices
Environmental Management Sub-com.
- Design Sub-com
- Construction Sub-com
- Office Work Sub-com
Environmental Committee (division and branch)
- Chair: GM of bus. Group or branch
- Members: GMs of each related section and dept.
Operating Core
G
G
G
G
G
G
M
M
M
F
M
F
G
G
M
Headquarters and subs. in Japan overseeing domestic market
Subsidiaries in U.S., Europe & Asia form the Overseas Group;
Regional HQs function as hubs of the global network
Kajima USA inc.
Kajim Europe B.V.
Kajima Overseas Asia Pte. Ltd.
International Division oversees directly:
- Middle East
- Africa
Building Engineering Department
Civil Engineering Department
Environmental Engineering Department
Architectural and Engineering
Kajima Associate Inc.
Kajima Design Europe Ltd.
Kajima Design Asia Pte. Ltd.
Division
Design
Bases
Building maintenance, inspection, survey and analysis services
Kajima Overall Control Automatic Management of Building (sub.)
Notes:
1) Within R&D, Kajima established units that horizontally interlink operations in individual technology development fields, and those units are working to integrate the R&D
planning, implementation, and evaluation processes with respect to all the Company's R&D activities.
2) In Feb 1999, Kajima undertook organizational restructuring of the TRI by shifting certain resources from the Building Engineering Dept. and the Civil Engineering Dept.
To expedite the development of strategic technologies, these and other resources were used to create the Environmental Eng. Dept., Advanced Technology Department,
and a Life-Cycle Engineering project team (which is a form of special-purpose "tiger team").
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NO.
Support Operations
265
Kalima - Market Segmentation Matrix
Notes:
Real estate asset securitization. Other fund-raising services rendered on fee basis.
Taiko Trading subsidiary - markets and leases diverse construction materials, including steel materials, temporary construction
materials, cement, and concrete as well as such construction equipment as excavation machinery, transporter machiner, cranes.
Leverage on wealth of experience and know-how to accurately evaluate products and technologies and help customers select
and procure the equipment and materials that best meet their needs. - more like a broker, intermediary
Real estate development and investment.
Selective investments in Private Finance Initiatives (PFI) projects.
Infrastructure projects make up a much smaller volume as compared to building projects, the main revenue generator. Building
projects also provide a more stable stream of revenues. As such, it is more efficient to manage civil engineering projects centrally
in the headquarters. Design for civil engineering is centralized as well.
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Residential Institutional Commercial Industrial Infrastructure Environment Diversification
D I D I D I D I D I D I D I
Supply 2 2 2 2 2 2
Feasibility studies * *
& Planning
A&E Design * * * * * * * 5 5 *
Construction * * * * * * * 5 5 *
O&M * * *
Renovation * * *
Finance 1 1
Own / Develop 3 3
Combined * * * * *
1_114 4 4
1
2
3
4
5
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Kajima (Non-consolidated)
1) Operational Performance (V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Revenue 1,602,150 1,512,804 1,250,260 1,174,910
Growth 10.1% -5.58% -17.35% -6.03%
COGS 1,452,491 1,376,468 1,126,300 1,057,628
Growth 11.3% -5.23% -18.17% -6.10%
Operating Income 37,036 31,892 39,112 39,361
Growth -1.3% -13.89% 22.64% 0.64%
Net income 10,025 6,003 -196,675 7,633
Growth -0.2% -40.12% -3376% -103.88%
Backlog 2,185,086 1,996,767 2,026,794 2,139,507
Growth -3.4% -8.62% 1.50% 5.56%
New Orders 1,524,289 1,324,485 1,280,287 1,287,623
Growth 5.9% -13.11% -3.34% 0.57%
2) Capital Structure (V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Equity 408,189 405,241 214,117 215,020
Non-current Liab. 400,840 460,886 500,762 452,305
Long Term Debt 307,878 363,870 328,819 290,376
Total Liabilities 2,010,562 1,859,055 1,813,688 1,802,736
Total Assets
Current Assets
Current Liabilities
Quick Assets
Acct. Receivables
2,418,751
1,728,099
1,609,722
694,369
422,986
2,264,296
1,515,530
1,398,169
584,153
356,797
2,027,805
1,376,641
1,312,926
484,166
255,193
Key Financial Ratios
Yr.
Dividend (yen/share)
Net Income/share
Dividend Payout ratio
NCL/(NCL+Equity)
LT Debt/Total Capital.
Total Debt ratio
Current Asset/Total A
Non-Current Asset/Total
Current Liab./Total Liab.
Current Ratio
Quick Ratio
Avg. Collection Period
Total Asset Turnover
Rev(t)/Backlog(t-1)
ROA
ROE
Gross Profit Margin
Operating Profit Margin
Net Profit Margin
Assumed tax rate:
Yr.
Interest Payment
NI + (1-t)*Interest
2,017,756
1,360,445
1,350,431
456,695
238,081
97 98 99 00
9
10.43
0.86
0.50
0.43
0.83
0.71
0.29
0.80
1.07
0.43
93.3
0.65
0.708
0.7%
2.5%
9.3%
2.3%
1.1%
50%
97
9
6.24
1.44
0.53
0.47
0.82
0.67
0.33
0.75
1.08
0.42
94.1
0.65
0.692
0.5%
1.5%
9.0%
2.1%
0.8%
7
-204.6
-0.03
0.70
0.61
0.89
0.68
0.32
0.72
1.05
0.37
89.3
0.58
0.626
-8.9%
-63.5%
9.9%
3.1%
-15.2%
16,288 13,141 12,274
18,169 12,574 -190,538
Notes:
a. Huge drop in Net Income in 1998 due to valuation loss of marketable and investment securities triggered by the domestic stock market decline.
b. Huge drop in Net Income in 1999 - extraordinary losses of V 347 billion due to (1) write down of real estate and provision for loss on investmnets in
subsidiaries; (ii) severance payments provision increased; (iii) cost of restructuring in accordance with the 3-yr plan.
3a) Revenue by Business Areas (in V billions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Civil Engineering 413.3 363.4 318.3 N/A
Architectural Eng. 1,070.2 1,063.8 834.0 N/A
Real Estate, Oth. 118.7 85.6 98.0 N/A
1,602.2 1,512.8 1,250.3
4a) New Orders by Business Areas (in V billions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Civil Engineering 396.0 325.0 360.5 338.7
Architectural Eng. 1,000.1 920.8 806.3 848.0
Development Proj. 128.1 77.7 113.5 100.9
1,524.2 1,323.5 1,280.3 1,287.6
5) R&D Investment (V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
investment 19,567 18,465 15,960 12,756
As % of Sales 1.2% 1.2% 1.3% 1.1%
3b) Revenue by Business Areas
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Civil Engineering 26% 24% 25%
Architectural Engineering 67% 70% 67%
Development Projects 7% 6% 8%
100% 100% 100%
4b) New Orders by Business Areas
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Civil Engineering 26% 25% 28% 26%
Architectural Engineering 66% 70% 63% 66%
Development Projects 8% 6% 9% 8%
100% 100% 100% 100%
6) Cash Flow Profile (V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Net CF from Operations 80,200 6,794 63,568 62,979
Net CFfrom Investment (3,762) (32,550) (7,135) 4,904
Capital Expenditure 18,803 18,947 10,071 6,207
Corporate Financing Gap 76,438 (25,756) 56,433 67,883
CAPEX Ratio 4.27 0.36 6.31 10.15
Cash Balance, Year End 140,762 92,188 78,633 89,189
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7
7.94
0.88
0.68
0.57
0.89
0.67
0.33
0.75
1.01
0.34
76.6
0.58
0.580
0.6%
3.6%
10.0%
3.4%
1.1%
98 99 00
9,858
12,562
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Kaiima (Consolidated)
1) Operational Performance (V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Revenue 2,100,701 1,938,933 1,658,884 1,727,871
Growth 19.1% -7.70% -14.44%M 
COGS 1,926,792 1,778,719 1,511,117 1,561,888
Growth 21.0% -7.68% -15.04% 3.36%
Operating Income 31,921 23,382 33,188 51,610
Growth -15.3% -26.75% 41.94% 55.51%
Net Income 4,300 -5,980 -199,357 9,229
Growth -239% -3234% -105%
Net Income (Group
Share) 7,345 -7,604 -198,557 9,018
Growth 46% -204% 2511% 105%
_,apt MERIMift t e in rules of accounting for consolidation
2) Capital Structure (V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Equity (w/o Minor) 383,102 366,445 174,595 176,058
Equity + Minor Int. 395,454 375,780 182,616 195,009
Non-current Liab. 579,506 646,539 653,980 611,710
Long Term Debt 448,754 506,566 450,053 407,694
Total Liabilities 2,472,925 2,308,548 2,219,865 2,228,533
Total Assets 2,868,379 2,684,328 2,402,481 2,432,542
Current Assets 1,991,280 1,784,265 1,589,172 1,635,370
Current Liabilities 1,893,419 1,662,009 1,565,885 1,616,823
Quick Assets 743,515 680,479 535,913 604,851
Acct. Receivables 429,268 411,703 268,202 346,247
3a) Revenue by Regions (in V billions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Japan 1,851.4 1,715.7 1,453.6 1,538.6
North America 131.3 107.1 97.0
Europe 249.3 17.9 33.1 44.4
Asia J 64.0 53.8 34.7
Other Area 10.1 11.3 13.2
2,100.7 1,939.0 1,658.9 1,727.9
4) R&D Investment (V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Investment 20,286 19,315 16,678.0 13,071.0
% of Sales 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 0.8%
Key Financial Ratios
Yr.
Dividend (yen/share)
Net Income/share
Dividend Payout ratio
NCL/(NCL+Equity)
LT Debt/Total Capital.
Total Debt ratio
Current Asset/Total A
Non-Current Asset/Total
Current Liab./Total Liab.
Current Ratio
Quick Ratio
Avg. Collection Period
Total Asset Turnover
ROA
ROE
Gross Profit Margin
Operating Profit Margin
Net Profit Margin
Assumed tax rate:
Yr.
Interest Payment
NI + (1-t)*Interest
3b) Revenue by Region
97 98 99 00
9 99
7.64
1.18
0.59
0.53
0.86
0.69
0.31
0.77
1.05
0.39
72.8
0.73
0.6%
1.9%
8.3%
1.5%
0.8%
50%
97
9
-7.91
-1.14
0.63
0.57
0.86
0.66
0.34
0.72
1.07
0.41
79.2
0.70
0.2%
-2.0%
8.3%
1.2%
0.3%
7 77
-206.6
-0.03
0.78
0.71
0.92
0.66
0.34
0.71
1.01
0.34
74.8
0.65
-7.4%
-73.4%
8.9%
2.0%
-11.4%
7
9.43
0.74
0.76
0.68
0.92
0.67
0.33
0.73
1.01
0.37
64.9
0.71
0.7%
5.1%
9.6%
3.0%
1.0%
98 99 00
26,376 24,836 22,103 16,91026,376 24,836 22,103
17,488 6,438 -188,306
16,910
17,684
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Japan 88.1% 88.5% 87.6% 89.0%
North America 6.8% 6.5% 5.6%
Europe 11.9% 0.9% 2.0% 2.6%
Asia J 3.3% 3.2% 2.0%
Other Area 0.5% 0.7% 0.8%
100% 100% 100% 100%
5) Performance of the Overseas Group (in V billions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Revenue
Operating Expenses
Operating Income
249.3 190.5 182.5 165.4
258.3 198.4 191.1 159.2
-9.0 -7.9 -8.6 6.2
6) Cash Flow Profile (V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Net Cash Flow from Operations 76,561 5,097 54,864 86,179
Net Cash Flow from Investment (54,157) (11,741) 2,075 39,162
Capital Expenditure 41,329 40,258 50,959 42,181
Corporate Financing Gap 22,404 (6,644) 56,939 125,341
CAPEX Ratio 1.85 0.13 1.08 2.04
Cash Balance, Year End 182,350 133,465 114,435 127,531
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INAME COUNTRY YEAR
KUMAGAI GUMI Japan 1898
No. of Employees
No. of Shareholders
No. of Shares Outstanding
1997
8,112
92987
680,724,000
Changed leader during term? YES.
Employee Structure 1997
Civil Engineers 27.8%
Architectural Engineers 38.9%
Electrical Engineers 2.8%
Mechanical Engineers 2.9%
Administrative staff 26.7%
Others 0.9%
100%
Technostructure
Institute of Construction Technology
International Engineering Center (Singapore)
Operating Core
F
M
M
M
F
M
Marketing divisions
Public sector and civil eng.
Architectural construction (private)
Renovation division
Sales division
(Target greater Tokyo)
Global Environment Office
Environmental Business Project Division
Appendix B
1998
8,112
N/A
680,727,047
(1998, 2000)
1998
27.8%
38.9%
2.8%
2.9%
26.7%
0.9%
100%
1999
7,555
N/A
680,727,047
1999
27.4%
39.7%
2.7%
2.6%
26.7%
0.9%
100%
2000
6,688
N/A
680,727,047
2000
27.5%
40.3%
2.6%
1.6%
27.2%
0.8%
Organizational Setting
100%
Support Operations
Notes: 1997
Combined six existing marketing divisions into two, with one concentrating on clients in the public sector and civil engineering areas, the other in
architectural construction for private-sector clients. Divisions will be directly responsible for capturing orders as well as developing consulting and
post-construction services
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Kumanai Gumi - Market Segmentation Matrix
Notes:
Operation of hotels, health and medical facilities, sports facilities and recreation facilities.
Design, manufacture, and sale of construction machinery and equipment.
Notably in working with developers in urban (re)/development projects: Canal-Town Hyogo, Tsuchiura Station Area Redevelopment.
Appendix B
Residential Institutional Commercial Industrial Infrastructure Environment Diversification
D I D I D I D I D I D I D I
Supply 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Feasibility studies * * * * * *
& Planning
A&E Design * * * * * *
Construction 3 3 3 * * * * *
O&M 1 1 * * * *
Renovation
Finance
Own / Develop
Combined * * * *
1
2
3
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Kumagai (Non-consolidated)
1) Operational Performance (V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Revenue 930,315 1,013,237 900,311 691,426
Growth -5.4% 8.9% -11.1% -23.2%
COGS 844,710 934,077 824,829 626,244
Growth -5.6% 10.58% -11.7% -24.1%
Operating Income 30,900 24,416 26,144 17,618
Growth -9.5% -21.0% 7.1% -32.6%
Net Income 1,099 -217,645 1,432 2,755
Growth 0.5% -19904% 101% 92.4%
Backlog 2,075,440 1,451,465 1,383,468 1,338,441
Growth 4.3% -30.1% -4.7% -3.3%
New Orders 1,001,584 903,861 841,483 650,215
Growth 14.8% -9.8% -6.9% -22.7%
2) Capital Structure (V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Equity 353,543 133,856 135,288 166,375
Non-current Liab. 387,001 320,624 314,907 303,876
Long Term Debt 352,885 268,516 284,754 279,841
Total Liabilities 1,317,982 1,425,476 1,369,857 1,364,220
Total Assets 1,671,525 1,559,332 1,505,145 1,530,595
Current Assets 1,118,758 1,034,950 874,208 812,067
Current Liabilities 930,981 1,104,852 1,054,950 1,060,344Quick Assets 422,221 375,278 318,598 294,151
Acct. Receivables 326,153 289,270 227,864 196,085
3a) Revenue by Business Areas (in V millions)
Yr. 96 97
Civil Engineering 288,566 253,451
Building Projects 663,840 644,782
Others 31,014 32,082
983,420 930,315
4a) New Orders by Business Areas (in V millions)
Yr. 96 97
Civil Engineering 234,863 276,159
Building Projects 601,300 705,949
Others 36,297 19,476
872,460 1,001,584
5a) Backlog by Business Areas (in V millions)
Yr. 96 97
Civil Engineering 727,400 755,089
Building Projects 1,230,331 1,301,140
Others 32,144 19,211
1,989,875 2,075,440
6) Revenue by Public/Private Sectors and Business Areas
Yr. 96 97
Civil Eng., Public 53% 55%
Civil Eng., Private 47% 45%
Building, Public 19% 18%
Building, Private 81% 82%
8) Backlog by Public/Private Sectors and Business Areas
Yr. 96 97
Civil Eng., Public 40% 43%
Civil Eng., Private 60% 57%
Building, Public 13% 9%
Building, Private 87% 91%
10) Cash Flow Profile (V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Net Cash Flow from Operations (304) (26,644) 8,577 N/A
Net Cash Flow from Investment (38,293) (73,281) (118,381) N/A
Capital Expenditure 3,284 6,480 6,055 N/A
Corporate Financing Gap (38,597) (99,925) (109,804) N/A
CAPEX Ratio -0.09 -4.11 1.42 N/A
Cash Balance, Year End 56,769 56,694 52,726 N/A
Key Financial Ratios
Yr.
Dividend (yen/share)
Net Income/share
Dividend Payout ratio
NCL/(NCL+Equity)
LT Debt/Total Capital.
Total Debt ratio
Current Asset/Total A
Non-Current Asset/Total
Current Liab/Total Liab.
Current Ratio
Quick Ratio
Avg. Collection Period
Total Asset Turnover
Rev(t)/Backlog(t-1)
ROA
ROE
Gross Profit Margin
Operating Profit Margin
Net Profit Margin
Assumed tax rate:
Yr.
97
3
1.61
1.86
0.52
0.50
0.79
0.67
0.33
0.71
1.20
0.45
132.4
0.55
0.468
0.86%
0.31%
9.2%
3.3%
1.56%
50%
97
98 99 00
0
-319.72
0.00
0.71
0.67
0.91
0.66
0.34
0.78
0.94
0.34
110.8
0.63
0.488
-12.70%
-89.31%
7.8%
2.4%
-20.24%
Interest Payment 26,842 25,054
NI + (1-t)*Interest 14,520 -205,118
0
2.1
0.00
0.70
0.68
0.91
0.58
0.42
0.77
0.83
0.30
104.8
0.59
0.620
0.79%
1.06%
8.4%
2.9%
1.34%
0
4.04
0.00
0.65
0.63
0.89
0.53
0.47
0.78
0.77
0.28
111.9
0.46
0.500
0.79%
1.83%
9.4%
2.5%
1.74%
98 99 00
21,277 18,608
12,071 12,059
3b) Revenue by Business Areas
Yr. 96 97
Civil Engineering 29% 27%
Architectural Engineering 68% 69%
Others 3% 3%
100% 100%
4b) New Orders by Business Areas
Yr. 96 97
Civil Engineering 27% 28%
Architectural Engineering 69% 70%
Others 4% 2%
100% 100%
5b) Backlog by Business Areas
Yr. 96 97
Civil Engineering
Architectural Engineering
Others
37% 36%
62% 63%
2% 1%
100% 100%
7) New Orders by Public/Private Sectors and Business Areas
Yr. 96 97
Civil Eng., Public 56% 61%
Civil Eng., Private 44% 39%
Building Projects, Public 14% 11%
Building Projects, Private 86% 89%
9) Revenue, New Orders and Backlog by Regions
Yr. 96 97
Revenue, Domestic 97% 98%
Revenue, International 3% 2%
New Orders, Domestic 95% 92%
New Orders, International 5% 8%
Backlog, Domestic 94% 90%
Backlog, International 6% 10%
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Kumagai (Consolidated)
1) Operational Performance (V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Revenue 1,058,751 1,134,315 998,294 799,066
Growth -2.9% 7.1% -12.0% -20.0%
COGS 963,116 1,044,820 913,145 721,573
Growth -2.8% 8.5% -12.6% -21.0%
Operating Income 31,981 25,140 28,158 17,265
Growth -10.4% -21.4% 12.0% -38.7%
Net Income -6,085 -229,005 -2,450 -5,572
Growth -3663% 99% -127%
Net Income (Group
Share) -7,357 -229,794 -2,528 -4,620
Growth -3023% 99% -83%
Increase due to change in consolidating rules of accounting
2) Capital Structure (V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Equity (w/o Minor) 260,387 28,468 25,517 11,877
Equity + Minor Int. 262,426 30,613 26,916 18,935
Non-current Liab. 447,244 368,290 358,172 418,483
Long Term Debt 409,231 311,807 321,871 369,970
Total Liabilities 1,630,099 1,684,643 1,522,589 1,601,470
Total Assets 1,892,525 1,715,256 1,549,505 1,620,405
Current Assets 1,297,652 1,210,808 1,063,312 911,160
Current Liabilities 1,182,855 1,316,353 1,164,417 1,182,987
Quick Assets 482,103 426,837 370,075 338,090
Acct. Receivables 362,606 322,762 260,600 222,557
3a) Revenue by Regions (in V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Japan 1,029,292 1,030,613 938,483 760,747
North America
Europe 29,459 103,702
Asia
Other Area
59,811 38,319
1,058,751 1,134,315 998,294 799,066
Key Financial Ratios
Yr.
Dividend (yen/share)
Net Income/share
Dividend Payout ratio (1)
NCL/(NCL+Equity)
LT Debt/Total Capital.
Total Debt ratio
Current Asset/Total A
Non-Current Asset/Total
Current Liab./Total Liab.
Current Ratio
Quick Ratio
Avg. Collection Period
Total Asset Turnover
ROA
ROE
Gross Profit Margin
Operating Profit Margin
Net Profit Margin
Assumed tax rate:
Yr.
Interest Payment
NI + (1-t)*Interest
3b) Revenue by Region
Yr. 97
Japan 97%
North America
Europe 3%
Asia J
Other Area
97 98 99 00
3
-10.81
-0.28
0.63
0.61
0.86
0.69
0.31
0.73
1.10
0.41
126.8
0.57
0.5%
-3.1%
9.0%
3.0%
0.9%
50%
97
0
-337.57
0.00
0.92
0.91
0.98
0.71
0.29
0.78
0.92
0.32
110.3
0.63
-11.9%
-159%
7.9%
2.2%
-18.9%
0
-3.71
0.00
0.93
0.92
0.98
0.69
0.31
0.76
0.91
0.32
106.6
0.61
0.6%
-9.4%
8.5%
2.8%
0.9%
0
-6.78
0.00
0.96
0.95
0.99
0.56
0.44
0.74
0.77
0.29
110.3
0.50
0.4%
-24.7%
9.7%
2.2%
0.8%
98 99 00
30,494 28,160 23,700 23,328
9,162 -214,925 9,400 6,092
98 99 00 01
91%
9%
94%
6%
95%
5%
100% 100% 100% 100%
4) Cash Flow Profile (V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Net Cash Flow from Operations (5,859) (40,956) 10,388 6,935
Net Cash Flow from Investment (87,972) (26,153) (16,078) (23,674)
Capital Expenditure 5,868 7,514 6,592 27,936
Corporate Financing Gap (93,831) (67,109) (5,690) (16,739)
CAPEX Ratio -1.00 -5.45 1.58 0.25
Cash Balance, Year End 80,049 74,587 71,350 88,696
Appendix B
0
272
NAME COUNTRY YEAR
KVAERNER Norway 1853 (Kvaemer Brug was founded on 1853; the Group was listed in Oslo Stock Exchange since 1967)
1997 1998 1999 2000
No. of Employees 55,400 56,421 43,614 28,205
No. of Shareholders 13,395 18,821 17,409 18,883
No. of Shares Outstanding 43,555,064 43,555,064 60,977,090 106,633,916
In moves to rduce debt and ameliorate liquidity problem, Kvaemer offered two rights issue for NOK 1.936 billion and NOK 2.588 billion in 1999 and 2000 respectively.
Changed Leader during term of study?
Ownership Structure 19
Aker Maritime ASA
Chase Manhattan
Bergesen d.y. ASA
Aksjefondet Odin
State Street Bank
Folketrygdfondet
Others
11
Composition of Employees
E&C
Oil & Gas
Construction
Shipping
Pulp & Paper
Other Businesses
11
Organizational Setting
YES (End of 1998; September 2001)
7 1998 1999 2000
17.8%
14.0% 16.0% 14.0% 13.9%
13.3%
6.6%
6.2%
4.7%
55.2%
15.9%
9.4%
3.6%
6.3%
48.8%
15.9%
9.3%
4.1%
6.4%
50.3%
6.2%
3.2%
8.1%
50.8%
00.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
18.6% 16.8% 17.5% 25.5%
21.5% 23.2% 25.9% 32.8%
16,8% 16.5% 17.6% 0.0%
19.1% 17.8% 19.8% 21.8%
6.3% 5.7% 5.5% 8.0%
17.7% 20.0% 13.7% 11.9%
00.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Technostructure
Technology Centre in Stockton-on-Tees, UK
Engineering resources are
combined in 1998 to create a
stronger 'E&C' area.
Operating Core
M
-M
-M
M
M
M
M
Oil & Gas
(mainly upstream production activities)
- Field development; Modifications, maintenance &
operations; oilfield products; process systems
Process
Metals
E&C
- Chemicals & Polymers; Hydrocarbons; Technology;
Pharmaceuticals; Metals E&C; Transportation;
Energy & Environmental; Industrial Construction
Construction
- Building and Civil engineering; Piling and foundations;
Mining and tunnelling; M&E
Shipbuilding
- A total of 13 yards in six countries worldwide. Six were
sold as of 1999.
Pulp & Paper
Support Operations
Kvaerner started its divestiture
process for shipbuilding in 1999. In
2000, it sold its building and civil
engineering businesses as well.
Appendix B
Notes: 1999
Following the disposal of Cunard (luxury cruise operation), John Brown Plastics Machinery, Kvaemer Ship Equipment and the Trafalgar House Residential in
1998, Kvaemer subsequently decided to exit from the shipbuilding business in 1999.
Notes: 2000
By 2000, ten of Kvaemer's shipyards were sold. Kvaemer also sold off its building and civil engineering activities in construction to Skanska.
The remaining businesses is clearly oriented towards engineering and construction activities in hydrocarbons, process and metal industries.
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Kvaerner - Market Segmentation Matrix
Notes:
Engineering and construction services to various metals and mining industries.
Provides design, engineering, fabrication, project management services, supply of pollution control systems and technology and
equipment to the fibre board industry.
Shipbuilding business, with 14 yards in Finland, Norway, Germany, UK, Singapore, Russia and the US.
Other non-core businesses include the luxury cruise operation (Cunard); John Brown Plastics Machinery; Kvaerner Ship Equipment.
These businesses, together with the residential housing development business in the US (Trafalgar House Residential), were
divested in 1998 to salvage some liquidity.
Appendix B
Residential Institutional Commercial Industrial Infrastructure Environment Diversification
D I D I D I D I D I D I D I
Supply 2 2
____ __ _ _ __ _ _ __4 4
Feasibility studies * *
& Planning
A&E Design * * * * * * * * * * 1,2 1,2
Construction * * * * * * * * * * 1,2,3 1,2,3
O&M * *
Renovation
Finance
Own / Develop / 4
Equity Investment
Combined * *
1
2
3
4
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Kvaerner (Consolidated)
1) Operational Performance (NOK millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Revenue 72,962 82,290 70,864 54,472
Growth 26% 13% -14% -23%
COGS 47,964 52,576 50,926 38,086
Growth 36% 10% -3% -25%
Operating Income 1,187 58 18 968
Growth 72% -95% -69% 5278%
Net Income 1,229 -2,014 -5,601 369
Growth 44% -264% -178% -107%
Backlog 86,597 89,837 60,583 51,122
Growth 28% 4% -33% , -15.6%
Order Received 87,319 84,733 54,570 66,067
Growth 75% -3% -36% 21%
2) Capital Structure (NOK millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Equity + Minor Int. 10,519 8,919 4,526 7,339
Non-current Liab. 13,012 16,530 15,405 10,374
Long-term Debt 10,703 14,197 13,106 8,258
Total Liabilities 47,739 45,087 39,546 25,317
Total Assets 58,258 54,006 44,072 32,656
Current Assets 33,661 32,391 25,958 17,463
Current Liabilities 34,727 28,557 24,141 14,943
Quick Assets 18,361 17,582 14,318 10,603
Acct. Receivables 14,462 13,909 11,560 8,375
Note: Minority interests are insignificant.
3) Backlog by Business Areas
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Shipbuilding 20% 27% 26% 48%
E&C 14% 13% 18% 24%
Oil & Gas 27% 20% 12% 18%
Construction 17% 19% 25% 0%
Pulp & Paper 4% 6% 6% 7%
Others 18% 16% 11% 4%
100% 100% 100% 100%
5a) Revenue by Business Areas (NOK millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Shipping 11,703 12,579 11,402 9,815
E&C 14,945 16,725 15,325 16,407
Oil & Gas 18,899 21,052 18,764 11,304
Construction 8,279 10,916 12,441 10,207
Pulp & Paper 5,440 5,109 5,323 5,175
Other Businesses 15,574 18,103 9,139 2,304
Eliminations -1,878 -2,194 -1,530 -740
72,962 82,290 70,864 54,472
6) Operating Profit by Business Areas (NOK millions)
Yr. 97 98 99
Shipping
E&C
Oil & Gas
Construction
Pulp & Paper
Other Businesses
749 251
166 -41
207 -235
-123 -19
-139 -283
327 385
47
336
238
139
-118
-624
00
32
508
148
171
183
-74
1,187 58 18 968
Discontinued operations starting from 1999 (divestiture partly completed by 2001).
Key Financial Ratios
Yr.
Dividend (NOK/share)
Net Income/share
Dividend Payout ratio
NCL/(NCL+Equity)
LT Debt/Total Capital.
Total Debt ratio
Current Asset/Total A
Non-Current Asset/Total
Current Liab./Total Liab.
Current Ratio
Quick Ratio
Avg. Collection Period
Total Asset Tumover
Rev(t)/Backlog(t-1)
ROA
ROE
Gross Profit Margin
Operating Profit Margin
Net Profit Margin
Assumed Tax Rate
Yr.
97 98 99 00
7 0 0 07
28.22
0.25
0.55
0.50
0.82
0.58
0.42
0.73
0.97
0.53
67.5
1.32
1.07
3.9%
12.2%
34.3%
1.6%
3.0%
30%
97
0 0 0
-41.34 -96.05 4.31
0.00 0.00 0.00
0.65 0.77 0.59
0.61 0.74 0.53
0.83 0.90 0.78
0.60 0.59 0.53
0.40 0.41 0.47
0.63 0.61 0.59
1.13 1.08 1.17
0.62 0.59 0.71
62.9 65.6 66.8
1.47 1.45 1.42
0.95 0.79 0.90
-1.9% -9.8% 2.9%
-20.7% -83.3% 6.2%
36.1% 28.1% 30.1%
0.1% 0.0% 1.8%
-1.3% -6.8% 2.0%
98 99 00
Interest Payment 1,350 1,353 1,102 1,036
NI + (1-t)*lnterest 2,174 -1,067 -4,830 1,094
4) New Orders by Business Areas
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Shipbuilding 16% 21% 9% 30%
E&C 16% 18% 27% 26%
Oil & Gas 32% 18% 16% 19%
Construction 13% 18% 22% 13%
Pulp & Paper 6% 7% 8% 7%
Others 17% 18% 18% 4%
100% 100% 100% 100%
5b) Revenue by Business Areas
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Shipping 16% 15% 16% 18%
E&C 20% 20% 22% 30%
Oil & Gas 26% 26% 26% 21%
Construction 11% 13% 18% 19%
Pulp & Paper 7% 6% 8% 10%
Other Businesses 21% 22% 13% 4%
Eliminations -3% -3% -2% -1%
100% 100% 100% 100%
7) Operating Profit Margin by Business Areas
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Shipping 6.4% 2.0% 0.4% 0.3%
E&C
Oil & Gas
Construction
Pulp & Paper
Other Businesses
1.1% -0.2% 2.2% 3.1%
1.1% -1.1% 1.3% 1.3%
-1.5% -0.2% 1.1% 1.7%
-2.6% -5.5% -2.2% 3.5%
2.1% 2.1% -. 8% -3.2%
8a) Revenue by Regions (in NOK millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Norway 14,985 14,539 14,126 6,697
Europe, Other 24,313 30,860 28,352 20,753
North America 13,836 18,323 17,113 15,815
Asia 10,764 9,418 6,440 5,355
World, Other 5,719 7,671 4,833 5,852
Shipping 3,345 1,479 0 0
72,962 82,290 70,864 54,472
9) Cash Flow Profile (NOK millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Net Cash Flow
from Operations (1,503) 2,719 (2,880) (125)
Net Cash Flow
from Investment 1,095 2,756 2,689 2,043
CAPEX 1,794 2,185 720 615
Corporate
Financing Gap (408) 5,475 (191) 1,918
CAPEX Ratio -0.84 1.24 -4.00 -0.20
Cash Balance 1,911 2,692 2,399 1,859
8b) Revenue by Regions
Yr.
Norway
Europe, Other
North America
Asia
World, Other
Shipping
97 98 99 00
21% 18% 20% 12%
33% 38% 40% 38%
19% 22% 24% 29%
15% 11% 9% 10%
8% 9% 7% 11%
5% 2% 0% 0%
100% 100% 100% 100%
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NAME COUNTRY YEAR
Mc DERMOTT
Babcock & Wilcox
U.S.
U.S.
No. of Employees
No. of Shareholders
No. of Shares outstanding
Mar-97
24,600
5,684
54,322,804
1923
( 18 (acquired by JRM in 1978)
Mar-98
24,700
4,974
55,432,949
Mar-99
20,350
4,609
59,015,091
1999
17,500
4,396
59,033,154
Changed Leader during term? YES. (1996, 2000)
Ownership Structure 1999
Individuals 2.3%
Fiduciaries and Nominies 0.2%
Institutions, Pensions, and Corporations 3.4%
Depositories and Security Dealers 94.1%
100.0%
Organizational Setting (Prior to 1999)
Technostructure Operating Core Support Operations
M J. Ray McDermott, S.A.
(marine construction services)
M Babcock & Wilcox Power Generation Group
M Babcock & Wilcox Government Group
(later BWX Technologies, Inc.)
M Industrial Group
Notes: 1997
In the process of eliminating corporate entities in order to simplify structure, nearly 50 legal entities have been eliminated or in the process of being
eliminated. The bottom line is given as: Cost consolidation.
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2000
11,800
4,110
59,769,662
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McDermott - Market Segmentation Matrix
Residential Institutional Commercial Industrial Infrastructure Environment Diversification
D I D I D I D I D I D I D I
Supply * * 2
Feasibility studies * * 2
& Planning
A&E Design * * 2
Construction * * 2
O&M * * 2
Renovation
Finance
Own / Develop 1 1
Combined * * 2
1 Ownership interests in provision of power through cogeneration, refuse-fueled power plants, and other independent power
producing facilities.
2 Provides nuclear fuel assemblies and nuclear reactor components to the U.S. Navy for the Naval Reactors Program. The Segment
also provide environmental restoration services and management of government-owned facilities, primarily within the DOE
nuclear weapons complex. It is also the sole supplier to the Navy of major nuclear steam system equipment.
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McDermott (Consolidated)
1) Operational Performance ($ thousands)
Yr. Mar-97 Mar-98 Mar-99 99 (9 mth.) 00
Revenue 3,150,850 3,674,635 3,149,985 1,891,088 1,877,753
Growth -3% 17% -14.3% -40.0% -0.7%
COGS 2,878,972 3,117,279 2,635,229 1,583,195 1,603,771
Growth 2% 8% -15.5% -39.9% 1.3%
Operating Income -147,245 355,457 217,416 74,707 -1,748
Growth -268% 341% -39% -66% -102%
Net Income -200,543 263,674 199,404 6,119 -22,082
Growth 231% -24% -97% -461%
Net Income (Group
Share) -206,105 215,690 153,362 440 -22,082
Growth 205% -29% -100% -5119%
Backlog 4,227,422 3,409,230 2,573,096 3,285,297 2,065,510
Growth 24% -19% -25% 28% -37%
CAPEX 93,192 75,649 111,787 52,801 56,244
Growth -19% -19% 48% -53% 7%
2) Capital Structure ($ thousands)
Yr. Mar-97 Mar-98 Mar-99 99 00
Equity (w/o Minor) 437,001 679,773 793,734 791,858 776,603
Equity + Minor Int. 597,860 869,739 989,101 791,886 776,603
Non-current Liab. 2,392,866 2,170,265 2,050,008 1,780,599 588,797
Long-term Debt 667,174 598,182 323,774 323,014 323,157
Total Liabilities 4,001,622 3,631,391 3,316,419 3,083,005 1,248,523
Total Assets 4,599,482 4,501,130 4,305,520 3,874,891 2,025,126
Current Assets 1,834,327 1,596,556 1,375,366 1,468,808 574,528
Current Liabilities 1,608,756 1,461,126 1,266,411 1,302,406 659,726
Quick Assets 1,132,023 1,020,778 809,601 892,108 386,299
Acct. Receivables 798,294 742,767 572,452 618,270 267,239
Note: Minority Interests are insignificant.
Change in reporting practice: From Year 1999, fiscal year is taken as ending in December.
3a) Backlog by Business Areas ($ thousands)
Yr. Mar-97 Mar-98 Mar-99 99 00
Power Generation 1,495,885 1,070,351 905,283 1,202,695 48,631
Marine Services 1,771,170 1,266,310 406,183 514,822 541,647
Government 791,981 810,230 860,981 1,151,960 1,078,803
Industrial 168,416 262,339 400,649 415,820 396,429
4,227,452 3,409,230 2,573,096 3,285,297 2,065,510
Backlog excluding B&W ($1,136 m) due to bankruptcy filing.
4a) Revenue by Business Areas ($ millions)
Yr. Mar-97 Mar-98 Mar-99 99 (9 mth.) 00
Power Generation
Marine Services
Government
Industrial
Eliminations
985.4 1,142.7 1,066.2 730.0 189.6
1,408.5 1,855.5 1,279.6 490.7 757.5
373.1 370.5 382.7 306.3 431.3
458.1 337.8 427.5 366.6 504.0
-74.2 -31.9 -6.0 -2.5 -4.6
3,150.9 3,674.6 3,150.0 1,891.1 1,877.8
5a) Operating Income by Business Areas ($ millions)
(Excluding allocation of general corporate expenses - net, asset disposals and income from investees)
Yr. Mar-97 Mar-98 Mar-99 99 (9 mth.) 00
Power Generation
Marine Services
Government
Industrial
-34.6 82.5
10.8 107.1
32.5 35.8
-30.6 4.7
90.3
126.5
39.4
16.9
52.1
31.1
28.6
8.5
4.7
-33.5
39.8
10.7
-21.9 230.1 273.1 120.3 21.7
5c) Operating Profit Margin by Business Areas
Yr. Mar-97 Mar-98 Mar-99 99 (9 mth.) 00
Power Generation
Marine Services
Government
Industrial
-3.5% 7.2% 8.5%
0.8% 5.8% 9.9%
8.7% 9.7% 10.3%
-6.7% 1.4% 4.0%
7.1% 2.5%
6.3% -4.4%
9.3% 9.2%
2.3% 2.1%
7a) International Revenue by Business Areas ($ thousands)
Yr. Mar-97 Mar-98 Mar-99 99 (9 mth.) 00
Int'l - PGS&E
Int'l - Marine
Int'l - Industrial
Domestic
296,544 196,831 189,148 154,324 48,593
839,583 1,112,685 731,022 182,120 261,922
242,973 195,886 319,937 309,175 425,980
1,771,750 2,169,233 1,909,878 1,245,469 1,141,258
3,150,850 3,674,635 3,149,985 1,891,088 1,877,753
8a) International Operating Income by Business Areas ($ thousands)
(Excluding allocation of general corporate expenses - net, but including asset disposals and income from investees)
Yr. Mar-97 Mar-98 Mar-99 99 (9 mth.) 00 Yr.
Int'l - PGS&E
Int'l - Marine
Int'l - Industrial
Domestic
-33,701 25,694 8,283 14,125 -33,546
14,525 317,482 129,440 -18,724 5,865
-29,614 90,516 4,592 5,570 8,209
21,383 -35,698 162,157 107,944 29,820
-27,407 397,994 304,472 108,915 10,348
Key Financial Ratios
Yr.
Dividend ($/share)
Net Income/share
Dividend Payout ratio
NCL/(NCL+Equity)
LT Debt/Total Capital.
Total Debt ratio
Current Asset/Total A
Non-Current Asset/Total
Current Liab./Total Liab.
Current Ratio
Quick Ratio
Avg. Collection Period
Total Asset Turnover
Rev(t)/Backlog(t-1)
ROA
ROE
Gross Profit Margin
Operating Profit Margin
Net Profit Margin
Assumed Tax Rate
Yr.
Interest Payment
NI + (1-t)*nterest
Mar-97 Mar-98 Mar-99 99 (9 mth.)
0.6
-3.95
-0.15
0.80
0.53
0.87
0.40
0.60
0.40
1.14
0.70
85.5
0.70
0.927
-3.1%
-36.8%
8.6%
-4.7%
-4.4%
34%
0.2
3.48
0.06
0.71
0.41
0.81
0.35
0.65
0.40
1.09
0.70
76.5
0.81
0.869
7.0%
38.6%
15.2%
9.7%
8.6%
0.2
2.53
0.08
0.67
0.25
0.77
0.32
0.68
0.38
1.09
0.64
76.2
0.72
0.924
5.5%
20.8%
16.3%
6.9%
7.7%
0.15
0.01
15.00
0.69
0.29
0.80
0.38
0.62
0.42
1.13
0.68
114.9
0.46
0.980
0.7%
0.1%
16.3%
4.0%
1.6%
I Mar-97 Mar-98 Mar-99 99 (9 mth.)
95,100 81,454 63,262 35,743
-137,777 317,434 241,157 29,709
00
0.1
-0.37
-0.27
0.43
0.29
0.62
0.28
0.72
0.53
0.87
0.59
86.1
0.64
0.925
0.2%
-2.8%
14.6%
-0.1%
0.4%
00
43,709
6,766
Note: Rev(t)/Backlog(t-1) for Dec-99 has been adjusted for 1-yr period; Dec-00 has
been adjusted to include revenue of B&W for consistency in calculation of the ratio.
3b) Backlog by Business Areas
Yr. Mar-97 Mar-98 Mar-99 99 00
Power Generation 35% 31% 35% 37% 2%
Marine Services 42% 37% 16% 16% 26%
Government 19% 24% 33% 35% 52%
Industrial 4% 8% 16% 13% 19%
100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
4b) Revenue by Business Areas
Yr. Mar-97 Mar-98 Mar-99 99 (9 mth.) 00
Power Generation 31% 31% 34% 39% 10%
Marine Services 45% 50% 41% 26% 40%
Government 12% 10% 12% 16% 23%
Industrial 15% 9% 14% 19% 27%
Eliminations -2% -1% 0% 0% 0%
100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
5b) Operating Income by Business Areas
Yr. Mar-97 Mar-98 Mar-99 99 (9 mth.) 00
Power Generation 158% 36% 33% 43% 22%
Marine Services -49% 47% 46% 26% -154%
Government -148% 16% 14% 24% 183%
Industrial 140% 2% 6% 7% 49%
100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
6) R&D Expenses (in $ thousands)
Yr. Mar-97 Mar-98 Mar-99 99 (9 mth.) 00
Total 50,749 37,928 28,064 35,534 50,586
(TotaVRev)% 1.6% 1.0% 0.9% 1.9% 2.7%
Customer-Sponsored 34,170 22,803 15,752 18,487 34,838
(CS/Rev)% 1.1% 0.6% 0.5% 1.0% 1.9%
7b) International Revenue by Business Areas
Yr. Mar-97 Mar-98 Mar-99 99 (9 mth.) 00
Intl - PGS&E 9% 5% 6% 8% 3%
Int'l - Marine
Int'l - Industrial
Domestic
27% 30% 23%
8% 5% 10%
56% 59% 61%
10%
16%
66%
100% 100% 100% 100%
14%
23%
61%
100%
8b) International Operating Income by Business Areas
Mar-97 Mar-98 Mar-99 99 (9 mth.)
Int'l - PGS&E
Int'l - Marine
Int'l - Industrial
Domestic
123% 6% 3% 13%
-53% 80% 43% -17%
108% 23% 2% 5%
-78% -9% 53% 99%
100% 100% 100% 100%
00
-324%
57%
79%
288%
100%
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9a) Revenue by Regions ($ thousands)
Yr. Mar-97 Mar-98 Mar-99 99 (9 mth.) 00
U.S. 1,431,868 1,688,388 1,573,896 1,139,010 902,279
Canada 257,285 264,846 437,363 277,917 336,431
U.K. 322,760 364,894 133,403 50,456 59,447
Asia 379,101 587,048 451,117 93,760 393,569
Middle East 99,617 271,525 138,173 62,649 27,069
Others 660,219 497,934 416,033 267,296 158,958
3,150,850 3,674,635 3,149,985 1,891,088 1,877,753
10a) Operating Income by Region ($ thousands)
Yr. Mar-97 Mar-98 Mar-99 99 (9 mth.) 00
U.S. -72,075 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Canada -31,173 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Europe & W. Afric. 8,669 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Asia -6,253 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Middle East -29,147 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Others 34,288 N/A N/A N/A N/A
-95,691
11) Operating Profit Margin by Region
Yr. Mar-97 Mar-98 Mar-99 99 (9 mth.) 00
U.S. -5% N/A N/A N/A N/A
Canada -12% N/A N/A N/A N/A
Europe & W. Afric. 3% N/A N/A N/A N/A
Asia -2% N/A N/A N/A N/A
Middle East -29% N/A N/A N/A N/A
Others* 5% N/A N/A N/A N/A
* Include a gain on sale of two derrick barges of $30.2 m.
13) Expected Volatility assumed in Option Valuation
Yr. Mar-97 Mar-98 Mar-99 99 (9 mth.) 00
Volatility 36% 36% 46% 49% 48%
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9b) Revenue by Regions
Yr. Mar-97 Mar-98 Mar-99 99 (9 mth.) 00
U.S. 45% 46% 50% 60% 48%
Canada 8% 7% 14% 15% 18%
Europe & W. Afric. 10% 10% 4% 3% 3%
Asia 12% 16% 14% 5% 21%
Middle East 3% 7% 4% 3% 1%
Others 21% 14% 13% 14% 8%
100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
10b) Operating Income by Region
Yr. Mar-97 Mar-98 Mar-99 99 (9 mth.) 00
U.S. 75% N/A N/A N/A N/A
Canada 33% N/A N/A N/A N/A
Europe & W. Af ric. -9% N/A N/A N/A N/A
Asia 7% N/A N/A N/A N/A
Middle East 30% N/A N/A N/A N/A
Others -36% N/A N/A N/A N/A
100%
12) Cash Flow Profile ($ thousands)
Yr. Mar-97 Mar-98 Mar-99 99 (9 mth.) 00
Net CF from Operations 106,647 577,737 300,285 (5,218) (49,066)
Net CF from Investment (234,754) (177,351) 242,752 (63,944) (27,991)
CAPEX 91,371 45,090 78,787 52,801 49,300
Corporate Financing Gap (128,107) 400,386 543,037 (69,162) (77,057)
CAPEX Ratio 1.17 12.81 3.81 -0.10 -1.00
Cash Balance 257,783 277,876 181,503 162,734 84,620
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NAME COUNTRY YEAR
NISHIMATSU Japan 1937
No. of Employees
No. of Shareholders
No. of Shares Outstanding
Changed leader during term?
Employee Structure
Administrative Officers
Building Engineers
Civil Engineers
Mechanical Engineers
Electrical Engineers
Others
1997
5,856
27,857
276,540,999
NO.
1997
34.5%
27.8%
27.0%
3.7%
1.6%
5.4%
100%
1998
5,654
27,849
276,540,999
1998
33.9%
28.9%
27.5%
3.4%
1.5%
4.8%
100%
1999
5,363
27,739
276,540,999
1999
33.1%
29.5%
29.0%
3.3%
1.6%
3.5%
100%
2000
5,033
31,853
277,955,718
2000
33.7%
30.3%
29.4%
3.1%
1.5%
2.0%
100%
List of Major Financial and Insitutional Owners
Sumitomo Trust and Banking
Fuji Bank
Yasuda Trust and Banking
Asahi Bank
Nippon Credit Bank
Yasuda Life Insurance Co.
Toyo Trust and Banking
Mitsui Trust and Banking
Mitsubishi Trust and Banking
Chase Manhattan Bank N.A., London
European Bank of Recovery Development
Chuo Trust and Banking
J.P. Morgan Trust Bank
Deutsche Bank AG, London
32.6% 28.3%
Appendix B
5.6%
5.0%
4.4%
3.4%
3.4%
2.3%
2.3%
1.8%
1.8%
1.4%
31.4%
5.2%
5.0%
4.3%
3.4%
3.4%
2.3%
2.1%
2.5%
3.7%
1.3%
33.2%
5.3%
5.0%
4.2%
3.4%
3.4%
2.4%
1.9%
2.7%
2.4%
1.9%
3.4%
5.0%
3.5%
3.4%
3.4%
2.3%
2.3%
1.4%
2.4%
1.2%
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Nishimatsu - Market Segmentation Matrix
Appendix B
Residential Institutional Commercial Industrial Infrastructure Environment Diversification
D I D I D I D I D I D I D I
Supply
Feasibility studies *
& Planning
A&E Design * * * * * * *
Construction * * * * * * * * * * *
O&M
Renovation
Finance
Own / Develop
Combined * *
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Nishimatsu (Non-consolidated)
1) Operational Performance (V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Revenue 727,935 711,672 710,012 558,118
Growth 0.8% -2.2% -0.2% -21.4%
COGS 666,791 658,949 661,152 509,280
Growth 1.9% -1.18% 0.3% -23.0%
Operating Income 26,370 16,668 16,547 19,396
Growth -16.5% -36.8% -0.7% 17.2%
Net Income 12,564 6,416 7,638 8,182
Growth -12.3% -49% 19% 7.1%
Backlog 1,270,700 1,159,100 985,900 906,900
Growth -2.2% -8.8% -14.9% -8.0%
New Orders 709,686 601,468 551,740 538,720
Growth 0.2% -15.2% -8.3% -2.4%
2) Capital Structure (V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Equity 156,795 159,593 164,266 170,330
Non-current Liab. 60,719 50,150 80,468 76,282
Long Term Debt 51,329 40,700 71,498 61,446
Total Liabilities 719,728 725,769 632,870 574,740
Total Assets 876,523 885,362 797,136 745,070
Current Assets 774,495 774,652 679,865 601,523
Current Liabilities 659,009 675,619 552,402 498,458
Quick Assets 294,030 283,563 272,485 229,484
Acct. Receivables 184,784 153,259 181,690 142,622
3a) Revenue by Business Areas (in V billions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Civil Engineering 391.3 310.0 372.6 274.7
Architectural Eng. 331.4 379.1 330.2 278.2
Development Proj. 5.2 22.6 7.3 5.2
727.9 711.7 710.1 558.1
4a) New Orders by Business Areas (in V billions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Civil Engineering
Architectural Eng.
Development Proj.
362.4 263.3 237.2 199.0
342.1 315.6 307.2 334.5
5.2 22.6 7.3 5.2
709.7 601.5 551.7 538.7
5) Revenue by Public/Private Sectors and Business Areas
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Civil Eng., Public 60.9% 62.8% 54.4% 52.9%
Civil Eng., Private 39.1% 37.2% 45.6% 47.1%
Arch. Eng., Public 26.9% 25.3% 19.8% 22.1%
Arch. Eng., Private 73.1% 74.7% 80.2% 77.9%
7) Revenue and Orders by Regions
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Order, Domestic 78.8% 75.0% 84.3% 86.6%
Order, International 21.2% 25.0% 15.7% 13.4%
Rev., Domestic 83.4% 78.9% 72.1% 86.3%
Revenue, Int'l. 16.6% 21.1% 27.9% 13.7%
9) R&D Investment (V billions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Investment
% of Sales
Key Financial Ratios
Yr.
Dividend (yen/share)
Net Income/share
Dividend Payout ratio
NCLI(NCL+Equity)
LT Debt/Total Capital.
Total Debt ratio
Current Asset/Total A
Non-Current Asset/Total
Current Liab/Total Liab.
Current Ratio
Quick Ratio
Avg. Collection Period
Total Asset Turnover
Rev(t)/Backlog(t-1)
ROA
ROE
Gross Profit Margin
Operating Profit Margin
Net Profit Margin
Assumed tax rate:
Yr.
Interest Payment
NI + (1-t)*Interest
97 98 99 00
12
45.46
0.26
0.28
0.25
0.82
0.88
0.12
0.92
1.18
0.45
91.2
0.84
0.560
1.6%
8.3%
8.4%
3.6%
1.9%
50%
97
10
23.2
0.43
0.24
0.20
0.82
0.87
0.13
0.93
1.15
0.42
86.7
0.81
0.560
0.79%
4.1%
7.4%
2.3%
1.0%
10
27.62
0.36
0.33
0.30
0.79
0.85
0.15
0.87
1.23
0.49
86.1
0.84
0.613
0.96%
4.7%
6.9%
2.3%
1.1%
10
29.47
0.34
0.31
0.27
0.77
0.81
0.19
0.87
1.21
0.46
106.0
0.72
0.566
1.11%
4.9%
8.8%
3.5%
1.5%
98 99 00
2,253 1,108 956 748
13,691 6,970 8,116 8,556
3b) Revenue by Business Areas
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Civil Engineering 54% 44% 52% 49%
Architectural Engineering 46% 53% 47% 50%
Development Projects 1% 3% 1% 1%
100% 100% 100% 100%
4b) New Orders by Business Areas
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Civil Engineering 51% 44% 43% 37%
Architectural Engineering 48% 52% 56% 62%
Development Projects 1% 4% 1% 1%
100% 100% 100% 100%
6) New Orders by Public/Private Sectors
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Public sector 37% 42% 41% 39%
Private sector 63% 58% 59% 61%
8) Cash Flow Profile (V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Net CF from Operations (5,637) 44,076 (42,295) N/A
Net CFfrom Investment (4,263) (17,898) (13,434) N/A
Capital Expenditure 6,285 8,906 10,382 N/A
Corporate Financing Gap (9,900) 26,178 (55,729) N/A
CAPEX Ratio -0.90 4.95 -4.07 N/A
Cash Balance, Year End 93,483 116,271 77,088 N/A
5.79 4.50 3.24 2.66
0.8% 0.6% 0.5% 0.5%
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NAME 
COUNTRY YEARO0bayashi jJapan 1892
No. of Employees
Changed leader during term?
Employee Structure
Architecture
Construction
Civil Engineering
Research
IT
Other technicians
Support
1997 1998
12,014 11,721
1999 2000
11,584 11,261
No.
1997 1998 1999
7.3% 7.4% 7.3%
29.2% 29.3% 28.6%
16.4% 16.5% 16.9%
2.0% 2.0% 2.0%
0.8% 0.8% 0.5%
14.0% 14.1% 15.1%
30.3% 29.9% 29.6%
List of Maior Financial and Insitutional Owners
Yoshiro Obayashi (Chairman)
Nippon Life Insurance Comp
Sanwa Bank Ltd
Sumitomo Trust & Banking
Hakuyo-Kai
Mitsubishi Trust & Banking
Sakura Bank Ltd
Employee Share-holding Assoc.
Chuo Trust & Banking
Organizational Setting
2000
7.3%
30.0%
17.1%
1.9%
0.5%
14.2%
29.1%
100% 100% 100% 100%
2000
8.68%
6.40%
4.11%
2.86%
2.67%
1.95%
1.79%
1.56%
1.47%
31.49%
Technostructure
Overseas Business Department
Information System Center
Technical Research Institute
M
M
Operating Core
Civil Eng. Construction Division
G Overseas Civil Eng. Const. Depts.
F
G
G
G
M
M
F
F
F
Building Construction Division
Marketing Depts.
Overseas Marketing Dept.
Overseas Building Const. Depts.
Overseas M&E Dept.
Renewal Center
Nuclear Facilities Division
A&E Division
Engineering Division
Civil Eng. Technology Division
Appendix B
2001
2001
Support Operations
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Obavashi - Market Segmentation Matrix
Notes:
Manufacture, supply, sale and lease of construction machinery and equipment
Manufacture and sale of concrete products
Acquisition, development, licensing for use, and sale of software industrial properties and providing know-how related to the
utilization of computers
Information processing services; providing information and supply of telecommunication circuits
Sale, lease, and maintenance of electronic office machinery and equipment including computers
Operation of insurance agencies
BOT projects - Sydney M2 Toll Road, Stadium Australia
Focus on BOT projects, in segments of transportation, energy and environment
Diversified into power generation, supply of electricity and heat business in 1999/2000.
Some projects are initiated by following global customer from Japan (Sumitomo Sitix, Komatsu Electronics)
Appendix B
Residential Institutional Commercial Industrial Infrastructure, 8 Environment Diversification
D I D I D I D I D I D I D I
Supply 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2 3,4,5
Feasibility studies * * * * *
& Planning
A&E Design * * * * *
Construction * * * * * * * 10 * * *
O&M * * * * * 6
Finance * * * * * * *
Own * 9 7
Combined * * * *
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
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Obavashi (Consolidated)
1) Operational Performance (V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Revenue 1,541,485 1,487,495 1,379,840 1,132,028
Growth 23.9% -3.50% -7.24% -17.96%
COGS 1,379,891 1,345,920 1,246,493 1,013,774
Growth 27.8% -2.46% -7.39% -18.67%
Operating Income 43,835 39,796 35,721 28,802
Growth 4.6% -9.21% -10.24% -19.37%
Net Income 13,622 11,723 8,893 5,711
Growth 13.4% -13.94% -24.14% -35.78%
Backlog 2,217,429 2,066,214 1,930,250 2,063,706
Growth -2.68% -6.82% -6.58% 6.91%
New Orders 1,479,970 1,335,399 1,244,829 1,271,722
Growth 5.4% -9.77% -6.78% 2.16%
2) Capital Structure (V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Equity + Minor Int. 301,558 307,009 309,670 329,530
Non-current Liab. 271,002 283,754 329,862 342,948
Long Term Debt 194,727 208,312 252,049 260,069
Total Liabilities 2,128,467 1,960,852 1,760,799 1,731,405
Total Assets 2,430,025 2,267,861 2,070,469 2,060,935
Current Assets 1,851,028 1,686,044 1,452,252 1,353,471
Current Liabilities 1,857,465 1,677,098 1,430,937 1,388,457
Quick Assets 679,509 615,990 522,710 498,155
Acct. Receivables 355,987 302,675 265,558 241,802
Note: Minority Interests are insignificant.
3a) New Orders by Business Areas (in V billions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Civil Engineering 401.4 352.3 354.7
Architectural Eng. 1,000.4 826.5 798.4
Others 78.2 156.6 91.7
1,480.0 1,335.4 1,244.8 0.0
4a) Revenue by Regions (in V billions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Japan 1,420.8 1,323.0 1,195.9 1,079.9
U.S.
Australia
Other
y 120.7
1,541.5 1,487.5
99.2 52.7 -
19.8 66.5 52.1
45.5 64.8 -
1,379.9 1,132.0
5a) New Orders by Regions (Civil Engineering) (V billions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Domestic
International
356.5 280.9
44.9 71.4
320.6 N/A
34.1 N/A
401.4 352.3 354.7
Key Financial Ratios
Yr.
Dividend (yen/share)
Net Income/share
Dividend Payout ratio
NCL/(NCL+Equity)
LT Debt/Total Capital.
Total Debt ratio
Current Asset/Total A
Non-Current Asset/Total
Current Liab./Total Liab.
Current Ratio
Quick Ratio
Avg. Collection Period
Total Asset Turnover
Rev(t)/Backlog(t-1)
ROA
ROE
Gross Profit Margin
Operating Profit Margin
Net Profit Margin
Assumed tax rate:
Yr.
97 98 99 00
8
18.28
0.44
0.47
0.39
0.88
0.76
0.24
0.87
1.00
0.37
84.8
0.63
0.677
0.8%
4.6%
10.5%
2.8%
1.2%
50%
97
8
15.73
0.51
0.48
0.40
0.86
0.74
0.26
0.86
1.01
0.37
80.8
0.63
0.671
0.7%
3.9%
9.5%
2.7%
1.1%
98
8 8
11.93 7.66
0.67 1.04
0.52 0.51
0.45 0.44
0.85 0.84
0.70 0.66
0.30 0.34
0.81 0.80
1.01 0.97
0.37 0.36
75.2 81.8
0.64 0.55
0.668 0.586
0.6%
2.9%
9.7%
2.6%
0.9%
0.5%
1.8%
10.4%
2.5%
0.9%
99 00
Interest Payment 10,681 8,619 8,028 8,013
NI + (1-t)*Interest 18,963 16,033 12,907 9,718
3b) Revenue by Business Areas
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Civil Engineering 27% 26% 28%
Architectural Engineering 68% 62% 64%
Development Projects 5% 12% 7%
100% 100% 100%
4b) Revenue by Regions
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Japan 92% 89% 87% 95%
U.S. 7% 4%
Australia 8% 1% 5% 5%
Other J 3% 5%
100% 100% 100% 100%
5b) New Orders by Regions (Civil Engineering)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Domestic
International
88.8% 79.7% 90.4% N/A
11.2% 20.3% 9.6% N/A
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
6) Cash Flow Profile (V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Net Cash Flow from Operations 100,185 37,633 32,342 76,001
Net Cash Flow from Investment (30,477) (24,348) 3,705 4,102
Capital Expenditure 19,372 16,701 16,826 13,577
Corporate Financing Gap 69,708 13,285 36,047 80,103
CAPEX Ratio 5.17 2.25 1.92 5.60
Cash Balance, Year End 108,341 88,718 95,376 96,744
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INAME ICOUNTRY YEAR
PENTA-OCEAN Japan 1896
No. of Employees
Changed leader during term?
1997 1998 1999 2000
5080 4671 3937 3774
NO.
Organizational Setting
Technostructure
PO Institute of Technology
General Administration Headquarters,
Corporate Planning Divisions Group:
F Corporate Planning Division
F Project Development Division
F Affiliated Enterprises Division
F Information Systems Division
Operating Core
M
M
G
F
F
F
F
M
F
M
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
Civil Eng. Headquarters
Planning Divison
Marketing Division
Design Division
2010 Business Promotion Division Group
Plant & Machinery Division
Architectural Headquarters
Planning Division
Urban Development Division
Material Procurement Division
Marketing Division
Design Division
Construction Control Division
Project Promotion Division
Facilities Division
International Headquarters
International Marketing Division
International Construction Division
International Administration Division
Support Operations
Safety/Environmental Control Division Group
F Safety Control Division
M/F Environmental Control Division
F Personnel Division
F Public Relations Division
F ISO Promotion Division
F Material Procurement Division
General Affairs Division Group
F General Affairs Division
F Legal Affairs Division
F Auditing Division
Adminstration
F
F
Divisions Group
Finance Division
Accounting Division
Appendix B
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Penta-Ocean - Market Segmentation Matrix
Residential Institutional Commercial Industrial Infrastructure Environment Diversification
D I D I D I D I D I D I D I
Supply 1 1 1 1 1 1
Feasibility studies 3 2
& Planning
A&E Design 3 * *
Construction 3 * * * * * *
O&M
Renovation
Finance
Own / Develop 3
Combined
1 Activities include shipbuilding, development of construction materials and equipment, vessel leasing and rental, management of
golf courses.
2 Develop environmentally friendly systems.
3 These are typically larger, full-scale urban housing and residential town development projects. Involve building an entire community.
Appendix B
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Penta-Ocean (Non-consolidated)
1) Operational Performance (V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Revenue 550,695 567,176 508,925 434,811
Growth -1.4% 3.0% -10.3% -14.6%
COGS 496,566 516,244 467,737 389,234
Growth -0.8% 4.0% -9.4% -16.8%
Operating Income 14,685 14,276 5,684 15,747
Growth -22.4% -2.8% -60.2% 177%
Net Income 3,807 3,209 -41,341 -15,024
Growth -11.8% -16% -1388% 63.7%
Backlog 634,771 571,317 527,701 487,252
Growth 15.2% -10.0% -7.6% -7.7%
Order Received 628,185 516,020 470,010 404,259
Growth 15.2% -17.9% -8.9% -14.0%
2) Capital Structure (V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Equity 88,616 88,978 44,606 51,634
Non-current Liab. 65,766 56,919 66,100 68,731
Long Term Debt 59,717 52,159 60,284 56,983
Total Liabilities 445,169 495,000 458,666 423,325
Total Assets 533,785 583,978 503,272 474,959
Current Assets 395,420 447,741 376,225 336,067
Current Liabilities 379,403 438,081 392,566 354,594
Quick Assets 248,400 289,684 261,207 220,217
Acct. Receivables 209,495 241,628 204,972 174,832
3a) Revenue by Business Areas (in V billions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Civil Engineering 335.0 319.2 280.2 270.4
Architectural Eng. 212.6 244.6 225.5 153.3
Development Proj. 3.1 3.4 3.2 11.1
550.7 567.2 508.9 434.8
4a) New Orders by Business Areas (in V billions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Civil Engineering 385.4 265.7 319.2 249.3
Architectural Eng. 240.4 246.7 147.3 144.1
Development Proj. 2.3 3.6 3.5 10.9
628.2 516.0 470.0 404.3
5a) Backlog by Business Areas (in V billions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Civil Engineering 360.1 295.8 330.9 302.5
Architectural Eng. 274.7 275.3 196.4 184.5
Development Proj. 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.3
634.8 571.3 527.7 487.3
6) Revenue and New Orders by Regions
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Order, Domestic 69.9% 86.2% 73.8%
Order, International 30.1% 13.8% 26.2%
Rev., Domestic 88.1% 80.1% 78.9% 82.7%
Revenue, Int'l. 11.9% 19.9% 21.1% 17.3%
Key Financial Ratios
Yr.
Dividend (yen/share) 7.
Net Income/share 10.5f
Dividend Payout ratio 0.71
NCL/(NCL+Equity) 0.4
LT Debt/Total Capital. 0.4(
Total Debt ratio 0.&
Current Asset/Total A 0.7'
Non-Current Asset/Total 0.2(
Current Liab./Total Liab. 0.8
Current Ratio 1.0'
Quick Ratio 0.61
Avg. Collection Period 149.
Total Asset Turnover 0.9-
Rev(t)/Backlog(t-1) 0.99
ROA 1.11 0%
ROE 4.410%
Gross Profit Margin 9.80%
Operating Profit Margin 2.7%/
Net Profit Margin 1.14 0%
Assumed tax rate: 500%
Yr. 97
Interest Payment 4,97
NI + (1-t)*nterest 6,29,
3b) Revenue by Business Areas
97 98 99 00
7.5
8.86
0.85
0.39
0.37
0.85
0.77
0.23
0.89
1.02
0.66
145.2
1.01
0.894
1.04%
3.61%
9.0%
2.5%
1.02%
0
-114.22
0.00
0.60
0.57
0.91
0.75
0.25
0.86
0.96
0.67
160.2
0.94
0.891
-7.22%
-61.90%
8.1%
1.1%
-7.71%
0
-41.57
0.00
0.57
0.52
0.89
0.71
0.29
0.84
0.95
0.62
159.4
0.89
0.824
5
98 99 00
5,201 4,210 4,930
5,810 -39,236 -12,559
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Civil Engineering 61% 56% 55% 62%
Architectural Engineering 39% 43% 44% 35%
Development Projects 1% 1% 1% 3%
100% 100% 100% 100%
4b) New Orders by Business Areas
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Civil Engineering 61% 51% 68% 62%
Architectural Engineering 38% 48% 31% 36%
Development Projects 0% 1% 1% 3%
100% 100% 100% 100%
5b) Backlog by Business Areas
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Civil Engineering 57% 52% 63% 62%
Architectural Engineering 43% 48% 37% 38%
Development Projects 0% 0% 0% 0%
100% 100% 100% 100%
7) Cash Flow Profile (V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Net CF from Operations 8,153 (22,085) 11,760 N/A
Net CFfrom Investment (5,559) (3,606) (554) N/A
Capital Expenditure 4,627 5,043 4,287 N/A
Corporate Financing Gap 2,594 (25,691) 11,206 N/A
CAPEX Ratio 1.76 -4.38 2.74 N/A
Cash Balance, Year End 38,905 48,057 56,234 N/A
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-2.57%
-31.22%
10.5%
3.6%
-2.89%
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NAME COUNTRY
RAYTHEON U.S.
Changed Leader during term? YES. (1998, due to retirement of previous chairman)
Organizational Setting (Raytheon Company)
Technostructure
Centers of Excellence
(organizations that design and
manufacture key components
and subassemblies to serve all
of RSC's segments with best-
of-class engineering and
manufacturing practices and
processes)
Operating Core
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
Raytheon Systems Company
(Defense, Sensor, Control and Comm Sys)
Raytheon Commercial Electronics
Raytheon Aircraft
Raytheon E&C
- Energy
- Process
- Infrastructure
- Metals & Piping
- Pulp and Paper
- Chemical Weapons Destruction
- Road Construction Equipment
Appendix B
Support Operations
Notes: 1997
Very distinct business segments, but better synergy can proabably be achieved between Raytheon Systems Company,
Raytheon Commercial Electronics and Raytheon Aircraft.
289
Raytheon Company (Consolidated)
la) Revenue by Business Areas (in $ millions)
Yr. 97 98 99
Electronics 8,194 14,822 14,489
Aircraft 2,446 2,643 2,696
Eng. & Construct. 3,033 2,065 2,656
13,673 19,530 19,841
2) Operating Income by Business Areas (in $ millions)
Yr. 97 98 99
Electronics 1,159 2,032 1,426
Aircraft 239 257 162
Eng. & Construct. 181 -253 -61
1,579 2,036 1,527
4a) Capital Expenditures by Business Areas ($ millions)
Yr. 97 98 99
Electronics 239 320 408
Aircraft 184 148 116
Eng. & Construct. 36 41 8
459 509 532
5) Identifiable Assets (in $ millions)
Yr. 97 98 99
Eng. & Construct.
Asset Turnover
1,758
1.73
1,478
1.40
1b) Percentage of Revenue by Business Areas
Yr. 97 98 99
Electronics 60% 76% 73%
Aircraft 18% 14% 14%
Eng. & Construction 22% 11% 13%
100% 100% 100%
3) Operating Margin by Business Areas
Yr. 97 98 99
Electronics 14.1% 13.7% 9.8%
Aircraft 9.8% 9.7% 6.0%
Eng. & Construction 6.0% -12.3% -2.3%
4b) Capital Expenditures by Business Areas
Yr. 97 98 99
Electronics 52% 63% 77%
Aircraft 40% 29% 22%
Eng. & Construction 8% 8% 2%
100% 100% 100%
1,521
1.75
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NAME COUNTRY YEAR
STONE & WEBSTER U.S. 1889
No. of Shares Outstanding
Changed Leader during term?
Organizational Setting
1996 1997 1998 1999
12,834,618 12,822,513 13,038,555 13,116,000
NO. (Since 1996)
Operating Core
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
Power -o Acquired Power Technologies in 1998
Process
Environmental/Infrastructure
- Federal facilities/Environmental remediation
- Water and wastewater facilities
- Transportation
Industrial
Consulting
-* Acquired Belmont Constructors in 1998
which serves hydrocarbons, water, industrial, power
Prescient Technologies
Commercial Cold Storage -- Acquired Nordic Group in 1998
a a
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Technostructure Support Operations
Stone & Webster - Market Segmentation Matrix
Notes:
Some equity investment through joint venture in wholesale gas marketing.
Refrigeration services, warehousing, software for aerospace and manufacturing design, management consulting especially for
asset divestiture and privatization.
Appendix B
Residential Institutional Commercial Industrial Infrastructure Environment Diversification
D I D I D I D I D I D I D I
Supply 2 2
Feasibility studies * * * * * *
& Planning
A&E Design * * * * * *
Construction * * * * * *
O&M * *
Renovation
Finance
Own / Develop 1 1
Combined * * * * * *
1
2
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Stone & Webster (Consolidated)
1) Operational Performance ($ thousands)
Yr. 96 97 98 99
Revenue 1,164,837 1,322,540 1,248,780 1,167,848
Growth 14% -5.6% -6.5%
COGS 1,109,828 1,206,677 1,250,598 1,212,979
Growth 9% 3.6% -3.0%
Operating Income -25,920 47,292 -72,534 -115,024
Growth 282% -253% -59%
Net Income -10,644 33,510 -49,302 20,472
Growth 415% -247% 142%
Backlog 2,487,552 2,519,302 2,636,166 2,600,000
Growth 1% 5% -1%
Order Received 1,714,139 1,330,970 1,331,332 N/A
Growth -22% 0%
2) Capital Structure ($ thousands)
Yr. 96 97 98 99
Equity 317,133 345,232 291,576 324,349
Non-current Liab. 89,411 96,687 69,685 80,648
Long-term Debt 24,260 22,510 22,228 19,950
Total Liabilities 374,932 393,545 543,106 608,947
Total Assets
Current Assets
Current Liabilities
Quick Assets
Acct. Receivables
692,065
394,424
285,521
243,793
181,900
738,777
408,644
296,858
286,996
180,057
Note: Minority Interests is insignificant.
3a) Revenue by Regions (in $ thousands)
Yr. 96 97
U.S.
International
834,682
392,005
473,421
321,727
276,235
98
703,832 659,005 517,644
461,005 663,535 731,136
1,164,837 1,322,540 1,248,780
4a) Operating Income by Regions (in $ thousands)
Yr. 96 97 98
U.S. -31,071 27,995 -76,885
International 5,151 19,297 4,351
-25,920 47,292 -72,534
5) Operating Profit Margin by Regions
Yr. 96 97 98
U.S.
International
-4.4% 4.2% -14.9%
1.1% 2.9% 0.6%
7a) Revenue by Business Areas (in $ thousands)
Yr. 96 97 98
Power
Process
Env/Infrastructure
Industrial
Other EPC work
Cold Storage
412,375
409,322
107,422
182,370
29,753
21.250
537,809
452,122
108,165
169,417
31,707
23,320
610,013
284,582
109,989
140,116
69,768
34.312
1,162,492 1,322,540 1,248,780
933,296
535,658
528,299
395,305
288,824
Key Financial Ratios
Yr.
Dividend ($/share)
Net Income/share
Dividend Payout ratio
NCL/(NCL+Equity)
LT Debt/Total Capital.
Total Debt ratio
Current Asset/Total A
Non-Current Asset/Total
Current Liab./Total Liab.
Current Ratio
Quick Ratio
Avg. Collection Period
Total Asset Turnover
Rev(t)/Backlog(t-1)
ROA
ROE
Gross Profit Margin
Operating Profit Margin
Net Profit Margin
Assumed Tax Rate
Yr.
Interest Payment
NI + (1-t)*Interest
96 97 98 98
0.6
-0.8
-0.75
0.22
0.071
0.54
0.57
0.43
0.76
1.38
0.85
54.2
1.65
0.608
-0.9%
-3.1%
4.7%
-2.2%
-0.5%
34%
96
0.6
2.59
0.23
0.22
0.061
0.53
0.55
0.45
0.75
1.38
0.97
49.9
1.85
0.532
4.8%
10.1%
8.8%
3.6%
2.6%
0.6
-3.83
-0.16
0.19
0.071
0.65
0.47
0.53
0.87
0.83
0.68
66.7
1.59
0.496
-5.9%
15.5%
-0.1%
-5.8%
-3.7%
0.45
1.56
0.29
0.20
0.058
0.65
0.57
0.43
0.87
1.01
0.75
88.3
1.32
0.443
3.3%
6.6%
-3.9%
-9.8%
2.5%
97 98 99
6,737 1,739 4,076 12,959
-6,198 34,658 -46,612 29,025
3b) Revenues by Regions
Yr. 97 98 99
U.S. 60% 50% 41%
International 40% 50% 59%
100% 100% 100%
4b) Operating Income by Regions
Yr. 97 98 99
U.S. 120% 59% 106%
International -20% 41% -6%
100% 100% 100%
6) Expected Volatility assumed in Option Valuation
Yr. 96 97 98
Expected Volatility 19.3% 21.0% 23.7%
7b) Revenues by Business Areas
Yr. 96 97 98
Power 35% 41% 49%
Process
Env/lnfrastructure
Industrial
Other EPC work
Cold Storage
35% 34% 23%
9% 8% 9%
16% 13% 11%
3% 2% 6%
2% 2% 3%
100% 100% 100%
8a) New Orders by Business Areas (in $ thousands) (EPC Only)
Yr. 96 97 98
262,137
701,354
532,163
188,871
29,614
640,843
340,880
55,542
256,916
36,789
1,070,117
210,932
-168,861
112,333
106,811
1,714,139 1,330,970 1,331,332
Power
Process
Env/Infrastructure
Industrial
Other EPC work
15% 48% 80%
41% 26% 16%
31% 4% -13%
11% 19% 8%
1.7% 3% 8%
100% 100% 100%
9) Cash Flow Profile ($ thousands)
Yr. 96 97 98
Net Cash Flow from Operations 28,455 83,184 (72,468)
Net Cash Flow from Investment 26,509 (48,893) (54,265)
Capital Expenditure 24,383 25,909 20,290
Corporate Financing Gap 54,964 34,291 (126,733)
CAPEX Ratio 1.17 3.21 -3.57
Cash Balance 57,887 75,030 45,492
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Power
Process
Env/Infrastructure
Industrial
Other EPC work
8b) New Orders by Business Areas (EPC Only)
Yr. 96 97 98
293
INAME COUNTRY YEAR
TECHNIP Group France 1958 (Incorporated)
No. of Employees
No. of Shares Outstanding
Changed Leader during term of study?
Ownership Structure
ISIS
Gaz de France
TOTAL
ELF Group
Technip (Treasury shares)
Personnel
Retail & Institutional Investors
International Investors & Others
YES (1999) (Due to retirement of previous chairman and CEO.)
12.4%
11.1%
6.1%
3.0%
3.8%
31.1%
32.5%
13.3%
11.6%
6.3%
3.2%
1.0%
3.5%
34.9%
26.2%
12.1%
11.1%
5.1%
1.3%
2.9%
3.0%
37.7%
26.8%
.
11.3%
10.6%
6.2%
3.9%
3.5%
28.5%
36.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Notes:
Notably a balanced structure between original shareholders, French and international investors.
In Oct 1998, a stock repurchase program amounting to 10% of outstanding stock is authorized. 5.85% of share capital was cancelled (Financial Strategy).
The 16.3% increase in earnings per share is partially attributed to the share capital cancellation.
Organizational Setting
Technostructure Operating Core Support Operations
M Oil and Gas Production (Upstream)
M Oil Refining (Downstream)
M Petrochemical
M Diversified Industries
M Chemicals/Fertilizers
M Life Sciences (e.g. pharmaceutical)
M Power generation and cogeneration
M Buildings
M Cement
Notes: 1999
Technip acquired KTI/MDEU for 192 million Euros (subsequently reduced by 63 m Euros) in 1999. The new affiliates, renamed as Technip Germany, Technip Benelux
and Technip USA, generated a net profit in the first year, showing good signs of turnaround.
At the completion of structural reorganization of the group, which in 1999 had led to the transfer of the engineering operations of Technip to Technip France, Technip
(parent) become essentially a holding company.
Appendix B
1997
6,402
16,532,549
1998
6,420
15,775,999
1999
9,709
15,758,537
2000
9,800
16,029,305
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Technip - Market Segmentation Matrix
Residential Institutional Commercial Industrial, 2 Infrastructure Environment Diversification
D I D I D I D I D I D I D I
Supply
Feasibility studies * *
& Planning
A&E Design * * 1
Construction * * 1
O&M 3 3
Renovation
Finance * *
Own / Develop
Combined * *
Notes:
1 Cement plant and equipment based on its proprietary technologies (1997p33)
2 Core businesses are mainly in oil and gas, petrochemicals and fertilizers. Non-core (which more resemble a diversification motive)
includes pharmaceutical, cosmetics and agro-industries.
3 FORWARD software for scheduling crudes and in operational decisions; installation of centralized control and security systems
(DCS/ESD)
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Technip (Consolidated)
1) Operational Performance (million Euros)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Revenue 1,809.3 1,846.4 2,782.2 2,972.0
Growth 17% 2% 50.7% 7%
COGS 1,428.9 1,433.6 2,160.6 2,313.4
Growth 17% 0% 51% 7%
Operating Income 128.9 142.9 163.5 182.6
Growth 29% 11% 14% 12%
Net Income 95.7 105.6 172.8 215.4
Growth 17% 10% 64% 25%
Backlog 2,488 2,793 3,468 3,410
Growth 33% 12% 24% -2%
Order Received N/A N/A 2,380 2,910
Growth 22%
2) Capital Structure (million Euros)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Equity + Minor Int. 501.8 504.4 636.2 769.8
Non-current Liab. 485.1 367.2 475.8 481.8
Long-term Debt 17.6 0.3 2.5 0.0
Total Liabilities 1,179.6 1,080.9 1,657.8 1,710.3
Total Assets
Current Assets
Current Liabilities
Quick Assets
Acct. Receivables
Notes:
1,681.4 1,585.3 2,294.0 2,480.1
1406.1 1,321.2 1,862.2 1,429.4
694.5 713.7 1,182.0 1,228.5
1,177.7 1,109.3 1,484.8 1,151.0
241.4 247.8 465.4 587.9
Key Financial Ratios
Yr.
Dividend (Euro/share)
Net Income/share
Dividend Payout ratio
NCU(NCL+Equity)
LT Debt/Total Capital.
Total Debt ratio
Current Asset/Total A
Non-Current Asset/Total
Current Liab./Total Liab.
Current Ratio
Quick Ratio
Avg. Collection Period
Total Asset Turnover
Rev(t)/Backlog(t-1)
ROA
ROE
Gross Profit Margin
Operating Profit Margin
Net Profit Margin
Assumed Tax Rate
Yr.
Interest Payment
NI + (1-t)* nterest
97 98 99 00
2.21
5.6
0.39
0.49
0.034
0.70
0.84
0.16
0.59
2.02
1.70
42.8
1.09
0.973
5.8%
20.8%
21.0%
7.1%
5.3%
37%
97
2.45 3 3.3
6.51 10.75 12.85
0.38 0.28 0.26
0.42 0.43 0.38
0.001 0.004 0.000
0.68 0.72 0.69
0.83 0.81 0.58
0.17 0.19 0.42
0.66 0.71 0.72
1.85 1.58 1.16
1.55 1.26 0.94
48.4 46.8 64.7
1.13 1.43 1.25
0.742 0.996 0.857
6.5% 8.9% 9.0%
21.0% 30.3% 30.6%
22.4% 22.3% 22.2%
7.7% 5.9% 6.1%
5.7% 6.2% 7.2%
98 99 00
96 106 173 215
1) Total assets have been adjusted to eliminate "Work in progress" (which is total accrued costs), offsetting the "Advances Received from Customers on
Contract" which are effectively progress payments. Such adjustment is helpful to facilitate comparison with U.S. and Japanese companies (whereby only
revenus in excess of billing is classified under "Work in Progress" or Inventory. Also, the adjustment will avoid underestimation of ROA and Asset Turnover.
2) Due to the acquistion of two engineering divisions of Mannesmann, the volume of sales and staff grew by 50% in 1999.
3) Interest payment is minimum in this case since there is very little long-term debt.
3a) Backlog by Regions (million Euros)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
France/W. Europe 498 335 478 437
Central Asia/CIS 199 140 222 152
Middle East 498 978 1313 1254
Far East 199 279 405 728
Africa 970 754 715 503
Americas 124 307 335 336
2488 2793 3468 3410
4a) Backlog by Business Areas (million Euros)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Refining, Gas 1,468 1,424 1,221 567
Petrolm. Upstream 448 670 814 1,310
Petrochem/Fert. 323 531 1,087 1,100
Industries
Arch. & Building 249 168 346 432.1
Eng., Other J
2,488 2,793 3,468 3,410
5a) Revenue by Regions (million Euros)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
France/W. Europe 724 534 725 577
Central Asia/CIS 119 108 197 140
Middle East 310 472 661 974
Far East 198 173 225 352
Africa 318 429 636 475
Americas 140 130 338 455
1,809 1,846 2,782 2,972
6a) Revenue by Business Areas (million Euros)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Refining, Gas
Petrolm. Upstream
Petrochern/Fert.
Industries
Arch. & Building
Eng., Other
853 1,001 1,103 846
128 223 590 885
522 328 485 690
222 196
604 551.1
84 98 J
1,809 1,846 2,782 2,972
7) Cash Flow Profile (million Euros)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Net Cash Flow from Operatns. (53.4) 46.4 283.5 (99.2)
Net Cash Flow from Investmnt. (33.7) 4.2 (163.2) (525.9)
Capital Expenditure 10.8 7.3 8.1 4.2
Corporate Financing Gap (87.1) 50.6 120.3 (625.1)
CAPEX Ratio -4.94 6.36 35.00 -23.62
Cash Balance at Year End 932.1 859.4 1,017.4 563.1
3b) Backlog by Regions
Yr. 97 98 99 00
France/W. Europe 20% 12% 14% 13%
Central Asia/CIS 8% 5% 6% 4%
Middle East 20% 35% 38% 37%
Far East 8% 10% 12% 21%
Africa 39% 27% 21% 15%
Americas 5% 11% 10% 10%
100% 100% 100% 100%
4b) Backlog by Business Areas
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Refining, Gas 59% 51% 35% 17%
Petroleum Upstream 18% 24% 23% 38%
Petrochemical/Fertilizer 13% 19% 31% 32%
Industries
Architectural & Building 10% 6% 10% 13%
Engineering, Other I
100% 100% 100% 100%
5b) Revenue by Regions
Yr. 97 98 99 00
France/Western Europe 40% 29% 26% 19%
Central Asia/ C.I.S. 7% 6% 7% 5%
Middle East 17% 26% 24% 33%
Far East 11% 9% 8% 12%
Africa 18% 23% 23% 16%
Americas 8% 7% 12% 15%
100% 100% 100% 100%
6b) Revenue by Business Areas
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Refining, Gas
Petroleum Upstream
Petrochemical/Fertilizer
Industries
Architectural & Building
Engineering, Other
47% 54% 40% 28%
7% 12% 21% 30%
29% 18% 17% 23%
12% 11%
22% 19%
5% 5%
100% 100% 100% 100%
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NAME COUNTRY YEAR
TOYO ENGINEERING CORP. Japan 1961
No. of Employees
No. of Shareholders
No. of Shares Outstanding
Changed Leader during Term? YES.
Ownership Structure
Financial Institutions 23.4%
Individuals 14.7%
Foreign Shareholders 10.6%
Other domestic companies 51.1%
Others 0.2%
(1999, Replaced Internally - Previously an EVP)
18.4%
24.6%
5.6%
51.0%
0.3%
13.9%
30.8%
3.8%
51.2%
0.4%
10.0%
37.8%
1.4%
50.4%
0.3%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Shareholders with > 1 m shs. 67.42% 55.91% 54.66% 51.37%
Overseas Operations
SEA &
China+lndia Indochina Africa Europe North Am. South Am. Middle East Rest of World
1) Rep. Offices, 1997 3 3 0 0 0 0
Moscow,
0 Korea 8
2) Subsidiaries 1 2 0 2 2 0 0 Korea 8 15
Moscow,
1) Rep. Offices, 1998 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 Korea 8
2) Subsidiaries 1 2 0 2 2 0 0 Korea 8 14
Moscow,
1) Rep. Offices, 1999 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 Korea 8
2) Subsidiaries 2 2 0 2 2 1 0 Korea 10 15
1) Rep. Offices, 2000
2) Subsidiaries
3
2
3
2
0
0
0
2
0
1
0
1
Moscow,
0 Korea
0 Korea
8
9 12
Liquidation of a financial subsidiary, TEC International Ltd.
Appendix B
1997
1,562
12,977
175,692,539
1998
1,532
15,629
175,692,539
1999
1,509
17,124
175,692,539
2000
1,142
18,025
175,692,539
pan
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Toyo Engineering Corp. - Market Segmentation Matrix
Notes:
Fields of computer-integrated manufacturing (CIM), advanced information system, pharmaceuticals, and logistics that combine
engineering technology with software development.
Consulting and implementation work related to SAP R/3, orders primarily from the pharmaceutical and chemical industries.
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Residential Institutional Commercial Industrial Infrastructure Environment Diversification
D I D I D I D I D I D I D I
Supply 1 1
Feasibility studies * * * 2 2
& Planning
A&E Design * * *
Construction * * *
O&M * *
Renovation
Finance
Own / Develop
Combined * *
1
2
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Toyo (Non-consolidated)
1) Operational Performance (V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Revenue 202,674 244,402 228,771 139,845
Growth 21% 21% -6% -39%
COGS 189,698 232,031 228,681 131,914
Growth 25% 22% -1% -42%
Operating Income 169 336 -11,746 -995
Growth -94% 99% -3596% 92%
Net Income 849 -32,448 -15,518 188
Growth -39% -3922% 52% 1Q1%
Backlog 389,330 387,165 263,380 22ZOO
Growth -2.0% -0.6% -32% -16%
Order Received 176,957 239,000 116,535 117,000
Growth -7.3% 35% -51% 0.4%
(Consolidated Figures)
2) Capital Structure (V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Equity 87,624 54,358 42,184 42,372
Non-current Liab. 65,578 63,170 63,869 46,572
Long Term Debt 64,113 62,268 63,232 45,853
Total Liabilities 198,164 199,352 201,925 171,626
Total Assets 285,788 253,710 244,109 213,998
Current Assets 243,736 217,705 203,871 177,474
Current Liabilities 132,586 136,182 138,056 125,054
Quick Assets 153,739 142,000 133,044 121,266
Acct. Receivables 69,529 94,418 74,673 54,928
3) Revenue, Backlog and New Orders by Regions
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Rev., Domestic 31.4% 12.5% 14.9% 28.7%
Rev., International 68.6% 87.5% 85.1% 71.3%
Backlog, Domestic 11.5% 14.3% 13.5% 13.2%
Backlog, Int'l. 88.5% 85.7% 86.5% 86.8%
New Ord, Domestic 20.0% 18.8% 20.8% 25.6%
New Orders, Int'l. 80.0% 81.8% 79.2% 74.4%
5a) Revenue by Business Areas
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Refinery 13.8% 20.4% 15.1% 11.5%
Petrochemical 35.3% 37.6% 57.4% 54.5%
Energy-Related 30.4% 27.7% 7.8% 10.6%
Chemical Fertilizer 5.6% 3.7% 6.0% 4.5%
Industrial Systems 13.3% 10.1% 13.3% 13.3%
Others 1.6% 0.5% 0.4% 5.6%
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100%
HPI 79.5% 85.7% 80.3% 76.6%
Non-HPI 20.5% 14.3% 19.7% 23.4%
5c) Backlog by Business Areas
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Refinery 22.7% 12.2% 8.9% 3.9%
Petrochemical 37.9% 63.6% 63.2% 42.5%
Energy-Related 23.47% 10.6% 10.3% 30.6%
Chemical Fertilizer 7.0% 4.8% 11.5% 14.7%
Industrial Systems 8.9% 8.8% 6.1% 8.1%
Others 0.03% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2%
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100%
HPI 84.1% 86.4% 82.4% 77.0%
Non-HPI 15.9% 13.6% 17.6% 23.0%
7) R&D Expenses (in V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
R&D Expenses 2,006 1,900 N/A N/A
As % of Sales 1.0% 0.8% N/A N/A
Key Financial Ratios
Yr.
Dividend (yen/share)
Net Income/share
Dividend Payout ratio
NCL/(NCL+Equity)
LT Debt/Total Capital.
Total Debt ratio
Current Asset/Total A
Non-Current Asset/Total
Current Liab./Total Liab.
Current Ratio
Quick Ratio
Avg. Collection Period
Total Asset Turnover
Rev(t)/Backlog(t-1)
ROA
ROE
Gross Profit Margin
Operating Profit Margin
Net Profit Margin
Assumed tax rate:
Yr.
Interest Payment
NI + (1-t)*Interest
4) Backlog by Regions
97 98 99 00
6 6
4.83 -184.68
1.24 -0.03
0.43 0.54
0.42 0.53
0.69 0.79
0.85 0.86
0.15 0.14
0.67 0.68
1.84 1.60
1.16 1.04
119.1 122.4
0.70 0.91
0.510 0.628
0.9% -11.4%
1.0% -45.7%
6.4% 5.1%
0.1% 0.1%
1.3% -12.5%
50%
97
0
-88.32
0.00
0.60
0.60
0.83
0.84
0.16
0.68
1.48
0.96
134.9
0.92
0.591
-5.6%
-32.1%
0.0%
-5.1%
-6.1%
0
1.07
0.00
0.52
0.52
0.80
0.83
0.17
0.73
1.42
0.97
169.1
0.61
0.531
0.8%
0.4%
5.7%
-0.7%
1.3%
98 99 00
3,530 3,579
2,614 -30,659
3,318 3,231
-13,859 1,804
Yr. 97 98 99 00
South East Asia 69.7% 35.7% 44.5% 28.8%
S. West Asia & Africa J 26.7% 18.4% 11.8%
Russia & Central Asia 6.3% 13.1% 17.5% 17.0%
Central & South America 0.0% 5.8% 0.0% 24.2%
Others 12.5% 4.4% 6.1% 5.0%
Domestic 11.5% 14.3% 13.5% 13.2%
TOTAL 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
5b) New Orders by Business Areas
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Refinery 22.6% 4.9% 6.0% 2.3%
Petrochemical 29.9% 78.5% 48.4% 18.3%
Energy-Related 14.3% 3.3% 3.4% 47.2%
Chemical Fertilizer 12.2% 0.2% 22.6% 9.0%
Industrial Systems 20.7% 13.0% 19.3% 21.4%
Others 0.3% 0.1% 0.3% 1.8%
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100%
HPI 66.8% 86.7% 57.8% 67.8%
Non-HPI 33.2% 13.3% 42.2% 32.2%
6) Cash Flow Profile (V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Net CF from Operations (14,824) (54,334) 7,579 6,510
Net CFfrom Investment (3,423) 32,066 (250) 8,829
Capital Expenditure 1,344 2,400 3,063 162
Corporate Financing Gap (18,247) (22,268) 7,329 15,339
CAPEX Ratio -11.03 -22.64 2.47 40.19
Cash Balance, Year End 54,319 33,721 51,490 59,013
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Toyo (Consolidated)
1) Operational Performance (V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Revenue 208,280 251,209 237,505 155,812
Growth 21.5% 20.6% -5.5% -34.4%
COGS 194,017 236,955 234,233 143,669
Growth 25.2% 22.1% -1.1% -38.7%
Operating Income 267 659 -11,015 279
Growth -90% 146.8% -1771% 102.5%
Net Income 682 -44,783 -15,261 -620
Growth -61% -6666% 66% 96%
2) Capital Structure (V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Equity + Minor Int. 88,944 43,496 32,549 32,305
Non-current Liab. 65,778 84,715 90,558 73,159
Long Term Debt 64,113 82,968 87,053 69,435
Total Liabilities 201,669 226,462 232,513 205,557
Total Assets 290,613 269,958 265,062 237,862
Current Assets 248,279 225,000 210,735 186,719
Current Liabilities 135,891 141,747 141,955 132,398
Quick Assets 158,573 151,872 141,724 129,922
Acct. Receivables 72,287 96,940 77,750 58,418
Note: Minority Interests are insignificant.
3) Cash Flow Profile (V million
Yr.
Net Cash Flow from Operations (16,259) (52,354) 3,550 4,082
Net Cash Flow from Investment (3,413) 12,395 (827) 7,238
Capital Expenditure 1,380 2,777 3,318 774
Corporate Financing Gap (19,672) (39,959) 2,723 11,320
CAPEX Ratio -11.78 -18.85 1.07 5.27
Cash Balance, Year End 56,381 41,057 56,792 63,939
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Key Financial Ratios
Yr.
Dividend (yen/share)
Net Income/share
Dividend Payout ratio
NCU(NCL+Equity)
LT Debt/Total Capital.
Total Debt ratio
Current Asset/Total A
Non-Current Asset/Total
Current LiabiTotal Liab.
Current Ratio
Quick Ratio
Avg. Collection Period
Total Asset Turnover
ROA
ROE
Gross Profit Margin
Operating Profit Margin
Net Profit Margin
Assumed tax rate:
Yr.
97
6
3.89
1.54
0.43
0.42
0.69
0.85
0.15
0.67
1.83
1.17
120.3
0.71
0.8%
0.8%
6.8%
0.1%
1.2%
50%
97
98 99 00
6
-254.92
-0.02
0.66
0.66
0.84
0.83
0.17
0.63
1.59
1.07
122.9
0.90
-15.3%
-68%
5.7%
0.3%
-17.1%
98
0
-86.85
0.00
0.74
0.73
0.88
0.80
0.20
0.61
1.48
1.00
134.2
0.89
-5.0%
-40%
1.4%
-4.6%
-5.6%
0
-3.57
0.00
0.69
0.68
0.86
0.78
0.22
0.64
1.41
0.98
159.5
0.62
0.5%
-1.9%
7.8%
0.2%
0.8%
99 00
Interest Payment 3,532 3,579 3,797
NI + (1-t)* nterest 2,448 -42,994 -13,363
3,759
1,260
97 98 99 00
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NAME COUNTRY YEAR
VINCI (SGE) France 1910
No. of Employees
No. of Shares Outstanding
Changed Leader during term?
Ownership Structure
Vivendi Universal
Suez
SGE Group's employee savings plan
Treasury Stock
Other investors (Institutional & individual)
Composition of Employees
Concession
Building and Civil Engineering
Electrical & Mechanical Engineering
Roadworks
Holding Company and Others
1997 1998 1999 2000
68,251 64,451 70,699 122,070
40,323,352 41,487,757 40,261,023 79,154,601
NO.
Dec-97 Dec-98 Mar-00 Dec-00
51.2% 50.25% 16.9% 9.0%
17.0%
1.6% 2.67% 3.0% 4.0%
3.24% 7.5% 7.0%
47.2% 43.84% 72.6% 63.0%
100.0% 100.00% 100.0% 100.0%
0.0% 0.1%
42.3% 42.1%
40.1% 39.8%
17.3% 17.9%
0.3% 0.2%
2.7% 7.7%
38.9% 38.4%
35.9% 20.8%
22.4% 30.7%
0.2% 2.4%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Organizational Settina (prior to merger with GTM)
Strategic Apex
Audit Committee Investment Committee Remuneration Committee
Created in Oct 2000, this is in
charge of examining acquisition
and divestment projects liable to
have a significant impact on
group sales and earnings.
Technostructure Operating Core Support Operations
M Concessions
- Cofiroute (31%)
- Stade de France (33%)
- Miscellaneous infrastructure
M Building and Civil Engineering
- Campenon Bernard SGE (building & civil eng.)
- Freyssinet (pre-stressing specialist, bridge and tunnel repair)
- Sogea (building & civil eng., hydraulic eng.)
- Norwest Hoist (subsidiary in the U.K.)
M Electrical works and engineering
- Groupe GTIE
M Roadworks
M Thermal and Mechanical Activities
- Sohpiane (thermal & acoustic insulation, power and
ventilation systems, fire protection and building services.
Notes: 2000
Vinci took over GTM following a friendly exchange offer announced on 13 July 2000, subsequently resulting in the holdings of 97.44% of GTM.
The two concession entities, Cofiroute and Stade de France were consolidated in the accounts of the new entity. The subsequent merger
between Vinci and GTM was approved by the two companies' shareholders. Note the very different merging environment as compared to
Raytheon E&C and Washington Group Int'l.
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Vinci - Market Segmentation Matrix
Residential Institutional Commercial Industrial Infrastructure Environment Diversification
D I D I D I D I D I D I D I
Supply 4 4
Feasibility studies * * * *
& Planning
A&EDesign * * * * * * 2 2 6 6 3 3
Construction * * * * * * 1 1 6 6 3 3
O&M * * * *
Renovation
Finance
Own / Develop/ 5 5
Equity Investment
Combined * * * * * * * *
Notes:
1 Fressynet, one of SGE's subsidiaries, represents a specialist in pre-stressing and cable-stay structures, which provide some
technological edge in bridge construction and repair (including tunnel repair).
2 Sogea, a subsidiary under the building and civil engineering business segment, provides design and management of water supply
systems in France and abroad.
3 Electrical engineering works, such as the design and construction of electrical power (mainly for power lines in transmission and
distribution); industrial works; information processing and telecommunication infrastructures.
4 With 400 coating plants, 95 blinder plants, 200 quarries and 90 recycling units, Vinci Roads (merged company between Eurovia and
Entreprise Jean Lefebvre of GTM) has large supply network to support its logistics of roadwork construction.
5 An active participant in the concession market similar to GTM.
6 Although Vinci does have a division that specializes in the environmental market (design and construction of household and
industrial waste treatment facilities), the operation is very minor in relative scale, contributing only Euro 16 million in sales (less
than 0.2% of total sales of Vinci) and hence does not represent a strategic foray into the market at all. This might developed into
a hurdle for future expansion in the core businesses since like most construction firms, Vinci is involved in large amount of
activities that create detrimental effects to the environment at large (e.g. power generation and installation, demolition works)
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Vinci (Consolidated)
1) Operational Performance (million Euros)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Revenue (include
concessions etc.) 8,341.8 8,262.2 9,328.3 N/A
Growth 24% -1% 13%
Revenue 8,140.2 8,011.5 9,056.8 14,126.8
Growth 24% -2% 13% 56%
COGS 5,525.5 5,414.7 6,120.1 9,583.4
Growth 25% -2% 13% 57%
Operating Income 43.0 123.6 223.4 722.4
Growth 187% 81% 223%
Net Income 49.4 96.2 150.8 355.6
Growth 95% 57% 136%
Net Income (Group
Share) 46.9 92.3 146.3 299.8
Growth 97% 59% 105%
Backlog N/A N/A N/A N/A
Growth
2) Capital Structure (million Euros)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Equity (w/o Minor) 446.9 526.4 567.3 1,834.2
Equity + Minor Int. 469.6 551.6 593.4 2,316.6
Non-current Liab. 1,512.0 1,488.2 1,906.9 6,964.4
Long-term Debt 179.4 222.7 500.7 2,897.5
Total Liabilities 7,639.5 6,037.5 7,385.2 16,446.9
Total Assets 8,109.1 6,589.1 7,978.6 18,763.5
Current Assets 6,783.4 5,131.3 5,606.3 10,047.3
Current Liabilities 6,127.5 4,549.3 5,478.3 9,482.5
Quick Assets 5,146.5 4,828.6 5,273.7 9,587.5
Acct. Receivables 3,523.8 3,367.6 4,042.7 7,322.7
3a) Revenue by Regions (in million Euros)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
France 5,379.4 5,215.6 5,509.1 10,690
Europe, Other 2,364.4 2,325.6 3,040.1 4,929
Africa 254.1 286.1 266.61
Asia 96.0 127.4 112.5 1,001
Middle East 26.7 41.1 46.9
Americas 19.6 15.7 81.6 711
8,140.2 8,011.5 9,056.8 17,331
4a) Revenue by Business Areas (million Euros)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Concession 55.3 98.7 248.8 847.5
Building & Civil
Eng. 3,763.5 3,626.8 3,811.4 5,849.1
Roadworks 1,557.3 1,559.3 2,149.1 4,061.3
Electrical Eng. and
Works 1,702.7 1,735.4 1,854.1 3,096.4
Thermal &
Mechanical Act. 1,099.3 1,047.2 1,052.3
Holding & Misc. -37.9 -55.9 -58.9 272.5
8,140.2 8,011.5 9,056.8 14,126.8
5) Operating Income by Business Areas (million Euros)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Concession
Building & Civil
Eng.
Roadworks
Electrical Eng. and
Works
Thermal &
Mechanical Act.
Holding & Misc.
7.2 8.4 37.9 356.8
-0.8 10.9 61.7 134.8
13.1 31.7 46.9 147.1
56.3 71.9 77.1 117.7
-31.6 2.9 18.9
-1.2 -2.2 -19.0 -34.0
43.0 123.6 223.5 722.4
Key Financial Ratios
Yr.
Dividend (Euro/share)
Net Income/share
Dividend Payout ratio
NCL/(NCL+Equity)
LT Debt/Total Capital.
Total Debt ratio
Current Asset/Total A
Non-Current Asset/Total
Current Liab./Total Liab.
Current Ratio
Quick Ratio
Avg. Collection Period
Total Asset Turnover
Rev(t)/Backlog(t-1)
ROA
ROE
Gross Profit Margin
Operating Profit Margin
Net Profit Margin
Assumed Tax Rate
Yr.
Interest Payment
NI + (1-t)*Interest
97 98 99 00
0.61
1.17
0.52
0.76
0.28
0.94
0.84
0.16
0.80
1.11
0.84
136
1.17
N/A
0.7%
10.6%
32.1%
0.5%
0.6%
34%
97
1.40 1.60 1.65
2.25 3.64 5.98
0.62 0.44 0.28
0.73 0.76 0.75
0.29 0.46 0.56
0.92 0.93 0.88
0.78 0.70 0.54
0.22 0.30 0.46
0.75 0.74 0.58
1.13 1.02 1.06
1.06 0.96 1.01
157 149 147
1.09 1.24 1.06
N/A N/A N/A
1.3% 2.1% 2.7%
19.0% 26.8% 25.0%
32.4% 32.4% 32.2%
1.5% 2.5% 5.1%
1.2% 1.6% 2.5%
98 99 00
49.4 96.2 151 356
3b) Revenue by Regions
Yr. 97 98 99 00
France 66% 65% 61% 62%
Europe, Other 29% 29% 34% 28%
Africa 3% 4% 3%
Asia 1% 2% 1% 6%
Middle East 0% 1% 1%
Americas 0% 0% 1% 4%
100% 100% 100% 100%
4b) Revenue by Business Areas
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Concession 0.7% 1.2% 2.7% 6.0%
Building & Civil Eng. 46.2% 45.3% 42.1% 41.4%
Roadworks 19.1% 19.5% 23.7% 28.7%
Electrical Eng. and
Works 20.9% 21.7% 20.5% 21.9%
Thermal & Mechanical
Activities 13.5% 13.1% 11.6%
Elimination, Misc. -0.5% -0.7% -0.7% 1.9%
100% 100% 100% 100%
6) Operating Margin by Business Areas
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Concession 13.0% 8.5% 15.2% 42.1%
Building & Civil Eng.
Roadworks
Electrical Eng. and
Works
Thermal & Mechanical
Activities
0.0% 0.3% 1.6% 2.3%
0.8% 2.0% 2.2% 3.6%
3.3% 4.1% 4.2% 3.8%
-2.9% 0.3% 1.8% J
Note: For the "Concession" segment before 2000, the revenues and operating income of Cof iroute, Stade de France, the Tagus River Bridges and the Prado-Carenage
Tunnel are all accounted for by the equity method and hence not included in these figures.
8)
Yr.
7) Cash Flow Profile (million Euros)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Net Cash Flow
from Operations 197.2 226.1 559.9 972.0
Net Cash Flow
from Investment (229.2) (249.7) (1022.2) (2860.3)
CAPEX 172.5 231.7 252.2 769.2
Corporate
Financing Gap (32.0) (23.6) (462.3) (1888.3)
CAPEX Ratio 1.14 0.98 2.22 1.26
Net Fin. Surplus 769.5 657.0 53.4 (1,855.4)
Trends for Concession Business
Total Revenues of
Concession Entities
Revenues - Group Share
(million Euros)
Operating Income of
97 98 99 00
647.5 812.8 883.7 197.1
201.6 250.7 271.5 N/A
N/A 413.0 467.3 101.8
Net Income (Grp. Share) 37.2 39.2 53.6 1.4
Operating Profit Margin N/A 50.8% 52.9% 51.6%
Net Profit Margin 18.5% 15.6% 19.7% N/A
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Yr. 97 98
303
NAME REGION YEAR
WASHINGTON GROUP INTL U.S. 1911
1997 1998 1999 2000
No. of Employees N/A N/A N/A 22,000
No. of Shares Outstanding 54,046,000 53,891,000 52,736,000 N/A
Changed Leader during term? YES (1998, previous CEO "retired". New CEO, who is indeed the chairman of the board, is a 38% owner of the company.
Oroanizational Setting
Technostructure Operating Core (1997) Support Operations
M Engineering & Construction
M IndustriaVProcess
M Power
M O&M
M International Infrastructure
M MK Centennial (Transportation)
M EnvironmentaVGovemment
M Heavy Civil Construction
M Mining
Operating Core (1999)
M Engineering & Construction
M IndustriaVProcess
M Energy
M O&M
M MK Centennial (Transportation)
M Heavy Civil Construction
M MK Government Services
C Federal Projects (MK-owned, provider of env. remediation,
planning & contracting services to DOD and DOE)
M/C Westinghouse Government Services
- Westinghouse Gov Services Company LLC (MK owned,
defense-related operations and services to DOD and DOE)
- Westinghouse Government Environmental Services Co. LLC
(MK 60% BNFL 40%, non-defense-related gov. env. Services)
Notes: 1998
1) Within the E&C Group, the Power and Int'l Infrastructure units are reorganized under the Energy Division, which also houses operation to cater for demilitarization programs.
Note the illogical grouping and overlap within the overall corporate structure.
2) The Heavy Civil Construction and Mining Groups are combined into one MK Contractors group.
3) The EnvironmentaVGovemment group is dissolved.
Notes: 1999
1) After the Westinghouse acquisition in March 1999, the Federal Programs division under the E&C group was combined with the Westinghouse government services
operations to create a new business unit called MK Government Services Group.
2) The Int'l Infrastructure unit and the Transportation unit (Centennial) (within the Energy Division of E&C group) was merged into MK Contractors group.
3) The new MK Gov. Serv. Group is led by management team drawn from Westinghouse, MK and BNFL (cultural tension is a potential problem).
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Washington Group International - Market Segmentation Matrix
Residential Institutional Commercial Industrial Infrastructure Environment Diversification
D I D I D I D I D I D I D I
Supply 1 1
Feasibility studies * * * * * * 1 1
& Planning
A&E Design * * * * * * 1 1
Construction * * * * * * 1 1
O&M * * * * * * 1 1
Renovation
Finance
Own / Develop 1 1
Combined * * * * * *
1 Feasibility studies, resource evaluations, permitting services of mining operations, including engineering and construction in
contract mining. MK also seeks equity positions in mining properties.
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Washington Group International (Consolidated)
1) Operational Performance ($ thousands)
Yr. 97 98 99
Revenue 1,677,301 1,862,174 2,248,228
Growth 11% 21%
COGS 1,597,986 1,775,632 2,129,997
Growth 11% 20%
Operating Income 52,827 58,743 79,656
Growth 11% 36%
Net Income 32,031 37,553 53,491
Growth 17% 42%
Net Income (Group
Share) 32,031 37,553 48,285
Growth 17% 29%
Backlog 2,759,300 2,680,100 3,328,000
Growth -3% 24%
2) Capital Structure ($ thousands)
Yr. 97 98 99
Equity (w/o Minor) 343,131 370,903 403,090
Equity + Minor Int. 343,131 370,903 487,930
Non-current Liab. 127,218 114,224 322,998
Long-term Debt 18,000 0 100,000
Total Liabilities 427,113 417,248 708,093
Total Assets 770,244 788,151 1,196,023
Current Assets 405,014 427,722 531,963
Current Liabilities 299,895 303,024 385,095Quick Assets 240,526 242,567 245,163
Acct. Receivables 187,311 175,513 215,523
3a) Revenue by Regions (in $ thousands)
Yr. 97 98
U.S.
International
99
1,474,831 1,595,463 1,948,132
202,470 266,711 300,096
1,677,301 1,862,174 2,248,228
4a) Operating Income by Regions (in $ thousands)
Yr. 97 98 99
U.S. 50,182 61,753 N/A
International 29,133 24,789 N/A
79,315 86,542
5) Operating Margin by Regions
Yr. 97 98 99
U.S. 3.4% 3.9%
International 14.4% 9.3%
7a) Profile of Public Contracts - Revenue (in $ thousands)
Yr. 97 98 99
Caltran 127,136 106,855
DOE 289,288 266,859 493,856
DOD 63,932 119,287 250,155
Other gov agen. 7,752 7,646
488,108 500,647 744,011
8a) Revenues by Business Areas (in $ millions)
Yr. 97 98 99
E&C Group
Gov. Service Grp.
Contractors Grp.
Elimination & Oth.
595.0 781.7 690.6
346.6 355.5 760.9
739.2 727.6 798.5
-3.5 -2.6 -1.8
1,677.3 1,862.2 2,248.2
9a) Operating Income by Business Areas (in $ millions)
Yr. 97 98 99
E&C Group 7.9 9.4 16.6
Gov. Service Grp. 15.4 23.2 46.8
Contractors Grp. 48.6 51.2 43.4
Intersegment Elm. 3.8 -0.9 -1.1
75.7 82.9 105.7
10) Operating Margin by Business Areas
Yr. 97 98 99
E&C Group 1.3%
Gov. Service Grp. 4.4%
Contractors Grp. 6.6%
1.2%
6.5%
7.0%
2.4%
6.2%
5.4%
Key Financial Ratios
Yr.
Dividend ($/share)
Net Income/share
Dividend Payout ratio
NCL/(NCL+Equity)
LT Debt/Total Capital.
Total Debt ratio
Current Asset/Total A
Non-Current Asset/Total
Current Liab./Total Liab.
Current RatioQuick Ratio
Avg. Collection Period
Total Asset Turnover
Rev(t)/Backlog(t-1)
ROA
ROE
Gross Profit Margin
Operating Profit Margin
Net Profit Margin
Assumed Tax Rate
Yr.
97 98 99
0.59
0.00
0.27
0.05
0.55
0.53
0.47
0.70
1.35
0.80
55.6
2.08
0.640
0 0
0.69 0.91
0.00 0.00
0.24 0.40
0.00 0.17
0.53 0.59
0.54 0.44
0.46 0.56
0.73 0.54
1.41 1.38
0.80 0.64
35.6 31.7
2.39 2.27
0.675 0.839
4.1% 4.9% 5.9%
9.8% 10.5% 12.5%
4.7% 4.6% 5.3%
3.1% 3.2% 3.5%
1.9% 2.0% 2.6%
34%
97 98 99
Interest Payment 890 869 7,642
NI + (1-t)*Interest 32,618 38,127 58,535
3b) Revenue by Regions
Yr. 97 98 99
U.S. 88% 86% 87%
International 12% 14% 13%
100% 100% 100%
4b) Operating Income by Regions
Yr. 97 98 99
U.S. 63% 71% N/A
International 37% 29% N/A
100% 100%
6) Expected Volatility assumed in Option Valuation
Yr. 97 98 99
Expected Volatility 30.7% 38.5% 35.7%
7b) Profile of Public Contracts - as a % of Total Revenue
Caltran 7.6% 5.7%
DOE 17.2% 14.3% 22.0%
DOD 3.8% 6.4% 11.1%
Other gov. agencies 0.5% 0.4%
29.1% 26.9% 33.1%
8b) Revenues by Business Areas
Yr. 97 98 99
E&C Group 35% 42% 31%
Gov. Service Grp. 21% 19% 34%
Contractors Grp. 44% 39% 36%
Eliminations & Others 0% 0% 0%
100% 100% 100%
9b) Operating Income by Business Areas
Yr. 97 98 99
E&C Group 10% 11% 16%
Gov. Service Grp. 20% 28% 44%
Contractors Grp. 64% 62% 41%
Intersegment Elm. 5% -1% -1%
100% 100% 100%
11) Cash Flow Profile ($ thousands)
Yr. 97 98 99
Net CF from Operations 9,290 71,728 35,491
Net CF from Investment (7,487) (28,155) (148,709)
CAPEX 19,700 25,493 48,417
Corporate Financing Gap 1,803 43,573 (113,218)
CAPEX Ratio 0.47 2.81 0.73
Cash Balance, Year End 53,215 67,054 29,640
$132 out of this $149 m net investment is spent on business acquisitions.
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APPENDIX C
DETAILS AND ASSUMPTIONS OF SELECTED
FINANCIAL PARAMETERS USED IN FUNDAMENTAL ANALYSIS
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C.1 BACKLOG AND NEW ORDERS RECEIVED
Trends of order received reflects the ability of the company to continually secures
new projects that will be recorded as backlog and later converted into revenues; thus the
process can be conceptually represented by:
(New Orders)t.i -+ (Backlog).1 -+ (Backlog)t & (Revenue)t -+ (Revenue)t1i
Due to the lagging effect typically created by the long duration of a project, many
uncertainty factors lure behind the conversion process from period t-1 to t+1. The
following are among some of these factors:
(i) Deferment / Reduction in Scope / Cancellation of a project by the client
during a period of hardship such as economic downturn;
(ii) Change orders during actual execution of projects that render previous
estimation of potential revenues to be recognized at period t-1 no longer
valid.
(iii) Deteriorating competitiveness of the firm or increasing intensity of
competition in the market arena.
Some innovative indicators can reasonably trace the dynamics of the above, such
as [(Revenue)t / (Backlog)t.]. The trend of this ratio tracks how much backlog a firm can
convert from the reserve recorded in the last period into current period earnings. A
decreasing trend may signal the presence of factor (i) and/or (ii) above.
Both the trend of (New Orders)t and (Backlog)t track whether the firm has been
able to secure sufficient new orders to maintain its level of backlog. As we have seen,
reduction in backlog can be due to the usual conversion into revenues but also
cancellation of project or other detrimental factors as provided in (i) and (ii) above. When
the effects of detrimental factors are isolated, however, a decreasing trend of backlog
simply signals factor (iii).
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Lastly, the composition (by geographical regions or business areas) of orders,
backlogs and revenues at the corporate level provides different signaling effect for the
coming future. For example, a changing composition of order received in terms of
business areas may predict a change in industrial environment. In the oil & gas value
system, a reduction in % of upstream work may lead a subsequent reduction in
downstream work in the coming medium term (1 ~ 2 years).
C.2 OTHER INCOME/EXPENSES & EXTRAORDINARY ITEMS (BELOW THE
OPERATING INCOME LINE)
In any year, it is worthwhile to analyze the source of Other Income/Expenses and
Extraordinary Items. Items such as write-offs of project estimation errors, liability
charges from lawsuits, and financial losses on investments (e.g. equity investment in
other companies and securities investment) deserve special attention, as these are the
items that can potentially distort Net Income figures and create "skewness" in the
corporation profitability. If a significantly different figure exists under these components
for a particular year, the Net Income figure for that year may not be used to build ratios
and trends.
C.3 CASH FLOW PROFILE
Increasingly, investors and analysts are paying more attention to the cash-flow
statement, which provides some new indicators that cannot be extracted from the balance
sheet and income statement (Business Week, 2001). Many also view that cash-flow
statement are subjected to less distortion, simply because "cash is real" and accounting
gimmicks are harder to get into those numbers.
Appendix C 309
Two comparison measures based on cash flow are introduced in the analytical
template:
(i) Corporate Financing Gap
= (Net Cash Flow from Operations) - (Net Cash Flow from Investments)
This measure is used to track how often a firm has to rely on external financing to
make up for its cash flow needs for operations and investment activities. When the
Corporate Financing Gap is negative, it implies that firms are not generating sufficient
cash to cover its investment needs either for sustaining normal operations (such as
incurring capital expenditure) or pursuing more aggressive strategies (such as acquiring
new businesses and ventures). In that case, they would logically turn to the option of
generating cash flow needs from financing activities (either by issuing new debt or equity
- provided that they have a 'healthy' balance sheet to do so) or drawing down existing
cash balance in the firm.
A firm that is in trouble would usually incur a negative figure of Net Cash Flow
from Operations, while actively disposing fixed assets, market securities and existing
business segments to boost up the Net Cash Flow from Investments. A check on the
Balance of Cash or Equivalent at Year End for each year is also helpful to confirm the
symptom, which is usually indicated by a decreasing trend during that period.
(ii) CAPEX Ratio = (Net Cash Flow from Operations) / (Capital Expenditure)
This measures the relationship between the firm's cash-generating ability from
normal operations and its investment expenditures for asset replacement and a nominal
addition of operating capacity. To the extent that the ratio exceeds 1, it indicates that the
firm has cash left for debt repayment or dividends after payment of capital expenditures
(White et al., 1997). Obviously, the ratio usually goes below 1 since most companies
have strong desire to pursue growth, thereby creating an imbalance between cash flows
from operations and investments. However, it is wise to keep track of this ratio to prevent
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the growth strategy being excessively aggressive at the expense of sound financial health
for existing operations.
Since business acquisitions and new ventures would require an abnormally high
level of investment cash flows (and a good proposal could easily raise new capital
required to fund such acquisitions and ventures), cash flows drawn for such purposes are
not counted as Capital Expenditure.
C.4 OTHER CALCULATION NUANCES
For analytical purposes in this research, Minority Interest is treated as equity. This
is consistent with the view that minority shareholders have only a residual claim on the
assets of the subsidiary or even those of the consolidated entity (White et al., 1997), thus
having a similar position as the parent company's or group's shareholders in viewing
corporate issues as a whole (such as the extent of leverage and profitability).
As a result, Minority Interest is lumped under Equity in the calculation of
Leverage Ratios (which include: Total Debt Ratio [Total Liabilities/(Total Liabilities +
Equity)]; Non-current Liabilities Ratio [Non-current Liabilities/(Non-current Liabilities +
Equity)]; and Long-term Debt Ratio [Long-term Debt/(Long-term Debt + Equity)].
Similarly, when calculating the Net Profit Margin [Net Income/Revenue], after-
tax income belonging to minority shareholders are lumped together with the net income
received by the parent company's or group's shareholders in considering the total Net
Income in the numerator.
The same argument goes with the calculation of the Return-on-Equity (ROE).
In most cases, Minority Interest is insignificant and this technicality makes
immaterial differences to the ratios calculated. However, when Minority Interest exceeds
about 5% of parent's or group's equity, it is deemed sufficiently significant to warrant its
separation in calculating the ROE for the parent's or group 's shareholders. In such cases,
the numerator of the ratio is strictly determined as the residual Net Income attributed to
the parent's or group's shareholders, and the denominator being their equity value in the
consolidated entity.
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APPENDIX D
OPERATING & FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF EIGHT
ADDITIONAL FIRMS FOR NPM- TAT PLOT
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Bilfinger + Berger (Consolidated)
(Euro thousands)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Revenue 4,099,820 4,011,805 3,653,778 3,631,142
Growth 14% -2% -9% -1%
COGS 2,919,982 2,457,623 2,572,184 2,490,514
Growth 10.8% -15.8% 4.7% -3.2%
Operating Income -32,503 -103,178 6,759 8,150
Growth -548% -217% 107% 21%
Net Income 20,788 -46,418 22,049 42,500
Growth -56% -323% 148% 93%
Backlog N/A N/A N/A N/A
Growth
New Orders N/A N/A N/A N/A
Growth
2) Capital Structure (Euro thousands)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Equity + Minor Int. 708,371 638,094 633,518 667,557
Non-current Liab. 930,765 840,956 1,013,393 991,243
Long Term Debt 44,320 18,435 212,948 220,453
Total Liabilities 2,346,068 2,225,565 2,441,762 2,332,621
Total Assets
Current Assets
Current Liabilities
Quick Assets
Acct. Receivables
3,054,439
2,473,424
1,415,303
2,010,198
862,892
2,863,659
2,282,600
1,384,609
1,901,841
905,457
3,075,280
2,356,371
1,428,369
1,831,961
929,824
3,000,178
2,297,698
1,341,378
1,783,696
907,588
Note: Minority Interests are insignificant.
Key Financial Ratios
Yr.
Dividend (Euro/share)
Net Income/share
Dividend Payout ratio
NCL/(NCL+Equity)
LT Debt/Total Capital.
Total Debt ratio
Current Asset/Total A
Fixed Asset/Total Asset
Current Liab./Total Liab.
Current Ratio
Quick Ratio
Avg. Collection Period
Total Asset Turnover
Rev(t)/Backlog(t-1)
ROA
ROE
Gross Profit Margin
Operating Profit Margin
Net Profit Margin
Assumed Tax Rate
Yr.
Interest Payment
NI + (1-t)*lnterest
97 98 99
0.51
0.56
0.91
0.57
0.06
0.77
0.81
0.19
0.60
1.75
1.42
79.0
1.30
N/A
1.0%
2.9%
28.8%
-0.8%
0.8%
40%
97
0.41
-1.28
-0.32
0.57
0.03
0.78
0.80
0.20
0.62
1.65
1.37
80.4
1.36
N/A
-1.2%
-6.9%
38.7%
-2.6%
-0.9%
0.41
0.62
0.66
0.62
0.25
0.79
0.77
0.23
0.58
1.65
1.28
91.7
1.23
N/A
1.2%
3.5%
29.6%
0.2%
0.9%
00
0.00
1.17
0.00
0.60
0.25
0.78
0.77
0.23
0.58
1.71
1.33
92.3
1.20
N/A
1.9%
6.5%
31.4%
0.2%
1.6%
98 99 00
18,774 19,344 20,776 24,490
32,052 -34,812 34,515 57,194
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Centex (Consolidated)
1) Operational Performance ($ thousands)
Yr. 97 98 99 00 01
Revenue 3,784,991 3,975,450 5,154,840 5,956,367 6,710,699
Growth 5% 30% 16% 13%
COGS 3,522,907 3,612,775 4,606,453 5,321,152 4,944,898
Growth 3% 28% 16% -7%
Operating Income 231,755 315,776 484,112 553,226 598400
Growth 36% 53% 14% 8%
Net Income 138,253 188,253 285,575 321,904 314,400
Growth 36% 52% 13% -2%
Net Income (Group
Share) 106,563 144,806 231,962 257,132 282,000
Growth 36% 60% 11% 10%
Backlog N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Growth
2) Capital Structure ($ thousands)
Yr. 97 98 99 00 01
Equity (w/o Minor) 835,777 991,172 1,197,639 1,419,349 1,714,064
Equity + Minor Int. 835,777 991,172 1,338,360 1,548,701 1,857,688
Non-current Liab. 477,836 473,020 280,389 470,749 2,066,735
Long-term Debt 236,769 237,715 280,389 419,912 2,066,735
Total Liabilities 1,843,052 2,425,047 2,929,549 2,490,039 4,791,355
Total Assets
Current Assets
Current Liabilities
Quick Assets
Acct. Receivables
2,678,829
2,020,464
1,365,216
1,018,705
987,385
3,416,219
2,745,211
1,952,027
1,680,657
1,582,341
4,267,909
3,500,481
2,649,160
1,966,662
1,855,394
4,038,740
2,986,678
2,019,290
1,032,641
893,078
6,649,043
4,920,289
2,724,620
2,717,995
2,602,815
Key Financial Ratios
Yr.
Dividend ($/share)
Net Income/share
Dividend Payout ratio
NCL/(NCL+Equity)
LT Debt/Total Capital.
Total Debt ratio
Current Asset/Total A
Fixed Asset/Total Asset
Current Liab./Total Liab.
Current Ratio
Quick Ratio
Avg. Collection Period
Total Asset Turnover
Rev(t)/Backlog(t-1)
ROA
ROE
Gross Profit Margin
Operating Profit Margin
Net Profit Margin
Assumed Tax Rate
Yr.
Interest Payment
NI + (1-t)*Interest
97 98 99 00 01
0.10
1.81
0.06
0.36
0.22
0.69
0.75
0.25
0.74
1.48
0.75
95.2
1.41
N/A
6.0%
12.8%
6.9%
6.1%
4.2%
34%
97
34,062
160,734
0.13
2.36
0.06
0.32
0.19
0.71
0.80
0.20
0.80
1.41
0.86
118.0
1.30
N/A
6.9%
15.9%
9.1%
7.9%
5.3%
0.16
3.75
0.04
0.17
0.17
0.69
0.82
0.18
0.90
1.32
0.74
121.7
1.34
N/A
8.1%
21.2%
10.6%
9.4%
6.1%
0.16
4.22
0.04
0.23
0.21
0.62
0.74
0.26
0.81
1.48
0.51
84.2
1.43
N/A
8.8%
19.7%
10.7%
9.3%
6.1%
0.16
4.65
0.03
0.53
0.53
0.72
0.74
0.26
0.57
1.81
1.00
95.1
1.26
N/A
8.3%
18.0%
26.3%
8.9%
6.6%
98 99 00 01
33,256 41,581 66,844 191,700
210,202 313,018 366,021 440,922
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Granite (Consolidated)
1) Operational Performance ($ thousands)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Revenue 1,028,205 1,226,100 1,328,774 1,348,325
Growth 11% 19% 8% 1%
COGS 878,256 1,034,884 1,107,210 1,113,083
Growth 13% 18% 7% 1%
Operating Income 38,137 69,258 84,262 85,575
Growth -2% 82% 22% 2%
Net Income 27,832 46,507 52,916 55,815
Growth 2% 67% -14% 5%
Backlog N/A N/A N/A N/A
Growth
Order Received N/A N/A N/A N/A
Growth
2) Capital Structure ($ thousands)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Equity + Minor Int. 257,434 301,282 327,732 377,764
Non-current Liab. 84,002 96,929 93,176 101,801
Long-term Debt 58,396 69,137 64,853 63,891
Total Liabilities 294,375 325,289 351,840 333,378
Total Assets
Current Assets
Current Liabilities
Quick Assets
Acct. Receivables
551,809
314,283
210,373
264,322
191,553
626,571
370,808
228,360
310,849
189,425
679,572
402,321
258,664
350,297
211,609
711,142
411,628
231,577
366,729
240,847
Note: Minority Interests are insignificant.
Key Financial Ratios
Yr.
Dividend ($/share)
Net Income/share
Dividend Payout ratio
NCL/(NCL+Equity)
LT Debt/Total Capital.
Total Debt ratio
Current Asset/Total A
Fixed Asset/Total Asset
Current Liab./Total Liab.
Current Ratio
Quick Ratio
Avg. Collection Period
Total Asset Turnover
Rev(t)/Backlog(t-1)
ROA
ROE
Gross Profit Margin
Operating Profit Margin
Net Profit Margin
Assumed Tax Rate
Yr.
Interest Payment
NI + (1-t)*Interest
97 98 99 00
0.16
0.69
0.23
0.25
0.18
0.53
0.57
0.43
0.71
1.49
1.26
61.3
2.01
N/A
6.4%
11.3%
14.6%
3.7%
3.2%
34%
97
7,515
32,792
0.20
1.13
0.18
0.24
0.19
0.52
0.59
0.41
0.70
1.62
1.36
56.7
2.08
N/A
9.0%
16.6%
15.6%
5.6%
4.3%
98
0.27
1.31
0.21
0.22
0.17
0.52
0.59
0.41
0.74
1.56
1.35
55.1
2.03
N/A
9.0%
16.8%
16.7%
6.3%
4.4%
99
0.31
1.38
0.22
0.21
0.14
0.47
0.58
0.42
0.69
1.78
1.58
61.2
1.94
N/A
8.9%
15.8%
17.4%
6.3%
4.6%
00
9,551 8,791 8,954
52,811 58,718 61,725
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Hochtief (Consolidated)
1) Operational Performance (Euro thousands)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Revenue 3,145,352 3,138,531 5,085,152 9,585,727
Growth -9% 0% 62% 89%
COGS 2,211,649 2,287,808 3,882,789 8,125,148
Growth -5% 3% 70% 109%
Operating Income -13,923 68,112 115,009 -79,282
Growth 589% 69% -169%
Net Income 80,693 88,065 205,299 126,954
Growth 9% 133% -38%
Backlog N/A N/A N/A N/A
Growth
New Orders N/A N/A N/A N/A
Growth
2) Capital Structure (Euro thousands)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Equity + Minor Int. 1,229,856 1,323,516 1,965,678 1,902,228
Non-current Liab. 1,110,431 1,356,611 1,607,027 2,183,139
Long Term Debt 119,514 223,757 231,323 439,829
Total Liabilities 2,911,090 2,853,575 4,017,139 4,667,147
Total Assets 4,140,941 4,177,094 5,982,816 6,569,375
Current Assets 2,460,179 2,630,213 3,675,337 3,873,305
Current Liabilities 1,800,659 1,496,964 2,410,112 2,484,008
Quick Assets 2,086,212 2,247,931 3,590,324 3,863,728
Acct. Receivables 852,371 771,439 1,871,581 2,340,110
Note: Minority Interests are insignificant.
3) R&D Expenditure (in Euro thousands)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
R&D Expenses N/A N/A 22,355 N/A
% of Sales 0.4%
Key Financial Ratios
Yr.
Dividend (Euro/share)
Net Income/share
Dividend Payout ratio
NCL/(NCL+Equity)
LT Debt/Total Capital.
Total Debt ratio
Current Asset/Total A
Fixed Asset/Total Asset
Current LiabiTotal Liab.
Current Ratio
Quick Ratio
Avg. Collection Period
Total Asset Turnover
Rev(t)/Backlog(t-1)
ROA
ROE
Gross Profit Margin
Operating Profit Margin
Net Profit Margin
Assumed Tax Rate
Yr.
Interest Payment
NI + (1-t)*Interest
97 98 99 00
0.61
1.15
0.53
0.47
0.09
0.70
0.59
0.41
0.62
1.37
1.16
100.5
0.77
N/A
2.3%
6.5%
29.7%
-0.4%
3.0%
40%
| 97
0.66
1.25
0.53
0.51
0.14
0.68
0.63
0.37
0.52
1.76
1.50
94.4
0.75
N/A
2.5%
6.9%
27.1%
2.2%
3.3%
98
0.75
2.91
0.26
0.45
0.11
0.67
0.61
0.39
0.60
1.52
1.49
94.9
1.00
N/A
4.7%
12.5%
23.6%
2.3%
4.7%
0.85
1.81
0.47
0.53
0.19
0.71
0.59
0.41
0.53
1.56
1.56
80.2
1.53
N/A
2.7%
6.6%
15.2%
-0.8%
1.8%
99 00
22,408 26,720 52,674 70,648
94,138 104,097 236,903 169,343
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NCC (Consolidated)
1) Operational Performance (SEK millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Revenue 29,581 34,160 37,460 38,728
Growth 29% 15% 10% 3%
COGS 22,926 26,303 28,356 29,749
Growth 24% 15% 8% 5%
Operating Income 588 1,064 1,115 570
Growth -32% 81% 5% -49%
Net Income -169 546 843 1,502
Growth -169% 423% 54% 78%
Backlog N/A N/A N/A N/A
Growth
Order Received N/A N/A N/A N/A
Growth
2) Capital Structure (SEK millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Equity + Minor Int. 9,262 9,696 9,825 9,991
Non-current Liab. 5,817 4,621 6,513 9,425
Long-term Debt 3,574 2,280 3,898 6,969
Total Liabilities 19,082 18,763 19,205 26,702
Total Assets
Current Assets
Current Liabilities
Quick Assets
Acct. Receivables
28,344
12,100
13,265
10,748
6,672
28,459
13,007
14,142
11,425
7,701
29,030
13,331
12,692
10,966
7,172
36,693
19,119
17,277
15,246
10,994
Note: Minority interests are insignificant.
Key Financial Ratios
Yr.
Dividend (SEK/share)
Net Income/share
Dividend Payout ratio
NCL/(NCL+Equity)
LT Debt/Total Capital.
Total Debt ratio
Current Asset/Total A
Fixed Asset/Total Asset
Current Liab./Total Liab.
Current Ratio
Quick Ratio
Avg. Collection Period
Total Asset Turnover
Rev(t)/Backlog(t-1)
ROA
ROE
Gross Profit Margin
Operating Profit Margin
Net Profit Margin
Assumed Tax Rate
Yr.
Interest Payment
NI + (1-t)*nterest
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1.45
-1.54
-0.94
0.39
0.28
0.67
0.43
0.57
0.70
0.91
0.81
150.6
1.13
N/A
1.2%
-2.1%
22.5%
2.0%
1.0%
28%
97
98
2.41
4.83
0.50
0.32
0.19
0.66
0.46
0.54
0.75
0.92
0.81
76.8
1.20
N/A
3.3%
5.8%
23.0%
3.1%
2.8%
98
99
11.00
7.70
1.43
0.40
0.28
0.66
0.46
0.54
0.66
1.05
0.86
72.5
1.30
N/A
4.3%
8.6%
24.3%
3.0%
3.3%
99
555
1,243
00
4.50
13.65
0.33
0.49
0.41
0.73
0.52
0.48
0.65
1.11
0.88
85.6
1.18
N/A
5.8%
15.2%
23.2%
1.5%
4.9%
00
565
1,909
661
307
552
943
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Perini (Consolidated)
1) Operational Performance ($ thousands)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Revenue 755,876 657,600 618,814 1,105,660
Growth -6% -13% -6% 79%
COGS 741,261 627,812 591,839 1,051,711
Growth -5% -15% -6% 78%
Operating Income -17,877 -455 -1,245 27,355
Growth -45% 97% -174% 2297%
Net Income 5,297 11,652 16,357 24,381
Growth 107% 120% -40% -49%
Net I (Eq.+Minor) -26 5,743 9,394 20,999
Growth 22188% 64% 124%
Backlog N/A N/A N/A N/A
Growth
New Orders N/A N/A N/A N/A
Growth
2) Capital Structure ($ thousands)
Yr. 97 98 99 00
Equity + Minor Int. 13,860 23,891 -63,968 35,624
Eq., Minor + Pref. 71,720 85,162 1,067 60,622
Non-current Liab. 108,999 91,570 60,755 33,355
Long Term Debt 84,898 75,857 41,091 17,218
Total Liabilities 343,204 293,429 274,421 332,830
Total Assets 414924 378591 275488 393452
Current Assets
Current Liabilities
Quick Assets
Acct. Receivables
,
306,176
234,205
207,100
175,795
,
259,524
201,859
179,947
133,440
,
262,096
213,666
166,261
108,068
,
379,952
299,475
267,203
207,688
Key Financial Ratios
Yr.
Dividend ($/share)
Net Income/share
Dividend Payout ratio
NCL/(NCL+Equity)
LT Debt/Total Capital.
Total Debt ratio
Current Asset/Total A
Fixed Asset/Total Asset
Current Liab./Total Liab.
Current Ratio
Quick Ratio
Avg. Collection Period
Total Asset Turnover
Rev(t)/Backlog(t-1)
ROA
ROE
Gross Profit Margin
Operating Profit Margin
Net Profit Margin
Assumed Tax Rate
Yr.
Interest Payment
NI + (1-t)*Interest
97
0
0.01
0.00
0.60
0.54
0.83
0.74
0.26
0.68
1.31
0.88
96.5
1.72
N/A
2.8%
-0.1%
1.9%
-2.4%
1.6%
34%
97
10,334
12,117
98
0
1.08
0.00
0.52
0.47
0.78
0.69
0.31
0.69
1.29
0.89
85.8
1.66
N/A
4.4%
30.4%
4.5%
-0.1%
2.6%
99 00
0
1.68
0.00
0.98
0.97
1.00
0.95
0.05
0.78
1.23
0.78
71.2
1.89
N/A
6.4%
-46.9%
4.4%
-0.2%
3.4%
0
1.13
0.00
0.35
0.22
0.85
0.97
0.03
0.90
1.27
0.89
52.1
3.31
N/A
8.1%
-148.2%
4.9%
2.5%
2.4%
98 99 00
8,685 7,128 3,966
17,384 21,061 26,999
Note: Minority Interests are insignificant.
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Shimizu (Consolidated)
1) Operational Performance (V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00 01
Revenue 1,718,037 1,756,892 1,599,296 1,564,715 1,711,982
Growth 2.3% -9.0% -2.2% 9.4%
COGS 1,553,966 1,606,881 1,458,788 1,419,559 1,559,663
Growth 3.4% -9.2% -2.7% 9.9%
Operating Income 47,326 35,644 31,558 44,325 57,629
Growth -24.7% -11.5% 40.5% 30.0%
Net Income 5,926 -43,689 -127,208 9,798 -64,538
Growth -837% -191% 108% -759%
Backlog N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Growth
New Orders N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Growth
2) Capital Structure (V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00 01
Equity + Minor Int. 361,495 312,253 175,518 246,035 232,926
Non-current Liab. 449,421 433,052 541,495 482,489 398,143
Long Term Debt 364,206 331,383 438,751 387,450 252,603
Total Liabilities 2,067,329 2,004,572 2,011,444 1,953,057 1,842,736
Total Assets 2,428,824 2,316,825 2,186,962 2,199,092 2,075,662
Current Assets 1,593,999 1,520,719 1,443,049 1,440,183 1,418,353
Current Liabilities 1,617,908 1,571,520 1,469,949 1,470,568 1,444,593
Quick Assets 1,224,664 1,134,979 1,143,300 1,106,841 1,158,644
Acct. Receivables 336,546 369,042 360,891 373,351 454,314
Note: Minority Interests are insignificant.
3) R&D Investment (V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00 01
Investment 11,579 11,388 N/A 8,355 N/A
As % of Sales 0.7% 0.6% 0.5%
Key Financial Ratios
Yr.
Dividend (V/share)
Net Income/share
Dividend Payout ratio
NCL/(NCL+Equity)
LT Debt/Total Capital.
Total Debt ratio
Current Asset/Total A
Fixed Asset/Total Asset
Current Liab./Total Liab.
Current Ratio
Quick Ratio
Avg. Collection Period
Total Asset Turnover
Rev(t)/Backlog(t-1)
ROA
ROE
Gross Profit Margin
Operating Profit Margin
Net Profit Margin
Assumed tax rate:
Yr.
Interest Payment
NI + (1-t)*Interest
97 98 99 00 01
9.00
6.73
1.34
0.55
0.50
0.85
0.66
0.34
0.78
0.99
0.76
71.5
0.71
N/A
0.3%
1.6%
9.5%
2.8%
0.4%
50%
97
9.00
-57.19
-0.16
0.58
0.51
0.87
0.66
0.34
0.78
0.97
0.72
73.3
0.74
N/A
-1.8%
-13.0%
8.5%
2.0%
-2.4%
5.00
-161.24
-0.03
0.76
0.71
0.92
0.66
0.34
0.73
0.98
0.78
83.3
0.71
N/A
-5.3%
-52.2%
8.8%
2.0%
-7.5%
5.00
12.50
0.40
0.66
0.61
0.89
0.65
0.35
0.75
0.98
0.75
85.6
0.71
N/A
0.7%
4.6%
9.3%
2.8%
1.0%
5.00
-81.72
-0.06
0.63
0.52
0.89
0.68
0.32
0.78
0.98
0.80
88.2
0.80
N/A
-2.7%
-26.9%
8.9%
3.4%
-3.4%
98 99 00 01
2,581 2,168 15,344 11,414 11,634
7,217 -42,605 -119,536 15,505 -58,721
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Taisei (Consolidated)
1) Operational Performance (V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00 01
Revenue 1,982,163 1,830,597 1,772,970 1,681,305 1,750,390
Growth -7.6% -3.1% -5.2% 4.1%
COGS 1,812,809 1,643,672 1,592,756 1,480,355 1,547,464
Growth -9.3% -3.1% -7.1% 4.5%
Operating Income 14,991 46,951 41,414 43,639 66,748
Growth 213% -12% 5.4% 53%
Net Income 2,002 -69,095 -8,560 -56,554 8,136
Growth -3551% 88% -561% 114%
Net Income (Group
Share) 5,785 -66,964 -5,671 -52,802 8,382
Growth -1258% 92% -831% 116%
2) Capital Structure (V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00 01
Equity (w/o Minor) 389,352 293,666 283,590 185,154 230,264
Equity + Minor Int. 436,004 337,392 322,136 220,161 263,768
Non-current Liab. 617,488 578,012 524,152 487,691 500,658
Long Term Debt 539,554 494,704 433,328 333,451 361,851
Total Liabilities 2,572,110 2,559,002 2,423,938 2,065,167 1,925,575
Total Assets 3,008,114 2,896,394 2,746,074 2,285,328 2,189,343
Current Assets 1,999,525 1,828,792 1,719,360 1,403,908 1,286,326
Current Liabilities 1,954,622 1,980,990 1,899,786 1,577,476 1,424,917
Quick Assets 1,510,558 1,420,162 1,320,617 1,049,797 956,354
Acct. Receivables 447,280 386,152 415,868 344,315 395,944
3) R&D Investment (V millions)
Yr. 97 98 99 00 01
Investment 10,817 11,037 N/A N/A N/A
As % of Sales 0.5% 0.6%
Key Financial Ratios
Yr.
Dividend (/share)
Net Income/share
Dividend Payout ratio
NCL/(NCL+Equity)
LT Debt/Total Capital.
Total Debt ratio
Current Asset/Total A
Fixed Asset/Total Asset
Current Liab./Total Liab.
Current Ratio
Quick Ratio
Avg. Collection Period
Total Asset Turnover
ROA
ROE
Gross Profit Margin
Operating Profit Margin
Net Profit Margin
Assumed tax rate:
Yr.
Interest Payment
NI + (1-t)*Interest
97 98 99 00 01
7.00
5.67
1.23
0.59
0.55
0.86
0.66
0.34
0.76
1.02
0.77
82.4
0.66
0.2%
1.5%
8.5%
0.8%
0.3%
50%
97
7.00
-67.25
-0.10
0.63
0.59
0.88
0.63
0.37
0.77
0.92
0.72
83.1
0.62
-2.2%
-19.6%
10.2%
2.6%
-3.6%
7.00
-5.88
-1.19
0.62
0.57
0.88
0.63
0.37
0.78
0.91
0.70
82.6
0.63
0.0%
-2.0%
10.2%
2.3%
0.1%
5.00
-54.73
-0.09
0.69
0.60
0.90
0.61
0.39
0.76
0.89
0.67
82.5
0.67
-1.9%
-22.5%
12.0%
2.6%
-2.9%
5.00
8.69
0.58
0.65
0.58
0.88
0.59
0.41
0.74
0.90
0.67
77.2
0.78
0.7%
4.0%
11.6%
3.8%
0.9%
98 99 00 01
6,294 5,649 19,053 15,814 16,765
5,149 -66,271 967 -48,647 16,519
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APPENDIX E
OUTLOOK OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (IT) IN
CONSTRUCTION AS OF YEAR 2000
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In this appendix, the status as of 2000 and the emerging changes of IT strategies
in construction is discussed.El The first part addresses the current problems of
information management in the construction industry. The second part elaborates on the
emerging IT system providers (B2B and the dotcoms). Since the field of IT is ever
changing, readers should be cautioned that new developments are always being added to
the scene.
E.1 IT & THE CONSTRUCTION COMMUNITY
Construction industry traditionally lags the other industries in adopting new
technology. Project information flow is always considered as one of the most critical
issue in project management. There are several characteristics that affect the industry in
applying IT in the construction business.
(i) Fragmented market
The construction business runs in a very fragmented manner. Unlike in the other
industries, the participants of the construction projects have little access to the
information of other players in the market. Firms often limit their contact to the network
that they are familiar with. In some cases, this kind of fragmented market may create
higher profit margin for the contractors because it generates fewer competitors in the
bidding process. However, contractors also feel that they are losing the chance to create
new business opportunities for their companies. This fragmented market nature provides
a basis for B2B e-commerce to increase communication among various players.
El This discussion is drawn from a group project and survey conducted by Charles Y.J. Cheah,
I-Tsung Tsai, Yijun Shi and Guillaume Quiviger for submission to the class of 15.568 - Management
Information System, in November, 2000.
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(ii) Non-standardized platform
Unlike the other manufacturing or service industries, the construction is operated
based on projects. Each company develops its process based on its target market,
expertise and corporate constraints. Due to the diversity in nature of the projects that
demands customized processes to handle, the construction industry has difficulty in
generating a standard platform for information management. Knowledge management is
considered as a critical tool to classify these diversities and integrate the information
flow. However, the difficulty in codification of construction knowledge sets a strong
barrier for knowledge dissemination. Proprietary technology and patented process further
strengthen the barrier.
(iii) Inter-organizational communication
Except for certain EPC (Engineering-Procurement-Construction) firms that can
incorporate the whole project process in their supply chain, most projects are driven by
small- and medium-enterprises. The work team is set up on a project-by-project basis and
the contractual relationship is dismissed when the project is completed. It is very difficult
to implement a long-term IT system for projects since each participant considers the
others as temporary partners. Consequently, there is a lack of incentives in promoting IT
application in the construction projects.
E.2 B2B E-COMMERCE IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRYE 2
There are currently more than a dozen of B2B websites emerging in the market to
provide IT services for the construction community. Based on the problem described
previously, there is a clear imperative to create a mutual platform to facilitate inter-
organization communication and to integrate project information and documentation.
These online service providers generally comprise two business models - as a whole
package provider or a professional/niche player.
E2 The source of information for this section comes from a report on IT, "e.Construction." Engineering
News Record, McGraw-Hill, September 25, 2000.
Appendix E 325
E.2.1 Whole package provider
These players provides full online services covering one or both of the two
following areas:
<I> Application Service Providers (ASP):
The ASPs serve the back-end of a project. This kind of online program is
basically composed of two components:
* Online meeting & team communication: the programs enable project teams to
capture practices and existing process knowledge and to leverage them through
digital connection and online meeting. Participants of the project are given
authority and notification to access updated project information gathered on the
project website.
* Document management: ASP provides comprehensive document management
and collaboration to standardize project documents and hook up these digital data
with the corporate database. This standardization allows project team members to
share project documents such as design drawings and specifications in a secure
online environment.
Specifically, the ASPs are expected to fulfill the following functions at different
stages of construction:
* Pre-construction Stage: The system should allows architects, contractors and
owners to exchange drawings, schedules, specifications, permit applications,
budgets, contracts, and other documents instantly over the Internet.
* Construction Stage: Services includes sets of workflow processes that streamline
the management of Requests-For-Information (RFIs), material review submittals,
progress billings for contractors, meeting minutes, and other standard business
forms, contracts and documents.
E3 Some of the better-known ASPs are: Cephren.com (which is a merger between bluelineonline.com & e-
bricks.com that is formed by a HBS graduate); Bidcom.com; Viecon.com - a subsidiary of Bentley
Systems; Bricsnet.com; Constructware.com; and Costructures.com - formed by an MIT adjunct professor.
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* Closeout and Commissioning Stage: operations and maintenance manuals, CAD
drawings and project-generated transactions records are saved in the server for
backup.
<2> Marketplace:
The online marketplace provides one-stop shopping for procuring materials,
equipment, operational goods and services. Buyers and sellers set up their catalogues in
the marketplace for dealing. They can also create, issue and manage Request-For-
Quotations (RFQs) and Purchase Orders (POs) for stock and custom-ordered items via
the Internet to expedite and automate the procurement process.
Specifically, the current online market provides the following functions:
0 Enhance existing vendor relationships by moving purchasing online --
streamlining the entire procurement process.
* Provide multiple authorized users within a company to access the market,
allowing the project team to collaborate internally on the creation and review of
bid packages.
0 Issue RFQs automatically to multiple vendors at the click of a button.
0 Attach electronic plans and specifications to bid packages through market.
0 Keep track of all new and pending transactions through a single, personalized
"dashboard" as well as maintaining a complete transaction history.
* Quickly compare and analyze bids received through the unique comparison
worksheet, which is created automatically as bids are received.
* Automatically issue purchase orders to successful bidders.
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A summary of these online services is indicated in Table E-1.
Collaboration Workflow Work Process Communication
Capabilities Capabilities Management
Review Drawing Meeting minutes Estimating/Budgeting Print
Check in/out Manage Bid solicitation Fax
correspondence
Redline/comment RIFs, Bid submission E-mail within project
Archive versions Transmittals Scheduling E-mail outside project
Lock Submittals Job progress reporting Personal digital
assistant
Review CAD models Approvals Multiple project
progress reporting
Review photos Change notifications Purchasing/procurement
Review without Accounting
application
Message board/discussions Facilities management
Schedule/host online
meeting
TABLE E-1 Web-based Services Offered by Whole Package Provider
E.2.2 Professional/Niche Players
These companies are more focus in specific market niches, such as equipment
rental and raw material supply online. These websites are mostly maintained or
sponsored by existing bricks-and-mortar rental companies or material suppliers in an
attempt to provide a hybrid model. They stand in a neutral position to provide people
with the option to perform transaction online or in the traditional way.
E.2.3 Other emerging developments
The software industry is currently in the process of developing new software
packages to create an alternative terminal for field operation in the construction site.
Software packages (e.g. pdf readers) for handheld devices such as Palm Pilots are under
development to expand their functionality to enable real-time retrieval of drawings from
the project website. As a result these devices may unleash the restriction of the
accessibility to real-time information in the field and facilitate the contractors to get
convenient, adapted and accurate information.
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